


*Social Cohesion and Social Justice  
in South Africa*



*A report prepared for the Department of Arts and Culture by the:  
Social Cohesion and Integration Research Programme  
Human Sciences Research Council  
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# **Social Cohesion and Social Justice in South Africa**

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## Introduction

### Overview of Research

Commissioned by the Department of Arts and Culture on behalf of the Social Cluster of Cabinet, this study provides data and analysis for assessing the social “health of the nation”. In providing a framework for analyzing the vitality of our social fabric, this report employs three key terms—social cohesion, social capital and social justice.

As a descriptive term, *social cohesion* refers the extent to which a society is coherent, united and functional, providing an environment within which its citizens can flourish.

As an explanatory term, *social capital* refers to the assets accumulated through various social networks and relationships, based on trust, which enable people to work together to achieve common goals. Social capital is a resource created by participating in social networks; it is found in both horizontal or bonding relationships, within social units, and vertical or bridging relationships between social units.

As a normative term, *social justice* refers to the extension of principles, enshrined in our Constitution, of human dignity, equity, and freedom to participate in all of the political, socio-economic and cultural spheres of society.

This report proposes a range of indicators that will allow for the continuous monitoring of the extent of social cohesion, social capital and social justice in our society. Based on these indicators, government and other social actors can gain a better sense of how specific policies and practices are building or undermining social cohesion and social capital.

It is clear from the research carried out that there is limited data or empirical evidence available that deals specifically with social cohesion, social capital and social justice. Bearing this in mind, the principal methodology that has been used in the report has been to mine existing data and to identify this data’s shortcomings. In the process, however, a framework for assessing social cohesion, social capital and social justice has emerged that will be useful in further research.

Work completed to date is as follows:

- A literature review has been conducted to lay the theoretical foundations for the study
- A bibliography has been compiled of all available literature on social cohesion, social justice and social capital
- A series of meetings has been held with specialist researchers to orientate them to the needs of the study
- Papers have been prepared by these researchers covering certain of the areas of the study

- A database of other sources of information has been compiled
- A draft report has been prepared.

There are some important riders and disclaimers that need to be made. Firstly, this effort is one made on behalf of a key client, the government. While the study seeks to respond to this client's needs it also seeks to contribute to an ongoing dialogue between key social forces and actors in the form of business, labour and other civil society formations and the citizens in general. This is crucial for the study to be meaningful.

Secondly, limitations of the scope of this report need to be acknowledged. It was produced under severe time constraints. The study was initially envisaged to take one year, but the report has had to be compiled in two months. This limited time has had an obvious impact on the scope of the report, the quality of the data obtained, and the opportunity for reflection and analysis in writing of the report. Nevertheless, we recognise that research on social cohesion, social capital and social justice is an ongoing process with many collaborators. For example, we note the between this study and a study commissioned from the HSRC Democracy and Governance unit by the Office of the Presidency on racism and sexism and the extent to which these impact on and are impacted by social cohesion and social capital.

Thirdly, we must realise that there are no established empirical indicators of social cohesion, social capital or social justice. But there are indicators of social processes, and of our society generally, that are useful in giving an account of the extent of social cohesion, social capital and social justice. Participation can be observed and measured in elections, campaigns, programmes, organisations, networks and institutions. Cooperation and partnerships can be observed and measured in institutions, in formal agreements such as the Growth and Development Summit, in collective bargaining and in various networks. Solidarity can be observed and measured in policy choices, philanthropy, and corporate social investment and in the programmes of various non-governmental organisations and not-for-profit organisations and networks. Dialogue can be observed and measured in the political arena, in institutions such as Nedlac, the Presidential Working Groups, the Millennium Labour Council, Provincial Development Forums, and Local Economic Development Forums and in processes of interfaith exchange and cooperation.

With all of this in mind, and for purposes of clarity, we have referred to strong or weak social cohesion and to high or low social capital. There is also use of terms such as positive or negative social capital and vertical or horizontal social capital, horizontal meaning between people in a group and vertical between groups in society. In each context, this refers to the relationship, participation, or sense of belonging, by way of example. In terms of social justice we refer to positive or negative social justice, indicating a tendency towards or away from the objectives set out in the Constitution.

One of the problems with such indicators is that they give only a very general and rather crude picture of the extent of social cohesion, social capital and social justice.

To get a qualitative assessment requires a significant investment in time and resources interviewing people. In the time given for this study and the resources made available, this qualitative aspect was not possible.

The issues of race, class and gender, age, identity and other segmentations of society are crucial foci of attention in their own right. The extent to which information sheds light on the differences, real or imagined, between racial groups, the sexes, different generations, rural and urban folk and other categories of people where difference is a crucial factor will provide the most useful data on social cohesion and social justice. Surprisingly, such data is limited.

The authors are aware of the dangers of instrumentalism and economism in various conceptions of social capital and social cohesion and seek to avoid these. Social cohesion and social capital are often called upon or recognised in times of crisis and emergency. They can also be elitist in nature and in themselves can also constitute a threat to society and the most vulnerable in it. We seek to shed light on these phenomena and, where possible, suggest ways in which this can be avoided, importantly through emphasising the normative proposition posed through the Constitutions and the Bill of Rights in particular.

Through the Ten Year Review, government has created a number of indicators that are useful for the measuring of social cohesion, social capital and social justice. Unfortunately in the time available to complete this report it has not been possible to engage with these indicators meaningfully. While the indicators deal primarily with the progress of government in meeting its objectives, they do create a useful base from the period 1995 to 2004 for future studies.

Finally, there are many gaps in the report. This has been largely due to the limited time available to prepare the report and not because the authors or researchers have deliberately chosen to ignore any issue for reasons of bias or prejudice.

## **Literature Review**

The notion of social cohesion has been utilized as a sociological concept for a long time. Emile Durkheim, the nineteenth-century French sociologist, first used it to describe the interdependent connections that hold together the various elements that constitute a society. In the last ten years, however, the term has been resurrected and employed as a framework and agenda for examining, promoting and managing the quality and sustainability of societies. Crucially, it provides a platform for governments to evaluate their public policies. An analysis of social cohesion is often used as a response to a perceived deterioration in social equality, social justice, or social order, which might be “threatened”, whether by crime, disease, value changes or any other factor. Jane Jenson of the Canadian Policy Research Network describes social cohesion “as a term used by those who sense an absence of some sort”.

The concept has stimulated a groundswell of research and a burgeoning literature by policy communities such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Union (EU) and their member

governments, the World Bank, the Club of Rome. The Canadian federal government, and its associated research community, has produced fundamental conceptual work.

### **Definitions of Social Cohesion**

While much of the initial literature on social cohesion attempts to define the paradigm, descriptions are expansive with little overlap. Tangible definitions are rare, with research bodies showing little effort to define it. An international comparison of definitions and terms by the Department of Canadian Heritage, for example, revealed that neither the EU and the OECD, nor the Council of Europe have official or working definitions of the concept. While the OECD's vision for social cohesion puts emphasis on the right to *economic wellbeing*, the Council of Europe stresses *democratic citizenship*, and the EU, *solidarity* (Jeannotte, 2000).

It is this flexibility and variety of definitions that has some social scientists classifying social cohesion as a quasi-concept or hybrid concept. Paul Bernard of the University of Montreal, a proponent of the quasi-concept argument, argues that social cohesion is almost always based on the "analysis of the data of a situation, and that it earns an aura of legitimacy by providing a partially correct reading of society" (Bernard, 1999). Therefore, in those research institutions where concrete definitions do exist, they have primarily been fashioned by the histories of the societies in question, as well as by the ideologies and agendas of the institutions conducting the research. The often quoted working model of the Canadian Social Research Network (CSRN), a research sub-committee of the federal government of Canada, for example, grew out of a research paper and public lecture by Jane Jenson of the same institute. It states that: "Social Cohesion is the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity in Canada based on a sense of hope, trust, and reciprocity among all Canadians" (Jenson, 1998). Another much-quoted model is that of the Commissariat general du Plan of the French government, which echoes the previous definition: "Social Cohesion is a set of social processes that help instill in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognized as members of that community."

What is meant by social cohesion is often contested, but there is some consensus that social cohesion can be said to be present in societies to the extent that societies are coherent, united and functional, and provide an environment within which its citizens can flourish. In other words, social cohesion is what holds societies together. And a key component for social cohesion is social justice. This is the measure of the extent of fairness and equity in terms of access to and participation in the political, socio-economic and cultural aspects of society.

It must be pointed out that there is both a negative and a positive aspect to social cohesion. Social cohesion that excludes certain people -- racial or ethnic groups, religious groups, social classes, gender groups -- may well create conditions for co-operation, networking, and in general build social capital but it will be a highly specific and limited kind of cohesion and ultimately be problematic and lead to its own breakdown. The negative effects of exclusion of certain elements in society -- often major groups, such as women or workers -- are significant in terms of their longer term social impact.

### **Definitions of Social Capital**

The notion of social capital has developed alongside social cohesion as a parallel concept. In the literature, it is difficult to separate the two constructs, since social capital is almost always used as an indicator of social cohesion (Chidester, et al. 2003). The World Bank, for example, uses the terms social cohesion and social capital interchangeably to mean the same thing. Broadly speaking, high stores of social capital are said to be features of cohesive societies (Fukuyama 1999).

Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman first popularized the concept. Bourdieu's social capital "is the advantages and opportunities accruing to people through membership in certain communities", while Coleman loosely defined the concept as "a resource of individuals that emerges from their social ties" (Portes, 1996). More recently, Robert Putnam, in his influential book *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000) has made considerable strides in furthering the debate. He asserts that "social capital is the features of social organizations, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate action and co-operation for mutual benefit" (Jeanotte, 2003).

### **Measuring and Assessing Social Cohesion**

Much of the debate on the issue of social cohesion revolves around whether or not social commentators believe it can be measured or qualitatively assessed. While it may not be possible to measure any one thing that can be recognized as defining social cohesion, there are indicators that can be identified which point to the presence or absence of social cohesion. There is clearly much existing data that can be analyzed, such as surveys, questionnaires and statistics that would constitute such a body of information. Such data probably needs to be augmented by qualitative assessment, in the form of interviews and engagement with social actors to determine what their perceptions of social cohesion is. To achieve a coherent picture, the segmentation of society is obviously important.

A fair amount of the reviewed literature concerns itself with the measurement of social cohesion. Indicators are inextricably linked with the definition from which they derive. Those institutions that primarily concern themselves with social solidarity and distribution typically develop indicators measuring rates of inclusion-exclusion, income distribution, poverty, and so on. Regina Berger-Schmitt of the Centre for Survey Research and Methodology (Mannheim, Germany), for example, has recently developed a European system of indicators that combines attention to "distribution and to social connections". These indicators are grounded in her theory that "social

cohesion's one dimension is to lessen disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, and the second is to strengthen social relations, interactions and ties" (Berger-Schmitt, 2000).

Others who focus more on social capital have developed different sets of indicators. Typical of this genre is Robert Putnam's work that studies membership and participation rates in voluntary organizations (Beauvais, 2002).

Indicators of social cohesion could include the ways in which people view themselves in terms of race, nationality, or other markers of identity; the extent to which there is common purpose or a shared set of values; and the extent to which people in society engage in and are part of a recognizable social dialogue. As important as the processes that include, are those that exclude. Many of the phenomena that are deemed to be negative, such as crime, violence, substance abuse and alienation, could well have their origins in or be exacerbated by the exclusion of individuals from communities and society in general. Phenomena that could be indicators of a lack of social cohesion or of the negative consequences of social cohesion include violence, unrest, substance abuse, intolerance, lack of motivation, a sense of hopelessness and the emphasis on difference.

Social cohesion is deemed to be present by the extent to which participants and observers of society find the lived existence of citizens to be relatively peaceful, gainfully employed, harmonious and free from deprivation, whether in terms of basic needs such as food, water, shelter, in terms of basic human rights such as freedom, democracy and governance, or in terms of culture, language and intellectual stimulation.

### **Contributors and Threats to Social Cohesion**

At a fundamental level, conversations around social cohesion have been a reaction to the perceived deterioration of societies in whichever way we understand "deterioration". For the most part, research communities have linked this decline to external forces or "threats" that prevent societies from functioning at optimal level. Extensive research into this aspect of social cohesion has made the most substantial contribution to the corpus of writing on the topic. The findings can be roughly grouped into four categories, i.e. political, economic, social and cultural threats. Within these categories, the impact of globalisation, the information age, increasing diversity (multiculturalism), unemployment, income inequalities, homelessness, etc. make for popular topics of investigation.

A significant part of this literature attempts to make analytical links between a further construct, "social exclusion", as a category of threats that undermine social cohesion. The EU literature, for example, defines social exclusion as "not only the material deprivation of the poor, but also their inability to fully exercise their social, cultural, and political rights as citizens" (Jeannotte, 2000). The Council of Europe, on the other hand, links social exclusion to the question of rights, such as the rights to identity, language, heritage, education and so forth.

A smaller body of research material looks at measures for promoting social cohesion. Literature is sparse and inconclusive. Although there appears to be little agreement on what promotes social cohesion, the research community has more successfully identified the characteristics and outcomes of cohesive societies. Here we see, typically, freedom of expression, active participation in society, access to material wellbeing, access to housing, healthcare and education, safety and security, and so forth. It is also within this literature that we see debates surface on the merits and demerits of the paradigm. Common examples that surface time and again are the economic boom of the “Asian little tigers” as an example of where social cohesion works, and Nazi Germany as an example of where it did not.

### **Social Cohesion and Policy**

Policy research lies at the core of any program seeking to evaluate and foster social cohesion. Whilst social cohesion as a paradigm provides a lens through which existing policies are evaluated, policy research provides a way for institutions to act on their agendas. Policy lays down the basis for organizational interventions and programmes.

Most of the literature suggests that the social cohesion paradigm is used where single-focus policies have not been effective. It provides an integrated model (and an alternative to the dominant economic model) that allows for discussions and plans of action in a range of interconnected policy fields. In other words, “every policy or action eventually has impact on every other policy and action, so social cohesion has to be taken into account in the development of every policy” (Stanley, 2003).

What is clear from the perspective of South Africa is that we need to develop our own model/s of social cohesion. Raw data for doing this already exists in several HSRC surveys, among others. Research generated in Canada, the US or Europe cannot be applied here without modification and re-orientation. We have therefore to generate our own research questions and objectives based on our national realities at the present and geared to what kinds of social cohesion we envisage for South Africa in the future.

### **Summary of Findings**

1. Social cohesion is a useful prism through which we can gain insight into how South Africa functions, whether well or not, at the level of society’s primary institutions, networks, organisations and communities, such as families, the state, and the economy. Although social cohesion can mean many things, it is in the first instance the extent to which people are included in social relations in coherent, constructive and productive ways. It is also about the membership of people in the various social institutions and formations that make up society.

2. Cohesion, therefore, is a relational reality that is grounded in the human connections, exchanges and networks of participation, solidarity, cooperation, dialogue and partnership that make social institutions function. However, social cohesion is not only a matter of inclusion. Cohesion also raises the value proposition that is implied in the term, “social capital”: A critical issue is what is the value of

participating in social networks, based on trust, which enable people to work together to achieve common goals? Cohesion also raises the proposition of values, as embodied in the South African Constitution, which directs our efforts and institutions towards social justice.

3. Social inclusion, social capital, and social justice—these key terms suggest the need to study social cohesion in a multi-dimensional way and for research to be coordinated to provide a framework for analysing social cohesion that will assist government in evaluating its policies and their impact, and which will also assist civil society in deciding on what its priorities should be for effective representation of the various interests that make up this broad constituency.

4. In the South African context, there are many challenges to social cohesion, social capital and social justice. Apart from the fact that there is an inherent duality in the notion of cohesion and inclusion, implying conflict and exclusion of the other, forces contributing to social disorder, lawlessness, entropy and decay in South Africa are both historical and contemporary. Colonialism, apartheid, patriarchy and capitalism have all contributed to the erosion of social cohesion, the destruction of social capital and to conditions of social injustice. These forces shaped our life chances, institutions such as the family, the state, the economy, our communities, intellectual life, cultural life and the values and attitudes of South Africans for decades, whether we found ourselves as proponents or opponents of the premises underlying these forces. This pattern of development and underdevelopment is one that continues to dominate our society today.

5. In our new and fragile democracy, the functioning of these crucial social institutions is also affected profoundly by new challenges, including ongoing and often increasing inequality, national reconciliation, regional migration, globalisation and the HIV and AIDS pandemic. These challenges are layered upon the sediment of the past dispensation that functions as part of the foundations of the new order. The legacy of apartheid gives a particular, obvious racial slant to the question of social cohesion in South Africa, inflecting issues of poverty and class, linguistic, cultural, religious, inter-generational, gender, sexual, rural and urban differences. As a result, we have inherited a society of multiple fragmentations. The challenge we face as a society is to build cohesion at the same time that we recognise, protect and give expression to difference. It is crucial, therefore, that our efforts to build social capital strengthen vertical bridging capital without diluting horizontal bonding capital.

6. Intuitively, many people presume or believe that South Africa is a country that should be, or soon will be, engulfed in either racial violence or class-based conflict or be driven to its knees by challenges such as HIV/AIDS. Yet, no matter how significant the challenges we face as a country, ours is a success story. We recognise that people all over the world look to South Africa as a model, an example and even as a “political miracle”. This clearly points to a degree of social cohesion and to social capital that allows for the functioning of society despite the social justice situation.

7. Just as there are challenges to social cohesion, so too are there processes that seek to include, to mediate and to order. Apart from the Constitution, there are positive aspects that are the foundations of our society, such as the resilience of families, networks, peer groups and various ethnic and linguistic identities. There are also phenomena such as philanthropy, corporate social investment, social dialogue and various forms of solidarity that strengthen these foundations. The positive impact of the transition, in the form of the democratic dividend, must surely contribute to building social cohesion. The success of the transition, the transformation of our society, will obviously be measured in terms of the degree of achievement of social justice. At the foundation level of this new democracy lies a commitment to a constitutional order that seeks to redress the past social exclusion by promoting social inclusion, primarily through ensuring social justice.

8. The impact of previous discriminatory policies and practices on life chances, the quality of life, opportunity, families, polity, culture and values and attitudes is well documented. These are referred to in the report but not all have been adequately researched due to the time constraint in preparing the report.

9. There are important areas of debate that need further engagement. The recent UNDP report for instance, argues that despite the extension of services reported on in the Ten Year Review, service deprivation, that is lack of access to decent or quality basic services, has increased. The debate about employment figures is ongoing. This report cannot settle these debates, but it hopefully makes a contribution to assessing whether our institutions are responding to the changing nature of employment and the new demands placed on the state.

10. Some of the indicators identified as measures of social cohesion, social capital and social justice are disputed. Nonetheless, there does appear to be merit in trying to assess whether our institutions, relationships, networks and organisations are functioning as well as they should or could be. There are concrete indicators of social inclusion and ways of assessing relational aspects of society. For instance, apart from the physical inclusion of people, we are attempting to gather data on what we have called the “three” economies; the formal, the informal or marginalised and the grey or illegal economy. This would seem to be an important measure of social cohesion, whether in terms of numbers of people in each, the relative monetary values and impact of each of these. The rise of single-issue movements for example, is an important indicator of social cohesion, once again whether in terms of numbers, impact or perception.

11. Data on perceptions of and cases of actual discrimination show some interesting differences. The HSRC in 2002 published findings of a survey that indicated that 27,5 % of people had been discriminated against in the 6 months before they were surveyed. The number of actual cases of allegations of discrimination at work or elsewhere appears to be relatively low given this figure. Anecdotal information points to racial discrimination from continued redlining of areas by financial institutions to incidences of accommodation at hotels being refused or denied. The experience of farm workers would seem to be an extreme case of ongoing racial discrimination but the fact that these attitudes and practices persist is worth considering, as is

continuing gender discrimination. These issues point to areas of discrepancy between perception and actual occurrences. The gap between survey data and formal complaints suggests that many people are not prepared to use public mechanisms of response.

12. The depoliticisation or demobilisation thesis also needs testing. Are people actually apathetic, less involved in political and community organisations, as is often claimed, or are there other factors at play? The activities of trade unions, political parties in the area of campaigns and the rise of single-issue social movements would seem to suggest otherwise, but exactly who constitutes organised civil society and for whom these movements speak is not clear.

13. Xenophobia is arguably the cause of the exclusion of many people from the mainstream of our society, regardless of claims as to whether the presence of foreigners is lawful or not in each particular instance. The phenomenon of “othering” has real consequences in many respects, including shaping the response of those excluded in legitimating behaviour that is not desirable. To what extent this is prevalent in society is only known in a very limited sense.

14. There is no doubt that, apart from the obvious challenges mentioned above, the impact of continuing inequality and discrimination, migration, the dominance of global popular culture, deracialisation of the economy or BEE, changing or new religious movements, racial, ethnic and national identities, to mention but a few significant factors and forces that are part of the pattern of development and underdevelopment, will impact on how our society functions. There is a need to contribute to a better understanding of these challenges by creating a reliable barometer of social cohesion, social capital and social justice and by contributing to debates on how to address our challenges by looking at what holds us together.

15. Given the broad sweep of definitions and conceptions of social cohesion, developing a framework for studying the phenomenon is itself a considerable challenge. Nonetheless, there do appear to be themes or threads that are discernible in most of the literature that has been surveyed. There are also surveys that have been conducted and in certain instances there is actual hard data. Given that social cohesion is about processes of social inclusion and relationships that foster the coherent functioning of communities and the larger society, there are indicators of factors that could reveal the extent of social inclusion and/or exclusion and suggest the type and quality of relationships in our society. It is clear that there are different levels at which social cohesion must be studied, including the national, regional and local levels. But social cohesion must also be located and assessed in terms of families, social networks, communities and interest groups. In terms of social justice, the Constitution clearly sets out the type of society we seek to build. Progress can be measured against this benchmark.

16. The key issue in terms of the government’s requirements is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding, monitoring and evaluating social practices, policies, programmes and activities that contribute to building social cohesion and attaining social justice. As has been stated above, a key aspect of social cohesion is

not only social justice, but also social capital. Both of these, social justice and social capital, in their own unique manner, contribute to building or undermining social cohesion. Social justice does so by ensuring a sense of fairness and shared benefit by individuals and communities, and social capital by the reproduction of relationships of reciprocity informed by mutual trust.

17. In the South African context it is clear that any notion of social cohesion must be a broad, democratic and progressive one. It must include the principles of unity, non-racialism, and non-sexism that have been the cornerstone of the national liberation struggle and that are now central to the Constitution. These might be termed indicators of national well-being, that include the sense of belonging people have to various communities, positive relationships, including the notion of partnerships, plurality and diversity, the mediation of conflict and the reduction of inequality.

18. A summary of social cohesion findings indicates that ours is a society characterised by both unity and fragmentation. While there are clear signs of weak social cohesion, in terms of race, class, high crime, inequality or any other measure, there are also significant indicators of strong social cohesion. Examples include the widespread popular support for the Constitution, the government or our sports teams, extensive social dialogue and even social partnership between government, business, labour and other sections of civil society. There are also significant processes of building social cohesion that are ongoing, such as reconciliation processes, policies that seek to address differences and inequality. Even as these create new social challenges, such as with BEE for example, they clearly move us away from our fragmented and iniquitous past.

19. A summary of social capital findings similarly indicates both positive and negative features of social capital, with high horizontal social capital within specific communities, organisations and networks, but low social capital of a vertical nature between various groups or sections of society. Interestingly, it is within poorer communities and those previously discriminated that one finds the most evidence of strong social capital, in the form of networks, organisations and activities. Examples of this include stokvels, social clubs, churches, trade unions, community organisations and the like.

20. A summary of social justice findings reveals that extending human dignity, equality and freedom remains a challenge for our society. While there is much that has been done through policies, programmes and efforts to move our society towards the goal of greater social justice, the challenges to our society make for slow progress, whether measured in terms of accessing political rights, socio-economic rights or any other measure. This challenge of development and underdevelopment is the critical challenge for our society. It alone constitutes the biggest threat to social cohesion and social capital. Nonetheless, there are signs of the recognition of social injustice in the behaviour of many people, such as those who practice philanthropy, acts of solidarity and giving and who participate in campaigns for greater social justice, whatever ones views on the merits of their demands or the form of struggle.

21. The areas not covered by the report and those only superficially covered; alcohol abuse, substance abuse, the impact of disability, indebtedness, multi-lingualism versus the dominance of one language, emerging new youth cultures, social dialogue, government engagement with citizens through imbizo, to name but a few, all require further research. There are limited resources available to carry out this crucial research.

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## **Chapter One: Addressing Poverty and Inequality**

This chapter deals with the material basis of our society, that is, the basis on which people have access to basic goods, services and opportunities. It attempts to consider these indicators, as well as some of the key challenges our society faces, such as crime, HIV and AIDS, economic development, racism and sexism.

In assessing social cohesion and social justice, there is a need for a general assessment of such indicators because they describe the degree to which inequality and factors such as race, class and gender determine the comparative chances of success for any human being in overcoming the challenges thrown up by the vagaries of existence. This is especially true in a society such as ours. The particular history we have is one in which discrimination, super-exploitation and oppression have touched every aspect of existence. To speak of social cohesion without assessing the impact of these factors at a basic material level would render such an exercise of attempting to assess the state of social cohesion, the extent of social capital and of social justice, meaningless. Equally important are the impact of spatial exclusion, rural disadvantages, age differences and other such factors.

### **Basic Goods and Services**

## Shelter

### Type of dwelling by population and sex (%)

	Brick structure separate stand	Traditional structure Traditional materials	Flat in block	Town hse/ smi-detachd	House/flat/ room in yard	Infrml in yard	Infrml NOT in yard	Room/flatlet on shrd prpty	Caravan or tent	Prvt ship/boat	Not in housing unit	Totals
separate stand	47.9	17.7	3.6	1.0	3.8	4.7	14.6	1.1	0.3	0.0	5.4	100.0
Male	46.6	14.3	3.7	1.0	3.7	5.3	16.4	1.2	0.3	0.0	7.5	100.0
Female	49.5	21.7	3.4	1.0	3.8	3.9	12.5	1.0	0.2	0.0	3.0	100.0
Coloured	71.8	2.8	6.6	5.8	3.0	3.4	3.9	0.7	0.3	0.0	1.8	100.0
Male	74.1	2.8	5.1	5.5	2.7	3.4	3.9	0.7	0.3	0.0	1.6	100.0
Female	67.6	2.7	9.3	6.4	3.5	3.3	4.0	0.8	0.3	0.0	2.1	100.0
Indian or Asian	65.5	1.4	13.9	12.1	3.9	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.2	0.0	1.4	100.0
Male	68.0	1.4	11.8	11.8	3.9	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.2	0.0	1.2	100.0
Female	58.0	1.4	19.9	13.0	3.8	0.3	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.0	1.8	100.0
White	70.6	1.1	11.3	9.8	2.1	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.0	3.5	100.0
Male	77.2	1.1	8.0	8.0	2.0	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.0	2.3	100.0
Female	53.2	1.0	20.2	14.5	2.6	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.0	6.7	100.0

### Type of dwelling by province (%)

	Brick structure separate stand	Traditional structure Traditional materials	Flat in block	Town hse/ smi-detachd	House/flat/ room in yard	Infrml in yard	Infrml NOT in yard	Room/flatlet on shrd prpty	Caravan or tent	Prvt ship/boat	Not in housing unit	Totals
Eastern Cape	40.7	37.5	4.5	1.4	2.5	2.0	8.8	0.8	0.2	0.0	1.5	100.0
Free State	57.9	7.0	1.7	1.4	2.7	5.8	19.4	0.7	0.2	0.0	3.2	100.0
Gauteng	50.2	1.2	6.6	4.4	6.8	6.6	15.8	1.5	0.3	0.0	6.5	100.0
KwaZulu-Natal	41.6	26.4	8.8	3.3	3.0	2.2	8.1	1.1	0.3	0.0	5.2	100.0
Limpopo	65.4	18.6	0.7	0.6	1.8	1.7	4.6	0.8	0.2	0.0	5.6	100.0
Mpumalanga	60.5	12.1	1.7	0.8	2.2	3.1	11.9	1.0	0.2	0.0	6.4	100.0
Northern Cape	72.1	3.2	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.4	9.3	0.9	0.8	0.0	6.0	100.0
North West	63.5	5.1	1.0	0.6	2.6	5.3	15.9	0.7	0.2	0.0	5.0	100.0
Western Cape	63.2	2.1	7.4	5.5	2.1	3.9	11.8	0.7	0.3	0.0	3.0	100.0

*Type of dwelling by population and province (%)*

	House / brick structure on separate stand			Traditional structure of traditional materials			Informal dwelling / shack in back yard			Informal dwelling/shack NOT in back yard		
	African	Colrd	Asian / Indian / White	African	Colrd	Asian / Indian / White	African	Colrd	Asian / Indian / White	African	Colrd	Asian / Indian / White
E Cape	74	12	1	99	1	0	85	14	0	95	5	0
Free State	83	3	0	97	1	0	98	2	0	98	2	0
Gauteng	66	4	3	79	3	2	98	1	0	99	1	0
KZN	72	2	14	99	0	0	98	1	1	98	0	1
Limpopo	96	0	0	100	0	0	99	0	0	99	0	0
Mpmlnga	88	1	1	99	0	0	99	0	0	99	0	0
North West	89	2	0	97	1	0	99	1	0	99	1	0
N Cape	34	47	0	35	60	0	63	36	0	61	39	0
W Cape	17	52	1	34	53	1	57	42	0	91	9	0
South Africa	70	10	3	97	2	0	93	7	0	97	3	0

## Energy

### Energy source for lighting by population and sex (%)

	Electricity	Gas	Paraffin	Candles	Solar	Other	Not applicable	Totals
Black African	63.0	0.3	7.5	28.6	0.2	0.4	0.0	100
Male	63.4	0.3	7.4	28.3	0.2	0.4	0.0	100
Female	62.7	0.3	7.6	28.8	0.2	0.4	0.0	100
Coloured	90.6	0.3	2.0	6.8	0.2	0.2	0.1	100
Male	90.3	0.3	2.0	7.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	100
Female	90.9	0.2	1.9	6.6	0.2	0.1	0.0	100
Indian or Asian	98.6	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.0	100
Male	98.6	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.0	100
Female	98.7	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.0	100
White	98.9	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	100
Male	98.9	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	100
Female	99.0	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	100

### Energy source for lighting by province (%)

	Electricity	Gas	Paraffin	Candles	Solar	Other	Totals
Eastern Cape	49.7	0.3	23.3	25.9	0.3	0.5	100
Free State	74.9	0.2	4.6	19.8	0.3	0.2	100
Gauteng	81.1	0.3	2.8	15.6	0.1	0.1	100
KwaZulu-Natal	62.1	0.4	2.5	34.3	0.2	0.4	100
Limpopo	64	0.2	7.4	27.6	0.3	0.5	100
Mpumalanga	68.4	0.4	4.2	26.5	0.2	0.4	100
Northern Cape	76.6	0.2	3.8	17.8	1	0.6	100
North West	71.2	0.1	2.9	25.4	0.1	0.2	100
Western Cape	88.1	0.3	7	4.4	0.1	0.1	100

## Sanitation

### Refuse disposal by population and sex (%)

	Local authority 1 per week	local authority Less than 1 per week	Communal dump	Own dump	No disposal	NA	Totals
Black African	40.5	1.6	1.7	44	12.1	0	100
Male	41.5	1.7	1.8	43.2	11.7	0	100
Female	39.6	1.6	1.6	44.7	12.5	0	100
Coloured	85.5	1.5	1.9	9.9	1.2	0.1	100
Male	84.8	1.5	1.9	10.5	1.2	0.1	100
Female	86.2	1.5	1.9	9.4	1.1	0	100
Indian or Asian	96.6	0.7	0.2	2.1	0.4	0	100
Male	96.3	0.7	0.2	2.3	0.4	0	100
Female	96.9	0.6	0.2	1.9	0.4	0	100
White	90.3	1	0.7	7.4	0.5	0	100
Male	89.6	1	0.8	8	0.6	0	100
Female	90.9	1	0.7	6.9	0.5	0	100

### Refuse disposal by province (%)

	Local authority 1 per week	local authority Less than 1 per week	Communal dump	Own dump	No disposal	Totals
Eastern Cape	37.2	1.4	1.2	43.4	16.7	100
Free State	58.4	3.2	3.5	25.5	9.3	100
Gauteng	83.2	2.7	2.3	9.2	2.6	100
KwaZulu-Natal	49.2	1.2	0.9	38.6	10.1	100
Limpopo	15.1	1.0	1.2	67.3	15.5	100
Mpumalanga	39.1	2.0	1.8	47.5	9.8	100
Northern Cape	68.4	2.9	2.6	22.4	3.6	100
North West	37.3	1.1	1.9	51.4	8.3	100
Western Cape	87.5	1.1	2.3	7.7	1.4	100

*Toilet facility by province (%)*

	Flush toilet (sewerage system)	Flush toilet (septic tank)	Chemical toilet	Pit latrine with vent	Pit latrine without vent	Bucket latrine	None	Totals
Eastern Cape	30.9	2.2	2.0	5.6	23.1	5.6	30.6	100
Free State	46.0	1.6	0.8	6.1	16.1	19.9	9.5	100
Gauteng	79.6	2.7	1.1	1.3	9.6	2.2	3.6	100
KwaZulu-Natal	38.9	3.7	5.2	8.9	26.2	1.2	15.9	100
Limpopo	16.0	2.0	1.3	8.1	49.1	0.7	22.8	100
Mpumalanga	37.1	2.3	1.6	8.5	37.4	2.7	10.3	100
Northern Cape	59.1	7.9	0.8	5.0	5.0	11.2	11.0	100
North West	35.1	1.9	0.9	10.6	37.7	4.3	9.5	100
Western Cape	80.7	5.6	0.3	0.8	1.3	3.7	7.6	100

## Communication

### Telephony

#### Telephone facilities by population and sex (%)

	landline & cell-phone	landline only	Cell-phone only	At a neighbour nearby	At a public telephone nearby	At another location nearby	At another location not nearby	No access to a telephone	not applicable (institutions)	Totals
Black African	6.40	7.46	19.16	7.1	42.7	3.9	4.7	7.7	1.0	100
Male	6.18	7.19	19.27	7.0	42.9	3.8	4.6	7.6	1.5	100
Female	6.59	7.70	19.06	7.2	42.5	3.9	4.8	7.8	0.5	100
Coloured	20.29	24.21	10.69	9.8	28.0	2.2	1.2	1.9	1.7	100
Male	20.08	23.49	10.73	9.8	27.8	2.2	1.2	2.0	2.6	100
Female	20.48	24.88	10.66	9.8	28.2	2.1	1.2	1.9	0.8	100
Indian or Asian	49.64	26.35	11.27	3.0	8.4	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.6	100
Male	49.63	25.61	11.63	3.0	8.5	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.7	100
Female	49.65	27.05	10.93	3.0	8.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.4	100
White	60.68	15.30	16.79	0.8	3.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	2.5	100
Male	61.41	13.98	17.31	0.8	3.4	0.2	0.1	0.3	2.4	100
Female	60.00	16.54	16.31	0.8	3.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	2.6	100

#### Telephone facilities by province (%)

	landline & cell-phone	landline only	Cell-phone only	At a neighbour Nearby	At a public telephone nearby	At another location nearby	At another location not nearby	No access to a telephone	Totals
Eastern Cape	7.7	7.8	13.7	10.2	35.2	5.2	7.1	13.0	100
Free State	9.8	10.4	15.0	6.6	43.9	4.1	2.7	7.5	100
Gauteng	20.4	10.8	23.6	3.8	37.8	1.2	0.7	1.7	100
KwaZulu-Natal	13.2	10.3	14.9	9.1	35.7	3.1	5.0	8.6	100
Limpopo	4.4	3.1	20.3	4.3	51.2	5.1	5.1	6.5	100
Mpumalanga	8.7	6.1	22.2	4.8	46.5	3.4	3.1	5.3	100
Northern Cape	13.5	15.8	11.7	13.7	34.0	3.9	2.4	5.0	100
North West	7.1	6.5	20.4	5.0	47.7	3.6	3.2	6.5	100
Western Cape	28.5	21.6	12.8	7.0	25.4	1.9	1.1	1.6	100

## Transport

### Mode of transport by population group and sex (%)

	NA	On foot	By bicycle	By motorcycle	By car as a driver	By car as a passenger	By minibus /taxi	By bus	By train	Other	Totals
Black African	50.6	34.5	0.3	0.25	1.4	2.3	6.4	3.1	1.3	0.3	100
Male	44.6	37.5	0.6	0.2	2.3	2.6	7	3.5	1.7	0.3	100
Female	55.7	31.7	0.1	0.1	0.7	1.9	5.9	2.7	0.9	0.2	100
Coloured	45.3	27.2	0.5	0.2	5.4	6.8	7.2	4.1	2.5	0.9	100
Male	40.4	29.3	0.8	0.2	7.8	7.3	6.4	4.0	2.8	1.0	100
Female	49.8	25.2	0.2	0.1	3.1	6.4	7.9	4.3	2.3	0.7	100
Indian or Asian	41.4	13.5	0.3	0.3	16.6	16.3	6.1	4.6	0.4	0.6	100
Male	31.0	14.6	0.3	0.4	25.1	16.0	6.3	4.9	0.6	0.9	100
Female	51.3	12.5	0.2	0.2	8.5	16.6	5.8	4.2	0.3	0.4	100
White	35.9	7.7	1.5	0.9	32.3	17.5	1.1	2.2	0.4	0.6	100
Male	27.9	8.4	2.0	1.2	39.0	16.9	1.1	2.3	0.5	0.7	100
Female	43.4	7.0	0.9	0.6	26.0	18.1	1.0	2.1	0.4	0.5	100

*Mode of transport by population group and province (%)*

	NA	On foot	Bicycle	Motor-cycle	Car as a driver	Car as a passenger	Minibus /taxi	Bus	Train	Other	Totals
Eastern Cape											
Black African	50.9	41.0	0.2	0.1	0.8	1.7	3.6	1.3	0.3	0.1	100
Coloured	50.7	28.6	0.4	0.1	3.9	5.6	8.0	1.8	0.2	0.6	100
Indian or Asian	35.0	12.8	0.4	0.4	23.3	20.8	5.0	1.6	0.1	0.5	100
White	40.4	9.2	1.0	0.8	28.4	17.0	1.0	1.7	0.2	0.5	100
Free State											
Black African	48.6	38.9	0.4	0.1	1.2	1.9	6.5	2.1	0.1	0.2	100
Coloured	48.6	33.0	0.7	0.1	3.4	4.0	8.1	1.7	0.2	0.2	100
Indian or Asian	30.5	16.6	0.7	0.6	23.6	23.7	2.4	1.4	0.1	0.4	100
White	38.7	11.1	2.2	1.0	27.6	16.0	1.0	2.0	0.1	0.4	100
Gauteng											
Black African	49.4	22.2	0.4	0.1	3.0	3.1	14.3	3.4	3.7	0.3	100
Coloured	44.2	19.8	0.4	0.2	9.5	9.0	11.2	4.0	1.3	0.3	100
Indian or Asian	36.3	9.7	0.4	0.4	24.7	21.4	3.8	2.4	0.3	0.7	100
White	32.1	6.0	1.4	0.9	36.6	18.6	1.1	2.4	0.3	0.7	100
KwaZulu-Natal											
Black African	52.8	34.0	0.2	0.2	1.0	2.3	5.0	3.4	0.8	0.3	100
Coloured	42.9	21.1	0.3	0.3	9.2	9.8	10.8	4.6	0.4	0.5	100
Indian or Asian	43.4	14.6	0.2	0.2	13.7	14.5	6.9	5.5	0.4	0.6	100
White	37.6	6.0	0.8	1.1	30.9	19.1	1.1	2.2	0.3	0.8	100
Limpopo											
Black African	48.1	43.9	0.3	0.1	1.1	1.8	2.6	1.8	0.1	0.2	100
Coloured	44.2	30.4	1.4	0.2	6.0	5.7	8.3	3.3	0.2	0.3	100
Indian or Asian	36.4	14.6	0.4	0.6	23.9	19.9	2.1	1.5	0.2	0.5	100
White	35.8	9.7	2.2	1.0	27.6	18.1	0.9	4.0	0.2	0.4	100
Mpumalanga											
Black African	48.2	37.2	0.4	0.2	1.3	2.5	4.5	5.2	0.1	0.5	100
Coloured	44.5	25.7	0.7	0.2	6.5	7.1	9.0	5.8	0.2	0.3	100
Indian or Asian	37.4	14.7	0.3	0.4	21.9	19.8	2.6	2.3	0.2	0.4	100
White	36.0	9.5	2.0	0.9	27.8	18.1	1.1	3.8	0.1	0.5	100
Northern Cape											
Black African	50.2	34.3	0.8	0.1	1.4	3.4	5.3	3.3	0.1	1.2	100
Coloured	53.1	33.3	0.7	0.1	2.3	3.7	2.7	3.2	0.1	0.9	100
Indian or Asian	43.7	16.6	0.4	0.4	16.6	16.8	3.2	1.2	0.3	0.9	100
White	40.3	13.2	2.4	0.6	26.5	13.3	1.0	2.4	0.1	0.3	100
North West											
Black African	53.2	31.4	0.4	0.1	1.4	1.6	6.5	4.5	0.8	0.1	100
Coloured	51.7	29.5	0.7	0.1	3.9	4.6	7.6	1.7	0.2	0.1	100
Indian or Asian	36.4	15.2	0.3	0.2	22.3	20.4	2.8	1.4	0.1	0.9	100
White	40.1	9.3	2.3	0.7	27.8	16.4	1.0	2.1	0.1	0.3	100
Western Cape											
Black African	47.1	26.5	0.4	0.2	1.7	3.7	6.2	5.2	8.4	0.8	100
Coloured	42.9	27.0	0.5	0.1	5.5	7.3	6.9	4.8	3.9	1.1	100
Indian or Asian	37.2	12.0	0.4	0.3	20.8	18.4	5.6	2.1	2.6	0.5	100
White	38.8	8.8	1.3	0.7	30.4	15.5	1.0	1.4	1.3	0.6	100

## Water

### Main water supply by population and sex (%)

	Piped water inside dwelling	Piped water inside yard	Piped water < 200m	Piped water > 200m	Borehole	Spring	Rain-water tank	Dam/pool/stagnant water	River/stream	Water vendor	Other	NA (homeless)	Totals
Black African	17.2	32.3	12.4	14.9	3.6	3.0	0.8	1.5	10.5	0.9	2.8	0.0	100.0
Male	17.6	32.9	12.5	14.7	3.5	2.8	0.8	1.5	10.0	0.9	2.8	0.0	100.0
Female	16.7	31.9	12.4	15.1	3.7	3.1	0.8	1.6	11.1	0.9	2.8	0.0	100.0
Coloured	68.7	21.5	3.5	4.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.1	100.0
Male	68.7	21.4	3.6	4.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.1	100.0
Female	68.8	21.6	3.5	4.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.0	100.0
Indian or Asian	87.3	8.3	1.1	2.7	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	100.0
Male	87.0	8.4	1.1	2.7	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	100.0
Female	87.4	8.2	1.0	2.7	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	100.0
White	86.3	9.2	1.1	2.8	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	100.0
Male	86.0	9.4	1.1	2.8	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	100.0
Female	86.5	9.0	1.1	2.8	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	100.0

*Main water supply by population and province (%)*

	Piped water inside dwelling	Piped water inside yard	Piped water < 200m	Piped water > 200m	Borehole	Spring	Rain-water tank	Dam/pool/stagnant water	River / stream	Water vendor	Other	Totals
Eastern Cape												
Black African	9.4	19.4	13.4	14.9	1.9	7.7	2.6	2.3	26.4	0.4	1.7	100
Coloured	53.6	31.3	5.6	5.7	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.5	1.0	0.1	0.8	100
Indian or Asian	87.1	8.4	0.8	2.6	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.0	100
White	88.7	6.4	1.1	2.7	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	100
Free State												
Black African	15.8	52.0	15.0	12.5	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	3.1	100
Coloured	30.7	48.3	9.5	7.9	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	2.2	100
Indian or Asian	75.4	19.3	1.6	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	100
White	83.8	12.4	0.9	2.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	100
Gauteng												
Black African	33.7	46.5	8.6	8.2	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	2.1	100
Coloured	72.6	19.7	2.9	4.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	100
Indian or Asian	89.9	6.6	0.9	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	100
White	85.7	9.7	1.1	3.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	100
KwaZulu-Natal												
Black African	17.0	23.8	12.2	15.4	5.0	4.0	0.9	2.5	15.3	1.0	3.0	100
Coloured	77.4	12.5	2.5	4.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.8	0.3	0.5	100
Indian or Asian	87.0	8.4	1.0	2.6	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	100
White	88.2	6.8	1.2	3.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	100
Limpopo												
Black African	7.7	31.1	15.9	23.5	5.3	2.2	0.3	1.9	6.2	1.8	4.0	100
Coloured	34.3	40.0	5.9	11.4	1.8	0.5	0.1	0.9	1.7	0.9	2.5	100
Indian or Asian	80.7	12.4	1.4	3.8	0.9	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
White	77.4	16.5	1.3	3.6	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	100
Mpumalanga												
Black African	15.7	41.1	13.6	15.5	3.4	1.0	0.6	1.1	3.2	0.7	4.0	100
Coloured	52.9	29.3	5.6	7.1	1.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.3	2.1	100
Indian or Asian	75.0	19.0	1.2	4.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	100
White	81.5	13.3	1.3	2.9	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	100



Rural / Urban inequality

Do you have the following - Grid Electricity \* Environmental milieu Crosstabulation (%)

	Environmental milieu				Total
	Urban formal	Urban informal	Tribal	Rural formal	
Yes	89.4	45.3	54.7	47.9	73.7
No	10.6	54.7	45.3	52.1	26.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Working landline telephone in your dwelling \* Environmental milieu Crosstabulation (%)

	Environmental milieu				Total
	Urban formal	Urban informal	Tribal	Rural formal	
Yes	39.3	3.0	7.9	5.3	25.6
No	60.7	97.0	92.1	94.7	74.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Have a cell phone for personal or business use \* Environmental milieu Crosstabulation (%)

	Environmental milieu				Total
	Urban formal	Urban informal	Tribal	Rural formal	
Personal use	33.5	21.0	23.2	16.3	28.6
Business use	.6	.5	.1	.8	.5

personal or business use	Both	10.0	1.8	1.3	1.6	6.4
	None	55.9	76.7	75.4	81.3	64.6
Total		100	100	100	100	100

These indicators, a sample of possible measures, indicate clearly the social cleavages in terms of access to basic goods and services, the racial inequalities and the rural/urban inequalities. Such cleavages are bound to impact negatively on social cohesion and social justice. They clearly point to low social cohesion and negative social justice.

## Crime

Measuring the crime rate in South Africa is difficult for a number of reasons, not least because of the changes introduced in reporting on crime. Studies on crime in South Africa have relied either on data collected from the police service or have engaged the public directly. In the case of the former, data is presented simply as the number of cases reported to the police service.

However, it is widely accepted that many crimes are not reported. Whereas murder is almost always reported, robbery is one of the most under-reported crimes committed in South Africa. Conducting surveys amongst the general public is one way of compensating for this problem in police statistics. An added benefit of such research is that it assesses the average South African's attitudes and perceptions of crime, something that police statistics do not. The first such survey was conducted by the Department of Safety and Security and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in 1998. In 2003, the Institute for Security Studies took it upon itself to conduct the second Victims of Crime survey.

Taking these issues into consideration, there does appear to be an improvement in terms of the prevalence of crime. Considering police statistics first, nationally, the rate of reported murders has fallen by nearly 24% since 1994, though it has increased in Mpumalanga (4.4%) and Western Cape (3.9%). AgriSA has reported that the number of attacks and murders on farms and smallholdings has also decreased from a high of 147 murders and 1011 separate attacks in 2001 to 54 murders and 345 attacks in the first six months of 2004. Between 1994 and June 2004 1438 incidents of murder and 8514 attacks have taken place on farms and small holdings around South Africa.<sup>1</sup>

Other categories of violent crime have shown increases over the past decade. Reported incidents of attempted murder have increased by 12.2%, common assault by 40%, rape by 17.8% and indecent assault by 132%. In the last few years, the provinces with the highest incidence of reportage of these crimes are Gauteng, Kwazulu Natal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape. Over the past decade, Gauteng has displaced Kwazulu Natal with the highest incidence of reported violent crime and the gap between Eastern Cape and Western Cape has narrowed. The picture changes somewhat when one considers the ratio of reported incidents per 100 000 of the population. Northern Cape, with the smallest population of all provinces but a rate of reported violent crime comparable with the other provinces, moves to the top of the ranking,

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<sup>1</sup> AgriSA, 2001

sometimes with a rate double that of the next figure in the ranking. Western Cape also moves up the ranking, while Gauteng and Kwazulu Natal, the largest provinces by population, tend to fall out of the top four. It is important to remember that these statistics are based on data gathered by the police service. Therefore, they are a measure of reportage in various categories of crime, rather than a measure of the actual incidents of these crimes.

At the same time, the rate of reporting crimes has been increasing since 1994. A difficulty with South Africa's crime statistics is that they make no allowance for under reporting and only indicate the raw number of reported cases in different categories of crime. Factoring the under-reporting rate into the calculation is difficult because South Africa is a dynamic social context; to know the under-reporting rate with reasonable accuracy would require that surveys be conducted at least annually. Comparison between the National Victims of Crime Survey conducted by government in 1998 and by the Centre for Security Studies in 2003 suggests that generally, the reporting rate of crime increased up to 1998, but has remained mostly consistent for the past five years. So for example, while the reporting rate for vehicular theft is about 97%, for robbery it is only about 29%.<sup>2</sup> The implication is that the actual incidence of robbery is likely about three times the figure quoted in SAP crime statistics.

From a social cohesion perspective, the discrepancy between the reported rate and the actual rate of crime in South Africa poses an analytical problem. If the increases in reported incidents closely correspond with the actual incidence of these crimes, then the rate of violent crime has increased. This would suggest an erosion of social capital and a decrease in social cohesion. If, however, the increases in reported incidents means only that more crimes are being reported to the police service than in previous years, it might suggest that more people have faith in the capacity of the police service to address their complaint. This would indicate an increase in social capital. More research is therefore necessary to develop our understanding of the relationship between crime, social cohesion, social capital and social justice. In general, the trend that the crime rate has been coming down since 1994 bodes well for social cohesion and social justice. However, the discrepancy between the reported rate and the actual incidence of crime means that measuring the impact of crime on social cohesion and social justice is difficult. Figures of citizens' arrests, informants, and notification of the police of crimes being perpetrated has not been located. Neither has information on the participation of citizens in Community Police Forums or anti-crime forums.

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<sup>2</sup> Conversation with Ted Legget

There are positive examples of community involvement in the fight against crime, such as the Bambanani campaign, however no data was found on the impact of the campaign.

*Murder by province (%)*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	17.7	16.7	17.4	16.1	15.5	16.5	16.0	16.6	15.6	
Free State	5.0	5.2	5.2	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.6
Gauteng	22.5	21.7	22.1	23.8	23.4	22.3	22.8	22.3	22.4	21.3
KwaZulu-Natal	29.6	28.3	25.3	25.4	25.9	26.7	25.3	25.1	25.1	26.2
Mpumalanga	3.8	4.4	5.5	5.0	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.3	4.9	5.3
North West	4.7	5.4	6.2	5.4	5.6	5.0	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.5
Northern Cape	2.2	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.1
Limpopo	3.9	3.5	3.7	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.7	4.0	3.3	3.6
Western Cape	10.5	12.1	12.3	13.2	14.1	14.2	16.2	16.1	17.0	14.3
RSA Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Murder by province, increase/decrease (%)*

	1994/1995 to 1995/1996	1995/1996 to 1996/1997	1996/1997 to 1997/1998	1997/1998 to 1998/1999	1998/1999 to 1999/2000	1999/2000 to 2000/2001	2000/2001 to 2001/2002	2001/2002 to 2002/2003	2002/2003 to 2003/2004	1994/1995 to 2003/2004
Eastern Cape	-2.3	-1.3	-11.2	-0.8	-4.2	-7.2	2.4	-5.3	1.3	-25.9
Free State	8.4	-4.2	-8.0	-4.6	-10.7	-9.7	-2.0	3.3	-5.5	-29.7
Gauteng	-0.2	-3.6	3.5	1.0	-14.2	-1.5	-3.8	1.1	-12.7	-28.0
KwaZulu-Natal	-1.0	-15.5	-3.5	4.9	-7.2	-8.7	-2.6	0.6	-3.8	-32.4
Mpumalanga	18.8	17.9	-12.9	-5.1	-7.5	-9.0	-5.1	13.8	-0.7	4.4
North West	20.3	7.2	-15.8	7.0	-20.5	-4.2	2.9	3.2	-4.2	-10.0
Northern Cape	21.9	-15.1	-7.4	10.1	-15.1	-5.1	-7.0	-4.0	-5.5	-28.4
Limpopo	-8.4	-0.2	4.1	-2.0	-14.4	-1.7	5.5	-16.6	0.7	-30.5
Western Cape	19.2	-3.5	2.7	9.5	-9.1	9.7	-2.1	6.3	-22.5	3.9
RSA Total	3.5	-5.2	-3.9	2.6	-10.0	-3.7	-1.6	0.7	-8.0	-23.7

*Rape by province (%)*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	12.7	12.6	13.0	13.9	12.9	13.4	13.0	12.4	11.6	13.3
Free State	8.3	7.9	7.5	7.4	7.0	6.8	6.7	7.1	7.1	7.3
Gauteng	26.1	25.0	25.0	24.5	23.7	23.5	23.3	23.2	23.1	22.6
KwaZulu-Natal	16.3	16.8	17.4	16.5	17.3	17.7	17.4	17.2	18.1	17.5
Mpumalanga	5.8	6.0	6.4	5.9	6.3	6.3	6.7	6.8	6.7	7.0
North West	8.9	9.5	8.9	9.1	9.1	8.8	8.9	9.3	9.6	9.5
Northern Cape	3.1	3.3	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.9
Limpopo	6.2	6.4	6.6	7.1	7.8	7.5	8.2	8.8	8.5	7.9
Western Cape	12.7	12.6	12.3	12.8	12.8	13.2	12.8	12.5	12.5	12.0
RSA Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Rape by province per 100 000 of the population*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	95.1	102.3	106.3	112.8	97.8	106.6	100.1	105.0	93.9	108.2
Free State	145.8	152.7	146.4	144.0	128.3	132.0	126.9	141.8	137.3	139.9
Gauteng	165.5	173.4	175.3	170.9	155.3	159.1	156.7	142.3	133.4	126.8
KwaZulu-Natal	90.4	101.7	106.0	100.6	99.3	104.9	102.3	99.2	99.3	94.7
Mpumalanga	96.8	109.8	117.9	107.8	108.1	110.8	116.9	118.1	111.4	114.5
North West	122.9	143.3	136.4	139.4	130.9	131.2	132.2	137.5	135.5	132.1
Northern Cape	168.6	199.3	175.3	175.2	174.7	170.1	174.8	177.5	179.3	187.2
Limpopo	60.0	66.8	68.9	72.9	74.3	74.3	79.1	90.9	83.9	76.9
Western Cape	148.6	161.5	159.8	165.7	157.1	167.0	161.9	150.0	141.7	133.3
RSA Total	115.3	125.9	126.7	126.2	118.3	122.8	121.0	121.1	115.3	113.7

*Rape by province, increase/decrease (%)*

	1994/1995 to 1995/1996	1995/1996 to 1996/1997	1996/1997 to 1997/1998	1997/1998 to 1998/1999	1998/1999 to 1999/2000	1999/2000 to 2000/2001	2000/2001 to 2001/2002	2001/2002 to 2002/2003	2002/2003 to 2003/2004	1994/1995 to 2003/2004
Eastern Cape	9.9	6.9	7.8	-11.3	10.8	-3.4	-1.4	-10.3	15.8	23.3
Free State	6.4	-2.2	-0.5	-9.5	3.2	-1.1	8.4	-2.8	2.5	3.3
Gauteng	6.7	3.5	-1.2	-7.4	5.4	-0.7	1.9	-3.9	-1.4	2.3
KwaZulu-Natal	14.6	6.6	-3.9	0.5	8.7	-1.8	1.6	1.5	-2.7	26.3
Mpumalanga	16.0	10.4	-7.0	2.5	5.8	6.8	3.7	-4.1	5.1	44.1
North West	18.6	-2.8	3.5	-4.6	3.4	0.9	7.0	-0.2	-0.7	26.0
Northern Cape	19.5	-10.9	0.6	0.8	-0.3	2.5	-4.3	0.8	4.0	10.6
Limpopo	14.7	7.2	8.1	5.0	2.8	10.0	10.0	-6.7	-7.0	50.4
Western Cape	10.3	0.9	4.9	-3.7	9.1	-2.6	0.0	-3.8	-3.3	11.2
RSA Total	11.3	3.3	1.0	-4.4	6.5	0.0	2.7	-3.4	0.6	17.8

*Indecent assault, by province (%)*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	10.2	9.8	10.9	12.2	10.5	11.5	10.9	9.4	9.7	
Free State	5.8	7.2	6.6	5.5	5.5	5.6	6.1	6.0	6.7	6.8
Gauteng	25.4	22.7	20.2	19.0	18.4	18.4	19.1	21.5	20.8	21.1
KwaZulu-Natal	16.1	15.9	13.9	15.2	15.9	15.2	15.8	15.2	15.9	16.5
Mpumalanga	3.4	4.4	8.3	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.5
North West	4.2	5.4	6.3	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.8	5.8	5.2
Northern Cape	2.5	2.7	2.5	3.0	3.3	4.0	3.4	3.6	4.0	4.3
Limpopo	2.8	3.6	3.3	3.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.2	2.9
Western Cape	29.6	28.2	28.0	31.9	34.4	33.7	32.7	31.6	30.5	30.6
RSA Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Indecent assault by province per 100 000 of population*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	6.8	8.2	9.0	9.4	8.0	10.6	10.6	11.3	13.3	13.3
Free State	9.1	14.4	13.1	10.2	10.1	12.5	14.5	16.9	21.7	23.1
Gauteng	14.5	16.2	14.4	12.5	12.0	14.4	16.1	18.7	20.2	20.8
KwaZulu-Natal	8.0	9.9	8.6	8.8	9.1	10.4	11.7	12.4	14.7	15.7
Mpumalanga	5.1	8.4	15.6	6.9	6.5	7.1	7.6	8.6	9.1	10.0
North West	5.2	8.5	9.7	7.8	7.5	9.2	10.3	12.2	13.7	12.7
Northern Cape	12.1	16.7	15.5	17.6	19.4	27.7	25.9	34.0	43.2	48.4
Limpopo	2.4	3.9	3.5	3.7	2.8	3.3	3.6	4.8	5.3	5.0
Western Cape	31.0	37.2	37.0	39.3	42.1	49.3	51.9	53.6	58.4	60.0
RSA Total	10.3	13.0	12.9	12.0	11.8	14.2	15.2	17.1	19.4	20.1

*Indecent assault by province, increases/decreases (%)*

	1994/1995 to 1995/1996	1995/1996 to 1996/1997	1996/1997 to 1997/1998	1997/1998 to 1998/1999	1998/1999 to 1999/2000	1999/2000 to 2000/2001	2000/2001 to 2001/2002	2001/2002 to 2002/2003	2002/2003 to 2003/2004	1994/1995 to 2003/2004
Eastern Cape	22.0	13.4	5.6	-13.0	34.9	3.4	-0.1	18.3	0.3	110.2
Free State	59.9	-7.0	-21.4	1.1	24.1	19.4	12.8	28.6	7.5	172.8
Gauteng	14.4	-9.4	-11.6	-2.1	22.8	13.1	30.4	10.8	6.9	92.3
KwaZulu-Natal	26.3	-10.9	3.0	5.6	17.1	13.5	11.2	20.2	9.0	137.0
Mpumalanga	67.6	91.2	-55.0	-4.1	13.8	8.4	15.5	8.2	11.7	138.2
North West	65.1	17.2	-18.7	-2.6	26.3	12.5	21.2	14.3	-5.9	184.0
Northern Cape	40.4	-6.5	14.6	11.4	45.8	-6.6	23.9	26.8	11.5	300.0
Limpopo	64.3	-6.0	6.9	-21.1	21.2	11.3	28.9	11.8	-4.2	142.9
Western Cape	21.8	1.3	7.4	8.8	20.2	5.9	11.5	10.8	5.7	139.8
RSA Total	27.9	1.9	-5.8	1.0	22.9	8.9	15.5	14.7	5.5	132.0

Child Abuse by province (%)

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	16.8	14.6	15.5	15.0	14.5	12.3	10.9	10.5	10.5	10.5
Free State	4.4	6.0	7.2	7.8	7.4	7.9	8.2	7.6	7.4	7.3
Gauteng	17.3	20.8	18.7	17.4	13.4	16.1	14.8	18.8	21.5	24.0
KwaZulu-Natal	10.6	12.1	11.7	12.8	9.2	9.1	9.0	8.6	10.8	10.5
Mpumalanga	2.9	6.0	7.6	6.3	9.2	8.2	6.3	5.1	4.7	4.6
North West	2.7	3.6	5.0	4.7	4.9	5.2	5.3	4.0	3.9	4.3
Northern Cape	4.5	5.8	3.7	3.7	6.2	6.4	6.9	7.3	7.9	6.8
Limpopo	9.6	9.7	8.5	11.2	12.0	10.1	10.8	10.5	7.1	6.0
Western Cape	31.3	21.4	22.0	21.2	23.1	24.7	27.7	27.6	26.2	27.1
RSA Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Child abuse by province, increases/decreases (%)

	1994/1995 to 1995/1996	1995/1996 to 1996/1997	1996/1997 to 1997/1998	1997/1998 to 1998/1999	1998/1999 to 1999/2000	1999/2000 to 2000/2001	2000/2001 to 2001/2002	2001/2002 to 2002/2003	2002/2003 to 2003/2004	1994/1995 to 2003/2004
Eastern Cape	-25.7	-8.3	-2.0	-8.4	-2.5	-12.0	2.6	80.6	22.5	19.0
Free State	16.9	3.1	9.1	-10.1	22.4	3.6	-1.5	76.6	33.8	249.3
Gauteng	3.6	-23.0	-5.7	-26.8	37.3	-8.2	35.6	107.0	51.0	194.3
KwaZulu-Natal	-1.2	-16.9	10.5	-32.0	13.5	-0.9	0.9	128.6	31.0	109.9
Mpumalanga	78.4	10.2	-16.2	38.6	2.0	-23.4	-13.4	66.2	33.2	242.0
North West	14.6	21.3	-6.1	-0.9	23.6	0.0	-19.8	78.1	48.7	239.0
Northern Cape	9.4	-45.4	2.4	57.6	18.7	8.2	12.2	95.9	16.9	218.0
Limpopo	-12.9	-25.0	33.9	1.6	-3.8	7.2	3.7	21.9	15.0	33.0
Western Cape	-41.4	-11.7	-2.2	3.3	23.1	11.7	5.8	72.3	40.1	83.5
RSA Total	-14.2	-14.0	1.5	-5.4	14.9	-0.4	6.5	81.2	35.6	111.9

*Drug related crime by province (%)*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	11.3	11.3	14.0	13.5	12.9	11.8	12.9	14.0	14.0	12.6
Free State	9.8	10.0	9.8	8.2	8.6	7.6	7.9	8.6	7.9	5.7
Gauteng	16.5	15.7	15.3	14.1	13.5	12.6	13.3	16.5	16.5	14.0
KwaZulu-Natal	18.6	18.3	19.7	20.9	21.9	20.2	20.7	19.4	19.9	21.7
Mpumalanga	4.8	4.4	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.0	3.2	2.8	2.1
North West	5.7	6.3	6.1	5.4	5.0	4.8	5.1	5.9	5.9	6.1
Northern Cape	3.4	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.6	4.1	4.0	3.6	3.8	3.3
Limpopo	3.2	3.0	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	2.7
Western Cape	26.7	27.1	22.9	25.8	26.2	31.4	28.9	25.4	25.7	31.8
RSA Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*Drug related crime by province, increases/decreases (%)*

	1994/1995 to 1995/1996	1995/1996 to 1996/1997	1996/1997 to 1997/1998	1997/1998 to 1998/1999	1998/1999 to 1999/2000	1999/2000 to 2000/2001	2000/2001 to 2001/2002	2001/2002 to 2002/2003	2002/2003 to 2003/2004	1994/1995 to 2003/2004
Eastern Cape	-14.3	26.9	1.3	-11.3	1.2	12.8	27.5	2.0	5.1	52.3
Free State	-13.0	0.8	-11.9	-2.6	-2.2	6.8	29.1	-6.6	-16.9	-21.2
Gauteng	-18.8	0.2	-2.8	-11.5	3.0	8.7	46.7	1.6	-1.3	15.3
KwaZulu-Natal	-15.8	10.5	11.9	-2.9	2.0	5.5	10.3	4.7	26.6	59.0
Mpumalanga	-21.5	9.7	0.6	-7.0	3.7	-2.0	-5.7	-9.9	-12.2	-38.9
North West	-4.3	-0.8	-8.0	-13.7	7.6	8.7	36.8	1.0	20.9	47.1
Northern Cape	-3.2	0.1	2.0	-8.2	26.8	0.0	6.0	6.9	1.5	32.3
Limpopo	-19.0	27.8	8.7	-5.6	-9.2	5.3	19.9	3.6	-8.0	16.1
Western Cape	-12.9	-13.5	18.8	-5.5	32.2	-5.3	3.5	2.9	44.4	62.7
RSA Total	-14.4	2.6	5.2	-7.0	10.4	3.1	17.7	1.7	16.5	36.5

*Commercial crime by province (%)*

	1994/1995	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004
Eastern Cape	10.7	9.8	10.0	10.5	9.9	9.7	10.0	8.9	8.3	7.6
Free State	6.9	6.7	6.2	5.7	5.2	5.2	5.3	4.6	5.4	4.5
Gauteng	36.2	36.3	37.0	37.3	38.6	41.5	40.1	41.2	41.6	43.7
KwaZulu-Natal	15.8	14.8	14.2	14.0	15.6	15.2	16.5	16.6	15.7	15.5
Mpumalanga	4.6	5.5	5.1	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.6	4.6	5.0	5.2
North West	4.8	5.6	5.3	5.3	5.0	5.1	4.6	4.4	4.8	4.7
Northern Cape	3.3	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.7
Limpopo	3.6	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.5	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.8	3.3
Western Cape	14.1	14.7	15.8	15.6	14.1	13.1	13.4	13.7	13.5	13.8
RSA Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*Commercial crime by province, increase/decrease (%)*

	1994/1995 to 1995/1996	1995/1996 to 1996/1997	1996/1997 to 1997/1998	1997/1998 to 1998/1999	1998/1999 to 1999/2000	1999/2000 to 2000/2001	2000/2001 to 2001/2002	2001/2002 to 2002/2003	2002/2003 to 2003/2004	1994/1995 to 2003/2004
Eastern Cape	-11.1	3.9	7.3	-6.2	5.2	1.4	-22.1	-10.5	-9.2	-37.1
Free State	-5.9	-6.3	-5.0	-8.8	6.4	-0.1	-23.7	12.2	-16.3	-41.8
Gauteng	-3.1	4.0	2.4	3.7	15.4	-5.3	-9.8	-2.7	4.3	7.0
KwaZulu-Natal	-9.5	-1.7	0.2	11.5	4.3	6.6	-11.7	-8.7	-2.2	-13.1
Mpumalanga	14.9	-5.7	3.3	-0.2	-4.9	-0.5	-11.9	4.1	2.1	-1.2
North West	12.6	-4.2	2.1	-5.1	9.1	-12.5	-15.0	4.6	-1.9	-13.0
Northern Cape	-30.6	-13.2	4.4	-3.9	3.6	-7.8	-5.1	-11.1	-8.9	-55.7
Limpopo	13.8	7.5	-1.1	3.6	-11.9	-1.3	-4.9	-7.9	-13.1	-17.1
Western Cape	0.6	9.5	0.8	-9.8	0.1	-0.2	-9.9	-5.4	1.6	-13.4
RSA Total	-3.3	2.0	1.8	0.1	7.2	-2.0	-12.2	-3.8	-0.6	-11.4



Whatever the extent of its impact, it is undisputed that high crime rates challenge and undermine the consolidation of South African democracy. Despite the paradox that high levels of crime often promote high levels of trust and social cohesion within communities that unite to face a common concern, it is also true that crime rates remain highest in townships, working class communities and underdeveloped high density housing areas such as inner cities. In contrast, crime is lowest in middle class and affluent neighbourhoods. This again demonstrates the link between crime, poverty and overcrowding. Read against South Africa's major social cleavages that trace a correlation between race, poverty and lack of resources, South Africa's crime rates continue to challenge society's efforts to achieve social justice, despite whatever advances have been made with regard to building social capital and advancing social cohesion.

This section to the values and attitudes section?  
 South African Social Attitudes Survey, September 2003:

Please tell me what you think are the 3 most important challenges facing South Africa today? [Code 1.00 in the three tables that follow indicate the % of each race group that thinks crime & security are in the top three challenges.]

% within Race of respondent

	Race of respondent				Total
	African/Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	
Crime	62.9%	45.8%	27.0%	31.3%	52.7%
1.00	37.1%	54.2%	73.0%	68.7%	47.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

% within Environmental milieu

	Environmental milieu			Total
	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural formal	
Crime	45.6%	57.9%	66.8%	62.4%
1.00				53.6%

e	1.00	54.4%	42.1%	33.2%	37.6%	46.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

% within Province

		Province										Total
		WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP		Total
Crim	.00	33.0%	52.7%	60.6%	55.7%	57.9%	51.0%	49.1%	66.4%	69.2%		53.6%
e	1.00	67.0%	47.3%	39.4%	44.3%	42.1%	49.0%	50.9%	33.6%	30.8%		46.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%

## Social Cohesion and HIV/AIDS

It is widely predicted that the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on social cohesion and social justice in future will be immense and will become increasingly apparent. Many South Africans are already familiar with the stigma and discrimination attached to HIV/AIDS. People living with AIDS (PLWA) are often forced to leave their jobs and are isolated in their communities. Often PLWA are treated with hostility in their communities and at work, particularly where community members and colleagues have little understanding of the disease.

AIDS has a particularly significant impact on mortality among children between the ages of one and five. 1 in 10 babies of mothers between the ages of 25 and 29 years are HIV+ and most will die before their fifth birthday. In most sub-Saharan African countries, mortality among children under 5 years has increased by 20-40%.

The impact of AIDS on adult mortality is more complicated because of the much longer period of morbidity. From a public health care perspective, longer periods of morbidity places increased demands on health care resources with the attendant social strains. The ramifications in terms of loss of income for households are also considerable. Care-related expenses increase at the same time that the capacity of households to earn income is reduced by the demands of looking after sick household members. Children may be forced to withdraw from school in order to help look after sick parents and children who miss too much school find it very difficult to rejoin school later. Mounting medical fees and funeral expenses collectively impoverish affected households.

Eventually, the high mortality of young adults leads to radically alter household structure as young and elderly persons become household heads and enter parenthood too early in their teens. Progressively increasing adult morbidity and mortality leaves many children orphaned or vulnerable. Already, the number of children living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa is estimated at 250 000, and the number of orphans at 660 000 (UNAIDS, 2002).<sup>3</sup> The number of child headed households has not significantly increased (see Susan Zielhl data), but this may be because the effect of the illness is being absorbed by communities and families. As the HIV/AIDS epidemic deepens, the socio-economic impacts widen to affect the whole community, adversely affecting community structure and function.

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<sup>3</sup> UNAIDS 2002. Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. July 2002. UNAIDS Geneva, Switzerland. <http://www.unaids.org>.

The social and economic consequences flowing from the erosive effects of the disease on South Africa's social capital base present a formidable challenge to government's efforts to achieve social justice. To effectively respond to this challenge will require on-going research with concomitant policy interventions into the following key areas:

- Stigma and discrimination
- Morbidity and mortality
- Adapted means of survival
- Changing household structure
- Caring for orphans and vulnerable children
- Changes in community life


In South Africa it was estimated that a total number of 5.3 million individuals had acquired HIV infection by the end of 2002.<sup>4</sup>

HIV prevalence among pregnant women in 2003 was observed to be 27.9%, an increase of 1.4% from 2002.

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<sup>4</sup> Dept. of Health, National HIV and Syphilis Antenatal Sero-prevalence Survey, 2003.

*Estimated HIV prevalence, 1990 – 2003*




In 2003, a prevalence rate of 37.5% was observed for KwaZulu-Natal. This was followed by Mpumalanga (32.6% ), Free State (30.1% ), Gauteng (29.6% ) and Eastern Cape (27.1% ).

*HIV prevalence by province among antenatal clinic attendees, 2001 - 2003 (%)*

	2001	2002	2003
Eastern Cape	21.7 (19.0 – 24.4)	23.6 (21.1 – 26.1)	27.1 (24.6 – 29.7)
Free State	30.1 (26.5 – 33.7)	28.8 (26.3 – 31.2)	30.1 (26.9 – 33.3)
Gauteng	29.8 (27.5 – 32.1)	31.6 (29.7 – 33.6)	29.6 (27.8 – 31.5)
KwaZulu-Natal	33.5 (30.6 – 36.4)	36.5 (33.8 – 39.2)	37.5 (35.2 – 39.8)
Limpopo	14.5 (12.2 – 16.9)	15.6 (13.2 – 17.9)	17.5 (14.9 – 20.0)
Mpumalanga	29.2 (25.6 – 32.8)	28.6 (25.3 – 31.8)	32.6 (28.5 – 36.6)
Northern Cape	15.9 (10.1 – 21.6)	15.1 (11.7 – 18.6)	16.7 (11.9 – 21.5)
North West	25.2 (21.9 – 28.6)	26.2 (23.1 – 29.4)	29.9 (26.8 – 33.1)
Western Cape	8.6 (5.8 – 11.5)	12.4 (8.8 – 15.9)	13.1 (8.5 – 17.7)


N.B. The true value is estimated to fall within the two confidence limits, thus the Confidence interval (CI) is important to refer to when interpreting data

*Estimated percentages of HIV+ women by age group (%)*




Source: Dept. of Health, National HIV and Syphilis Antenatal Sero-prevalence Survey, 2003: 10

*Estimated percentages of HIV+ babies by age group (%)*



Source: Dept. of Health, National HIV and Syphilis Antenatal Sero-prevalence Survey, 2003: 11

*Estimated number of HIV+ men by age group (%)*



Source: Dept. of Health, National HIV and Syphilis Antenatal Sero-prevalence Survey, 2003: 11

Participants in the South African Social Attitudes Survey conducted by the HSRC in 2003 were asked to identify the 3 most important challenges facing South Africa today. Code 1.00 in the three tables that follow indicate the % of each race group that thinks HIV/AIDS; unemployment; crime & security; or poverty are in the top three challenges.

*Race of respondent crosstabulation (%)*

		Race of respondent				Total
		African/Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	
HIV	0.00	52.4	55.5	49.0	63.9	54.0
	1.00	47.6	44.5	51.0	36.1	46.0
Total		100	100	100	100	100

*Environmental milieu crosstabulation (%)*

		Environmental milieu				Total
		Urban formal	Urban informal	Tribal	Rural formal	
HIV	.00	45.7	47.7	59.0	55.0	50.2
	1.00	54.3	52.3	41.0	45.0	49.8
Total		100.0%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Province crosstabulation (%)*

		Province									Total
		WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	
HIV	.00	54.8	59.7	44.7	47.4	42.0	37.4	47.2	63.9	59.8	50.2
	1.00	45.2	40.3	55.3	52.6	58.0	62.6	52.8	36.1	40.2	49.8
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

While HIV and AIDS will clearly impact negatively on social cohesion and exacerbate the challenges of social justice, perversely, HIV/AIDS may be one of the key indicators of high social capital in our society. As communities and households rise to the challenge of coping with the pandemic, relationships are put to the test. Government has been criticised for responding too slowly to the pandemic, but the counter to this is that the government has had an effective response within its resource limitations and hence the pandemic has not had the negative impact predicted. These are issues that require further research.

What is clear is that the impact of HIV/AIDS in terms of social cohesion and social justice will be significant. The impact of policies and strategies in relation to this remain to be seen.

## Economic development

### Business opportunities

The economy is a contested area and socio-economic positions not only influence individual perceptions of social realities but also relations, interactions, ties and the access to resources and opportunities. There are differences between the affluent and the poor, dominant and marginalized groups and political winners and losers. Negative perceptions of social realities depend on the socio-economic position, minority status, religion or age group and they are higher among disadvantaged groups such as the less-educated, low-income earners, crime victims, those in poor health and the unemployed.<sup>5</sup> Generally, the social order does not work equally for everyone and contention and conflict arise from inequality, indignity and exclusion. The cooperation between unequal partners is a problem because the nature of public goods is disputed: competing social structures place a variety of demands on the state.<sup>6</sup>

Trust, an essential aspect of social cohesion and social capital, is considered to facilitate human interactions and as a cultural and moral resource, trust informally influences modes of cooperation. Trust is based on assumptions and beliefs members of society have about each other and on expectations that other people will comply with certain arrangements, norms, and rules.<sup>7</sup> Trusting behavior increases the vulnerability to someone whose response cannot be controlled.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the quality of social and institutional arrangements and relations contributes critically to the stability that is conducive to trust building. The absence of trust limits mutually beneficial relations. Nevertheless, social relations and economic conditions that are precarious, unpredictable and risky prevent high levels of interpersonal trust.

Optimism and trust are related because a positive perspective on life helps to generate interpersonal trust. If people believe that improvement is possible and that they have choices and can control their environment, they are more likely to adopt cooperative values.<sup>9</sup> This is reflected in generalised trust and tolerance towards people who are different from oneself, the

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<sup>5</sup> Foley and Edwards 1999

<sup>6</sup> Edwards and Foley 1998

<sup>7</sup> Offe 1999

<sup>8</sup> Coleman 1990

<sup>9</sup> Uslaner 1999

respect for other values and norms and the willingness to accommodate other people's preferences.<sup>10</sup>

However, optimism and generalised trust are related to the socio-economic context, and volatile economic conditions reduce levels of trust.<sup>11</sup> If uncertainty prevails, trusting behaviour is too risky and often people tend to have more faith in people like themselves who come from a similar socio-cultural context.<sup>12</sup> In addition, marginalisation and discrimination potentially result in opposition to mainstream society by frustrated factions in sub-cultural structures. Common experiences of adversity and opposition generate particularised forms of solidarity and they replace missing opportunities or social recognition.<sup>13</sup> For example lacking prospects of gainful employment or decent living conditions create a generation of hopeless young people with nothing to lose and no constraints to anti-social or high-risk behaviour.

Social cleavages are characteristics of segmented societies and are reflected in strong networks furthering particular interests in competition for resources and power and at the expense of social cohesion and stability. The competition for scarce resources and opportunities is divisive and limits incentives for cooperation. Unfavourable conditions are for example class, gender, and ethnic inequalities, the marginalisation of minorities, and endemic poverty combined with insufficient social safety nets.<sup>14</sup> Social cohesion and stability depend on the capacity of the state to mediate between competing social structures in order to lessen disparities and to strengthen social relations, interactions and ties.<sup>15</sup>

In post-apartheid South Africa, the redistribution of resources and opportunities is a major challenge. However, changes take place in a context, where the political transformation created a climate of uncertainty for some and opportunity for others, and asymmetric distribution of risks and benefits and high emotions. The transition process is characterised by a contradictory process of both gains and losses of trust, rising levels of tolerance and intolerance and the struggle for power. The value of the existing social order under apartheid was low and deteriorating and as a consequence of the transition, new values and belief systems are being shaped. Not only changing hierarchies and positions of influence and power have emerged in

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<sup>10</sup> Uslaner 1999

<sup>11</sup> Warren 1999

<sup>12</sup> Uslaner 1999

<sup>13</sup> Portes 1998

<sup>14</sup> Woolcock 1998

<sup>15</sup> Berger-Schmitt 2000

response to the new political and social order, but also new subcultures and dissidents. In addition, due to the magnitude of inequality and slow economic growth, gains made by one group or section of society are usually at the expense of another. This situation is no doubt aggravated by the decline in average household income on the one hand and the rise of income of some sectors of the population and of the profits made by some companies. Between 1995 and 2000 average household income has declined by 9.8%, and per capita income by 3.1%. (what about income rise, eg, company directors pay? And profits of companies that accrue to shareholders?) These gains and losses are unequally distributed between individuals, population groups, and regions.<sup>16</sup>

Democratic political arrangements and socio-economic conditions determine levels of generalised trust and optimism and influence attitudes and the adoption of cooperative values such as tolerance and solidarity, which are the sources of beneficial forms of social capital based on a shared development vision and the awareness of the interdependence of all social groups.<sup>17</sup>

The government is aware of the critical correlation between a more equal distribution of resources and opportunities and social stability. Since 1994, the government has adopted different strategies and policies in order to address these inequalities and disparities and to promote historically disadvantaged groups in the following economic sectors:

- ownership of property
- ownership of business
- access to capital
- access to land can be created or?
- distribution of quotas
- procurement

### Housing

One of the primary means of ensuring some ownership of property is through private housing. The White Paper on Housing regulates the delivery of housing to people previously denied such opportunities on racial grounds and from 1994 to 2003 about 1.5 million houses were completed

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<sup>16</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>17</sup> Kalati and Manor 1999

and transferred to new owners.<sup>18</sup> However, different challenges contribute to dissatisfaction and rising tensions in this regard. This includes alleged and actual corruption around tenders, non-compliance with building regulations, poor quality and biased or irregular allocation of houses. In addition, many housing projects are in peripheral areas, away from job and business opportunities and do not in any way challenge the current spatial development patterns inherited from apartheid.. The development of housing projects in existing residential areas is contested by residents and property owners claiming that property values drop, which is worsened by banks redlining high risk areas and those with rapid demographic changes for mortgages.<sup>19</sup> In addition, demographic changes, for example in the vicinity of Alexandra Township in Johannesburg, show that as the number of Africans increases, Whites tend to relocate in other areas.<sup>20</sup>

Between 1994 and 2003, the government has provided 1.5 million houses and depending on the province, between 28% and 54% of all housing subsidies approved were given to female-headed households. The number of Africans living in formal houses increased from 45% to 55% during this period. However, the number of Africans living in informal dwellings decreased by 1% due to population growth.<sup>21</sup> In addition, there are no significant changes in access to formal housing between the different racial groups and statistics of formal housing do not reflect the magnitude of different property standards. Finally, property markets in townships are dysfunctional, in that only 8% of houses were subject to transactions in the past five years and only 26% of homeowners were willing to sell their homes. Township housing assets are "dead capital" at an estimated amount of R 68.3 billion.<sup>22</sup> (What is the 'white' property market?)

### Black Economic Empowerment

The government has developed different strategies to bring substantial change to the patterns of wealth ownership in order to overcome racial and gender based exclusion from access to productive resources and skills. The economy performs below its potential because the majority of people earn and generate low levels of income and effective participation of the majority of South Africans in the economy would be a contribution to stability and prosperity in the interest of all. The Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BEE) regulates BEE and

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<sup>18</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>19</sup> Mail and Guardian Feb 1997, Mar 1997, May 2001

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Johnny Tsuene, 21 October 2003

<sup>21</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>22</sup> Mail and Guardian June 2004

is augmented by charters, in particular in the financial, mining and liquid fuel sectors. These set targets for equity sales to Black shareholders, as well as setting criteria and targets for preferential procurement, employment equity and skills development.<sup>23</sup> Government tenders, licences, concessions or the purchase of state assets to companies is partly determined by compliance with these requirements.<sup>24</sup> Certain industries are compelled to increase shares of African owned businesses and for example the five foreign oil companies have concluded BEE deals. They transferred 18% to black companies increasing their share in the local petrol market from 0.56% to 4.19%, a considerable step towards the government target of 25%.<sup>25</sup> Mineral rights are transferred to the "ownership of the people" and vested with the state. Within ten years, 26% of mining industry assets will be transferred to historically disadvantaged South Africans and within five years, women participation has to increase to 10%.<sup>26</sup>

By the end of September 2002, 260 previously disadvantaged individuals held 367 directorships in 387 South African based companies. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has financed 625 black entrepreneurs with a total of R 5.6 billion since 1990. BEE directors held 62 executive positions and 305 non-executive positions.<sup>27</sup> An increasing number of black-controlled companies list on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, however, the total of black-owned assets is still only about 10% of all listings.<sup>28</sup> Considering the small percentage of BEE beneficiaries its impact is low and it does not contribute significantly to new patterns of income and wealth distribution.

Large businesses contribute 65% to the GDP, medium 15%, small 14% and micro enterprises 6%. In contrast, large businesses provide 46% of employment opportunities whereas small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) contribute 53.9% to the labour market (medium enterprises 13%, small 16% and very small, micro and survivalist enterprises together 25%).<sup>29</sup> Trade, agriculture and services are within the small business sector those with notable growth and it is estimated that every investment in a new entrepreneurial business creates an average of 15 jobs.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Mining Charter, DME November 2002

<sup>24</sup> BEE Act Gov. Gazette 9 Jan 2004

<sup>25</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>26</sup> Mining Charter, DME November 2002

<sup>27</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>28</sup> Empowerdex 2002

<sup>29</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>30</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

## Entrepreneurs

The number of entrepreneurs is low, only 3.7% in comparison to the global average of 10%.<sup>31</sup> Access to capital and educational and cultural constraints limit entrepreneurship.<sup>32</sup> Considering the low capacity of only 43.5% labour force absorption in the formal economy, the employment supply of the informal sector is an important contribution raising the absorption capacity of the overall labour market to 70.6%. A strategy to reduce poverty is the creation of SMMEs; many SMMEs are in the informal sector. Appropriate policies and an improved infrastructure provision create favourable conditions for micro and survivalist enterprises. In addition, poverty has gender, race and spatial dimensions, making the increase of business opportunities for women, in particular African women imperative.<sup>33</sup> Racial divisions in the informal sector are as follows: 88.1% Africans, 4.8% Coloured, 4.8% Indians and 1.9% Whites; the proportion of males is 53%, of females 47%.<sup>34</sup>

44% of Africans start a business out of necessity because they have no alternative in contrast to only 11% Whites, whereas the percentage of whites starting a business because of opportunities is much higher. Up to 90% of black-owned businesses are located in townships. These differences are reflected in the lower survival rate of African start-ups, the ratio of start-ups to new firms is 3.3 to 1 for Africans and 1 to 1 for Whites.<sup>35</sup>

Retail trade with 20.7% constitutes the largest sector of SMMEs. Franchises contribute to almost 12% of the GDP and despite international competition, home brands control over 90% of the market. The number of franchises bought by Africans has doubled between 1995 and 2000. In addition, there are township enterprises such as the 100 000 Spaza shops countrywide; they provide employment for an estimated 230 000 to 300 000 South Africans but are not racially integrated.<sup>36</sup> Further sectors of SMMES are agriculture, forestry and fishing with a share of 20% of the GDP, and manufacturing with 17.7%, finance and business with 10.5%, community, social and personal services with 10.2% construction with 8.8%, transport and storage with 3.9%, catering and accommodation with 3.8%, and finally mining and quarrying with 0.6% of the GDP.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2003

<sup>32</sup> Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2003

<sup>33</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>34</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>35</sup> Business Map Foundation 2004

<sup>36</sup> SA survey 2002/2003

<sup>37</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

## Access to Capital

Historically financial services focused on meeting the needs of wealthier South Africans. This is for example reflected in the redlining of certain areas for mortgages, the inaccessibility of credits for low-income earners, lacking capital in the agricultural sector and the low percentage of entrepreneurs.<sup>38</sup>

Since 1999, banking companies have opened microlending subsidiaries and there are about 1300 registered micro-lenders providing loans to about 2.5 million people. Banks and their micro-lending subsidiaries, some with interest rates up to 300%, provide about 70% of these loans. Registered micro-lenders have dispersed a total of approximately 10 million loans amounting to a gross credit of R 14 billion. Most of these loans are used for consumption; however, the proportion of housing and entrepreneurial loans is increasing. The estimated value of loans by unregistered micro-lenders ranges between 10 to 50% of that of registered firms.<sup>39</sup>

The lack of competitive pressure in financial services is to the disadvantage of consumers. In addition, well-meant consumer protection is counterproductive, because regulations rather restrict than facilitate the access to the formal financial sector and expose in particular poor people to the exploitative practices of the informal sector. Credit transactions are costly and complicated, in addition, high bank fees are a further deterrent. In contrast, the easy access to debit orders is considered contributing to the increase in unmanageable consumer debts. Problems with settlements of debts are exacerbated by abusive practices such as reckless overlending, fraud and the bribery of bank and payroll clerks.<sup>40</sup> From 1994 to 2002, the number of total liquidations per annum varied between 2909 and 4012 and that of insolvencies between 2541 and 6025.<sup>41</sup> However, these numbers do not reflect liquidations and insolvencies in the informal sector, where debt servicing is rigorously enforced, sometimes with far-reaching consequences. In addition, Statistics South Africa do not provide information on racially based patterns of debt.

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<sup>38</sup> Mail and Guardian, May 2001

<sup>39</sup> Iris Report 2001

<sup>40</sup> Iris Report 2001

<sup>41</sup> Stats SA in brief 2004 P0043

People without formal jobs have difficulties to open bank accounts and certain banks even have minimum salary requirements. Credit cards, overdraft facilities and personal loans are a prerogative of middle and high-income groups. Of the estimated 1 million home-based businesses only very few have access to capital and meeting the financial needs of under-banked South Africans is still a primary challenge to the financial service industry.<sup>42</sup>

#### Access to Land

Land reform programmes aim at overcoming the unsustainable system of land use and management and the structure of landownership inherited from the past. In 2002, of the 8.5% of South Africans employed in the agricultural sector, 80.2% were Africans, 13.3% Coloureds and 6.3% Whites. 47.7% of these workers had formal, 51.5% informal employment in the sector.<sup>43</sup> Tenure reform, restitution and redistribution are the main focus areas of land reform.<sup>44</sup>

Tenure reform provided for the first time a legal definition of a labour tenant and it aims at securing tenure for black farm workers on white-owned commercial farms including the conversion of existing or historical use rights into land ownership. In addition, since March 2003, minimal salaries for farm workers are prescribed. Poor rural women constitute the majority of communal tenure users and potentially benefit from tenure reform policies. Land restitution addresses historical injustices of expropriations and forced removals. The pace of restitution was extremely slow in the beginning and of 67 300 claims, 29 877 or 44% have been settled until 2002 and 37 423 or 56% still to be settled. Finally, land redistribution aims at the transfer of arable land to black farmers and until 2000 a total of 821 134 hectares of land were redistributed to 53 950 households. However, this is only 1% of total agricultural land and far away from the RDP's target of 30%.<sup>45</sup>

The budgetary allocations to land reform programmes are small, only one third of one per cent of the total national budget.<sup>46</sup> Consequently, demand for land is high and funding for the purchase

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<sup>42</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>43</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>44</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>45</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>46</sup> UNDP 2003

and redistribution of arable land has been inadequate. This is reflected in the high number of people with neither access to land nor grants.<sup>47</sup>

Production levels of land reform beneficiaries are extremely low, less than 10% use their land for agriculture and many are not using their land at all. Successful land reform has to be integrated in broader development programmes including the access to capital in order to promote incentives for a sustainable production protected from the competition with white farmers who have monopolised agricultural production and the volatility of international markets.<sup>48</sup> The agricultural sector with 20% constitutes the second largest share within the different SMME sectors.

#### Distribution of Licences and Quotas

Licences and quotas are regulatory measures of the government in the interest of the population, the environment, equity, and justice. Legislation regulates the appropriate distribution of licences according to criteria such as certain skills for drivers', equity and justice for mining, adequacy of supply of liquor or responsibility for gun licences. However, discrepancies between the demand, requirements and the supply of licences are together with insufficient law enforcement conducive to abuse, patronage and corruption. Further controversy arises around highly politicised regulations from gambling or cellphone licences to well-meant control measures such as the price ceiling for medication. Two examples, the regulations relating to a transparent pricing system for medicines and fishing quotas illustrate contentions emanating from conflicting interests.

The transparent pricing system for medicines introduces a single exit price for all medicines and regulates dispensing charges providing for equal conditions regardless of one's location in order to avoid the exploitation by providers of products with a monopolised supply and a low demand elasticity. Without regulations, manufacturers privileged big pharmacies in urban areas with discounts recovered at the expense of small pharmacies in rural or peri-urban areas that could not afford bulk purchases and cost for medicines varied considerably. In this case, a well-meant regulation results in gains made by one group at the expense of the other.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Stats SA General Household Survey 2003

<sup>48</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>49</sup> Mail and Guardian, 10 May 2004

A further dispute concerns the fact that doctors have to obtain a dispensing licence. In order to apply for a licence, doctors have to complete a course, which was even contested in court because doctors consider the dispensing of medicine an inherent right based on their qualification. In contrast, the Department of Health and the Pretoria High Court defend the legislation designed to protect the public from exploitation in a literally vital area.<sup>50</sup> It is too early for an assessment of the legislation's impact.

During apartheid, legislation for the exploitation of marine resources favoured white large-scale operators and five white-owned commercial companies dominated the market. In 1994, only 0.75% of the commercially allowable catch was allocated to Africans and only 7% of all 2 700 registered commercial fishing boats belonged to Africans. The lack of capital was a major inhibition.<sup>51</sup> In contrast today, increasingly quotas go to BEE companies, in some sectors more than 80%, for example 73% of quotas in hake deep sea trawling went to companies where Africans held a majority of shares, others include abalone (87.2%), pelagic fishing (75.8%) and West Coast rock lobsters (66.7%).<sup>52</sup> ??

The government has also launched a programme to improve the access to the fishing industry and conditions for small-scale and subsistence fishers. These communities have to be protected against more powerful large-scale enterprises in a context, where measures to sustain marine resources conflict with their livelihood. Under the revised quota system, for example people fishing only for food security purposes do not have to apply for quotas. Requirements to obtain permits have changed from a 100 Rand fee to a non-refundable 6000 Rand fee for applications submitted by commercial companies. In contrast micro-enterprises pay only 500 Rand for their applications. Furthermore, 25% of the total allowable catch has to be transferred to previously disadvantaged communities.<sup>53</sup> In order to overcome information deficits, to improve the efficiency of services and provide for transparency, along the entire coast Marine Coastal Managements officials operate together with different NGOS to help in particular micro- and subsistence fishermen and fisherwomen with their applications for quotas. However, the number of applications exceeds the number of sustainable quotas by far and not everybody is satisfied.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Mail and Guardian, 2 June 2004

<sup>51</sup> UNDP 2003

<sup>52</sup> SA Survey 2002/2003

<sup>53</sup> Mail and Guardian (Barry Streek), 3 Aug 2001

<sup>54</sup> Mail and Guardian (Barry Streek), 14 Sep 2001

The economy is a contested area and competing population groups do not only have different expectations and priorities, but also place a variety of demands on the state. The magnitude of inequality and the inevitable bias in resource allocation to overcome the legacies of the past result in gains made by one group at the expense of another. In this context, it is difficult for population groups once forced not to interact with each other to see the interdependence of all social groups. The government is committed to redistribution, but is constrained by limited resources and social pressure. In addition, there is little public debate on the necessity for redistribution and social justice as a fundamental condition of social cohesion and stability.

## The world of work

Researchers, development practitioners, and institutions across the world are starting to raise questions about the fruits (or the spoils) of what are termed neo-liberal policies and strategies that have become a defining feature of present day globalization. Concerns have been raised about the negative values that these policies promote (such as an obsession with competition and self-enrichment) as well as the extent to which these policies have not only failed to meet their own targets, but have also deepened inequality and undermined social justice. It is within this context, and partly in an attempt to find more sustainable developmental alternatives, that the positive relationship between values such as cooperation for mutual benefit and political and economic efficiency have been investigated and concepts such as social capital and social cohesion are gaining popularity.

Although the debates over the meaning and measurement of social capital and social cohesion will be dealt with elsewhere it must be recognized that the application of these concepts to the economy is also contested. The study of the economy incorporates a variety of different disciplines (such as economics, economic sociology, industrial sociology, and labour history) and the examination of social capital and related concepts is not only unevenly distributed across these disciplines, but also tends to be framed within the main schools of thought of the disciplines concerned. Nonetheless, cooperation, thought to be central to social capital and social cohesion, has received wide attention in the literature and this preliminary investigation into the South African labour market will draw on some of the insights into cooperative relations within the workplace, the industrial relations system, and the economy that emanate from these various fields. In so doing, this study aims to identify those areas that need more attention to develop a nuanced understanding of cooperation and cohesion within South African society.

There is a general consensus that present day economic realities are rooted in the social relations inherited from the past and we have to be sensitive to the way in which both apartheid practices and the transition to democracy have shaped and continue to shape economic and social norms and relations. As a result, special attention will be paid to the racial and gender inequalities within our society and how these are changing over time. It should be borne in mind, however, that due to the tremendous changes that our society has undergone over the last decade, these relations could still be in flux.

For this report we were asked to look at a number of specific variables: employment levels; type of work; employment equity; training and skills; trade unions. We have taken note of different types of data in our examination of these variables and while quantitative measures have been used to trace key trends, qualitative measures have highlighted how these trends impact on people's lives. As Tony Ehrenreich from COSATU stated in his contribution to *What Holds Us Together*, 'Statistics do not bleed. Working families do.'<sup>55</sup> In this instance, workplace studies that make use of interviews have been examined to identify the nature and extent of cohesion and cooperation within the economy.

### Cooperation and Conflict

There is increasing recognition that the economic behavior is embedded within social relations and that the wheels that drive the economy are oiled by activities and transactions based on cooperation and related norms such as trust and reciprocity.<sup>56</sup> In order to use cooperation as an analytical tool, however, a basic distinction must be made between voluntary and necessary, or forced, forms of cooperation. Voluntary forms of cooperation take place between parties that are more or less equal and who derive a shared or fair benefit from the aid that was given. On the other hand, necessary cooperation takes place not only when cooperation becomes obligatory, but also when one party has more power and the benefits derived are disproportionate.<sup>57</sup>

Workplaces (whether it be firm or factory) clearly have both kinds of cooperation and in his study of *Sociology and Economic Life* (1992), Mark Granovetter considers the positive impact that personal-relations between employees have on generating cooperation and trust and managing conflict within the workplace and broader economy. Although Granovetter concentrates on the benefits that such relations generate for the functioning of companies, radical sociologists and historians have long studied both informal and formal instances of voluntary cooperation (solidarity or mutual aid), amongst workers. This solidarity, however, is shaped by the relations that workers have with their managers and/or employers.

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<sup>55</sup> Ehrenreich, T (2003) 'Labour, Globalization and Social Cohesion in South Africa.' in D. Chidester, P. Dexter, W. James (eds.) *What Holds Us Together*. (Cape Town: HSRC Press:) p. 83

<sup>56</sup> See Granovetter, M and Swedberg, R. (1992) *The Sociology of Economic Life*. (Westview Press: Colorado) pp. 53-79 for

a more detailed discussion on the concept of embeddedness.

<sup>57</sup> The notion of voluntary cooperation is based on Robert Putman's definition of social capital. See Putman, R.D (1993) *Making Democracy Work: civic traditions in Modern Italy*. (Princeton University Press: New Jersey.) and Putman, R.D (2001) 'Social Capital: measurement and consequences.' in Printemps. Spring 2001. (ISUMA)

Worker-employer relations, which are central to the production process, are hierarchical and are based on exploitation and dependence. Although cooperation may be necessary to make sure that production takes place, such cooperation is not usually informed or sustained by trust and reciprocity. These unequal relations are governed by entirely different norms. Dunbar Moodie, who examined the operation of a 'moral economy' on the goldmines, shows how these norms, which are framed within a set of obligations and rights, is negotiated through a complex, and often conflictual, process over time.<sup>58</sup> All too often, however, cooperation at the workplace has been enforced through the use of authoritarian measures and, drawing on the work of Michael Burawoy, Karl von Holdt argues that racial authoritarianism characterized workplace relations under apartheid and created high levels of distrust and conflict.<sup>59</sup>

Conflict costs money. This is not only true in terms of industrial action, but the breaking of contracts in general wastes time and generates extra costs (such as legal fees). At the same time, recent studies on social capital and social cohesion indicate that voluntary cooperation gives rise to more efficient economic and political practices. Some economists have adopted a very cynical approach to these findings in that they encourage the harnessing of the social relations and networks that underpin voluntary cooperation (for example the skills, information, and networks that workers have before they are trained by the firm) simply to minimize transaction and production costs and thereby increase profitability. This, it would seem, promotes a new area of enclosure as mutual aid is subsumed and exploited under capital relations.

More recent sociological studies approach cooperation from an entirely different angle. Noting the conflict-ridden nature of necessary cooperation in production, they argue that economic efficiency can be encouraged through creating conditions for meaningful cooperation<sup>60</sup> (in which the rewards are considered fair) and thereby mitigate conflict in the workplace. This can only be done, they maintain, when there is broader commitment by employers and the government to creating more equitable workplaces and an economic framework that offers real benefits to

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<sup>58</sup> Dunbar Moodie, "The Moral Economy of the Black Miners' Strike of 1946" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 13,1 (1986), pp. 1-35

<sup>59</sup> Von Holdt, K (1997), 'From the Politics of Resistance to the Politics of Reconstruction: the union and 'ungovernability' in the workplace.' Seminar Paper, Institute for Advanced Social Research.

<sup>60</sup> The extent to which voluntary cooperation can be obtained within a capitalist framework is a subject for much debate.

workers.<sup>61</sup> From this perspective discussions on the restructuring of the South African labour market have suggested that there are three key areas that can perpetuate meaningful cooperation between classes. These include: 'asset redistribution'; 'skill enhancement' and social dialogue.<sup>62</sup>

#### Asset redistribution

#### Employment Levels

Asset redistribution is based on the assumption that equity improves economic performance and greater equality in the distribution of and access to resources tends to promote efficiency within individual companies as well as within the broader economy. Key labour market trends demonstrate that the South African economy has a long way to go in terms of reversing the legacies of apartheid and creating a more equitable society. Persistent racial, class, gender and generational inequalities do not only undermine meaningful forms of cooperation, but also create deep social divisions and erode social cohesion.

One of the most striking features of the South African labour market is the exceptionally high unemployment rate. According to conservative estimates, unemployment increased from 16% in 1995 to 30% in 2002. Statistics South Africa has estimated that 28.2 % (and as high as 41% when 'discouraged' work seekers are included) of the working age population was unemployed in 2003.<sup>63</sup> This means that out of the 16,2 million economically active South Africans, 4.6 million were officially without regular employment.<sup>64</sup> Unemployment has not only reached crisis proportions, but long-term unemployment is also on the rise and the proportion of the unemployed who have been looking for work for three years or more rose from 34% in 1995 to 43% in 1999.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Macun, I (1998) 'Cooperation and Trust in South African Industrial Relations: theory and evidence.' (Unpublished: SWOP)

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> SSA, Labour Force Survey, September 2003. p. 8 The official definition of the unemployed refers to those who a.) did not work during 7 days prior to the interview, b.) want to work and are available to start work within a week of the interview, c.) have taken steps to look for work or started some form of self-employment in the 4 weeks prior to the interview. The expanded definition includes 'discouraged' work seekers' and therefore includes those who have not looked for work in the 4 weeks prior to the interview. Considering the chronic nature of unemployment in SA, many researchers argue that the expanded definition is more accurate. Figures for both the official and expanded definitions will be cited in this report.

<sup>64</sup> LFS, September 2003. p. ii

<sup>65</sup> SSA, South African Labour Market: selected time-based social and international comparisons, 2002. pp. 66-68

With the present focus on redressing the legacies of apartheid, the extent to which unemployment entrenches historic inequalities is troubling. Africans have not only experienced the most marked increase in unemployment since 1995<sup>66</sup>, but also have the highest unemployment rate, which was officially estimated at 33.7% in 2003.<sup>67</sup> Expanded definitions of unemployment indicate that up to 48.8%, that is almost half of the African working age population, was unemployed at this time.

Gendered patterns of unemployment were just as stark. While unemployment for men was still high (estimated to be 25.4% and up to 35.7% when more broadly defined), women had an unemployment rate of 31.3% in 2003 and as much as 47.8% when more broadly defined.<sup>68</sup> It is South Africa's youth, however, that bare the brunt of unemployment and according to Miriam Altman, 72% of those classified as unemployed in 2002 were under the age of thirty-five.<sup>69</sup> Youth clearly find it difficult to find work and 73% of unemployed men and women under the age of 30 years had never worked before.<sup>70</sup>

There are also marked spatial and geographical disparities and in spite of rapid urbanization that has taken place since the lifting of the influx control laws in the 1980s, unemployment is still slightly higher in the country's rural areas. Figures for 2001, for instance, indicated that 32% (or just over 50% when the 'discouraged work seekers' are included) of the working age population in non-urban areas was unemployed.<sup>71</sup> These patterns are reflected in provincial figures. In 2003 the Western Cape had an unemployment rate of 19.6% (23.5% expanded), the lowest in the country. The province with the highest unemployment rate varies according to the definition used. Although the Eastern Cape has the highest official rate of unemployment, which is 29.9%, Limpopo Province has a large number of 'despondent' work seekers and has the highest unemployment rate in the country (estimated at 49.7%) when the expanded definition is applied.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> See SSA, South African Labour Market, 2002. p. 31- 54 for increases in unemployment rates between 1995 and 1999.

<sup>67</sup> LFS, September 2003. pp. 6-7

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Altman, M. (2003) 'The State of Employment and Unemployment in South Africa.' in Daniel, J, H. Habib, and Southall, R. (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*. (HSRC Press: Cape Town) p. 162

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* It is important to note that this high unemployment rate amongst youth may account for the high overall percentage of unemployed people who have no work experience.

<sup>71</sup> The LFS for September 2003 does not supply figures for urban and non-urban areas. These figures need to be tracked, however, to trace changes in urban-rural unemployment rates as urbanization intensifies over time. See SSA, South African Labour Market, 2002. pp. 208, 216

<sup>72</sup> LFS, September 2003. pp. 8-9

The high level and persistency of unemployment raises concerns over other fundamental economic indicators. In 1996 the South African Government introduced the Growth, Employment and Re-distribution Strategy (GEAR), which sought to restructure the post-apartheid economy along neo-liberal lines. This policy has attracted substantial criticism, especially from the trade union movement, and key economic indicators show that while the government has been successful in reducing government spending and inflation, increased investment and economic growth have not responded as favorably as the policy predicted.

Many Analysts have gone on to argue that economic growth has not only been limited, but has failed to create either enough or meaningful employment.<sup>73</sup> Like most developing countries, South Africa has a relatively young population and large numbers of young work seekers enter into the labour market each year.<sup>74</sup> Although there has been some growth in employment (with the number of employed people rising from just under 8 million in 1994 to just over 11 million 2002<sup>75</sup>) this growth has not been enough to absorb new entrants.

In addition, this growth has also been confined to the informal sector. According to Ravi Naidoo, Statistics South Africa classifies any income-earning activity (regardless of the poor returns and instability) as 'informal employment'. Jobs in this sector, especially when referring to elementary employment, tend to be survivalist in nature and are unlikely to generate enough income to sustain a family or contribute to sustained development.<sup>76</sup> He argues that employment in the informal sector should rather be seen as a concealed form of under-employment.

On the other hand, there has been a substantial decline in formal sector employment and one in ten non-agricultural formal jobs have disappeared since 1994.<sup>77</sup> Industrial restructuring, which was originally prompted by the economic slow-down in the 1970s, has continued into the 1990s and led to massive employment shedding in primary sectors such as mining and agriculture.<sup>78</sup> For instance, it has been estimate that up to 500 000 jobs were lost on the farms in the 1990s. Post-1994 economic liberalization has facilitated further restructuring and mechanization and has had a massive impact on the

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<sup>73</sup> See Altman, M. (2003) and Naidoo, R. (2000) (a) 'Overview of Current Economic and Labour Market Conditions in South Africa.' (Unpublished: NALEDI)

<sup>74</sup> See Chapter 9 SSA, South African Labour Market, 2002.

<sup>75</sup> Department of Labour (2003) *Labour Market Review May 2003*. p. 7

<sup>76</sup> Naidoo, R. (2000) (a) p. 2

<sup>77</sup> Naidoo, R. (2003) 'The Union Movement and the South African Transition, 1994- 2003.' Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust/ Centre for Policy Studies Seminar (copies available at NALEDI) p. 2

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

manufacturing industry. This contraction has not been limited to the private sector and 191 076 jobs, or 13% of jobs, in the public service and major state enterprises were lost between 1995 and 2001.<sup>79</sup>

#### Types of Employment

Many private sector employers blame the new labour laws and high wages for the high unemployment rate.<sup>80</sup> They claim that workers in the formal sector, which employed 64% of the 11 million employed in 2002<sup>81</sup>, have become a 'labour aristocracy' who benefit of at the expense of the unemployed and these employers have called for the creation of a more flexible labour market. There are, however, a number of flaws with this argument.

The distinction between the unemployed and the employed is not that marked and figures show that the unemployed rely on the employed for their survival. As much as 73% of unemployed men and 77% of unemployed women (according to the official definition) depended on the financial support of a household member in 1999.<sup>82</sup> Even though wages have improved for some workers<sup>83</sup>, labour productivity in general has been greater than the growth in real wages and the aggregate profit share grew by 10% between 1990 and 2001.<sup>84</sup> There are also huge disparities between the wages of workers and high level managers and while the average wage for unskilled African men in the retail sector range from R1200- R1900 a month<sup>85</sup>, managers are receiving millions of Rands just in bonuses.

Moreover, even though apartheid was based on a myriad of laws to control the movement of black workers, Naidoo reminds us that African workers had very few rights in the past and that the labour market has always been flexible. While legislation such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour Relations Act are much needed advances, there are indications that the labour market is becoming more flexible. For instance, formal workers still do not have that many rights. According to Miriam Altman, benefits in the formal sector in 2001 could be broken down as follows: 57% of workers had written contracts; 55% had pension plans and 63%

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<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> Naidoo, R. (2003) p. 3

<sup>81</sup> DoL, *Labour Market Review May 2003*. p. 7

<sup>82</sup> SSA, *South African Labour Market (2002)*, p. 155

<sup>83</sup> While some authors assume that the wages for skilled workers has increased, SSA, *South African Labour Market, 2002* p. 151 argues that while the wages in more skilled occupations have not kept pace with inflation, the real wages of less skilled workers has increased between 1995 and 1999.

<sup>84</sup> Natrass, N (2003) 'The State of the Economy: a crisis of employment.' in Daniel, J, H. Habib, and Southall, R. (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*. (Cape Town: HSRC Press) p. 148

<sup>85</sup> Naidoo, R. (2003), p.3

had access to paid leave.<sup>86</sup> Altman also notes that there are huge disparities in working conditions between the private and public sector. Whereas 86.7% of workers in the public sector had pension plans in 2001, only 47.2% of workers in the private sector had the same benefit.

Employers have also started making more extensive use of 'atypical' employment including the use of casuals, contractors, and labour brokers. NALEDI, the research arm of COSATU, estimates that the use of casual employment rose 275% between 1999 and 2002, while sub-contracted labour rose by an astonishing 322%.<sup>87</sup> Workplace studies highlight the negative impact the use of atypical forms of labour can have on the relations between workers. In her study of workers in the retail sector, Bridget Kenny looks at the tensions that have emerged between casual and permanent workers. Although casuals have fewer rights/ benefits and earn less than their permanent counterparts, the extensive use of causal labour and job insecurity has divided and atomized workers. Workers identify themselves according to their employment status – such as '*amacasual*' and '*amapermanent*' - and as one permanent workers stated, 'I used to feel happy to come to work...Now, what is the purpose? I have a job, but tomorrow it could be gone. And they want me to smile today.'<sup>88</sup>

#### Employment Equity

Although figures for the racial and gender breakdown of atypical types of work are needed, it is clear that in spite of the passage of the Employment Equity Act, racial and gender inequalities persist in the more skilled and managerial occupations. Even though African, Coloureds and Indians constitute the majority of the total workforce, they hold relatively few key decision making positions in the economy. The Commission for Employment Equity has noted that in 2002 African, Coloureds and Indians accounted for 32% of legislators; 19% of all top management positions and 22% of all senior management position.<sup>89</sup> Whites, on the other hand, account for 68% of legislators; 81% of all top management positions; and 78% of senior management positions. Disparities in the professions are less pronounced and African, Coloureds and Indians account for 56%, while whites account for 44%.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Altman, M. (2003) pp. 166-7.

<sup>87</sup> Naidoo, R. (2003), p.4

<sup>88</sup> Kenny, B. (2001) 'We Are Nursing these Jobs': the impact of labour market flexibility on South African workers in the retail sector.' In ILRIG (eds) *Is there and Alternative? South African Workers Confronting Globalization*. p. 98

<sup>89</sup> Department of Labour, *Commission for Employment Equity: annual report 2002-2003*. p. viii

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 13-16

There has been even less improvement for women who account for 26% of legislators; 14% of all top management positions and 21% of all senior management position. Although women are more fairly represented in the professions, where women occupy more than half of the positions, and technical categories, they tend to be clustered in the lower rungs.<sup>91</sup> According to the Employment Equity Commission men (and not women) dominate the lower end jobs and account for 69% of elementary occupations; 54% of non-permanent positions; and 64% of unskilled positions. It should be noted that these figures, which are derived from the reports of employers, are probably confined to the formal sector.<sup>92</sup>

Over and above these racial and gender inequalities, South Africa also has deep class cleavages and South African is considered to be one of the most unequal countries in the world. With such inequity it is obvious that significant asset redistribution is necessary to create the conditions needed for more meaningful cooperation. Poverty alleviation remains a key focus at this stage and there have been calls for the creation of a social grant for the poor as well as payment of a 'living wage' to workers.

#### Skills enhancement

Proponents of the skill enhancement argument maintain that there is a positive relationship between the level of skills and the amount of discretion workers are given over their work.<sup>93</sup> Discretion is based on trust and this trust may facilitate more healthy forms of cooperation in the economy and the workplace. To date, there has been very little research conducted on skills and training in South Africa. This is quite disconcerting since the government has adopted skills development as a central strategy to address the skills shortage and inequity; alleviate poverty; and create employment.

The new democracy inherited a racially skewed skill base and marked shortages in technical and managerial skills.<sup>94</sup> The quality of education made available to Africans under apartheid also proved unsatisfactory and questions have been raised about the literacy levels of the workforce. Keenly aware of these problems, the government passed the Skills Development Act (1998) and Skills Levy Act (1999) and went on to established 25 sector education and training authorities

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<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* pp. viii

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 13- 20

<sup>93</sup> Macun, I (1998) p. 24- 5

<sup>94</sup> Moleke, P (2000) 'The State of the Labour Market in Contemporary South Africa.' in Daniel, J, H. Habib, and Southall, R. (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004.* (HSRC Press: Cape Town) pp. 204- 206

(SETAS) in 2000, which are funded through the 1% pay-roll levy.<sup>95</sup> These Acts and related institutions are part of the broader National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS), which aims to enable local business to, '...compete more successfully in the global economy, attract investment, ...eradicate poverty and build a more inclusive and equal society.'<sup>96</sup>

Analysts have warned, however, that skills development is not a panacea. Currently the average skills profile of a large company can be broken down as follows- 15% managerial/professional; 30% skilled artisan and 55% semi and unskilled.<sup>97</sup> According to Naidoo, surveys of large companies indicate that firms will be recruiting fewer full-time employees. Those that are recruited will be highly skilled, while any new lower skilled positions that are created will be temporary (linked to contract work and more flexible arrangements). He argues that the rising skill profile of companies, therefore, will reflect the outsourcing of the less skilled workers rather than a growth in industrial knowledge-intensity.

In addition, the correlation between education levels and unemployment is not as straightforward as commonly thought. Figures indicate that while people who have obtained the highest education levels had the lowest unemployment rates, the unemployment rates for those who had completed secondary education was higher than for people who had no formal education at all. In 2003 as many as 1 111 000 of those who had passed grade 12 were unemployed, while relatively fewer number of 136 000 of the unemployed (officially defined) had no education.<sup>98</sup>

So far SETAS training has focused on ABE, IT skills, and HIV-AID, and health and safety issues.<sup>99</sup> Concerns, however, have been raised about these new institutions. Not only have they fallen short of providing the promised 72 000 learnerships for unemployed youth, but they seem to be institutionally weak have been and have plagued by financial irregularities.<sup>100</sup> Ravi Naidoo and David Jarvis also note that while trade unions seem to lack the capacity to shape training programs within sectors, many employers are treating the skills levy as a form of tax and are not investing in training.<sup>101</sup> For example, only 12% of the potential grant claims have been processed by the Metal, Engineering and Related Sectors Education Training Authority

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<sup>95</sup> Merten, M and Letsoalo, M 'The M&G Seta Report.' *Mail and Guardian*, August 6 to 12 2004

<sup>96</sup> Quoted in Moleke, P. (2000) p. 209

<sup>97</sup> Naidoo, R and Jarvis, D (n/d) 'Skills Development, not a panacea.' NALEDI

<sup>98</sup> LFS, September 2003, p. 59

<sup>99</sup> Merten, M and Letsoalo, M 'The M&G Seta Report.' *Mail and Guardian*, August 6 to 12 2004.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Naidoo, R and Jarvis, D (n/d)

(Merseta) to date. Nonetheless, the real test of their success will be the extent to which these authorities address the skill shortages and stimulate job creation in their respective sectors.<sup>102</sup>

One key critique of the skills enhancement thesis is that discretion over work is not necessarily tied to skill and it may be possible to pass on greater responsibility to workers employed in jobs that require less skill by expanding their decision making over the way work is carried out and changing the way in which work is monitored.<sup>103</sup> This means that managerial and supervisory practices need to be changed in order to generate more trust in the workplace. So far studies indicate that the current trend towards adopting more atypical forms of labor will have the opposite impact and promote distrust between workers and their managers. In Kenny's study on flexible labour in the retail sector, for instance, she found that casuals and sub-contracted workers were monitored by close circuit television and that managers did not bother with disciplinary hearings and simply chased workers away when they were suspected of any wrong doing.<sup>104</sup>

### Social Dialogue

Social dialogue refers to the management of employment relations and socio-economic issues through informal, formal and statutory systems and institutions of negotiation and consultation. In the South African context this includes collective bargaining between unions and employers as well as negotiation over broader social and economic policy through forums such as NEDLAC that include employers, unions, the government and broader civil society.<sup>105</sup> It is convincingly argued that when dialogue takes place on a regular basis, parties have to negotiate in good faith and regular contact allows relations of trust to be built up. Related to this, some authors argue that tripartite forums such as NEDLAC will also deepen democracy in that civil society is given an opportunity to influence policy formation.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> It is most likely that NALEDI's research into the various sectors will provide much needed information on job creation and skills in the various sectors. The research findings, however, have been embargoed and will only be released early next year.

<sup>103</sup> Macun, I. (1998), p. 24

<sup>104</sup> Kenny, B. (2001) p. 97

<sup>105</sup> There seems to be some debate over what voice regulation may include- while Macun i. (1998) suggests that dialogue should exclude the state, Naidoo suggests that voice regulation should also include forums such as NEDLAC, which include the state. (see Naidoo, 2000 (b) 'Worker Rights in a Hostile Environment: going beyond competitiveness.' Presented to Economic Integration and Inequality in the Global Economy, Ballagio, Italy (copy available from NALEDI)

<sup>106</sup> Naidoo, R. (2000) (b.) p. 5

Since the early 1970s Black trade unions with have fought for basic trade union and negotiating rights and since 1994 trade unions have been accepted as a permanent feature of the economic landscape. Figures from the Department of Labour show that the number of industrial actions by industry dropped from 107 in 1999 to 47 in 2002 and the number of work days lost decreased from just over 2.5 million to just over 600 000 in the same period.<sup>107</sup> On the other hand, the number cases referred to the CCMA increased from just over 110,000 in 2001 to 118,000 in 2002<sup>108</sup>, while the number of collective bargaining agreements declined by more than half from 156 in 1994 to 73 in 2000.<sup>109</sup>

The social dialogue system in South Africa is well developed, complex and effective. Apart from the 76 bargaining councils covering various sectors of the economy, there is bargaining at a large proportion of enterprises. There are also institutions such as the Employment Equity Commission, The Employment Conditions Commission, the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration that are all governed by the social partners or constituencies. Regular consultations take place between the President and the constituencies through the Presidential Working Groups and between organised labour and business in the Millennium Labour Council.

#### Trade Unions

At this stage it is unclear whether these figures point to improving relations between employers and trade union or changes taking place in the trade union movement due to shifts in the labour market. There has been a steady increase in registered trade union membership in the last decade from 2 905 993 members in 1992 to 3 939 075 in 2001.<sup>110</sup> Unlike many other countries where there is a general decrease in the number of trade unions through mergers over time, the number of registered trade unions in South Africa has increased.<sup>111</sup> Between 1992 and 2001 the number of registered grew from 194 to 485. According to Macun, most of these registered trade unions are not affiliated to any federation and are not concentrated in any occupational group or industry. The majority of organized workers, however, are concentrated into three main trade

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<sup>107</sup> *Dol Labour Market Review, May 2003*. pp. 49- 50

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.* p. 52

<sup>109</sup> South African Institute of Race Relations, 'South African Survey, 2002/2003'. p. 187

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.* p. 185.

<sup>111</sup> Macun, I (2000) 'Growth, Structure and Power in the South African Labour Movement.' in Adler, G and Webster, E (eds) *Trade Unions and Democratisation in South Africa, 1985-1997*. (Witwatersrand University Press: Johannesburg) pp. 57-74.

union federations. These include COSATU (with a membership of 1.8 million); FEDUSA (with a membership of 500 000) and NACTU (with a membership of 397 106).<sup>112</sup>

These figures alone fail to give us any insight into the main challenges that the trade union movement has experienced over the last ten years. Firstly, it is often noted that the trade unions have failed to respond effectively to the increases in atypical and flexible labour arrangements. Unions have failed to reach out to outsourced, sub-contracted, and casual workers, and even when unions have organized flexible workers they have been unable to address their demands. Secondly, even though the main federations have challenged business and government's right to make unilateral decisions by participating in structures such as National Economic Forum, the National Manpower Commission, and, more recently, NEDLAC,<sup>113</sup> these federations have failed to forge a united position on broader issues. In addition, authors such as Sakhela Buhlungu argue that the trade union movement lacks the strategic, financial, and administrative capacity to take advantage of the opportunities that an engagement with business and the government could offer.<sup>114</sup> To give an example, the high turn over and loss of experienced trade unionists erodes the skills base and upsets the relationships that have been forged during negotiation. Most importantly, the influence of the trade union movement will always remain limited as long as the government refuses to negotiate macro-economic policy.<sup>115</sup>

By looking at the internal dynamics of trade unions, especially COSATU, Buhlungu raises a number of questions about voluntary cooperation between workers today. Many of COSATU's affiliates have come from a tradition that was based on democratic practices and 'workers control'. Putman argues that organizations that have clearly defined boundaries and are based on rules decided on by the members tend to be more effective and these new unions reflected a high level of social capital amongst black workers. According to Buhlungu, internal democracy is being undermined by the emergence of an elitist bargaining culture based on the technical knowledge of trade union officials; rising apathy amongst members; and a decline in shop steward education.

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<sup>112</sup> <http://www.cosatu.org.za>; <http://www.fedusa.org.za>; <http://www.nactu.org.za>

<sup>113</sup> Friedman, S. and Shaw, M. (2000) 'Power in Partnership? Trade Unions, Forums and the Transition.' in Adler, G and Webster, E (eds) *Trade Unions and Democratization in South*. . (Witwatersrand University Press: Johannesburg)

<sup>114</sup> Buhlungu, S (2000) in Daniel, J, H. Habib, and Southall, R. (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*. (Cape Town: HSRC Press).

<sup>115</sup> See also Naidoo, R. (2001) 'Poverty Alleviation Through Social Dialogue: the role of trade unions in South Africa. (NALEDI)

Although some attention has been paid to trade unions, there is little written on the cooperative relations amongst workers that transcend the workplace and the workday. The formation of 'home-boy networks' by migrant workers serves as an excellent example. These networks, which played a central role in reproducing migrant cultures in the first half of the twentieth century, were controlled by older more experienced male migrants from a particular area and provided young rural men with much needed support and protection as they tried to adapt to work and life in the urban areas.<sup>116</sup>

More recent studies which look at the impact that these networks had on the on the spread of disease, especially STDs, emphasize the regulatory function that these networks exercised, especially in terms of prohibiting liaisons with urban women and ensuring that wages were sent back to maintain the rural economy.<sup>117</sup> 'Home-boy networks' have been eroding since the 1940s and investigations into migrant worker attitudes on the mines at present suggest that destructive masculine identities, which have reached beyond the workplace and have a negative impact on gender relations and health, have since taken root.<sup>118</sup> Similarly, a study by Stephanie Barrientos and Andrietta Kritzingler on the fruit export sector indicates that migrants are particularly vulnerable, especially when it comes to issues of cohesion in that those migrants employed in the apple export industry tended settle in transient settlements made up of 'strangers' in which high levels of crime and violence undermine any sense of belonging.<sup>119</sup>

## Unemployment

## Race, Gender and Geography

One of the most striking features of the South African labour market is the exceptionally high unemployment rate. According to conservative estimates, unemployment increased from 16% in

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<sup>116</sup> David Coplan, "The Emergence of an African Working-Class Culture" in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone (eds.) *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930* (London: Longman, 1982), pp. 358-375. and Dunbar Moodie, "Migrancy and Male Sexuality on the South African Gold Mines" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 14,2 (1988), pp. 228-256.


<sup>117</sup> See papers of Aids in Context Papers, History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand (April 2001) especially Delius P and Glaiser, C. 'Sexual socialisation in historical perspective'; Horwitz, S. 'Migrancy and HIV/Aid- a historical perspective; and Marks, S. 'An Epidemic Waiting to Happen ? The Spread of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in a Social and Historical Perspective.'

<sup>118</sup> Campbell, C (1997) 'Migrancy, Masculine Identities and Aids: the psychological context of HIV transmission on South African gold mines. *Soc. Sci Med.* Vol. 45, No. 2. pp 273-1997.

<sup>119</sup> Stephanie Barrientos and Andrietta Kritzingler (2003) 'The Poverty of Work and Social Cohesion in Global Exports: the case of South African Fruit.' in D. Chidester, P. Dexter, W. James (eds.) *What Holds Us Together*. (Cape Town: HSRC Press:) pp. 92-119.

1995 to 30% in 2002. Statistics South Africa has estimated that 28.2 % (and as high as 41% when 'discouraged' work seekers are included) of the working age population was unemployed in 2003.<sup>120</sup> This means that out of the 16,2 million economically active South Africans, 4.6 million were officially without regular employment.<sup>121</sup> Long-term unemployment is on also on the rise and the proportion of the unemployed who have been looking for work for three years or more rose from 34% in 1995 to 43% in 1999.<sup>122</sup>

### Unemployment (Labour Force Survey 2003)



Unemployment by population and sex (Labour Force Survey, 2003)

There are also marked spatial and geographical disparities in the distribution of unemployment. For example, in 2001 32% (or just over 50% when the 'discouraged work seekers' are included) of the working age population in non-urban areas was unemployed.<sup>123</sup> These patterns are reflected in provincial figures. In 2003 the Western Cape had an unemployment rate of 19.6%


<sup>120</sup> SSA, Labour Force Survey, September 2003. p. 8 The official definition of the unemployed refers to those who a.) did not work during 7 days prior to the interview, b.) want to work and are available to start work within a week of the interview, c.) have taken steps to look for work or started some form of self-employment in the 4 weeks prior to the interview. The expanded definition includes 'discouraged' work seekers' and therefore includes those who have not looked for work in the 4 weeks prior to the interview. Considering the chronic nature of unemployment in SA, many researchers argue that the expanded definition is more accurate. Figures for both the official and expanded definitions will be cited in this report.

<sup>121</sup> LFS, September 2003. p. ii

<sup>122</sup> SSA, South African Labour Market: selected time-based social and international comparisons, 2002. pp. 66-68

<sup>123</sup> The LFS for September 2003 does not supply figures for urban and non-urban areas. These figures need to be tracked, however, to trace changes in urban-rural unemployment rates as urbanization intensifies over time. See SSA, South African Labour Market, 2002. pp. 208, 216

(23.5% expanded), the lowest in the country. The province with the highest unemployment rate varies according to the definition used. Although the Eastern Cape has the highest official rate of unemployment, which is 29.9%, Limpopo Province has a large number of 'despondent' work seekers and has the highest unemployment rate in the country (estimated at 49.7%) when the expanded definition is applied.<sup>124</sup>



Unemployment by province (Labour Force Survey, March 2003)

### *Youth Unemployment*


Like most developing countries, South Africa has a relatively young population and large numbers of young work seekers enter into the labour market each year.<sup>125</sup> Although there has been some growth in employment (with the number of employed people rising from just under 8 million in 1994 to just over 11 million 2002<sup>126</sup>) this growth has not been enough to absorb new entrants.

<sup>124</sup> LFS, September 2003. pp. 8-9

<sup>125</sup> See Chapter 9 SSA, South African Labour Market, 2002.

<sup>126</sup> Department of Labour (2003) *Labour Market Review May 2003*. p. 7

## Number of unemployed by age, 1995 & 2002



Source: Woolard and Altman (2004), forthcoming, calculated from Stats SA: OHS 1995 and LFS Sept 2002.

In addition to high rates of unemployment, young people who are lucky enough to find jobs also face conditions of employment that are precarious and insecure. For example, at least a quarter of respondents in the SYR survey who had work were employed in temporary positions, and the trends suggest that temporary employment for youth is increasing. Many young people, particularly Africans and coloureds, were also employed in elementary occupations and in domestic work. Furthermore, a substantial number (31.7%) of young people were employed in the informal sector, probably because they had been unable to find jobs in the formal economy. Here also major racial inequalities exist, with 39.2% of Africans and 31% of coloureds being employed in the informal sectors as against 15% of whites and 3.3% of Indians. Comparison of 1997 OHS data and 2002 LFS data shows an increase in youth involvement in the informal sector from 17% in 1997 to 25% in 2002.

## Wages and household income

Even though wages have improved for some workers<sup>127</sup>, labour productivity in general has been greater than the growth in real wages and the aggregate profit share grew by 10% between 1990 and 2001.<sup>128</sup> There are also huge disparities between the wages of workers and high level managers and while the average wage for unskilled African men in the retail sector range from R1200- R1900 a month<sup>129</sup>, managers are receiving millions of Rands in salaries alone, not to mention bonuses. These are often driven by increased profits created from cutting jobs or adopting less labour intensive methods, driving the paradox that as companies contribute less to social cohesion and social justice and even to social capital, they reap more actual return on capital and profits.

### *Skills promotion*

The new democracy inherited a racially skewed skill base and marked shortages in technical and managerial skills.<sup>130</sup> The quality of education made available to Africans under apartheid also proved unsatisfactory and questions have been raised about the literacy levels of the workforce. Keenly aware of these problems, the government passed the Skills Development Act (1998) and Skills Levy Act (1999) and went on to establish 25 sector education and training authorities (SETAs) in 2000, which are funded through the 1% pay-roll levy.<sup>131</sup> These Acts and related institutions are part of the broader National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS), which aims to enable local business to, '...compete more successfully in the global economy, attract investment, ...eradicate poverty and build a more inclusive and equal society.'<sup>132</sup>

One criticism of the skills enhancement thesis is that the rising skill profile of companies will reflect the outsourcing of the less skilled workers rather than a growth in industrial knowledge-intensity.

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<sup>127</sup> While some authors assume that the wages for skilled workers has increased, SSA, South African Labour Market, 2002 p. 151 argues that while the wages in more skilled occupations have not kept pace with inflation, the real wages of less skilled workers has increased between 1995 and 1999.

<sup>128</sup> Natrass, N (2003) 'The State of the Economy: a crisis of employment.' in Daniel, J, H. Habib, and Southall, R. (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*. (Cape Town: HSRC Press) p. 148

<sup>129</sup> Naidoo, R. (2003), p.3

<sup>130</sup> Moleke, P (2000) 'The State of the Labour Market in Contemporary South Africa.' in Daniel, J, H. Habib, and Southall, R. (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*. (HSRC Press: Cape Town) pp. 204- 206

<sup>131</sup> Merten, M and Letsoalo, M 'The M&G Seta Report.' *Mail and Guardian*, August 6 to 12 2004

<sup>132</sup> Quoted in Moleke, P. (2000) p. 209

A second criticism relates to the often assumed correlation between education levels and unemployment. Figures indicate that while people who have obtained the highest education levels had the lowest unemployment rates, the largest *growth* in unemployment between 1995 and 2003 occurred among people with matric and tertiary education. Unemployment rates grew by 56% for those with matric and by 139% for those with tertiary qualifications. It should also be noted that, by 2002, the unemployment rate of those with matric was only slightly lower than those with a primary education and had surpassed the unemployment rate of people with no schooling (see Table2). These trends suggest that the rapid growth in unemployment at the top end of the education scale is related to the difficulties that new entrants into the labour market have in finding jobs, and may therefore be indicative of the growth of *youth* unemployment.

	1995	2002
No schooling	33.12	32.2
Primary	35.49	41.38
Incomplete secondary	33.85	48.39
Matric	25.28	39.51
Tertiary	6.44	15.37
Total	29.24	39.51

Unemployment rates by education level, 1995 and 2002 (Bhorat, 2003: 43)

#### Unpaid care work

A crucial area of socio-economic activity is the reproductive activity that is largely performed by women that ensures basic units of society, households, function. This important social base provides the first unit of society, the family, with its material basis for continuation. Food, care and hygiene are vital to social cohesion and social justice.

A recently published study points to the lack of information in South Africa regarding this important aspect of social existence that requires further study. It also points out the difficulty of measuring unpaid work. (Budlender, p21) The study defines unpaid care work as, 'the activity of serving people and their well-being...arising from a social or contractual obligation, such as marriage or less formal relationships' and not receiving a wage for this activity that 'has a cost in

terms of time and energy' of the person carrying it out. (Budlender, p2) From UNDP sources, the study does show that in South Africa, women receive 45% of the income of men.

The reasons for the work being unpaid relates to the patriarchal nature of society, there are patterns of such work being unpaid that are reproduced, the undervaluation of the work and its unskilled character generally. The report speaks also to the phenomenon of the feminisation of poverty. (Budlender, p7) In terms of participation in the labour force, women in South Africa make up 43.9 % of the labour force while only 40.3 5 are employed. (Budlender, p13) (What are they in population terms? 54%?)


Equity and fair reward are two of the most important prerequisites for meaningful cooperation (as opposed to necessary cooperation) to take place between workers and their employers in the workplace and the economy. Some authors argue that asset redistribution, training and education, and social dialogue, especially on a national scale, can level the playing fields and contribute to such cooperation. This would constitute a building of social cohesion and social capital and also ensure greater social justice. South Africa is a deeply divided society and the ability to actually achieve a society that promotes the well-being of all within the current context of neo-liberal globalization remains questionable. Cooperation across social divisions will remain limited where macro-economic policy is unilaterally decided and employers and the other beneficiaries of changes in the economy continue to undermine workers' rights by paying low wages and avoiding basic laws and protections through the adoption of atypical work and flexible labour strategies.

## Racism

Ten years into our new democracy, race remains an important aspect of South African society both because racism has not significantly decreased and because cognisance of the social fact of race focuses our attention on promoting social cohesion and achieving social justice. While there has been some qualitative research into racism in South Africa, data that quantifies the extent of racism and racial discrimination is relatively poor. Where this research has been conducted, the reliability of findings is contested due to the controversy of the subject and social cleavages. Perceptions and attitudes, which are central to racism, can be a useful point of entry into the subject. Much of the available quantitative data has been gathered through social attitudes surveys such as the HSRC's South African Social Attitudes Survey.

Research conducted during 2000-1 asked respondents about race relations. 42% indicated these had improved since 1994 while 15% indicated relations have deteriorated (fig 1). Cross-tabulated by race (fig 2), slightly more Africans believed race relations have improved than Whites (42.9% and 39.3% respectively) while nearly three times as many Whites believed that race relations had deteriorated (33.4% and 11.7% respectively). Indians seemed most optimistic with 58.9% believing relations have improved against only 8.3% who believe they had deteriorated. The coloured population appeared the most guarded, with the highest percentage of respondents believing race relations have stayed the same as well as the highest percentage of respondents indicating they were uncertain (35.2% and 11.4% respectively). An interesting statistic that comes from the same study is that almost the same percentage of respondents felt that race no longer matters as against the percentage that thought race does still matter (39.5% and 38.9% respectively).

Fig 1: Race relations in post-1994 South Africa, aggregate data



Grossberg, 2002:65

Fig 2: Race relations in post-1994 South Africa, by race

	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Improved	42,9	33,5	58,9	39,3	42,1
Remained the same	34,9	35,2	24,1	19,8	32,8
Deteriorated	11,7	19,9	8,3	33,4	14,9
Uncertain	10,5	11,4	8,7	7,6	10,1

However, the data becomes unreliable when the research attempts to quantify the extent of racism in South Africa. For example, 72,5% of respondents indicated that they had not experienced and racial discrimination during the preceding past 6 months. Grossberg notes that this figure applied to the majority of respondents across all racial groups, within all provinces, and across all Living Standard Measurement (LSM) categories. She goes on to say that of the 27,5% of respondents who report they have been racially discriminated against, most report that it was only on one occasion.<sup>133</sup> The difficulty here is that to conclude from this finding that the incidence of racism is receding is to assume that all respondents are equally able to identify when they are being discriminated against. Furthermore, it assumes they all share the same definition of racial discrimination.

Positive correlations between race and poverty, access to basic services and access to land as well as intersections between racism and public discourse and cultural and intellectual life draw

<sup>133</sup> Grossberg, 2003: 66-67

a strong parallel between one's race and the extent of one's marginalisation or access to full participation in South African social life. Though social mobility within racially defined population groups has increased since 1994 and therefore does to a certain extent reduce the congruency of these correlations, that the correlations remain powerfully positive is undeniable and therefore remain a profound indicator of how much work remains if social justice is to be achieved for the majority of the population. Another way of looking at this statistic is to draw a distinction between prejudice and discrimination. From this perspective, the statistic identifies the number of South Africans who feel they have been treated with prejudice on the basis of their race in the preceding six months. In contrast, the statistic says very little about the broader issue of racial discrimination in South Africa. Quite simply, the problem of racial discrimination is intricately woven into South Africa's social fabric; while the pattern is often plain to see, tracing the thread can be very difficult.

Perhaps a more useful quantitative indicator of racism in South Africa is data from the 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Report of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) which shows that between April 2001 and March 2002 the commission received 3001 complaints (fig 3). Of these, 320 were rejected outright on the basis that no violations had taken place and a further 1395 were referred to other forums. During the same period, 969 cases were resolved and 277 cases remained outstanding. To what extent race played a role in these cases is not clear, though given that the Commission for Gender Equality deals with gender discrimination and bearing in mind the 1395 referred cases, it is likely that race played a role in most if not all of these cases. What is clear is that the Human Rights Commission is a very important and very busy forum.

Fig 3: Complaints received at the SAHRC

Nature of Complaints	Numbers Received	Numbers Dealt With	Numbers Referred	Numbers Outstanding	Open cases received prior to this financial year (head office)	Rejected Complaints
Equality	233	197	0	70	82	
Human Dignity	94	84	0	35	7	
Life	5	1	0	5	4	
Freedom and Security of the Person	86	68	0	28	5	
Privacy	9	9	0	3	1	
Freedom of Expression	2	1	0	1	2	
Political Rights	0	0	0	0	1	
Freedom of Association	2	2	0	1		
Citizenship	4	3	0	2	3	
Freedom of Movement and Residence	8	1	0	7	4	
Freedom of Trade, Occupation and Profession	7	5	0	4	2	
Labour Relations	173	64	50	10	22	
Environment	7	6	0	1	3	
Property	29	23	0	7	2	
Housing	30	18	0	14	5	
Health Care, Food, water and Social Security	24	19	0	5	24	
Education	25	15	0	13	18	
Language and Culture	7	5	0	2	2	
Access to Information	40	29	0	11	9	
Just Administrative Action	136	134	0	20	9	
Access to Courts	70	49	0	27	26	
Arrested, Detained and Accused persons	84	25	63	11	7	
More information Required from Complainant	211	211				
Complaints belonging to other forums	1395		1395			
No violations of humanrights (outright rejections)	320					320
TOTAL	3001	969	1508	277	238	320

From SAHRC 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Report, April 2001-March 2002: 24

The publications of the SAHRC are another important indicator of how much and in what ways race still matters in South Africa. Some of the important reports published by the commission include, the Inquiry into Racism in the SAPS Vryburg District (1999), Racism, 'Racial Integration' and Desegregation in South African Public Secondary Schools in conjunction with a report on the Conference on Racial Integration in Schools (1999), Faultlines: Inquiry into Racism in the Media (2000), a report following the National Conference on Racism (2001), the Inquiry into Racism and Racial Discrimination in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (2002), and a statement on Hate Crimes and Hate Speech in South Africa following judgement

in a case brought before the commission by a political party in relation to political slogans (2003). Clearly racism does still matter, whether it be in the work of government departments, the campaigning of political parties, the policing of communities, the rhetoric of mass media, or the lived experience of learners.

From the perspective of the current inquiry, the prominence of questions of racial discrimination as well as the racially skewed patterns of access to basic services suggests that society is still extensively divided along racial lines and consequently that social cohesion is weak. However, if horizontal bonding social capital is weak, the prominence of public debates surrounding race and the outputs of the SAHRC suggest that vertical bridging social capital is actually quite strong. This vertical capital is strengthened by the work of civil society organisations and agencies. Although there remains a long way to go, the supplanting of apartheid's institutional apparatus with a new and inclusive state infrastructure that invests in vertical bridging social capital suggests that South Africa has travelled a considerable distance on the road toward social justice. This perspective is to some extent supported by quantitative data that suggest that racial divisions are narrowing, though this data needs deeper critical analysis. However, while the work of establishing an institutional framework through which to address racial discrimination has largely been done, the difficult work ahead involves building horizontal bonding social capital so that the cohesiveness of society may be strengthened. Crucial to this social investment is careful monitoring and evaluation to ensure that meaningful progress is made and to consolidate the social benefits thereby gained.

## Sexism

### The South African gender struggle

Feminism is a multi-stranded approach to issues of gender and women in particular, and was introduced relatively late to South Africa and generally viewed with mistrust from within the anti-apartheid struggle and the supporters of the Nationalist government (Levett & Kottler, 1998). Mamphela Ramphele and Emile Boonzaier noted in the late 1980s that “race relation form the core of the political debate and concern about gender relationships is either irrelevant or overshadowed by the more pressing problems associated with relationships between different races, ethnic groups, cultures, tribes and so on” (1988: 153 in Boonzaier & Sharp). Issues of race dominated the struggle rhetoric, and issues of culture and identities later came to dominate the formulation of the South African constitution and the development of post-apartheid policy and public discourse. Remarkably, the shift for democracy in South Africa and the emphasis on gender equality occurred without a unified, coherent feminist lobby; but rather because of pockets of women with feminist agendas of equality (Levett & Kottler). The gender struggle in South Africa is therefore relatively young, and while major gaps in gender equity still exist, extraordinary progress has occurred.

Women in South Africa across the board have been marginalised. The patriarchal apartheid state favoured the economic and social advancement of white able-bodied heterosexual men, and instituted unfair and discriminatory socio-economic policies that while racially based, had a strong gender component. The dismantlement of apartheid and the strengthening of constitutional democracy served as the motivation for the landmark Commission on Gender Equality – an independent forum to facilitate, promote and monitor gender equality in South African society (de la Rey & Kottler 1999). The state rhetoric around socio-economic policy favours gender equity, yet the outcomes of the economic policies do not favourably impact on most South African women.

For Robert Putnam (2000) the institution and sustainability of democracy in a country is a measure of the social cohesion in that nation. The South African constitution and government policy are widely regarded as the most progressive in terms of democratic gender rights in the world. However, there is a schism between policy and practice – government policy is not always implemented as intended, and sometimes there is very little awareness on the ground by public administrators and the general public of these policies and the implications of

implementation (Zietkiewicz and Long, 1999). For example, although women are able to enjoy positions of power in government, the private sector and the NPO sector, they are subject to increasing levels of crime.

### Measurement

Women make up more than half of the total South African population (52%). In 2001 there were approximately 23.4 million women compared with 21.4 million men, yet the socio-economic statistics reflect a minority position for women. The World Bank ranked South Africa in 2000 as having the highest gender empowerment measure, and the fourth highest gender-related development index in Africa.

There are two dimensions to the gender situation – a quantitative dimension (the relative numbers of females and males in specific sectors, settings or situation), and a qualitative dimension (focussing on knowledge, experiences, priorities, values and perceptions of both men and women) (Thomas ref). As such two distinctive approaches to the measurement of these concepts must be used. Firstly a quantitative approach<sup>134</sup> that counts the numbers of women and the roles they play in various sectors (for example, the number of women scientists); the incidences of gender discrimination (including sexual harassment and unpaid care work) and gender violence (rape; sexual abuse; sexual assault and domestic violence). The second approach would necessarily include in depth analysis and interviews of the perceptions and attitudes of both men and women to gender discrimination and sexism in order to understand more fully how to promote gender equity in order to in turn advance social cohesion.

Many studies have shown that even those women who might be relatively more economically and educationally empowered than the majority of women in the townships, nevertheless endure barriers to their full and non-gendered participation in contemporary society and communities. Given the historical and current economic disempowerment of women generally in South Africa, and black women more specifically, it is important to understand the gendered nature of social capital and social cohesion.

### Feminisation of poverty

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<sup>134</sup> This paper is an attempt at this first approach.

While the state claims that the reduction of poverty in the country is one of its main and critical objectives, it employs long-term macro-economic policies that on the whole do not seem to benefit the poor. The most recent national survey, Census 2001 makes a clear argument that the poor are in fact worse off now than they were in 1996, and women constitute the majority of the poor. Almost a decade after democratisation and the ushering in of liberal economic policies, statistics show that poverty and inequality have increased, with a 7.6% increase in unemployment between 1997 and 2002, to 30.5% (Statistics South Africa, 2002).

#### Gendered nature of poverty

Economic empowerment; poverty and unemployment are gendered – more women than men are likely to be poor; and more women than men are likely to be unemployed. Pape (2000) notes that the gender aspects of globalisation have been kept at the margins. It is important to unpack the gendered nature of globalisation in order to assess its effect on social cohesion. Mies (1994) emphasises the trend of feminisation of poverty located at the interstices between globalisation processes and gender. She explains that by recognising that economic policies are seldom gender neutral, the exploitation of women within the context of economic liberalisation can be more holistically understood.

A wider and more thorough definition of poverty is required in order to implement strategies to combat or reduce it. "Poverty is more than just a lack of income. Poverty exists where an individual or a household's access to income, jobs and infrastructure is inadequate or sufficiently unequal to prohibit full access to opportunities in society. The condition of poverty is caused by a combination of social, economic, spatial, environmental and political factors" (Parnell & Mosdell, 2003). Government projects tend to target poverty with a short-term and rural focus. The post apartheid demographic reality counters stereotypes that have depicted South African cities as predominantly white, adult and male places: in fact black women and children make up the bulk of the total urban population (Parnell & Mosdell, 2003; Stevens, 2003). Chronic poverty is increasingly located within the households of single African women (Budlender, 2000) and while the majority of those women reside in the rural areas, a significant proportion are living in informal settlements in South Africa's cities.

#### Government responses to poverty

##### *Special Public Works Projects*

The government responded to the loss of jobs in the formal sector with social welfare projects. In 1997 the South African Department of Finance, in response to the deep levels of poverty existing in the country, introduced a fund for poverty relief. Projects applying for support from this fund had to comply with certain criteria, one of which being to “favourably impact on households in which single women are the main breadwinners” and to allocate 60% of temporary and permanent jobs in the Special Public Works Projects to women (Pareeze, 2003: 1). The South African Human Rights Commission’s (2004) 5<sup>th</sup> Socio-economic Report notes that women are considered a vulnerable group by government, along with the youth and people with disabilities; and while officially 51.3% of the jobs set aside by the Public Works Project in 2002/2003 financial year, this figure does not take into account the women employed in the youth and people with disabilities categories. If we assume that 50% of these two categories were made up of women, then of the 20 539 employees of the Public Works project, the percentage of females in the Public Works Project workforce is closer to 75%.

Government poverty relief projects while mainstreaming gender issues to some degree, do not target the underlying causes of poverty for women, but instead focus on the income dynamics of households (Pareeze, 2003; Woolard & Klasen, 2003).

#### Social Grants

The Gender Advocacy Project (2001) notes that while working class women and their families bear the brunt of poverty in South Africa, there are no specific social policies or welfare directed at the economic support of these women. Within this context, a campaign for a universal Basic Income Grant [BIG] amongst major role-players in the NGO world has been launched<sup>135</sup>. This grant is targeted specifically at poverty reduction, as a concrete measure to address the needs of the poor through comprehensive social security.

Children under that age of 8 years living in households with a combined income of less than R1300 in urban settings and R900 in rural settings are eligible for the Child Support Grant (Department of Welfare). It has been argued that this grant has gendered implications as most primary caregivers of children in South Africa within in this income bracket are black women, but at R108 per child per month, restricted only to the youngest children, the impact of the grant for women although welcome is slight (Gender Advocacy Project, 2001).

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<sup>135</sup> The BIG coalition includes members from diverse fields – economics; children’s sector; gender advocacy; poverty reduction; religious and church groups. It is interesting to note that no Islamic organisations form part of the coalition.

The South African population is aging at a more rapid rate than most other African countries and the majority of older people in South Africa and those eligible for social pensions are women (May 2003). Census 2001 shows that women over 60 years old account for 8.8% of the population while men of the same age account for 6.4% and men older than 65 years old account for only 3.7% of the total South African population. In addition, women tend to live longer than men, outliving their husbands and partners<sup>136</sup>. In all age groups there are higher percentages of women but this increases dramatically in the 64+ age groups (May 2003). For example there are almost half a million women over the age of 74 years compared with only 280 000 men in the same age group (May 2003).

Gender breakdown of older people, 50-84+ (May, 2003:14)


Age Groups	Male	Female	Sex ratio (male/female)	% Male Chronic poor	% Female Chronic poor	Total
50 – 63	62.5	56.6	0.81	24.7	26.1	59.1
64 – 73	24.7	26.8	0.68	24.1	25.2	25.9
74 – 83	10.3	12.8	0.59	21.9	24.5	11.8
84+	2.4	3.8	0.46	28.9	23	3.2
Total	2182435	2980763	0.73	18.6	20.2	5163198

The social pension is specifically designed to target women in that the grant is available to women from the age of 60, but only available to men from the age of 65 (Women’s Budget Initiative, 2004). In 2001, almost 800 000 women or 5.3% of South African women were pensioners or retired:

*Figure 1: Pensioners or retired persons in South Africa in 2001 by gender*

<sup>136</sup> If straight or choosing to be in a partner relationship

**Pensioners or retired persons in South Africa 2001**



Julian May (2003) reports that these social pensions are rarely used solely for the beneficiary. Instead, because of high rates of unemployment and poverty, social pensions are used to support on average five to six persons per household and are an important social security net for the poor and chronically poor most of whom are women and/or female-headed households (May 2003). Further benefits to the social pensions scheme is that this income secures credit for households at local stores, contributes to the education fees of grandchildren, distributes money in cash stricken deep rural areas (Ferreira et al 1995 in May 2003). Although elder abuse including the theft and mismanagement of pensions is widespread in South Africa<sup>137</sup> (Department of Welfare 2001), in some cases social pensions ensure respect for the beneficiary and secure the right of the older person to stay within the household as a contributing member (Ferreira et al 1995 in May 2003).

<sup>137</sup> For more on [elder abuse see xxxxx](#)

### Feminisation of work

Advocates for globalisation argue that the process has translated into an increase in women's participation in the formal economy in 75% of economies worldwide (Pape quotes Standing, a member of the International Labour Organisation). This theory of the "feminisation of work" neglects to examine the quality of that work – while more jobs may have been created, the nature of those jobs are often temporary and enjoy low pay (Benjamin, 2001; Parenzee, 2003; Pape, 2000). Budlender (2000) explodes the theory of feminisation of work by explaining that the percentage of South African women in the formal workforce has only increased by 1% between 1970 and 1998, from 32% to 33%. This computation includes the isolation years of apartheid, where ostensibly the South African economy did not enjoy the benefits of belonging to a global economy.

Pape (2000) analyses the direct effects of globalisation in the clothing industry in Cape Town, an industry dominated by a female workforce of approximately 76%. With the South African signature to GATT and the lifting of protectionist measures in the clothing industry, a series of factory closures and resultant job losses occurred. Since 1990 in excess of 80 000 jobs were lost, more than 20 000 in 1998 alone (Jansen, 1995 in Pape, 2000). Unemployment among women workers increased, as did a trend towards flexible arrangements, or part-time work; and the formation of sewing businesses in the informal sector [which affords no benefits and low pay].

### Employment and unemployment

Women are far less likely to be employed than men and more likely to be unemployed or not economically active than men (Census 2001):

*Figure 2: Employment by gender 2001*

Employment by gender 2001





Figure 3: Employed, unemployed and not economically active persons by gender, 2001 (%)

Percentage of employed, unemployed and not economically active persons by gender 2001



### Gender discrimination in the workplace

Research Surveys (2003: 1) undertook a telephonic study with women in the three major metropolitan areas of South Africa – Gauteng, Durban and Cape Town – and found that “despite the fact that women have achieved great success and made invaluable contributions to society, widespread gender discrimination still exists”.

### Black economic empowerment

Affirmative action policies are meant to further the fight against gender discrimination in the workplace by affording women greater opportunities for leadership roles, yet as Niven Postma Head of Business Women’s Association of South Africa (BWASA) explains, gender transformation takes a backseat to gender transformation in the private sector (Financial Mail, April 30 2004). Black empowerment charters and skills shortages do seem to have encouraged women’s employment, but the glass ceiling is still evident across the board in corporates. Director of BusinessMap, Jenny Cargill notes that “there is a perception that the white old-boys network has been replaced by a black version...” making it difficult for women to advance through affirmative action and economic empowerment strategies with the same effectiveness as black men (quoted in Financial Mail, April 30 2004: 21). Sharmila Boola (2004) argues for a broad based approach to empowerment that factors gender in as a critical component of transformation, pointing out that the Black Economic Empowerment Bill is silent on issues of gender and women’s empowerment.

### Women as leaders in the corporate sector and government

The December 19 2003 edition of the Financial Mail listed the South African business power elite in South Africa and out of xxx people on the list, only one woman – Maria Ramos, Transnet CEO – made the list. The list was based on both objective (number of directorships, control of assets etc) and subjective (who was perceived as powerful) criteria. That only one woman qualified as part of the business power elite is indicative of both real and perceived widespread power imbalances between women and men in the corporate sector.


A census by BWASA earlier this year revealed the poor state of gender empowerment at 347 JSE-listed companies, and 17 of the largest state owned companies:

*Table 2: Percentage of women as Executive managers, Directors, Chief Executive Officers and Board Members at JSE-listed companies in 2004*

Position	Percentage of women
Executive managers	14.7
Directors	7.1
Chief Executive Officers	1.9
Board Members	3


The BWASA (2004) census counts 170 women holding 221 JSE directorships between them, showing a greater tendency for women to share power than men. The Financial Mail (2004) notes that it seems as though it is still easier for women to be appointed as board members than CEOs, pointing out the dismally low rate for women: 1.9%.

Figure 4: Spread of directorships amongst women directors



When the comparison between the percentages of men and women holding directorship positions in top JSE listed companies and parastatals is made, the picture is stark:

Figure 5: Percentage of directorships held by women and men in JSE-listed companies and parastatals 2004



Although government-owned businesses perform remarkably better than private sector corporations on the gender equity scale in terms of directorships, the overall trend is stark. The Financial Mail (2004: 20) reports that “out of the top 25 companies on the JSE that account for 70% of its market capitalisation, only at MTN do women occupy more than a quarter of the directorships”. Internationally, the larger the company and the greater its market capitalisation, the more women are employed overall and in corporate leadership positions; but the converse is true in South Africa (BWASA 2004). The two largest South African companies as of 30 September 2003 – Anglo American PLC and BHP Billiton PLC – have a combined female directorship proportion of 0% (BWASA 2004).

“However, what does seem to affect women director representation is the size of the industry (as measured by market capitalisation). In most cases, women director representation is indirectly proportional to the size of the industry. The largest (and oldest) South African industries have the lowest proportion of women directors, and more ‘new economy’ industries have a greater inclusion of women directors. There are a number of possible explanations for this, including the

hypothesis that existing (formal and informal) industry networks might preclude women in some industries and/or that women enter different industries at different rates” (BWASA 2004: 18). Other explanations include the possibility that established industries are not taking the call for gender equity as seriously as state-owned enterprises, and/or that significant barriers to women’s advancement are not being dissolved within certain sectors.


Government seems to be faring better than the private sector and implementing the gender policies tabled in parliament. The graph below illustrates the difference in percentages of women executive managers and directors of parastatals (25.6% and 26.8% respectively) and JSE-listed corporates by sector:

*Figure 6: Percentage of women directors and women executive managers at parastatals and JSE-listed corporates by industry*



There were only 7 women CEOs/MDs of listed companies on September 30 2003 in South Africa, a total of 1.9% compared with 98.1% of male CEOs/MDs (BWASA 2004). Again, state-owned enterprises fared better than corporates:

Figure 7: Women CEOs as a proportion of all CEOs



It is generally agreed that affirmative action allows women better access to leadership positions in the workplace – 80% of women across age groups and 73% of women aged 25 – 34 years old believe this to be true (Research Surveys, 2003). However, women executives in a recent edition of the Financial Mail (2004: 21) cited the following as barriers to advancement up the corporate ladder:

1. Exclusion from informal and formal networks;
2. Stereotyping;
3. Lack of mentoring;
4. Ineffective leadership style;
5. Limited opportunities for visibility.

*Employment opportunities*

The statistics above show clearly women are less likely to be employed than men, and 68% of women feel that they are discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities (Research Surveys, 2004). Single and divorced women feel this most strongly (73%) than women living with partners or married women (65%) echoing the Financial Mail's (2004) observation that in business, women with partners or live at home husbands tend to have greater professional success than single women. On a positive note, 78% of women surveyed by Research Surveys agreed that employers are becoming more sensitive to the needs of working mothers.

### Salaries

Within the bracket of people employed in the private sector, it is estimated that men's salaries on average are about 43% higher than those of women (Gqubule, 2004). Of the women participating in Research Surveys' (2003) research only 48% felt that they earned equal salaries as men doing the same jobs. More white women (53%) than black women (44%) believed this to be the case.

### Sexual harassment

Sexual harassment is a legal offence in South Africa, yet the majority of women surveyed (76%) feel that it is common in the workplace. Interestingly, more black women agreed with this statement than white women – 82% compared with 72% - yet the overwhelming picture is that of frequent sexual harassment (Research Surveys, 2004).

### Government Policies

Prior to democracy in 1994 women constituted 2% of the national representation in parliament (Gender Advocacy Programme 2002). During the second term of democracy women's representation at a national level jumped to 29.8% and is now at almost 50% (Gender Advocacy Programme 2002). Although government policy on Black Economic Empowerment does not explicitly include women, there is a forward trend towards gender equity in parliament leadership, publicly spearheaded by the President and the African National Congress.

The Gender Advocacy Programme (GAP) (2002) notes that obstacles to women's full participation in local government include the lack of flexibility in work time and child care which is particularly an issue at municipal level. Councillors noted that attitudes towards gender roles are different in rural and urban areas, with rural areas embracing more traditional and stereotypical notions of gender. GAP (2002) also found that councillors were unsure of whether policies had

been written on maternity leave and sexual harassment. The GAP (2002) study showed that negative attitudes towards women's leadership and traditional notions of women's roles were apparent at local government level and suggested the implementation of gender quotas as one way of addressing gender inequity. However, in a recent poll by Markinor (2004) 72% of respondents felt that government had done a good job in terms of forwarding gender in South Africa.

#### The Nonprofit sector

Analysis of the employment and volunteering statistics in the NPO sector has been examined elsewhere (see Social Cohesion and Participation in Community Life), yet no data was collected as to the gendered nature of employment and work. Anecdotal evidence suggests that like the government sector, the nonprofit world seems more gender equitable than the private sector, but further study is required to ascertain the types of employment (full-time; part-time; volunteer), leadership and work environment from a gendered perspective of this sector. This research would contribute to a more holistic picture of the world of work for women which is not isolated to the private sector and government.

#### Education

##### Levels of education in South Africa

Education in South Africa has been marred by the political system of apartheid making racial cleavages the norm in terms of the levels of adult education (Human Rights Watch, 2001). More recent democratic efforts within the education system have attempted to even out these disparities, but the legacy of inequity is persistent and poorer educational institutions are significantly less resourced than wealthier educational institutions (Human Rights Watch, 2001; South African Human Rights Commission, 2003).

*Figure 7: Highest level of education completed by people older than 20 years, by gender, 2001*





Figure 7 above shows that almost the same amount of women who have no schooling whatsoever (20%) have matriculated (19.5%). Only 22% of South African women have some or complete primary school education. The gender distribution seems quite even, but a race breakdown of the statistics for women (Figure 8 above) shows that significantly more white women than had the opportunity to finish high school or attend higher education institutions. The reverse is true for low levels of education – far fewer white women than any other race group have education levels below some secondary schooling.

## Schools

## Context<sup>138</sup>

Almost half of South Africa's population are under 18 years old, and almost 12 million children - accounting for 28% of the population - are enrolled in schools (Statistics South Africa, 2003).

The South African Schools Act of 1996 makes the attendance of all children between the ages of 7 to 15 years old mandatory (Department of Education, 2003); therefore schools are important and influential sites of socialisation, service delivery and social cohesion. However, the statistical evidence on the situation of schools for South African learners show that these sites of learning are also sites of danger. The recent socio-economic report by the South African Human Rights Commission (2003) shows that many of South Africa's schools have shortfalls in infrastructure from too few classrooms to lack of access to library facilities:

*Table 3: Lack or shortages at South African schools*

Lack or shortage	Number of schools
Shortage of classrooms	10 723
Shortage of textbooks	13 204
No electricity	10 859
Inadequate toilet facilities	2 498
Lack of access to library facilities	22 773

## Learner participation


In 2001, 11 738 126 learners were enrolled in primary and secondary schools in the nine provinces of South Africa, with the vast majority (97.9%) attending public schools (Department of Education, 2003). The location of schools seems to echo the population distribution for children, with the most densely populated provinces of KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape enjoying 43.1% of the nation's schools. Only 2.3% of children benefit from early childhood development skills at pre-primary schools, although almost two thirds of all school-going children in the country are enrolled in primary schools. Once learners reach secondary school, the enrolment rate drops to one third (34.3%).

*Figure 9: Percentage distribution of learners by pre-primary, primary, secondary and other school phase in 2001*

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<sup>138</sup> Please note that this section is identical to the section entitled Schools in the Community Life Report

**Percentage distribution of learners by phase in 2001**




#### Gender parity index

The gender parity index (GPI) is considered one of the key indicators of development set down in the Millennium Development Goals, as it notes the levels of equality in school registration and attendance between boy and girl learners. The GPI<sup>139</sup> score for South Africa across all provinces in 2001 for primary schools was 0.95 and for secondary schools 1.10 (Department of Education, 2003). In effect, this means that there is an equal distribution of girl and boy learners at schools in South Africa on the whole, but that there marginally fewer girls in primary school than boys and vice versa in secondary schools.

*Figure 10: Gender distribution of learners in pre-primary, primary and secondary schools in 2001*

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<sup>139</sup> Please note that these figures are adjusted for age appropriate school enrolment.




#### Teacher participation

In 2001 the Department of Education (2003) employed 364 201 teachers, almost 66% of whom were women. The percentages of women teachers vary across provinces, with Limpopo showing the lowest percentage (55.5%) and Gauteng the highest (71.8%):

*Figure 11: The percentage of women teachers in South Africa across provinces in 2001*

Percentage of women teachers in South Africa across provinces in 2001



The recent wage negotiations between public servants (including teachers) and government has highlighted some of the concerns that teachers have. The public support garnered for the teachers and other public servants gives a reasonable indication of the sense of social cohesion that can be convened although sporadically and informally.

#### Governance


It is important to ascertain the numbers and percentages of women principals at South African schools; and the level of participation of women parents on school governing bodies.

#### Matric

10% more South Africa female learners (55%) than male learners (45%) wrote National Senior Certificate examinations in 2001, but a greater percentage of women learners (39.9%) failed than male learners (36.4%), and a lower proportion of women learners passed (60.1%) than male learners (63.6%):

Figure 12: National Senior Certificate examination pass and failure rates by gender, 2001

National Senior Certificate examination pass and failure rates by gender, 2001



### Subjects

One of the most pervasive gender stereotypes is that women are unsuited to science, mathematics and business.

Subject	Number of candidates who wrote		Percentage of candidates who passed	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Accounting	52800	83295	82.5%	84.6%
Biology	137836	173190	69.1%	66.3%
Business economics	69084	101433	74.5%	73.7%
Geography	94626	106684	76.3%	66.2%
Mathematics	122490	141455	51.4%	42.6%

Physical Science	79321	74526	71.4%	65.6%
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Table 4: National Senior Certificate examination results for selected subjects by gender, 2001

Table 4 above shows the pooled results for both Standard and Higher grade subjects. The overall highest pass rate was for Biology, and although more women learners wrote the subject, a marginally lower percentage of them passed. Again more women learners wrote mathematics, the subject with the poorest overall pass rate, and a smaller percentage of women learners passed.

The Department of Education's Equity in the Classroom Project recognises that all learners should have full and unrestricted access to all subjects, and the need to improve girl and women learners achievement at school level ([www.education.pwv.gov.za](http://www.education.pwv.gov.za)). This project was implemented in 2000 and further research is required to assess the effectiveness of this project.

#### Gender violence at schools

The sexual and gender violence that girls at schools experience occurs against the backdrop of extensive sexual and gender violence in South African society (Human Rights Watch, 2001). According to a recent Human Rights Watch (xxx) report entitled *Scared at School*, girl learners are being raped, sexually abused, sexually harassed and assaulted at schools by their teachers and male classmates. Schools cannot be theorised as nodes of community safety. There is growing concern about violence in schools that takes the form of teacher-on-student violence, student-on-student violence and violence perpetrated against learners by members outside of the school community. The Constitutional Court's ruling prohibiting corporal punishment in schools (Guthrie and Berry, 2003) goes some way to alleviating violence as a method of control and to publicising the damaging effects of violence on society and children in particular.

The report indicates that girls in positions of power and/or achievement – prefects, leaders, high achievers - are the main targets of such attacks, as they are perceived as too arrogant and too assertive. This indicates the level of gender discrimination that Donnelly (2004) describes as hate crimes. The message sent to girls is that high achievement and success will be met with punishment and is not welcome or encouraged.

Women teachers are also at risk for sexual harassment at schools. Dreyer et al (2001 in Panos Institute 2003) conducted a study into primary school teachers experiences of gender violence. Prior to training on the definitions and meaning of sexual harassment and gender violence, no teachers reported having experienced either. After training, 12% of female teachers detailed that they had experienced some form of sexual harassment by a colleague.

Gender violence may be perpetrated at schools by teachers, male learners, strangers to the school environment, school staff and even female learners. The Human Rights Watch Report (2001) and information from other sources (Department of Health, 1998; Mail and Guardian, Jan 30 – Feb 5 2004) show that the majority of perpetrators are male learners and teachers who misuse their authority by threatening and bribing girl learners. In 1998, the South African Demographic Health Survey assessed the frequency of rape in a nationally representative sample and found that 1.6% had been raped before the age of 15. Of these women, 33% named their school teacher as the rapist (Department of Health 1998).

The South African Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (2003) collected data on the percentage of high school learners who perpetrated or suffered partner violence and rape:





Figure 13: Percentage of high school learners who perpetrated or suffered partner violence and coerced sex, by gender, 2002

The statistics presented above relate only to learners at high school and to partner violence and rape. Both boy and girl learners claimed to have been raped by their partner, with larger percentage of girl learners (11.1%) than boy learners (8.1%) experiencing this. More boys (14.4%) declared that they had been assaulted by their partners than girls (12.9%) with assault being the most common form of partner abuse reported (13.6%).

15.2% of male learner respondents and 11.7% of girl learners admitted to having assaulted their partners. The coerced sex statistics are startling in that almost as large a proportion of girls (7.2%) as boys (9.8%) stated that they had forced someone else to have sex with them. There is a very interesting age component to this statistic, with significantly more younger girls (under 13 years old) admitting to this than boys of the same age. By age 14, this trend reverses and almost double the proportion of boys compared with girls perpetrate rape, but by 18 and 19 years old and older the statistic

evens out with similar proportions of female and male learners coercing their partners into sex:



**Figure 14: Percentage of high school learners who have raped, by gender and age group**

#### Attitudes of boy learners to gender and sexual violence at schools

When asked what they thought of gender and sexual violence at schools, boys in the Human Rights Watch (2001) report revealed sexist and misinformed attitudes. 80% of the boys interviewed placed the responsibility for the violence with the girl victims, claiming that women were responsible for sexual violence; and half of the boys explained that girls really mean yes when they say no.

#### Impact of gender and sexual violence at schools

“Tolerance of sexual violence at schools is a serious form of discrimination that is highly disruptive to education and has a destabilising effect on the general learning environment. The effects of sexual violence on the victims is devastating. All the rape survivors interviewed said that their academic performance had suffered and that they

found it harder to concentrate. Parents told the Human Rights Watch that their daughters had become depressed, disruptive and anxious which was affecting the whole family. Some of the victims transferred schools but many have simply left” (Donnelly, 2004: 2).

#### Schools responses to gender and sexual violence

Sexual violence and abuse seem to be endemic to the school environment for girls<sup>140</sup>. In November 2003, several NPOs<sup>141</sup> released the Dossier of Shame, a document detailing the schools in KwaZulu Natal that allegedly covered up reports of child rape and sexual assault on school premises by learners and by teachers (Mail and Guardian, Jan 30 – Feb 5 2004). ChildLine KwaZulu Natal claimed that only two of the 58 cases of sexual abuse at schools by teachers against learners, which had been reported to the organisation in that province, had been investigated (Mail and Guardian, Jan 30 – Feb 5 2004). The South African Human Rights Commission found that in Gauteng “teachers and principals were reported not to want to get involved with sexual abuse cases and ignore incidents reported to them or simply refer the abused child to the police station without reporting the matter themselves” (2002: 98).

It is also important to note that while teachers are have a special responsibility towards fostering an environment conducive to learning, they are also part of the broader social scheme and their experiences and behaviours outside of the classroom cannot be easily divorced from their classroom conduct. Dreyer et al (2001) showed that “47% of female teachers reported experiencing physical abuse at the hands of an intimate partner, 31% sexual abuse, and 69% psychological abuse. 25% of male teachers admitted that they had been physically abusive, 12% sexually abusive and 33% psychologically abusive to an intimate partner (in Panos Institute 2003: 25). Teacher-focussed training in gender violence and abuse would be highly recommended.

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<sup>140</sup> The following paragraph is duplicated from the Community Life report.

<sup>141</sup> The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children; Women against Child Abuse; Kwa-Zulu Natal ChildLine; United Sanctuary Against Abuse and Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN).

### Department of Education's responses to gender and sexual violence

The Department of Education has formulated and implemented a school-based module on managing sexual harassment and gender-based violence, intended to serve as a handbook for learners and educators (2004). The module deals with issues of gender violence and sexual harassment; homophobia; abuse of learners; school policy on sexual harassment, school management teams and sexual harassment, gender and HIV/Aids, and counselling and healing (Department of Education, 2004). Again, detailed research is required to ascertain the effectiveness of this module.

The Human Rights Watch (2001: 7) notes that “neither the national or provincial departments of education systematically monitor incidents of violence in schools. Similarly there are no data systems to facilitate the evaluation of crime statistics on the basis of where the crime is committed”. While the quantitative data is not collected, strong qualitative evidence exists to backup the claims of sexual violence against girls in schools. Proper monitoring and data systems can assist in effectively measuring and tracking the drive for gender equity at schools.

### Further education and training

In 2001 male learners made up 53% of the further education and training (FET) sector in South Africa (Department of Education, 2003) showing that a substantially larger proportion of men have access to this type of education than women:

Percentage distribution of learners in the FET sector by gender, 2001





Figure 15: Percentage distribution of learners in the FET sector by gender in 2001

#### Learner participation by vocational study

The vast majority of FET learners study engineering (52%) which is still male dominated as male learners make up 71% of this vocational field. Women learners outnumber men learners in the following areas: Art-Music; Business Studies; Educare and Social Services; and General Education.



**Figure 16: Percentage of learners in the FET sector by vocational field and gender in 2001**

### Educator participation

Following from the spread of vocational fields shown above, most teachers at FET institutions are clustered in the engineering, business studies and utility studies departments. The gender disparity amongst teachers in these educational institutions is not as large as that amongst learners:

Percentage distribution of teaching staff at FET institutions by gender, 2001




Figure 17: Percentage distribution of teachers in the FET sector by gender in 2001

### Higher education

As in the field of work, affirmative action and equity policies tend to favour race as a category for advancement to the neglect of gender. Table 5 below details the proportions of black and female students at higher education institutions and clearly shows that at historically black universities (HBUs) and technikons (HBTs) women's student representation in the head count is far below that for black students; at historically white universities (HWUs) and technikons (HBTs) women are also underrepresented compared with black students:

Institution	Black students as a proportion of head count totals		Female students as a proportion of head count totals	
	Contact	Distance	Contact	Distance
HBU's	98%	100%	56%	74%
HWUs	45%	92%	52%	65%
UNISA	52%	66%	78%	57%
HBTs	99%	n/a	55%	n/a
HWTs	76%	98%	47%	45%

Table 5: Headcount enrolments at higher education institutions by race and gender, 2001

In terms of numbers, historically white universities and technikons have a greater capacity for student enrolment. Historically black universities have about 18% the enrolment figures than historically white universities:




Figure 18: Headcount of enrolments of female students at universities in 2001

Similar information was not available for technikons.

### Staff participation

As with learner enrolments, far fewer women are employed in higher education institutions than black staff. A closer analysis of these figures shows that most black staff members constitute the category service staff and are therefore employed as cleaners, gardeners, security guards, and messengers as opposed to administrative roles or academic posts. Most women staff are employed as administrative and service staff, with a minority in academic posts. Clearly, the transformation imperative at higher education institutions in South Africa needs a more focussed approach that actively targets and supports both women and black staff into positions of power.




Figure 19: Percentages of permanent staff employed at universities and technikons by race and gender in 2001

Cheryl de la Rey now one of the few black women deputy vice chancellors in the country completed her PhD in 1999 on the experiences of women professors at South African universities. As qualitative research the piece did not focus on the quantitative aspects of women's severe under-representation in leadership positions in the academy, it did however explore these women's experiences and found that across academic field (ranging from music to medicine) the women professors related tales of sexual harassment in some cases and gender bias and discrimination in all cases. The situation for top women academics in South Africa by 1999 was marked by struggle and discrimination because of the male dominated higher education environment (de la Rey 1999).

## Gender and Violence

### Rape

South Africa has the highest per capita rate of reported rape in the world (Rape Crisis, [www.rapecrisis.org.za/statistics.htm](http://www.rapecrisis.org.za/statistics.htm)). Rape is directly related to the perceptions of gender in a society – the higher the attitudes about women's subjugation to men, the higher the incidence of rape (Kadali 1997). Rape is an act of sexist aggression and violence and has little to do with sexual urges and more to do with asserting dominance and power over women who are regarded by perpetrators as naturally weak.


### Definitions

In South African law, rape is defined as intentional unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. There are several problems with this definition:

- Forced anal or oral sex is not considered rape. Neither is penetration with an object or a body part other than the penis. These are considered "indecent assault", which carries a lower penalty than rape.
- Violent sexual crimes between people of the same sex are not recognised as rape. ([www.powa.org.za](http://www.powa.org.za))


People Opposing Women Abuse (POWA 2004) and most civil society organisations dealing with gender violence defines rape as any forced or coerced genital contact or sexual penetration.

Over the past ten years, a total of 512 851 rapes have been reported to the South African Police Services (SAPS) (2004, [www.saps.gov.za](http://www.saps.gov.za)), and rape reporting has increased by 17.8% nationally over the financial year 1994/1995 to 2003/2004.



**Figure 20: Number of rape cases reported to SAPS between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004**

**Percentage increase in reported rapes to SAPS between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004, by province**



**Figure 21: Percentage increase in reported rapes to SAPS between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004 by province**

The SAPS annual report for 2002/2003 (SAPS 2003) notes that rape accounts for 5.9% and 2% of the reported contact crimes<sup>142</sup> and serious crimes in South Africa respectively, and that in the rape ratio in 2002/2003 was at its lowest level since 1994/1995. SAPS (2003) notes that this drop may be due to the police action of the Anti-rape strategy of the National Prosecuting Authority that has identified rape flash points and thereby provides the necessary policing in these flash point areas.

However, this strategy does not take into account the fact that most rapes occur at the victim's home and by a known assailant ([www.powa.org.za](http://www.powa.org.za)). SAPS (2003) explains that over 90% of the offenders were known to their victims prior to the rape:

Relationship of offender to victim	Percentage
------------------------------------	------------

<sup>142</sup> Crimes against persons

Acquaintance	41.8%
Relatives	21.4%
Known by sight	10.4%
Neighbours	9.4%

Table 6: Relationship of offender to rape victim, 2003

More disturbing evidence of the links between sexism and rape is the increasing levels of rape victims in the most vulnerable categories – children and the elderly (ChildLine 2004 [www.childline.org.za](http://www.childline.org.za), Department of Social Services 2001).

#### Attitudes towards rape

The SAPS (2003: 13) Annual Report states that the explanations offered by alleged perpetrators of rape include the use of drugs and alcohol, membership of a gang, and disturbingly the attitude of ‘macho-man’.

A Research Surveys (2004) report into sexual harassment at the workplace noted that more than two-thirds (67%) of women surveyed agreed with the statement “sometimes when a woman is raped there are two sides to a story”. The report also identified a major difference between white and black women’s attitudes to rape, with 82% of black women respondent agreeing with the statement as opposed to the lower but still substantial figure of 54% for white women.

In 1998, a research study by the Department of Psychology at the University of the North found a definite split in the attitudes towards rape of black and white adolescents. Black students scored significantly higher on conservative attitudes towards rape than white students, but no gender difference was found in relation to rape attitudes and beliefs about sexuality and rape (Peltzer et al 1998). The results of the research show that there is a definitive correlation between sexist attitude towards women and conservative attitudes towards rape. The findings also showed that South African youth scored lower on conservative attitudes towards rape than American youth (Peltzer et al 1998).

The table below presents the findings in key areas:

Statement	Black students	White students
The main role of the wife is to take care of her husband	3.6	2.4
The best relationships are those in which the man is in control	3.4	2.4
Strong men do not cry	3.2	2
Girls should not ask boys out on dates	3.3	2.1
Most women fantasize about being raped by a man	2.7	1.8
In most cases the rape victim shares some responsibility for the attack	3	2.3
Some women provoke men into raping them	3.1	2.6
Mean rape score	3.2	2.8

Table 7: Attitudes of black and white students to rape

### Domestic violence

The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 prohibits by law the use of violence and force in the domestic setting that may cause sexual, physical or psychological harm to the victim.

Domestic relationship means a relationship between the applicant and respondent in any of the following ways:

- married couples, including marriage according to any law, custom or religion, divorced or separated couples
- couples living together (including gay or lesbian couples)

- parents of a child or persons who have or had parental responsibility for that child ([www.powa.org.za](http://www.powa.org.za))

The raw data provided by SAPS does not include the category domestic violence and so independent analysis of this category is not available. However, the SAPS Annual Report for 2002/2003 published the following data:

The most prominent violent offences against women next to rape are common assault and assault with the intention of doing gross bodily harm with 53.7% and 40.2% respectively of victims being women.

“In 89% of the domestic violence cases the victims were female, in 10% the victims were male and in 1% the gender was indicated as unknown. The gender of the perpetrators was exactly opposite” (SAPS 2003: 10).

In 61% of cases there was a history of previous domestic violence, showing the ongoing and escalating nature of this crime. SAPS (2003) report that in two thirds of the cases no weapon was used, the perpetrator beat the victim. Where weapons were used the following trends emerged:

Type of weapon used	Percentage
Blunt instrument (stick, club, stone etc)	45.2%
Knife	22.1%
Sharp instrument (bottle neck, screwdriver etc)	11.1%
Firearm	7.7%
Panga/axe	4.3%
Hot object or hot liquid	3.8%
Sjambok	2.4%

Table 8: Percentage of weapon use in assaults against women 2002/2003

The Medical Research Council (2004) notes that not much is known about who kills South African women and under which circumstances other than that in most cases of intimate femicide is linked strongly to cases of domestic abuse. Of the total number of

female homicides in South Africa in 1999 (3798), 40.5% were non-intimate femicides (woman killed by someone other than her partner); 41% were intimate femicides (woman killed by intimate partner<sup>143</sup>; and in 18.6% of the cases the perpetrator was unknown.

Of the cases where the relationship could be established, just over half of all femicides were perpetrated by cohabiting partner:




Figure 22: Relationship status in intimate femicide cases

The rates of intimate femicide differ along race lines with the rate for coloured women (18.3 per 100 000) almost double that for African women (8.9 per 100 000). Yet the statistics show that a far higher proportion of African men (76.4% of intimate femicide perpetrators) perpetrate this crime than any other race group.

<sup>143</sup> Current or ex-husband, boyfriend, same sex partner, rejected would-be lover

The study also interrogated the conviction rates for these crimes and found that for intimate femicides the conviction rate stands at 35.1% and for non-intimate femicides the conviction rate is 39.8%. “A significant difference in the average sentences for perpetrators between the two groups was found. The average sentence handed down for perpetrators of intimate femicide was 107 years in comparison to 12.4 years for perpetrators for non-intimate femicide” (MRC 2004: 3).

#### Trafficking of women and children

Molo Songololo (2000a) reports that 25% of prostitutes in South Africa are children; in 1997 the Child Protection Unit of SAPS estimated that a quarter of Cape Town’s children living on the street engage in prostitution, and that the police in 1998 alone dealt with 38 000 child prostitutes. The same organisation reports that the trafficking of women in South Africa is untenable (2001b). Again, the links between sexist interpretations of gender roles and gender-based violence contribute negatively to the social cohesion of the country placing large numbers of vulnerable women and children at great risk.

#### Abuse, neglect and ill-treatment of elderly women

As noted above, the incidence of elderly rape is increasing; and the levels of respect for women of all ages seems to be very low if the prevalence of gender violence, rape and sexual harassment is used as a measure. The 2001 Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report notes that elderly abuse encompasses physical, psychological and sexual abuse and that physical abuse of the elderly seems to have become normalised behaviour in many communities.

As discussed earlier, women live longer than men and account for a far larger proportion of the elderly than men. It therefore follows that more elderly women are subject to crime and abuse. Over and above this, elderly women in deep rural areas are subject to another form of hate crime – with hunting (Department of Social Development, 2001).

The Department of Social Development is in the process of implementing the Madrid Plan of Action, devising special policies geared towards the prevention of elder abuse, neglect and ill-treatment ([www.welfare.gov.za/Documents/2003/2003.htm](http://www.welfare.gov.za/Documents/2003/2003.htm)).

#### Women and girls in the media

The depiction of women and girls in the media (television; radio; print and internet) is a useful indicator of the levels of sexism and gender discrimination levelled at the public on an ongoing basis. Advertisements that appear in the media are representative of the values and interests of the sectors that place the ads. Because industry and corporates are male-driven, it is possible, although statistically tenuous to link the levels of sexist representation in advertisements to the levels of patriarchy in those industries and society as a whole.

Commissioner Getrude Fester of the Commission on Gender Equality (2004) notes that one of the major challenges to the full and equal participation of women in South African society is the constant stereotypical portrayal of women in the media. She added that the Southern African Media and Gender Initiative has undertaken the work of promoting gender-sensitive media and to monitor these depictions.

#### Depictions of gendered childhood

In 2003, Jeanne Prinsloo undertook a study of the gendered representations of childhood in advertisements in popular<sup>144</sup> South African magazines. She notes that in searching for images of boys and girls, it was difficult to find girls 'doing' anything as they were for the most part arranged in fashion shoots as static objects. Prinsloo (2003) investigated the location of the children and the roles assigned to the children and found that these were far from gender neutral: most boys were depicted in the public domain usually engaged in physical activities, while most girls were depicted in the private sphere playing.

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<sup>144</sup> Bona, Edgars Club, You, Sunday Times Magazine, True Love and Huisgenoot

	Neutral	Domestic domain					Public domain		
Gender	Pose	inside	bedroom	bathroom	kitchen	Living room	outside	sport	shop
Girl	17.4%	21.7%	2.2%	4.3%	2.1%	8.7%	32.6%	0%	10.9%
Boy	5.3%	10.7%	1.78%	0%	0%	12.5%	58.9%	10.7%	0%
Indeterminate	6.1%	59.2%	12.2%	10.2%	0%	2%	10.2%	0%	0%

Table 9: Distribution of boys, girls and children of indeterminate gender and location

Gender	Unstructured play	School work	Sport/ physical	Car wash	Nurture	Sleep	Other
Girl	45.6%	0	2.2%	0	39.1%	6.5%	6.5%
Boy	23.2%	5.4%	30.4%	3.6%	33.9%	5.4%	0%

Table 10: Distribution of boys and girls by roles

The most striking evidence from the tables above is that no girl children are depicted as engaging in school work or in sports in the public domain, while no boy children are depicted in the kitchen in the domestic setting or shopping in the public setting. Clearly traditional gender stereotyping (men play sport and do academic work, while women cook and shop) plays a major role in the representation of children in advertising. In addition, Prinsloo (2003: 33) noted that most children when depicted with adults are in the company of their mothers: “the mother is foregrounded as the nurturer and a regular presence, the family unit is nuclear and the father is infrequently in the company of his children without the presence of the mother”.

#### Media depictions of women MPs

The gender balance in parliament is clear. South Africa has one of the highest representations of women in cabinet and government in the world, and almost half of the top leadership positions are occupied by women. Yet as Jane Raphaely explains “...female MPs get 10% of the [media] coverage that male MPs do” (Financial Mail, April 30 2004: 21).

### Depictions of gender research in the media

A recent press release by Markinor (2004) a leading market research company, entitled *What Women Want* is an example of gender research that does more harm than good in the endeavour for gender equity. While noting that traditional gender roles are receding in popularity, the press release uses emotive and combative language stating that “the new breed (sic) of ambitious females (sic) reveal a level of contempt for traditional roles and are quite literally, throwing the baby out with the bath water” (2004: 1).

### Women in the armed forces

In 1994 with the advent of democracy in South Africa, women were afforded full entry into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and military guidelines and policies in line with the constitution were issued to allow women equal training and employment as men (Cilliers et al 1997). By 1997, the Department of Defence employed women as 18% of its workforce and the SANDF employed 11.2%; which Cilliers et al applaud as impressive. While government policy and practise are in keeping with constitutional demands, public opinion on the matter of women in the security forces seemed to enjoy popular resistance.

### Attitudes towards women engaging in combat duty

Cilliers et al (1997) found that three years after the implementation of gender equitable policy in the SANDF, public opinion was still split on the issue of women in the military, particularly in combat situations. Overall a slightly larger proportion (48%) of people surveyed were against women being involved in combat compared to those who were in favour (46%) with 6% undecided. The survey found marked differences across race groups on this issue, with far more white respondents (60%) in favour of women engaging in combat than any other race:

Attitudes towards women volunteering for combat duty by race, 1997




Figure 23: Attitudes towards women volunteering for combat duty by race, 1997

Slightly more women (48%) than men (46%) responded affirmatively to the question, and more men (50%) than women (47%) disagreed with the statement.

Attitudes towards women volunteering for combat duty by gender, 1997





Figure 24: Attitudes towards women volunteering for combat duty by gender, 1997

### Attitudes towards women participating in police patrols

There seems to be general consensus regardless of the gender of respondents that women police should not be deployed in dangerous areas, and that if they are they should be accompanied by male members of the police force (Cilliers et al 1997).



**Figure 25: Attitudes towards women participating in police patrols in dangerous areas by gender, 1997**




Figure 26: Attitudes towards women participating in police patrols in dangerous areas accompanied by male police, by gender, 1997

Women in the armed and police forces challenges many stereotypes that women are unable and/or unwilling to engage in protectionist strategies for their communities and nation. One of the most useful measures of social cohesion between the genders would be to revisit this study ten years after the implementation of gender sensitive and gender equitable policies.

#### Women refugees

Refugee women constitute possibly one of the most vulnerable groups of people on the planet, at risk of war and interpersonal violence and destitution within their home countries and at further risk of harassment, violence, sexual assault, unsanitary conditions and epidemics when fleeing their home countries (Valji et al 2003).

Worldwide refugee demographics show that 80% of the 27 million refugees and displaced people are women and children (Anker 1996 in Valji et al 2003). In 1998, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) noted that only 17.8% of UNHCR-assisted refugees in South Africa were women. The Department of Justice stated in 2002 that only 5% of all persons who had received refugee status were women ([www.doj.gov.za/policy/gender02.html](http://www.doj.gov.za/policy/gender02.html)). Although most asylum seekers coming into South Africa are young men the application process is skewed in favour of men receiving refugee status as opposed to women (Valji et al 2003).

South African legislation is arguably more gender sensitive than elsewhere in the world, and Valji et al (2003: 63) point out that “South Africa is in the unique position of having included gender within the definition of ‘social group’ in the Refugees Act of 1998”. Yet they also explain that positive discrimination in the application process is required and that there is a need for a more comprehensive understanding of political persecution

that includes the violation of women's rights, in order to contribute to making the process for refugee status more equitable.

Women asylum seekers and refugees are also at risk for the high levels of gender discrimination and violence perpetrated against women in South Africa. By not granting these women refugee status, they are unwilling to report any offences against them and are unable to formally apply for work, increasing the levels of poverty and violence for women in the country.

The state of education for women and girls in South Africa is on the one hand an enabling environment in terms of policy, but is also an environment that renders women and girls vulnerable to the violence in broader society. This indicates low social cohesion. The extent of networks between women have not been adequately covered and the manner in which these would indicate high or low social capital therefor cannot be determined. The extent of sexism and discrimination clearly points to poor levels of social justice.

## Findings

### Social cohesion

In terms of social cohesion, it is clear that our society can be characterised as one with weak social cohesion if the measures are the material basis of society. This is manifested in the high inequality, poverty, exclusion and the resultant social consequences.

### Social capital

In terms of social capital the situations is an interesting one. While there is low social capital, in terms of vertical or bridging social capital, it is not clear that this pattern is reproduced in terms of horizontal or bridging social capital. That is, within communities, networks, groups, institutions and organisations. The section dealing with these reveals a different picture.

### Social justice

The picture in terms of social justice is also mixed. While there are clear indicators of the tendency towards social justice, the implementation of the constitution and various legislation, in other terms the tendency is away. Increasing inequality, for instance, point to the social justice objectives as moving further away from the majority of people.

### Further research required

There are clearly many issues that would need further research, particularly in terms of social cohesion. The data available has painted a picture of social cleavages and difference, but there is little available data on how people overcome these challenges. Clearly the institutions, organisations and networks that people help create an enabling environment to build social cohesions, social capital and advance towards greater social justice.

## Chapter Two: Institutions, Organisations and Networks

What is the role of key institutions, such as the family, and organisations and networks, such as trade unions, voluntary associations and religious bodies, in building social cohesion?

### Family

The family, as the basic unit of society, needs to be assessed. The extent to which people are socialised, values transmitted, behavioural traits entrenched and personalities are formed happens primarily within the family unit in most cases. Definitions of family are changing; poverty, unemployment and other challenges have all impacted upon the family. What is the state of this basic unit in our society? To what extent have the changes our society has experienced impacted positively and negatively on families? Do practices such as polygamy, homosexuality, the decline in formal marriages, to mention but a few, impact negatively on society? Ours is not a position that argues for the stereotypical nuclear family, but we recognise that the vast majority of people in our country begin the life and usually live it and end it in some intimate relationships with kin. The health of these relationships, the security and certainty of the household as a first unit has a profound impact on the functioning of our society and must therefore receive our attention.

Even a brief perusal of the literature on social cohesion indicates that this is a nascent rather than well-developed field of enquiry. It would seem that there are disagreements about what social cohesion is, whether it differs from social capital, whether it can be measured and if so, how it should be measured – to name a few. These questions are intimately connected since scholars working with different definitions are likely to develop different measurements and are likely to come to different conclusions about the degree to which it is present within any particular social context. It is therefore crucial that at the outset of this project, consensus is reached on the meaning of the term ‘social cohesion’. In this regard, we should guard against defining social cohesion so broadly as to encompass everything about a society and the project ends up being an almost complete audit of all aspects of South African society. A shotgun approach (which will result in a little bit of knowledge of a large number of things) is to be avoided in favour of a targeted approach (sound knowledge of a limited number of issues).

We also need to be wary of instrumental definitions of social concepts. For instance, the French government’s definition states that social cohesion refers to “a set of social *processes* that help instil in individuals the sense of belonging ...” (quoted in Draft Report, 3 August 2004). In other words, it is not seen a synonymous with a feeling of belonging but with *processes that generate* that feeling. We are therefore still left in the dark as to what social cohesion is, because the nature of those processes is not described. There are other examples of such instrumental approaches which muddy the waters rather than clarify the meaning of the concept in question. Coleman, Bourdieu and Putman all define social cohesion/capital as “a resource for collective action” (in Stone, 2001: 4). Not only is this definition vague, but as Stone (2001) indicates, the focus seems to be more on what social cohesion *does* (its consequences or outcomes) than what it *is*. Before one can debate what something does, one needs an understanding of what it is and in my view these definitions avoid rather an address that very important and difficult of tasks.

Since it is not possible to go into a detailed discussion of the definitional problem, suffice it to note that I will be using social cohesion as synonymous with social capital and, following Stone define it as referring to “networks characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity” (Stone 2001:6).

The common sense view of the relationship between the family and social cohesion is that strong families make for strong communities and strong societies and thus represent the major, if not the ultimate, source of social cohesion. This is not a view shared by all, though, as Fukuyama (1999), commenting on Italian society has pointed to the possibility of strong family norms resulting in a lack of social cohesion in the society as a whole. This idea is echoed in the work of Granovetter who indicates that “the relatively ‘weak’ ties of community may be more supportive of a vibrant civil society than the strong ties of the family” (in Winter, 2000:6). It is nevertheless the case that in most instances, where family issues have been incorporated into discussions of social cohesion/capital, it is the first view that has prevailed. For instance, Putnam sees the family as “the most fundamental form of social capital” while Bourdieu claims it is “the main site of accumulation and transmission of social capital” (in Winter, 2000:5). Statements such as these have not, however, translated into a great deal of research on the family- social capital connection. It would appear that researchers have been more concerned with generalised rather than particularised forms of trust (trust of strangers and institutions as opposed to trust of ‘familiar’ as in family and friends). Moreover, in cases where family has been brought into research on social capital, there has been a marked lack of discussion of exactly what it is, in families, that generate social networks characterised by trust and reciprocity.

One example of an attempt to theorize and conduct empirical research on the family – social cohesion connection is Coleman. In his analysis, social capital is seen as residing in the strength of the parent-child relationships which in turn was operationalised by means of the ‘physical presence of adults in the family and on the attention given by adults to the child’ (in Winter, 2000:7). In turn, these were measured by means of the parent-child ratio (number of parents per child) and how frequently children discussed personal matters with their parents. These variables were then correlated with educational outcome (the chances that a child will drop out of school). His research shows that children are less likely to drop out of school when they live in a two-parent, two child family than if they live in a single parent, five-child situation/family. His second finding is that there is no correlation between the frequency with which parents and children discuss personal issues and the chance of dropping out of school. The general finding then, is that the higher the parent-child ratio the better the educational outcomes of children. Coleman expresses this idea when he writes: “the most prominent element of structural deficiency in modern families is the single-parent family” (Coleman, in Winter, 2000:7).

Quite justifiably, this research has been criticised on a number of grounds:

- \* for measuring only the frequency of interaction (discussion) between parent and child rather than the quality of the relationship or the quality of family culture (presence of norms of trust and reciprocity);

- \* for not taking account of non-resident parents;

- \* ignoring the role of siblings in creating (extending) family networks and acting as surrogate parents to children;

“(Coleman) treats the presence of siblings as deleterious to the quality of any parent-child relation, rather than as having social capital potential, by extending networks of relations in a household” (Stone, 2001:10).

\* for presenting his case in extreme terms (comparing a two child plus parents family with a single parent plus five children family) and ignoring other factors which may account for negative school outcomes (the parent's level of education, poverty etc.)

\* for confusing the parent-child ratio with family structure.

\* he seems to be operating within a western paradigm of family life as indicated in the assumption that a child is cared for by a maximum of two 'parents'.

Coleman's research nevertheless represents a starting point in the attempt to link intra-familial relationships to the 'production' of social capital. His research as well as the critiques thereof can usefully be incorporated into analyses of the family-social cohesion connection in South Africa. For instance, the importance of seeing siblings as potential care-givers, role models, parental figures as well as the quality of the relationship between children and non-resident biological parents. Other research which has looked at the relationship between family-as-household and family-as-kin group (family members who live in other households) as well as the family-community interactions and networks will also assist in an understanding of social cohesion in the South African context (see Winter, 2000 & Stone, 2001).

Just as the concept of social cohesion has gained prominence in First World societies in reaction to a perceived decline in civil society and societal break-down, so too has the family been gaining prominence in the South African context against the background of a perceived immanent collapse of society. However, in our case, the trigger for the concern has been a disease: HIV/Aids.

"A bleak future is predicted ... there will be a boom in South Africa's orphan population ... as the AIDS epidemic takes its toll. Growing up without parents, and badly supervised by relatives and welfare organizations, this growing pool of orphans will be at greater than average risk to engage in criminal activity ... Children orphaned by AIDS will have no role models in future and they will resort to crime to survive" (Whitesides and Sunter, 2000:96).

To present the matter crudely, the logic that has been employed is as follows:  
HIV/Aids causes illness and death, death leads to orphans, orphans are raised in less than desirable family situations (single parent, elderly & child-headed households), in the absence of role models orphans resort to crime thus threatening the fabric of South African society.

The problem with this chain of reasoning lies primarily in the third 'link' i.e. the failure to distinguish between legal/technical definitions of orphans and a sociological definition (i.e. being an orphan means not being taken care of). As such, this reasoning links directly to the question of whether families do or do not contribute to social cohesion. Related to this, is the question of how, in a South African and African context, families react to adverse circumstances. It is the lack of understanding of the latter, that has led to apocalyptic claims about how HIV/Aids is affecting South African society. A claim frequently found in the literature is that 'in the past extended families absorbed orphans but they are becoming increasingly stretched and thus unable to cope'. However, as Bray (2003) has convincingly argued, in the social scientific literature on this issue, the notion of 'coping' is seldom defined and the connection between 'families not coping' and social collapse is asserted rather than demonstrated.

Similarly, I have argued elsewhere (Ziehl, 2002) that the actual incidence of child-headed households has been grossly exaggerated and attempts to 'prove' that they have increased

have been based on spurious data. For instance, the Hlabisa study found 'no child headed households, except as a temporary household from' (in Ziehl & Burns, 2004:14). Drawing on census data, Burn and I have further shown that there has actually been a decline in proportion of households headed by someone under the age of 20 and over the age of 65 between 1996 and 2001 (Ziehl & Burns, 2004:14). National level data do not therefore support the idea that child or elderly headed households have increased. Below I present the data on household structure from the 1996 and 2001 censuses, which should cast some more light on the question of how family life is or is not changing within the South African context. The data has been arranged to highlight the proportion of extended and couple-headed households. We have adopted this approach so as to test Whitesides and Sunter's claim that, because of HIV/Aids, there has been a significant decline in these family structures:

"Many of us take for granted that children will normally be brought up in caring, nurturing environments. AIDS overturns this principle. The norm is no longer a two-parent family or, prominent in the African context, the extended family" (2000:95).

	1996	2001
Single Person	16.22	18.54
Couple Household	10.00	9.16
Couple & Children	23.93	20.60
<b>Nuclear Families Excluding Single Parent</b>	<b>50.25</b>	<b>48.30</b>
Single Parent	12.33	11.31
<b>Nuclear Families Including Single Parent</b>	<b>62.58</b>	<b>59.61</b>
Head & Other Relative (not child or spouse)	7.06	10.11
Couple & Other Relative	2.24	2.22
Couple, Children & Other Relatives	8.10	10.10
Single Parent & Other Relative	10.60	14.72
<b>All Extended Families</b>	<b>28.00</b>	<b>37.15</b>
Non-Relatives	4.98	3.24
Unspecified	4.55	
Total	100.00	100.00

Table 1: Comparison of Household Structure: 1996 & 2001, arranged to highlight extended family households (%) (Ziehl & Burns, 2004)

As shown in Table 1, there has actually been a decrease in the proportion of extended family households between 1996 and 2001. Table 2 (below) shows that there has indeed been a decrease in the proportion of couple headed households, but this is not of the magnitude one might expect on the basis of predictions made.

	1996	2001
Couple	10.00	9.16
Couple & Other Relative	2.24	2.22
<b>Couple Headed Without Children</b>	<b>12.24</b>	<b>11.38</b>
Couple & Children	23.93	20.60
Couple, Children & Other Relatives	8.10	10.10
<b>Couple Headed With Children</b>	<b>32.03</b>	<b>30.70</b>
<b>All Couple Headed Households</b>	<b>44.27</b>	<b>42.08</b>
Single Person	16.22	18.54
Single Parent	12.33	11.31
Head & Other Relative (not child or spouse)	7.06	10.11
Single Parent & Other Relative	10.60	14.72
Non-Relatives	4.98	3.24
Unspecified	4.55	

Total	100.00	100.00
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Table 2: Comparison of Household Structure: 1996 & 2001 Arranged to Highlight Couple Households (Ziehl & Burns, 2004)

These data are presented not as conclusive proof of how family life is or is not changing within the context of HIV/Aids and other phenomena. Rather they are presented as a starting point for sound social scientific analysis of this issue. Household structures represent only the shell within which family life is conducted. We need to know far more about inter and intra family relationships and exchanges before we can develop a sound understanding of how families operate and how they contribute to social cohesion. This calls for research into the extent and quality of familial networks based on trust and reciprocity – an area of investigation hitherto under-explored.

These data are also presented tentatively since there is a sense in which the census is a blunt instrument when it comes to measuring social change. It is neither designed for, nor is priority given to the question of analysing family life. There are also a number of problems around the methodology used to elicit information on household structures – most notably the use of the subjective concept ‘household head’ (see Ziehl, 2002 & Budlender). But, as noted, they are presented here as a starting point for analyses of the family – social cohesion connection. They present one example of existing data sources that can be used for that purpose.

Another potentially useful data source is the SASAS (S.A. Social Attitudes Survey). The 2003 questionnaire contained a number of question on family related issues which have not yet been analysed. The 2004 questionnaire does not include any family-related questions which suggests that they need to be reincorporated into future SASAS surveys or included in an independent survey so as to monitor change.

Some questions that could be addressed as part of this project are:

- \* Do members of families (as households) feel a sense of belonging?
- \* Do levels of closeness vary by gender and age?
- \* Do family members share the same values or is there a generation gap?
- \* What is the nature of these values?
- \* Do members of families feel a sense of belonging with those living in other households?
- \* What is the nature of exchange intra and inter household?
- \* Are familial relationships (intra and inter household) marked by trust and reciprocity?
- \* How does South Africa compare with other societies on these issues?

The last question raises the issue of a comparative approach. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasized. If for example, it is found that 75% of South Africans trust their family members and 65% trust strangers, is this high or low? This question cannot be answered unless the data is compared to something. Such a comparison can be historical which would require a repetition of the study after five or ten years. (Any shorter period will result in short term

variations being mistaken for long term trends). The comparison can also be cross-sectional – comparing different societies at one point in time. It is only through contextualizing the results of this project by means of information about other societies and other times in history that we can generate meaningful data on the extent of social cohesion in this society.

A final point, the Australian Institute of Family Studies has been running a special programme entitled: “Families, Social Capital and Citizenship” since at least 2000. This represents a useful opportunity for an exchange of ideas and mutual learning.

This paper has been a modest attempt at bringing together discussions of social cohesion generally and issues around the family. It would seem that even prominent theorists of social cohesion/capital have asserted rather than demonstrated the connection between family and social cohesion. Moreover, the limited empirical research that has been conducted on this issue leaves much to be desired. Much more work needs to be done on both the theoretical and empirical level.

Despite the prominence it has recently enjoyed in the public arena, family life in the South African context, too, remains severely under-researched – particularly at the national level. This project can go a long way towards rectifying that situation by giving analytical priority the family – the ultimate foundation of social cohesion.

	1996	2001
Single Person	16	19
Couple Household	10	9
Couple & Children	24	21
<b>Nuclear Families Excluding Single Parent</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>48</b>
Single Parent	12	11
<b>Nuclear Families Including Single Parent</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>60</b>
Head & Other Relative (not child or spouse)	7	10
Couple & Other Relative	2	2
Couple, Children & Other Relatives	8	10
Single Parent & Other Relative	11	15
<b>All Extended Families</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>37</b>
Non-Relatives	5	3
Unspecified	5	
Total	100	100

Table 1: Comparison of Household Structure, Arranged to Highlight Extended Family Households (Ziehl & Burns, 2004)

	1996	2001
Couple	10	9
<b>Couple &amp; Other Relative</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Couple Headed Without Children</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>
Couple & Children	24	21
Couple, Children & Other Relatives	8	10
<b>Couple Headed With Children</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>All Couple Headed Households</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>42</b>
Single Person	16	19
Single Parent	12	11
Head & Other Relative (not child or spouse)	7	10
Single Parent & Other Relative	11	15

Non-Relatives	5	3
Unspecified	5	
Total	100	100

Table 2: Comparison of Household Structure, Arranged to Highlight Couple Households (Ziehl & Burns, 2004)

It is not possible to determine how families in South Africa have changed for a period longer than five years. This is because the only nationally representative data available to us (which covers some aspects of family life) come from the 1994 and 2001 censuses. Censuses conducted prior to 1994 covered a different geographical base (excluded the TBVC areas) and are therefore not comparable to the post 1994 data. But even if this were not the case, data on household structure from the 1991 census were neither coded nor analysed and even though the 1970 data was analysed, it is in a format that is not suitable for comparison with more recent censuses. I will therefore focus only on what we know about family life in the sense of 'who is living with whom' (or who was living with whom at the time of the census) from the 1994 and 2001 censuses.

Linking up with debates, initiated in the West and resuscitated recently against the background of discussions around globalization, the data are presented in a way that will allow us to ascertain the extent to which South Africans are conducting their family lives within the context of the extended family model/system or the nuclear family model/system. It is important to note that this question cannot be answered by just focussing on nuclear family *households* alone (see Ziehl, 2001). This is because each of the family models (or systems) incorporates a series of household structures and one of these is common to both family systems. More specifically, nuclear family households are common to both extended and nuclear family systems and cannot therefore be used as the litmus test for whether a society is approximating one or other of these family *systems*. On the other hand, extended family households are almost unheard-of in nuclear family systems and can therefore be used to ascertain whether a society is approximating the extended family system. Similarly, couple households are rare in extended family systems but very common in nuclear family systems and can therefore be used as an indicator of whether the community/society is approximating the nuclear family system. But the main point I am wishing to make here is that family life and household structures need to be seen in dynamic terms and when we wish to answer the question of whether a society is approximating a particular family model or moving away from another, we need to group together the household structures which represent the various phases of the domestic life cycle associated with that family model. In Table 1, the data have been arranged by grouping together those household structures which represent the phases typical of the nuclear family model (people living on their own, with spouse only and with spouse and children only). As can be noted from that table, about half of of South African households fell within those categories in 2001 and when single parent families are added, it rises to 60%. This may seem high, but it is not. In First World societies such as Great Britain more than 85% of households represent one of the phases in the conventional nuclear family pattern and when single parent households are added, the relevant figure is over 95%. By contrast, in South Africa extended family households constitute more than a third of all households, whereas in Great Britain they represent only 1% (Ziehl, 2003).

As regards the trend, the data show that the proportion of households falling within the nuclear family model have reduced (albeit slightly) from 50% in 1994 to 48% in 2001. When single parent families are added, the respective figures are 63% and 60%. The data therefore show a small decline in the proportion of households falling within the nuclear family model. On the other hand, when we focus only on extended family households, we notice that there has been a

substantial increase from 1994 to 2001 (28% to 37%). This means that South Africans are by no means abandoning the extended family system in favour of the nuclear family system.

	1996	2001
Single Person	16.22	18.54
Couple Household	10.00	9.16
Couple & Children	23.93	20.60
<b>Nuclear Families Excluding Single Parent</b>	<b>50.25</b>	<b>48.30</b>
Single Parent	12.33	11.31
<b>Nuclear Families Including Single Parent</b>	<b>62.58</b>	<b>59.61</b>
Head & Other Relative (not child or spouse)	7.06	10.11
Couple & Other Relative	2.24	2.22
Couple, Children & Other Relatives	8.10	10.10
Single Parent & Other Relative	10.60	14.72
<b>All Extended Families</b>	<b>28.00</b>	<b>37.15</b>
Non-Relatives	4.98	3.24
Unspecified	4.55	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Table 1: Comparison of Household Structure: 1996 & 2001, Arranged to Highlight Nuclear Family Model (Ziehl & Burns, 2004)

Table 2 omitted.



Similar findings emerge when our unit of analysis is the individual (rather than the household) and we ask: How are individuals related to the 'head' of their household? Tables 3 and 4 (see also Figures 1, 2 & 3) focus only on children and indicate the number and proportion of children living in households headed by a parent, grandparent, other relative or non-relative. They show that the proportion living in a household headed by a parent declined (65% to 59%) from 1994 to 2001 while those living with a grandparent present increased (24% to 27%). These data again show the veracity of the extended family model in the South African context.

	Child		Grandchild		Other Relative		Non-Relative		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0-4	2542932	59	1427731	33	284600	7	50983	1	4306246	100
5-9	2947168	65	1235410	27	338679	7	43597	1	4564854	100
10-14	3135581	69	942954	21	422350	9	46344	1	4547229	100
15-19	2714520	68	548973	14	670509	17	79671	2	4013673	100
Total	11340201	65	4155068	24	1716138	10	220595	1	17432002	100
Excluding Relationship Unspecified.										


Table 3: Relationship to Household Head (Individuals) Census 1996

	Child		Grandchild		Other Relative		Non-Relative		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0-4	2396029	54	1699328	38	325719	7	28740	1	4449816	100
5-9	2835990	58	1536053	32	449851	9	31660	1	4853554	100
10-14	3156744	62	1217481	24	622251	12	65441	1	5061917	100
15-19	3018986	61	766147	15	1044501	21	152087	3	4981721	100
Total	11407749	59	5219009	27	2442322	13	277928	1	19347008	100

Table 4: Relationship to Household Head (Individuals) Census 2001



**Figure 3: Relationship to Household Head  
1996 & 2001(All Ages)**




Women, Child, or single parent-headed households:

From 1996 to 2001, the proportion of households headed by men has declined (62% to 57%) while those headed by women has increased (38% to 43%) (Table 5 and Figure 4). Tables 6 and 7 show the break down by age and indicate that in both years the proportion of households headed by men decreases while those headed by women increase after 50 years of age. To a large extent, this is an indication of gender differences in mortality.

	Male Number	%	Female Number	%	Total Number	%
1996	5815621	62.19	3536425	37.81	9352046	100.00
2001	6429927	57.38	4775777	42.62	11205704	100.00


Table 5: Male and Female Headed Households, 1996 & 2001



Age	Males Number	%	Females Number	%	Total Number	%
0-19	120303	48.94	125528	51.06	245831	100.00
20-34	1717441	65.92	887755	34.08	2605196	100.00
35-54	2629308	66.13	1346932	33.87	3976240	100.00
55-64	676025	56.64	517540	43.36	1193565	100.00
65+	672544	50.52	658670	49.48	1331214	100.00
Total	5815621	62.19	3536425	37.81	9352046	100.00

Table 6: Male and Female Headed Households by Age, Census 1996

	Male		Female		Total	
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Age	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
0-19	114151	50.15	113461	49.85	227612	100.00
20-34	1836481	61.34	1157410	38.66	2993891	100.00
35-54	3018361	60.03	2009654	39.97	5028015	100.00
55-64	797721	54.80	658017	45.20	1455738	100.00
65+	663213	44.20	837235	55.80	1500448	100.00
Total	6429927	57.38	4775777	42.62	11205704	100.00

Table 7: Male and Female Headed Households by Age (Census 2001)

As regards child-headed households, Table 8 and Figure 5 show that households headed by someone under the age of 20 represented about 3% of households in 1996 and 2% in 2001. They have thus declined over the five-year period. Table 8 further shows that households headed by someone between 34 and 65 have increased, while those headed by someone over 64 have decreased over the same time period.

Age	Census 1996		Census 2001		% Change
	Number	%	Number	%	
0-19	245832	2.63	227612	2.03	-0.6
20-34	2605197	27.86	2993891	26.72	-1.14
35-54	3976241	42.52	5028016	44.87	2.35
55-64	1193565	12.76	1455738	12.99	0.23
65+	1331217	14.23	1500448	13.39	-0.84
Total	9352052	100	11205705	100	

Table 8: Household Head by Age (Census 1996 & 2001 in Ziehl & Burns, 2004:14).

The proportion of single parent households can be deduced from Tables 1 and 2. These show that single parent households represented about 12% of all households in 1994 and 11% in 2001.

Considering the issue of orphans, table 9 present the results of two sample surveys for the questions: "Is this person's mother alive?" and "Is this person's father alive?". It shows that of all children under the age of 15, just under 1.5% were maternal orphans (mother deceased), about 11% were paternal orphans (father deceased) and about 1.5% were double orphans (both mother and father deceased) in 1995. It further shows that by 2002, maternal orphans had

increased by 1.12%, paternal orphans had decreased by the same margin, while double orphans increased by 0.16%.

October Household Survey 1995			General Household Survey 2002			
Orphans: 0-14 Years	Number	%	Orphans	Number	%	Change
No	37342	86.46	No	27684	84.23	-2.23
Maternal	595	1.38	Maternal	823	2.50	+1.12
Paternal	4646	10.76	Paternal	3170	9.64	-1.12
Double	608	1.41	Double	515	1.57	+0.16
			Other	676	2.06	
Total	43191	100.00	Total	32868	100.00	

Table 9: Orphans

Estimating the impact of these issues on social capital and social cohesion is difficult. To a large extent, the data simply show us 'who is living with whom', how many children have lost a parent etcetera. As such, they represent 'the shell' within which family life is conducted. We need far more information on what happens within family households before we can make any meaningful claims about how and whether the family is generating social cohesion in this society. More particularly, we need research on the quality of relationships within (family) households and between (family) households. We need to know whether those relationships are based on trust and reciprocity and thereby the extent to which they can contribute to social cohesion/capital.

There are also a number of problems in using census data as a source of information on changing family life in South Africa. The census was neither designed for, nor gives priority to the study of family life. For instance, using the 'household head' as reference point is problematic in the sense that this is a subjective label and it is impossible to differentiate between the person who filled in the census questionnaire (the respondent) and the 'head'. As I have argued elsewhere (Ziehl, 2001) it would be more profitable to use the oldest person as the reference point and determine family structures from there. This methodology lends itself more to the identification of multi-generational family structures and the persistence or otherwise of the patrilineal kinship system. The SASAS (South African Attitudes Survey) does use this methodology but the data has not been analysed and/or published.

What is needed to shed light on the question of the family-social cohesion connection is a nationally representative sample survey dedicated primarily to the question of family life. The following are questions that could be covered in such a survey:

Although the inadequacies of the census have been pointed out, the data presented above does show that in the South African context, extended family relationships continue to be used as a resource which enables people to take up opportunities and deal with adverse events. Whether they assist or hinder upward social mobility is another question which a national survey of family life could address.

## Children and Youth

Social cohesion is an illusive, but complex concept. While it has its roots in classical social theory, its more recent usage is associated with the rise of the concept of social exclusion in Europe in the 1970s and with attempts to develop a conceptual framework of socio-economic disadvantage that transcends the limitations of poverty as income deprivation. As such, social exclusion incorporates the deprivations associated with poverty (and especially the inequalities generated by poverty), and in its scope is almost indistinguishable from multidimensional approaches to poverty, such as human development and Sen's (2000) interpretation of poverty as capability deprivation. In its many different forms and guises, social exclusion has been seen as one of the competing approaches to, and definitions of, poverty (see, for example, Ruggeri Laderchi et al., 2003), as a concept that has replaced poverty in European policy formation (Aasland & Flotten, 2001), and in some of its forms, even as synonymous with income poverty (Peace, 2001).

How then is social cohesion related to social exclusion, and other associated concepts like social capital and social inclusion? Miller (1998: 1-2) provides a useful framework in which to understand the relationships between these concepts. Firstly, social exclusion and social cohesion may be seen as opposite ends of a bipolar process<sup>1</sup>. Policies that seek to reverse the process of social exclusion may therefore be described as promoting social inclusion or social cohesion. However, as Miller (1998: 1) argues, the differences between the three concepts "are not merely semantic, they reflect different ways of focusing on the same issue and can have profoundly different implications both for the way those who are socially excluded are viewed and for the role that public services are expected to play".

While social exclusion focuses attention on those who are excluded, social inclusion "locates this concern to tackle social exclusion in a wider context". The focus of social inclusion is therefore not only on the excluded, but also on the rest of the community. This dual concern with the 'excluded' and the 'included' arises from the recognition that social exclusion can have negative outcomes not only for those who are excluded, but also for the rest of the community. This might, for example, take the form of fear of crime or violence arising from social exclusion. Social cohesion provides for an even broader focus than social inclusion by locating social exclusion and inclusion within a framework of social processes such as participation, governance and social fragmentation. More specifically, social cohesion focus attention on social capital, "the networks of interactions that we have with one another, that bind us together and act as a primary means of exchanging the information, skills and help that anyone needs in their everyday life" Miller (1998: 2).<sup>2</sup>

In this section, a broad approach is adopted to social cohesion, in which it is seen as incorporating elements of poverty and inequality, but also of social capital. The paper starts out by considering why it is important to focus on children and youth when assessing social cohesion and social exclusion in societies. It then goes on to discuss social cohesion in the context of South Africa. This is done firstly in relation to the legacies of apartheid and the destructive impact of apartheid on the social fabric, and in particular on the heavy toll exacted from children and youth. Thereafter the paper focuses on a number of quantitative indicators of

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<sup>1</sup> The duality in the concept is captured by Jane Jenson when she describes social cohesion "as a term used by those who sense an absence of some sort".

<sup>2</sup> Berger-Schmitt (2000:4) adopts a similar perspective when she argues that social cohesion incorporates two societal goal dimensions, one concerning the reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, and the other focused on strengthening social relations, interactions and ties (social capital).

recent social trends that have impacted heavily on children and youth and which hold important threats to social cohesion in South Africa. These include very high rates of youth unemployment, child and youth poverty, including the deep inequalities that arise from poverty associated with children and youth, low and declining marital rates among young South Africans, the involvement of young people in crime and violence, and civic engagement trends among children and youth.

Children generally suffer higher rates of poverty than adults in that child poverty rates are usually higher than the poverty rates of adults. In the United States, for example, the rate of poverty among children in 1992 was 21,9% in contrast to a rate of 14,4% for adults. This discrepancy in child and adult poverty rates has been attributed to poorer families having more children on average, as well as to high rates of single parent families among the poor (see, for example, Betson & Michael, 1997: 30-31). The argument runs both ways. While the poor, for various reasons, generally have higher fertility rates, families that have more children have greater financial needs because they have more people to support. Similarly, while teenage pregnancies and single-parent households are often associated with the conditions of poverty, having one rather than two adults to support a household is in itself likely to increase vulnerability to poverty. Purely by virtue of their numbers therefore, children make up a substantial and growing proportion of the poor. Reducing child poverty, therefore, is essential to addressing poverty in general.

This argument is reinforced by demographic trends. To begin with, children make up a significant part of the population that is targeted by development. This is particularly true of the developing countries, where in 2000, 49% of their populations were below the age of 18. Furthermore, population growth rates of developing countries are nearly twice that of the world as a whole. While developing countries account for ten per cent of the world's population, they are responsible for about 20 per cent of the annual number of births (UNICEF, 2001: 2). Also within developing countries, children and young people tend to be most concentrated in those areas that are poorest. In South Africa, for example, children under 18 years accounted for about 41% of the total population in 1996. However, 55% of these children were located in the largely impoverished rural areas, where they made up 49% of the population, as against 34% of the urban population.

A third reason for focusing on children and young people is because they are at crucial stages in their growth and development. Early childhood, for example, "offers a critical opportunity to influence the intellectual, physical and emotional development of human beings. The detrimental effects of missing this one-time opportunity are often irreversible" (UNICEF: 2001:2). Poverty can have profound effects on the physical, cognitive, emotional and social development of children at various stages of their development, not only preventing them from reaching their full potential, but also guiding them in directions that are detrimental to the future well-being of society.

Child and youth poverty are therefore intimately connected to sustainable development. In 1987 the Brundtland Commission defined sustainability as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". This definition draws attention not only to conserving resources for the future, but also to future generations themselves. Clearly, there can be no future, without a future generation, and no matter how carefully we prepare for the future, our efforts would be meaningless without investing in those people who will make up future generations.

A related reason for why we need to focus on children and youth is that they are often the most vulnerable members of a society. Because children, and to a lesser extent young people, are largely dependent on adults, they enter or avoid poverty by virtue of their family's economic and other circumstances. For the most part they are unable to alter family conditions by themselves before they reach adulthood (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997:55). Young children are also often dependent upon adults to make decisions for them and rarely have the means to challenge such decisions. Within the context of globalisation, young people also face new challenges and vulnerabilities such as high rates of unemployment, the need for higher levels of education and training in order to secure positions in labour markets, and transitions to adulthood have become uneven and fragmented (Thomson et al., 2004: xiv).

A good indicator of a country's level of development is the way it treats its most vulnerable members. As Uri Bronfenbrenner (cited by Thornley, 1996) wrote more than a quarter of a century ago, the worth of a society can be measured by "the concern of one generation for the next ... A society which neglects its children, however well it may function in other respects, risks eventual disorganisation and demise".

Finally, children and youth are important to social cohesion because they have the potential to perpetuate the poverty and social exclusion of their households of origin. This applies not only to their own lifetimes, but also across the generations. Unless children are helped to escape poverty and social exclusion, the probability is increased that they will grow up to be poor (and social excluded) adults and also that they might raise poor (and socially excluded) children of their own.

A major difficulty in measuring social cohesion or social capital relates to determining a norm against which the degree of social cohesion (or the lack thereof) can be assessed. This might be done, for example, by means of longitudinal data in which one can compare the results of social cohesion indicators at two or more points in time, and thereby assess whether social cohesion has increased or decreased over a period of time. Another might be to use the same indicators of social cohesion across different countries or other geographical areas and thereby reach an assessment of the degree to which differences in the levels of social cohesion vary across countries. In the absence of data of this kind, one has to rely on those indicators for which data exists (for example, income poverty and unemployment rates) and to use more deductive reasoning to assess relative levels of social cohesion.

Both approaches are used in this paper. First, I consider the impact that apartheid and its legacies have had on social cohesion in South Africa. While this subsection of the paper does make use of some empirical and quantitative data, the major emphasis is on more qualitative historical analysis and deduction. The second sub-section of the paper considers social cohesion within the context of post-apartheid South Africa and makes greater use of more recent quantitative analyses relating to poverty, unemployment, marital trends, crime and violence, and youth civic engagement.

The destructive impact of colonialism, apartheid and racial oppression on the social fabric of black communities in South Africa has long been documented. In an article published in 1991, for example, Mamphela Ramphele analysed the causes and consequences of social disintegration in black communities. Among the symptoms of disintegration, she listed family breakdowns, with increasing divorce rates, separation, single parenthood and teenage pregnancy; breakdown of the authority of parents and teachers; high unemployment and

unemployability rates; low performance in all spheres of life, including school; high crime and violence rates at all levels of social interaction; alcohol and drug abuse; despair and acceptance of a victim image; and the flight of skills and positive role models from the townships into higher-income areas.

The causes of social disintegration in black communities are complex, and include colonial conquest, subordination and repression, dispossession and impoverishment, and rapid and massive urbanisation following the lifting of restrictions on movement. Inadequate social services and infrastructure, forced removals and other disruptions of communities, and the flight of potential role models from the townships also played a role. In addition, Ramphela points to the destruction of family life by the migrant labour system and conditions in the hostels, the system of Bantu Education, disruption of schools, and indifferent or hostile job markets. Various social and political developments such as the alienation of young people from adult leaders and parents, the involvement of children in the frontline of resistance, the politics of making South Africa ungovernable, school boycotts, people's courts, and the brutalisation of both victims and perpetrators by widespread violence, also contributed to social disintegration.

These diverse but systematically related factors have placed increasing strains on social relations, helped to entrench violence as a means of settling disputes, and have disrupted or destroyed community institutions and authority structures.

On the most general level, apartheid (and the colonial system out of which it grew) created deep rifts not only between blacks and whites but also between racial sub-groups, while the violence inherent in the system severely undermined trust. As Rock (1997:88) observed, apartheid created a "climate of distrust and fear" in which it was difficult to establish trusting relationships. This paved the way for intra-community and intra-family violence.

Besides its racially divisive effects, apartheid launched a more direct attack on the social fabric through a formidable battery of laws and policies to enforce spatial and social segregation. For example, scholars have extensively documented the destructive impact of the migrant labour system on family life.<sup>3</sup> Thomas (1987), for example, attributes what she calls "a very extensive psychosocial pathology in the homelands" to migrant labour, enforced ruralisation and consequent entrapping poverty. The migrant labour system operated by separating families, usually the men from their wives and children. This led to many migrant labourers entering into relationships with women in the towns, and subsequently to illegitimate births, divorces and desertions. Mothers who had been deserted often faced the choice of starving in the homelands, or becoming migrant labourers themselves. In addition to a heavy toll of child neglect, malnutrition and infant mortality, "most homeland children grow up without their fathers and many without their mothers as well. Most are sub-optimally nurtured by stopgap guardians who are seldom as competent...as a...mother would be" (Thomas, 1987:114).

Wilson and Ramphela (1989:199) estimated that more than two million of the five million black workers in South Africa at the time were migrant labourers. While examples of migrant labour exist in other countries, "there is no other country where such a system has existed for so long and has trapped so large a proportion of the labour force in a dehumanising structure." Pass laws, forced removals and restrictions on the construction of black housing in urban areas were used to prevent, and in some cases reverse, black urbanisation. It is estimated that between 1916 and 1986, 17 million people were prosecuted under the pass laws (Wilson and Ramphela, 1989:208). The pass laws not only slowed down black urbanisation and consigned many

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<sup>3</sup> For example, Murray, 1980 & 1981; Spiegel, 1980; Thomas, 1987.

families to lives of poverty in the homelands, but contributed also to the break up of families. Limitations on housing construction in the townships also led to extreme overcrowding of existing accommodation and the development of squatter and informal settlements. In Cape Town, for example, all construction of housing for Africans was halted in 1966 (Wilson and Ramphela, 1989:215).

The Group Areas Act had a devastating impact on black families not only because it uprooted families from the communities in which they were located, but also because it moved many households to areas that were distant from their workplaces. This meant that parents often had to leave home before sunrise and returned long after sunset. For example, the establishment of the KwaNdebele homeland situated between 110 and 150 kms from Pretoria, resulted in up to eight hours travelling time for workers employed in Pretoria. In consequence the time that parents could spend with their children was severely limited (Rock, 1997: 73-74; Wilson and Ramphela, 1989:213-214).

It is estimated that between 1960 and 1983, 3,5 million people were victims of forced removals. The scale of these removals had major implications for the social cohesion of South African communities. The Surplus People Project (SPP), an extensive national study of relocation in the early 1980s that was published in five regional volumes, provides a wealth of information on the impact of relocation on families and communities. Of special interest within the context of this paper are the ways in which relocations and removals are conceptualised within the reports. For example, the report on forced removals in Natal (Surplus People Project, 1983 (a): 545-55) suggests that relocation might be more appropriately described as “dislocation”:

This dislocation reveals itself concretely in several ways – in the high incidence of violence experienced in major relocation townships such as Ezakheni and Newlands East and the faction fighting found in rural relocation target points in the Msinga district and along the South Coast; in the alienation, apathy and despair articulated by so many of the respondents in the relocation areas surveyed by SPP; in the very real material losses and psychological trauma suffered by rural households...

The report goes on to argue that what made relocation sites so difficult to live in was not only the lack of facilities, but also “the social fragmentation and high level of stress they demonstrate”.

The Transvaal Report (Surplus People Project, 1983 (b): 5-12; 343-5) is even more explicit, placing relocation within the context of state policies that deliberately promoted “disorganization” of the dominated classes and the “economic, political and ideological fragmentation of black people in South Africa”. Relocation (among other state interventions) was therefore seen as part of a broad state agenda of dividing (and therefore weakening) the common bonds between dominated classes by the location and relocation of black people in ethnically-divided Bantustans or homelands. Disorganisation and fragmentation are depicted as essential to the maintenance of class exploitation, by preventing unified resistance, blocking claims to a common citizenship, and keeping wages low.

On a more micro-level, Don Pinnock (1985) has vividly documented the destructive impact of forced removals to the Cape Flats on coloured families and communities. Pinnock (1985:29) shows how the old working class neighbourhoods from which people were removed, were “places in which different strata of the working class had won space for their own forms of life. These spaces were both physical (the networks of streets, houses, corner shops and shebeens) and social (the networks of kin, friendships, neighbourhood and work). They were a mixture of rights and obligations, intimacies and distances, providing a sense of solidarity, local loyalties

and traditions.” The Group Areas removals destroyed these relationships, networks, rights and obligations, and with it the sense of continuity, security and social controls:

...like a man with a stick breaking spider webs in a forest. The spider may survive the fall, but he can't survive without his web. When he comes to build it again he finds the anchors gone, the people are all over, and the fabric of generations lost. ... Now the family is taken out of this environment where everything is safe and known. It is put in a matchbox in a strange place. All social norms have suddenly been abolished. Before, the children who got up to mischief in the streets were reprimanded by neighbours. Now there's nobody, and they join gangs because that's the only way to find friends (Oscar Wollheim cited by Pinnock, 1985:30).

One of the first casualties of the removals was the extended family, resulting in the isolation of nuclear families within small housing units. The removals had destroyed the way “the street, the corner shop and the shebeens in the ‘old’ areas had provided the residents with a great measure of communal space” (Pinnock, 1985:32). This in turn placed increasing strain on the nuclear family, as it had to serve as the sole focus of solidarity, as well as compensate for the diversity of relationships previously provided by neighbours and wider kin. As pressures on the nuclear family increased, working-class households were not only isolated from the outside. Isolation in turn bred fear and mistrust.

As these pressures built up, the nuclear family became a “battleground” rather than a source of security and support. Tensions arose in marital relationships, with increases in divorce, desertion, illegitimacy and single-parent families. Difficulties also arose between parents and their children. Promiscuity, and alcohol and drug abuse increased, while children took to the streets in search of friends and diversion. The collapse of social control over the youth also had implications for the growth of gangs in the Cape Flats. In his study of the Mowbray removal, John Western (1978:438-439) illustrates the ways in which the broader community regulated the behaviour of young people and of outsiders. Members of the community kept a lookout for strangers and for bad behaviour among the youth and would report transgressions to parents or intervene themselves. Informants claimed that there was no delinquency in Mowbray because all adults assumed the role of parents: “Mowbray was one family ... We grew up good boys, we wouldn't be naughty in front of the old people ... We respected other fathers, they checked us... We were more scared of the old people than of the police” (Western, 1978:438).<sup>4</sup>

A central feature of the destructive impact of apartheid on the social fabric was the heavy toll it exacted from children, and the implications this has had for succeeding generations. Pamela Reynolds (1989: 1999), in common with Ramphele, draws our attention to the long-term impacts and implications of the exposure of children to violence under apartheid:

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<sup>4</sup> A note of caution is necessary here. There may be a tendency for informants to idealise and sentimentalise the communities from which they were removed, and as Western (1978:437-41) points out, some of his informants were ambivalent in their perceptions of their former community. Similarly, some respondents felt that housing in the new communities of the Cape Flats compared favourably with their previous accommodation. There is also the question whether with the passage of time impoverished and disempowered communities like Mowbray would still have experienced disintegration of the extended family, more distant relationships with neighbours and the rise of youth gangs, even if they *had not been relocated*. A further question that arises in this context is the extent to which extended families actually gave way to nuclear families. Even today debate is continuing on whether Black South Africans are increasingly converging into nuclear families, and as Ziehl (2001:6) has argued, “we need to be very circumspect when we make pronouncements about how family patterns (in South Africa) may or may not be changing”.

...even when the current regime has been toppled there will be a need to consider the lot of children whose lives have been disrupted, uprooted, shredded by an evil system. It will take time and conscious effort and commitment and understanding to cancel the effects of apartheid. Families must be reconstituted, wealth redistributed, education overhauled.

With the disruption of families and communities, children bore a major part of the brunt, in having to cope with the absence of parents, neglect, malnutrition, domestic violence and abuse. As Rock (1997:91) has pointed out “the loss of connectedness to parents and other suitable adult role models frequently lays the foundation for the development of negative relationships with peer groups through which exposure to criminal activity, substance abuse and school refusal remains an ever-present possibility”. Moreover, the absence of parents has also reflected adversely on the ability of young adults to deal with the responsibilities of adulthood and to assume the role of effective parents themselves (Rock, 1997:79; Ramphele, 2002; Thomas, 1987:114).

From the 1970s children increasingly became a focal point of the violence that overtook South Africa and began assuming positions of leadership and responsibility in the liberation struggle. As the struggle spilt over into the education sector, schools were disrupted and many became centres of conflict and violence. Large numbers of children and adolescents left the country to undergo military training, while others were inducted into militarised self-defence units (SDUs). Their involvement in the struggle drove a further wedge between the youth and their elders and continued the process of undermining parental authority and informal social control. In various ways, and as both victims and perpetrators, children became embroiled in the political violence that swept the country in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, it is estimated that more than 26 000 children in KwaZulu-Natal and 18 000 children in the PWV region were displaced as a result of violence between 1991 and 1993. A majority of these children were under five years of age (Rock, 1997: 65). See also Seekings, 1993; Straker, 1992; Hirschowitz et al., 1994; Dawes, 1994; UNICEF, 1989; Jones, 1990.

Not all violence to which children were exposed, was directly political. Black townships were characteristically overcrowded, under-serviced, poverty-stricken and crime-ridden, placing enormous strains on families and often resulting in high levels of anger and aggression. Such circumstances often led to the violent abuse of children. All indications are that by 1994 intra-family violence and abuse had reach very high levels and this trend has continued well into the transition period.

Under these conditions, it became very difficult for children almost anywhere in the country to escape exposure to violence and other traumatic events. For example, a study of adolescents in urban and rural townships in the Free State in the early 1990s revealed substantial signs of psychological distress. Two-thirds of the children interviewed had experienced at least one traumatic incident that they could not forget, and 77% exhibited at least three stress-related symptoms (Rock, 1997: 74-76). In his study of children in the Lwandle hostel in the Western Cape, Sean Jones (1990:ii; 236-7) observes that one of the most prominent features of life in the hostels was the frequency with which children were exposed to acts of extreme violence. Exposure of children to violence was inevitable because of the impossibility of shielding them from violence in a situation in which there was no clear demarcation between public and private space.

The exposure of children to violence can exact costs not only from the individuals concerned, but also from society itself. As Rock (1997:97) states, “a significant number of children emerge

from violent experiences with an inclination to be violent themselves". Research has also shown that South African children who have been exposed to incidents of political violence have been more inclined than those who have not experienced such exposure to emulate such acts. As Chikane (1986: 344) observed, "the most tragic reflection of the war situation in which South Africa finds itself is that it faces the years to come with children who have been socialized to find violence completely acceptable and human life cheap."

In her recent book on children in Crossroads, Ramphela (2002:162) reminds us that we "need to acknowledge the full extent of the legacy of apartheid and its socio-economic consequences:

The full extent of the impact of apartheid on society needs to be accepted. Families are in crisis. Schools are in crisis. Communities are in crisis. The triumphalism of the immediate post-apartheid period has led to a delay in appropriate interventions. There seems to be a discomfort in acknowledging the depth of the social crisis as if that would reflect badly on post-apartheid South Africa. But it is the failure to acknowledge the crisis that is reflecting badly on the society. How can others have confidence in the ability of society to tackle its problems if it denies their existence. The people cannot govern unless enabled to do so actively.

While apartheid laid the foundations for social disintegration in South Africa, conditions in post-apartheid South Africa (most of which have had their origins in the apartheid period) have also contributed to undermining social cohesion and have placed major obstacles in the way of the integration of young people into society. In particular, frighteningly high levels of youth unemployment, high rates of child and youth poverty, and pervasive inequalities in the access to resources of different segments of the youth population have resulted in the social exclusion of many young South Africans.

Unemployment is central to the issue of social cohesion not only because it denies income to the unemployed (and therefore contributes to poverty), but also because it excludes the unemployed by failing to recognise their productive role as human beings in society: Employment "provides social legitimacy and social status as well as access to income... It brings with it human dignity and entitles individuals to economic rights and social recognition that are essential for full citizenship. The symbolic dimension of exclusion is related to these criteria of personal achievement and to the need to be useful to society and to be recognised as such by society" (Council of Europe, 2001: 14).

South Africa is experiencing very high rates of youth unemployment that compare unfavourably even with most of the developing countries. Unemployment in South Africa has been steadily growing since the early 1970s. This has been part of a global trend, and according to ILO estimates (International Labour Office, 2001: 3), youth unemployment rose by eight million across the globe between 1995 and 1999. Young people between 15 and 30 years of age make up more than half (56%) of those who are unemployed, and the data also demonstrate long waiting periods before most young South Africans find employment. For example, the recent Status of the Youth Report (SYR) survey (Emmett et al., 2004) showed that only 32.3% of the sample of young people between the ages of 18 and 35 years had ever had a job. The youth labour market is also characterised by extreme inequalities. While only 27% of Africans and 39% of coloureds in the SYR survey had ever worked, the corresponding percentages for whites and Indians were 65% and 50%, respectively. See Table 1 below.

	Distribution for all		Race distribution (%)			
	n	%	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Yes	1 145	32.3	26.7	39.2	50.4	65.2
No	2 396	67.7	73.3	60.8	49.6	34.8
Total	3 541	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 1: Percentage of respondents who ever had a job by race, 2003 (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

Gender differences were less marked and although slightly more young men (33.5%) than young women (31.3%) had ever had a job, this difference was not statistically significant. In relation to location, however, young people who lived in the metropolitan areas enjoyed a clear advantage over those in non-metropolitan urban areas and rural areas. While nearly 41% of metropolitan youth reported that they had ever had a job, the percentages of youth who had had jobs in non-metropolitan urban areas and rural areas were 31% and 27%, respectively.

The extent and growth of youth unemployment in South Africa is clearly depicted by the graph below. Using data from the 1995 October Household Survey and the September 2002 Labour Force Survey, Woolard & Altman (2004) estimated that young people between 15 and 34 years accounted for more than 70% (3.4 million) of the total unemployed. These very high rates of youth unemployment reflect the inability of the economy to absorb the large numbers of new entrants into the labour market. While it is estimated that between 1995 and 2002 employment grew by 13.9% (representing 1.3 million jobs), labour supply over the same period grew by 38% (representing 4.3 million new labour market entrants).




Figure 1: Number of unemployed by age, 1995 & 2002 (Woolard and Altman, forthcoming, 2004)

In addition to high rates of unemployment, young people who are lucky enough to find jobs also face conditions of employment that are precarious and insecure. For example, at least a quarter of respondents in the SYR survey who had work were employed in temporary positions, and the trends suggest that temporary employment for youth is increasing. Many young people,

particularly Africans and coloureds, were also employed in elementary occupations and in domestic work. Furthermore, a substantial number (31.7%) of young people were employed in the informal sector, probably because they had been unable to find jobs in the formal economy. Here also major racial inequalities exist, with 39.2% of Africans and 31% of coloureds being employed in the informal sectors as against 15% of whites and 3.3% of Indians. Comparison of 1997 OHS data and 2002 LFS data shows an increase in youth involvement in the informal sector from 17% in 1997 to 25% in 2002.

Although only a small minority of youth was self-employed, the main reason for self-employment given by respondents was the unavailability of jobs in the formal sector. Waiting times between school and work and one job and the next have also increased. Data from the SYR survey show that respondents took an average of 14.5 months to find jobs after completing their education, and that the average waiting times between jobs was 10.3 months.

With two thirds of the SYR sample never having worked before, the majority of young South Africans have very tenuous relationships to the labour market, and many have little alternative but to remain economically dependent on their households of origin. As we shall see, these inequalities have important implications for the transitions to adulthood of the different population groups, particularly in terms of their relative rates of economic dependence and their abilities to set up independent households.

The high rates of youth unemployment are also reflected in changing trends in the relationship between employment and educational levels. Using data from the 1995 October Household Survey and the February 2002 Labour Force Survey, Borat (2003:41-47) shows an increase in unemployment rates across all education categories, except for those with no schooling. While in both 1995 and 2002 the unemployment rates of those with matric and tertiary qualifications were lower than those with primary and incomplete secondary education, the largest growth in unemployment over this period occurred among people with matric and tertiary education. Unemployment rates grew by 56% for those with matric and by 139% for those with tertiary qualifications. It should also be noted that, by 2002, the unemployment rate of those with matric was only slightly lower than those with a primary education and had surpassed the unemployment rate of people with no schooling (see Table 2). These trends suggest that the rapid growth in unemployment at the top end of the education scale is related to the difficulties that new entrants into the labour market have in finding jobs, and may therefore be indicative of the growth of youth unemployment.

Education level	1995	2002
No schooling	33.12	32.20
Primary	35.49	41.38
Incomplete secondary	33.85	48.39
Matric	25.28	39.51
Tertiary	6.44	15.37
Total	29.24	39.51

Table 2: Unemployment rates by education level, 1995 and 2002 (%) (Bhorat, 2003: 43)

While all population groups experienced growth in unemployment between 1995 and 2002, the greatest increase among those with tertiary qualifications was for Africans (see Table 3). The increase in unemployment among this segment of the population from ten per cent in 1995 to 26% in 2002 represents an increase of 160%. Although the unemployment rate among whites remains below that of the other population groups, the increase in unemployment of this group was higher than that of both coloureds and Indians, with unemployment among whites with

tertiary qualifications doubling between 1995 and 2002. However, as Borhat observes, it is essentially the growth in African tertiary unemployment that largely accounts for the rise in national tertiary unemployment from six per cent in 1995 to 15% in 2002.

Race	1995	2002
African	10.01	25.95
Coloured	8.49	9.86
Indian	5.56	8.21
White	2.26	4.63
Total	6.44	15.37

Table 3: Tertiary unemployment rates by race, 1995 and 2002 (%) (Bhorat, 2003: 44)

Unemployment rates for university graduates are lower than those for all persons with tertiary qualifications. For example, among African university graduates the unemployment rate in 2002 was 16.4% compared with 26% for all tertiary qualified Africans, while for whites the corresponding figures were 3.15% and 4.63%. However, as Table 4 demonstrates, in spite of their lower rates of unemployment, the increase in the rates of unemployment of university graduates between 1995 and 2002 was considerably higher than that for all tertiary qualified labour market participants. Thus, the unemployment rates of degreed Africans more than quadrupled between 1995 and 2002 and unemployment of white graduates increased by 141% in the same period. For Borhat (2003: 45), these trends leave “no doubt that we are witnessing the beginning of a graduate unemployment problem in South Africa.”

Unemployment numbers	African	White
1995	8 834	5 645
2002	45 959	13 597
Change (percentage)	420.25	140.87
Unemployment rates		
1995	5.87 (0.015)	0.01 (0.006)
2002	16.41 (0.018)	3.15 (0.008)

Table 4: Unemployment of university graduates: African and White, 1995 and 2002 (%) (Bhorat, 2003: 45)

To sum up therefore, young people not only have considerably higher rates of unemployment than their adult counterparts, but many also face poor and insecure conditions of employment in temporary, informal and menial jobs. With rapidly increasing unemployment at higher levels of education, the attainment of secondary and even tertiary qualifications is also no longer a guarantee of finding employment.

While considerable attention has been devoted to the issue of child poverty, information on youth poverty is more difficult to find (United Nations Programme for Youth, 2004: 83). However, we are in the fortunate position of having access to the recent data of what is undoubtedly the most comprehensive analysis of youth poverty undertaken in South Africa. This analysis was undertaken on behalf of the Umsobomvu Youth Fund by the HSRC’s Child, Youth and Family Development research programme for the Status of the Youth Report, 2003. Using data from Statistics South Africa’s Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) of 2000 and the September 2000 Labour Force Survey (LFS), the analysis showed that approximately a third (34%) of young South Africans between the ages of 18 and 35 years were living in poverty, with 16% being ultra-

poor.<sup>5</sup> Poverty rates were higher for 18 to 24 year olds (with a total poverty rate of 41%) than for 25-35 year olds (with a total poverty rate of 29%).




Figure 2: Youth poverty in South Africa, 2000 (*Status of the Youth Report, 2004*)

Racial inequalities play a decisive role in the distribution of youth poverty in South Africa, with African youth having significantly higher incidences of moderate and ultra poverty than other race groups. While the poverty rates of coloured youth were less than half that of African youth, their rates of poverty were still relatively high when compared to white and Indian youth, whose rates of poverty were minimal. (See Table 5.) It is also worth noting that nearly half (48%) of African 18-24 year olds were poor compared to 35% of African 25-35 year olds.

<sup>5</sup> Poverty lines were based on household expenditure and set at R1 305 (20% per capita household expenditure) for the 'ultra-poor' and R2 352 (40% per capita household expenditure) for the 'moderately poor'.

	Ultra-poor	Moderately poor	Non poor	Total
18-24 years				
African	24	24	53	100
Coloured	5	11	83	100
Indian	1	0	99	100
White	0	1	99	100
25-35 years				
African	16	19	65	100
Coloured	4	10	86	100
Indian	0	1	98	100
White	0	0	100	100


Table 5: Race by youth poverty status, 2000 (*Status of the Youth Report, 2004*)

In relation to gender, young women had higher rates of poverty than young men, although the disparity was larger for the older (25-35 years) age category than for 18-24 year olds. For example, while 19% of males and 21% of females in the 18-24 year age group were classified as ultra-poor, the corresponding percentages for the 25-35 year age group were 11% for males and 16% for females. There was also a significantly higher incidence of poverty among young people residing in rural area. For example, while 10% of 18-24 year olds living in urban areas were classified as ultra-poor and 15% as moderately poor, the percentages for 18-24 year olds living in rural areas were 35% ultra-poor and 28% moderately poor. Youth poverty is also unevenly distributed among the provinces, with the highest percentages of youth poverty occurring in Limpopo (31% ultra-poor), the Eastern Cape (29% ultra-poor), KwaZulu-Natal (23% ultra-poor) and the Free State (22% ultra-poor). In contrast, more urbanized and industrialized provinces like Western Cape and Gauteng had ultra-poverty rates of 3% and 6%, respectively.

As stated earlier, child poverty rates are usually higher than the poverty rates of adults. This was confirmed by an analysis of poverty by age group for the whole population. Of the six age categories used in the analysis, children between 0 and 17 years had the highest percentages of poverty, with 27% being ultra-poor and 24% moderately poor. After children younger than 18 years, the 18-25 years age cohort had the highest poverty rates, particularly in relation to ultra-poverty. In contrast, the 25-35 years age group has significantly lower rates of both ultra and moderate poverty and, in terms of poverty rates, were almost indistinguishable from the '35+' age category. Both the 25-35 and the 35+ age groups were also better off than female and male pensioners<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> 'Female pensioners' include all women who were older than 59 years, while 'Male pensioners' included all men above the age of 64 years. The '35+' category therefore included women between the ages of 36 and 59 years and men between 36 and 64 years.

Figure 3: Poverty by age group in South Africa, 2000



Source: Status of the Youth Report (Emmett et al., 2004)

More detailed analysis shows that the causes of poverty differ between the 18-24 years and the 25-35 years age groups. While poverty within the 25-35 years cohort can be attributed to high rates of unemployment, this is not the case with the 18-24 year cohort because a majority of this age group was economically inactive (see Table 6). Rather than unemployment, the main driving factor behind poverty in this younger age group is associated with their economic dependence on poor households. While unemployment did play some role in the poverty of this age group, in that 21% of 18-24 year olds were unemployed, the main source of their poverty arose from their dependence on poor households, in that a majority (58%) was economically inactive. In this respect, the 18-24 year age group has more in common with the under-18 age group (93% of whom were economically inactive) than with the 25-35 year age group (53% of whom were employed).

	Pre 18	18-24	25-35	35+
Inactive	93%	58%	23%	26%
Employed	5%	21%	53%	63%
Unemployed	2%	21%	24%	11%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 6: Employment status: 2000 (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

The extent to which young people's current poverty status was affected by the socio-economic status of the households in which they grew up was explored through a series of analyses that compared the situation of youth during childhood with a range of variables associated with their current situations and perceptions. Table 7 shows that respondents who grew up in poor households were considerably less likely to have ever worked than those from more affluent households. The data show a progressive increase from 27.1% for the first or poorest category to nearly 60% in the most well off category. Those who grew up in more affluent households were therefore twice as likely to have had a job than those who grew up within the first two

categories of poorer households. The depth of this inequality is even more striking when one takes into account that more than a third of the sample was studying.

Financial situation on growing up	Percentage who have had jobs	Percentage who have never had jobs
Not enough money for basic things like food and clothes	27.1	72.9
Had money for food and clothes, but are short of many other things	27.7	72.3
Had most of the important things, but few luxury goods	45.4	54.6
Some money for extra things such as going away for holidays and luxury goods	59.2	40.8

Table 7: Respondents who had ever had jobs by financial situation of household during childhood, 2003 (%) (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

Further analyses showed that young people who grew up in better off households were also consistently more likely to be able to support themselves (with or without parental and other support) than young people who grew up in poor households. Furthermore, the data showed that respondents from poorer households were more likely than their more affluent counterparts to have had the additional burden of supporting others financially. Young people who grew up in poor households were also less likely to be the main breadwinners in their households and to have greater financial dependence on mothers and grandparents than those from better off households. On the other hand, respondents from more affluent households were more likely to be dependent on their fathers as breadwinners than their poorer counterparts – an indication of a higher prevalence of female-headed households among poor people. Respondents who had grown up in poorer households were more likely to be living in households headed by their parents and other relatives than their more affluent counterparts. Conversely, respondents from poorer households were also less likely to be heads of household themselves than respondents who grew up in wealthier households. On the whole therefore respondents from better off households enjoyed greater residential, as well as financial, independence from their parents or households of origin.

In addition to their greater dependence on their households of origin, respondents from poorer households were also more likely to report that their financial situation had deteriorated and their households had become poorer than those who originated from better off households. Conversely, respondents who grew up in more affluent households were most likely to report improvements in their financial situations and least likely to report a deterioration in their financial circumstances. From Table 8, for example, it can be seen that about twice as many respondents who grew up in more affluent households, as compared to respondents who grew up in the category of poorest households, reported that their financial situations had improved since childhood. In contrast, nearly 15 times more respondents from the poorest households than from the best off households reported that their situation had deteriorated.

Financial situation on growing up	Change in financial situation since 17 or younger		
	Improved	Stayed the same	Got worse
Not enough money for basic things like food and clothes	30.1	38.5	31.4
Had money for food and clothes, but are short of many other things	49.8	38.4	11.8

Had most of the important things, but few luxury goods	62.1	28.4	9.5
Some money for extra things such as going away for holidays and luxury goods	58.8	39.1	2.1

Table 8: Respondents who reported an improvement or deterioration in their financial situation since childhood by socio-economic status of household during childhood, 2003 (%) (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

Very similar trends were obtained in the responses of young people to a question about whether their households had become richer or poorer in the past ten years, with respondents who grew up in poorer households more likely to report that their households had become poorer, and respondents who grew up in more wealthy households more likely to report that their households had become richer.

Financial situation on growing up	Household richer or poorer than 10 years ago			
	Poorer	Richer	Same	Not sure
Not enough money for basic things like food and clothes	34.2	17.1	27.1	21.6
Had money for food and clothes, but are short of many other things	18.0	26.3	37.9	17.8
Had most of the important things, but few luxury goods	9.5	44.6	29.6	16.4
Some money for extra things such as going away for holidays and luxury goods	14.3	48.3	23.9	13.4

Table 9: Respondents reporting that their households were richer or poorer than ten years ago by socio-economic status of household during childhood, 2003 (%) (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

In terms of the population groups, African respondents were least likely to say that their situation had improved and most likely to say that it had deteriorated or stayed the same. Following Africans, coloureds were next least likely to see their financial situation as having improved, while Indians were most likely to perceive a positive change in their situation. Respondents in the 25-35 year age group were also more likely to report a positive change in their financial situation as compared to those in the younger age group. This finding is consistent with the lower rates of poverty and higher rates of employment among 25 to 35 year olds, but is also indicative of how growing up does provide opportunities for escaping childhood poverty. Africans, the 18-24 year age group, and those living in rural areas were least likely to report that their households had become richer and most likely to report that their households had become poorer.

To sum up therefore, while about a third of South African youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years are poor, poverty is most concentrated among African youth, youth living in rural areas, and youth living in provinces with large rural populations such as Limpopo, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Poverty rates were also higher for young women than young men. Analysis of poverty among the whole South African population shows that of all age groups, poverty rates were highest for children under 18 years, followed by 18-24 year olds. On the other hand, youth in the 25-35 years age group were not poorer than the rest of the population and had lower rates of poverty than both pensioners and children and youth under 25 years of age. Causes of poverty also differ among the two youth groups, with the main source of poverty for 25-35 year olds being unemployment and that for 18-25 year olds being dependence on poor households.

Growing up in poor households was also shown to be associated with various disadvantages. Young people who grew up in poor households were considerably less likely to have ever had a job or to report that they were able to support themselves than youth who grew up in more affluent households. Furthermore youth who grew in poor households were considerably more likely to report that their financial situations had deteriorated and that they had become poorer. Africans, 18-24 year olds, and young people living in rural areas were most likely to report that the financial situation of their households had deteriorated and that their households had become poorer.

Taken together, these trends are indicative of high levels of vulnerability to poverty among South African children and youth. In particular, those youth who started out life as poor and disadvantaged by race or location were least likely to report positive developments in their lives such as improvements in the financial circumstances of their households, having had a job, being able to support themselves, and establishing financial independence from their parents. While some young people do manage to escape poverty, the dominant trends confirm research that shows that childhood poverty tends to produce negative outcomes that perpetuate poverty and inequality for many others. The analysis also suggests that poverty and unemployment create major obstacles to young South Africans transition to adulthood, especially in the difficulties they experience in establishing financial and residential independence from their households of origin. This is particularly so for African and coloured youth, young people who grow up in rural areas, and children who grow up in poor households. These trends have not only important implications for the transition of adulthood, but also for the integration of young people into society and therefore for social cohesion.

### **Marriage trends among young South Africans**

As Miller (2000) argues, families “have a huge impact on social cohesion through the way they care, fail to care or directly undermine their members”. However, if society does not reproduce families and marriage rates decline, this is likely to have important implications for social cohesion and the integration of young people into society. In South Africa marital rates among young people are low, particularly for the poorer more vulnerable segments of the population, and appear to be declining. In part this can be attributed to the longer time that young people spend in education, but it is also likely that poverty and unemployment play a role by limiting the opportunities of young people to set up families of their own.

For example, data from the LFS 2002 (Table 10) show that by age 24 years very few young people had married, but the percentage is especially low among Africans, particularly when compared with the rates for Indians and whites. These differences were more pronounced for the 25-29 years age group, with only a quarter of Africans married as compared to 63% of whites and 54% of Indians. While the marriage rates of coloureds were higher than those of Africans, the percentage of those married (42.5%) is still less than half of their numbers. For the 30-34 year age group, the rate of marriage among Africans (44.2%) is still below half of this age complement, and only exceeds half in the 35-39 year cohort. Even in the older age groups, the marriage rates of Africans were significantly lower than those of other groups, particularly those of whites and Indians. For all the population groups, the highest rates of marriage were among the 40-44 year age group. However, even in this group only 62.5% of Africans were married in contrast with 72.1% of coloureds, 84.4% of whites, and 85.4% of Indians. In general therefore, there were very different marriage patterns for the four population groups, with Africans and (to a lesser extent) coloureds marrying at lower rates and later in life than whites and Indians. These patterns coincide with the distributions of poverty and unemployment among the population

groups and suggest that lower marriage rates among African and coloured youth are a product of poverty and unemployment.

Marital status	Population group	Age group (years)					
		18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45+
Married	African	7.4	25.1	44.2	57.3	62.5	55.4
	Coloured	11.6	42.5	58.7	69.5	72.1	62.9
	Indian	14.6	53.9	76.3	76.7	85.4	73.1
	White	14.7	63.3	78.0	83.3	84.4	76.5
Widow/Widower	African	0.1	0.5	1.4	3.0	4.9	24.9
	Coloured	0.2	0.2	1.7	1.9	3.7	19.7
	Indian	0	0.5	0.5	4.0	3.5	16.2
	White	0.1	0.3	0.9	0.9	1.2	13.9
Divorced/Separated	African	0.2	0.8	2.1	3.8	7.0	6.1
	Coloured	0.3	0.2	3.7	6.1	7.7	5.5
	Indian	0.3	0.5	3.0	7.4	5.3	4.0
	White	0.2	0.3	0.9	6.8	8.2	5.8
Never married	African	92.2	73.6	52.3	35.9	25.6	13.6
	Coloured	87.9	55.7	35.9	22.4	16.6	11.9
	Indian	85.2	44.7	20.0	11.9	5.8	6.7
	White	85.0	34.2	17.3	9.1	5.9	3.7

Table 10: Marital status by population group (%) (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

Data from the SYR survey, as depicted in Figure 4 show similar trends to the LFS data in Table 10, but also differentiate between formal marriages and living together. While Indian and coloured respondents had lower rates of cohabitation than Africans and whites, these differences were relatively small and did not account for the marked variations in marital rates between the groups.




Figure 4: Percentages of respondents married and living together by population group, 2003 (%) (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

Trends showing a decline in marriage rates among young people are clear from Figure 5, which compares the percentages of respondents in the different population groups who have never been married using data from the 1995 OHS and the 2003 SYR survey. The data show increases in the percentages of persons who have never married for all the population groups, although the decline in marital rates of whites appears to be most marked. These trends are confirmed by Posel and Casale (2003: 9) who used data from household surveys between 1993 and 1999 to show a progressive decline in rates of marriage for African women in the 1990s. Their data showed a decline in marriage rates from 34.6% in 1993 to 30.2% in 1999. The percentages of African women who were never married or not currently married showed a similar trend, with the percentages of women in this category increasing from 38.4% in 1993 to 51.5% in 1999.




Figure 5: Percentages of young people who have never married by population group, 1995 and 2003 (Status of the Youth Report, 2004)

## Youth, Crime and Violence

A further potential indicator of social cohesion, or rather the lack thereof, are the high levels of crime and violence in South Africa, and in particular the high rates of involvement of young people as both victims and perpetrators. By global standards, South Africa has very high levels of violent crime. In 1997, for example, of 110 countries with crime levels listed by Interpol, South Africa had the highest per capita rates of murder and rape, the second highest rate of robbery and violent theft, and the fourth highest rates of serious assault and sexual offences, (Schonteich, 2000). While a third of all crimes recorded in South Africa in 1999 were violent, the corresponding percentages of violent crimes were 15% in the United States and 6% in the United Kingdom. More recent crime statistics suggest that crime in South Africa is levelling off, but still remains at very high levels (Schönteich & Louw, 2001; Masuku, 2003).

The National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS), the most comprehensive source of data on fatal injuries in South Africa, clearly shows that violence and injury in South Africa are strongly associated with age and gender. NIMSS data indicate that the majority of non-natural deaths were among young people, with 15-29 year-olds accounting for 36% of all non-natural deaths and 30-44 year olds accounting for a further 36% in 2001. In the same year, young people between the ages of 20 and 34 years accounted for 55% of homicides and 47% of

suicides. As Figure 6 illustrates, from 15 years of age, homicides rise sharply, peaking in the 25-29 year age group. Rates remain high for the 30-34 year age group, but decline steadily after that. It is noteworthy that the three age categories with the highest rates of homicide are the 20-24 year, the 25-29 year, and the 30-34 year age groups. These three age groups, which account for more than half of the deaths by homicide, correspond roughly with the definition of youth used in South Africa.




Figure 6: Homicide rates by age (NIMSS, 2001)

More recently released data for 2002 show very similar trends, although homicides are presented as percentages of all categories of fatal injuries and disaggregated by gender. Figure 7, which presents the percentages of homicides for males, shows that for 20-24 year-olds and 25-29 year-olds homicides made up 62% and 61 of fatal injuries, respectively.




Figure 7: Percentage of homicides of all categories of fatal injuries by age group – Males (NIMSS, 2002)

The corresponding percentages for females are considerably lower than those of males, and peak in an older (30-34 years) age group, but the second highest rates are for the 20-24 and 25-29 years age groups.




Figure 8: Percentage of homicides of all categories of fatal injuries by age group – Females (NIMSS, 2002)

Suicide presents a relatively similar profile to that of homicide in that it also peaks in the 25-29 year age group, and with the three age groups between 20 and 34 years having the highest rates and accounting for nearly half (46.5%) of all suicides (see Figure 9). As in the case of homicide, suicides also rise sharply in the 15-19 years age group, and begin to decline after 34 years of age although not quite as steeply as for homicides.




Figure 9: Suicide rates by age, 2001(NIMSS, 2001)

In contrast, deaths from unintentional injuries such as those caused by drowning, burns, falls and poisoning, which generally involve lower levels of risk behaviour, show a very different profile, with a more even distribution among the population. Young people between 20 and 34 years accounted for 31.4% of deaths resulting from unintentional injuries, in contrast with corresponding percentages 54.8% for homicide, 46.5% for suicide and 40% for transport deaths. Overall, these trends suggest that while young people constitute a high-risk group for all forms of fatal injuries, they are particularly vulnerable to violence, whether self-inflicted or inflicted by others.




Figure 10: Unintentional injuries by age group (NIMSS, 2001)

Gender differences are even more marked than those for age. In spite of high levels of violence against women in South Africa, 80% of all fatal injuries recorded by NIMSS in both 2001 and 2002 were for males and 20% for females. While male deaths were higher for all the categories of injuries, the disparity between males and females is particularly pronounced in relation to deaths due to homicide.





Figure 11: Gender differences in fatal injuries

11:

Young people are not only disproportionately victims of crime and violence, but are also over-represented as perpetrators of crime. For example, in June 2002, 36% of the prison population was under the age of 16 years, while 53% of those awaiting trial were below the age of 26 years (Palmary & Moat, 2002). Data from the South African Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Programme (SA-ADAM), a national survey of arrestees conducted in 146 police stations countrywide early in 2000, showed that 69% of arrestees interviewed during the survey were between the ages of 18 and 35 years, with those in the 18-25 year cohort making up 30.7% of the sample and those in the 25-35 year cohort making up 38.5% of the sample. Figure 12 compares the percentages of arrestees in the SA-ADAM survey with the proportions that each age group constituted of the entire population, using data from the 1999 October Household Survey (OHS). For both the 18-24 and 25-35 year age groups, the percentages of arrestees were proportionately more than twice that of the percentages they constituted of the population, while the proportion of arrestees in the 36 years and older age group was only marginally higher than that of the population as a whole.



*Figure 12: Comparison of age groups as percentage of the general population (OHS 1999) with age groups of arrestees (SA-ADAM national survey) (OHS, 1999 and SA-ADAM national survey)*

The high rates of crime and violence among young people as both victims and perpetrators can, and has been, related to the impacts that apartheid and poverty have had on South African communities and families. For example, writing about gangs and gangsterism in the Western Cape, Pinnock (1996 & 1998) argues that street gangs serve important social purposes for youth in that they provide a sense of belonging and emotional support that are often absent from dysfunctional families and tough, alienated neighbourhoods. However, even more important in Pinnock's view is that gangs provide their members with the rituals or "rites of passage" from childhood to adulthood. Quoting the anthropologist Joseph Campbell, Pinnock (1996:10) argues that "boys everywhere have a need for rituals marking their passage to manhood. If society does not provide them they will inevitably invent their own."

Through the rituals and activities of gangs, young men try to prove themselves worthy of adulthood and respect. In so doing, they mimic rituals that have existed for millennia and that find expression in existing practices such as African initiation ceremonies, Jewish bar mitzvahs, and first communion. In the context of wealth, initiation of young people has been institutionalised into brief formal ceremonies. However, under the difficult conditions of poverty, unemployment and the disintegration of families and communities, attempts by young men to create a passage to adulthood are often catalysed into “protracted lawbreaking and violence” (Pinnock, 1996:10). As Pinnock (1996: 11) argues, “crimes of violence happen when the underpinnings of our culture fail, when the ties that hold us together, socialise our children and satisfy our needs are broken.”

From a related, but different perspective, Ramphela (1991 & 2002) has documented the conditions under which children in poor communities grow up, in the absence of successful role models, particularly male role models, and within family and community settings that have been eroded by poverty and repression. Family and community life, she argues, is characterized by deep uncertainties, insecurity and mistrust:

Whereas the family is meant to provide a safe haven in life's troubled waters, in New Crossroads uncertainty permeates family life in a manner difficult for outsiders to comprehend. The family unit cannot be taken for granted and the availability of a mother, let alone both parents, is a luxury few children enjoy. In addition the provision of basic needs is beyond the means of many, and trusting and respectful relationships are an exception rather than the rule. The family is under siege from the combined legacy of the migrant labour system, poverty, adherence to outmoded traditions, and the changing roles of men and women as gender politics is reconfigured everywhere in post-apartheid South Africa (Ramphela, 2002: 153-4).

It is within these contexts of poverty, mistrust, the disintegration of families and communities, the lack of care and nurturing of children, and the immense difficulties that young people face in attaining recognition and respect as adults and integrated members of society, that high levels of youth crime and violence become understandable. These conditions not only help to explain the high levels of violence among young men, but also the violence that is inflicted on women and girls. As Ramphela (2002: 160) points out, the “dissonance between the cultural expectations of gender power relations on the one hand, and the reality of powerlessness on the other, sets off a vicious cycle of low self-esteem, resentment, anger and abuse of the very source of your support – the woman: mother, sister, wife, lover.”

Against a background of high and rising youth unemployment, poverty, HIV/AIDS, financial and residential dependence, declining marriage rates, early and unwanted pregnancies and crime and violence, there is considerable cause for concern about the marginalisation and social exclusion of large sections of South African youth.

### Youth and Social Cohesion

A recurring theme in the literature on South African youth is the concern that large, and possibly even increasing, sections of young people are being marginalized and excluded from the mainstream of South African society. Concern about the marginalisation of South African youth first arose in the 1970s and 1980s when large numbers of young people were drawn into the frontlines of the often violent struggle against apartheid. Growing awareness of the social devastation that decades of racial oppression, inequality, poverty and violence (both political and interpersonal), had wrought on children and young people also served to focus concern on the

youth. It was against this background that the term 'the lost generation' was coined, and debates raged about a 'crisis' among South African youth, culminating in two major studies on youth in South Africa.

Shortly before the election of a democratic government in 1994, Everatt & Orkin, (1993:34-35) estimated that a third of young South Africans were marginalized or seriously alienated from society, and that a further 43% were 'at risk'. Only a quarter of South Africans between 16 and 30 years of age were regarded as fully engaged with society. These estimates were based on an index the authors developed to assess the extent to which young people saw themselves as having little or no future; were alienated from their families, jobs and schools; described themselves as violent or angry; had never heard of AIDS; were out of touch with or hostile to the changes taking place in South Africa; had low self-esteem; and were not involved in any social organisation or structure.

While much has changed since the early 1990s, concern continues to be expressed about the youth. A decade later, many young South Africans are seen as apolitical, apathetic, materialistic and consumer-oriented. Against a background of high levels of youth unemployment, political disaffection, the erosion of social institutions and the ravages of HIV/AIDS, the marginalisation and social exclusion of South African youth remains a reality:

There is particular concern that large sections of the youth particularly those that live in rural areas have been marginalized and are not effectively participating in the transformation process. The youth are seen in a fundamental sense as disempowered and excluded. (Mkandawire, 2002)

In common with global trends, young South Africans seem to be withdrawing from political participation, including voting and registering to vote, and there are signs of deep disillusionment with political and economic institutions. Electoral trends since 1994 have been indicative of a withdrawal of South African youth from political participation. For example, only about a quarter of South Africans between 18 and 29 voted in the local government elections of December 2000. While young people voted in large numbers in the first democratic election of 1994, their commitment had dissipated by the next general election in 1999 (Levin, 2000).

In the run up to the 2004 general election, concerns were once again expressed about young South Africans' withdrawal from, and disenchantment with, politics. In a leading article early in 2004, the Mail & Guardian posed the question whether the 'young lions' of the 1980s have been replaced by a generation of 'young yawners': "In just 10 years arguably one of the most highly politicised generations of youth has given way to one in which apathy is unprecedented and disenchantment with politics is acute."<sup>7</sup>

Pre-election polls for the 2004 general election indicated that voters between the ages of 18 and 24 years made up 44% of voters who said that they did not want to vote (Faull, 2004: 15). However, following the second round of voter registrations in 2004, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) reported that young people accounted for nearly 60% of all new voter registrations. Although this represented a considerable improvement on youth registrations during the 2000 local government elections, 52% of voters between the ages of 18 and 24 years did not register and therefore were unable to vote in the April election (Faull, 2004: 15).

There are also various indications of lower rates of participation by youth in civil society organisations. For example, a study of civil society in South Africa by IDASA and CORE

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<sup>7</sup> Mail & Guardian, January 30-February 5 2004. See also Hopewell Radebe, 'Finding ways to attract youth to politics', Business Day, 9 December 2003, p. 3.

(2001:22) drew attention to the small number of civil society organisations that catered for young people. Qualitative data from a study on the constraints on the delivery of services to children and youth indicated limited involvement of youth in civil society (including sports organisations), as well as the fragility of existing youth organisations.

High levels of political and economic disenchantment were apparent among high school learners in Gauteng in a survey on civic engagement conducted by the HSRC in 2003 (Emmett, 2004). For example, it was found that nearly a third (32%) of learners were in agreement with the statement, 'I wish that we still lived in the old South Africa'. It is noteworthy that 29% of African learners in the sample indicated that they wished they still lived in the 'old South Africa'. This percentage compared with 18% of Indian learners, 26% of coloured learners and 44% of white learners. A quarter of African learners, 29% of Indian learners and 24% of coloured learners also indicated that they were likely to leave South Africa because they did not like the way the government was run. More learners from poorer households wished that they lived in the 'old South Africa' than learners from wealthier households. Furthermore, nearly half of the respondents (45%) felt that other race groups had more advantages than they did.

The survey also showed low levels of trust in other people, in the government and economy, and in local institutions among learners. For example:

- Two-thirds of the respondents felt that it was necessary to be careful in one's dealings with other people, whereas only 20% felt that one could usually trust other people.
- A relative majority (43%) of respondents felt that "the government does not care what you think" as against 35% who felt that "the government is interested in what you think".
- Furthermore, 61% of learners agreed with the statement that "the people who run the country are not really concerned with what happens to you", while only 17% disagreed.
- Just over half of the sample indicated that the "government will do whatever it wants to, no matter what people like us feel", with a quarter disagreeing.

Trust in government was strongly mediated by race, with minority groups, and especially white and Indian learners, more likely to mistrust the government. For example, 65% of white learners, 53% of Indian learners, 51% of coloured learners and 35% of African learners indicated that the government did not care what one thought.

High levels of disillusionment among learners were also apparent with regard to their economic prospects and especially about finding jobs after completing their education:

- 77% of learners agreed that no matter how well educated they were, it would be difficult for them to find good jobs;
- 61% felt that people leaving school in the 1990s found it easier to find jobs than they would;
- 48% maintained that their families were having "more money troubles now than in the past few years";
- 47% were worried that members of their families who were employed might lose their jobs in the next year, and
- 58% maintained that it was harder to find housing that their families could afford.

Racial differences were far less pronounced in relation to economic issues than they were to political issues. That is, learners were worried about being able to access employment regardless of their population group. A similar situation applied to perceptions of personal safety, with more than 60% of respondents indicating that they did not feel safe in their communities. Somewhat more respondents (68%) indicated feeling safe in their schools. However, nearly half

of the sample (48%) reported that there had been serious incidents of violence in their schools, and 61% reported that learners had brought weapons to school at some time.

There were also relatively low levels of trust in the police. For example, just over a third of respondents (34%) felt that the 'police were fair to everyone'; while 39% said the statement was not true. Higher percentages of Indian and African learners felt that the police were not fair to everyone. Female learners were also more likely than males to indicate mistrust of the police. In response to the statement 'Most people who live here try to obey the law', a majority of African learners (55%) assessed the statement as not true or only slightly true, as compared to 45% of coloured learners and 26% each of white and Indian learners. Learners from poorer backgrounds were more likely to experience their communities as less law-abiding than better-off learners.

Involvement in youth and community organisations is regarded as an important indicator of youth civic engagement, as well as a predictor of involvement in civic and political affairs in later life. In general the study showed relatively low levels of involvement by Gauteng learners in organised structures and activities. The highest levels of involvement were in church activities, with 62% of learners reporting that they regularly attended church services and 38% indicating regular involvement in church activities other than religious services.

However, involvement in sports, both in and out of school, was relatively low, with 31% of learners playing in school teams on a regular basis and 24% of learners participating in school societies or clubs on a regular basis. Forty-two percent of learners indicated that they had never participated in school societies or clubs. There were also marked inequalities in the participation rates of learners in school-based extra-curricular activities. For example, 61% of white learners reporting regularly playing in school sport teams, in contrast with 23% of African learners, 28% of coloured learners and 24% of Indian learners. Participation in civic or community organisations was low, with only 13% of learners indicating participation on a regular basis.

In contrast to these low levels of participation in organised activities, learners showed high levels of commitment to the public good and to helping others even when this involved making sacrifices. For example, 74% of the sample indicated that people should help one another without expecting to get paid or rewarded, 48% stated that they would be willing to give up part of their income in order to help starving people, and 44% reported that they were prepared to work fewer hours and earn less in order to create jobs for the unemployed.

In South Africa, with its history of racial segregation, intolerance and conflict, social contact of young people across the different race groups is especially important to the transformation of political attitudes and racially exclusive identities, and for the development of the tolerance, trust and broad social networks that are the foundations of a democratic and non-racial society.

The survey of Gauteng learners showed, however, that even in the highly urbanised and industrialised context of the province, social relationships across the major population groups remain limited. For example, the data show that 30% of the sample had no friends in other racial groups, while only 17% had friends in all three of the other major racial groups. Contact with other racial groups was most limited for African learners, with 36% reporting that they did not have friends in any of the other racial groups, and only 12% reporting that they had friends in all the other major race groups. In contrast 23% of white learners, 21% of Indian learners and 7% of coloured learners reported having no friends in other race groups. The limited contact of African learners with other race groups is probably related to de facto residential segregation especially in the townships where most of the schools attended by African learners are located.

Overall therefore, the findings of the Gauteng learner survey suggest cause for concern. Low social trust, high levels of disenchantment with the political system and economy, limited hopes for the future, low rates of participation in organised activities, and limited relationships across racial lines are all indicative of low levels of social cohesion, and suggest that current trends of disengagement by young people in the political system and in civil society are likely to continue, at least in the short-term.

While apartheid laid the foundations for social disintegration in South Africa, many of the conditions that have undermined social cohesion in South Africa and contributed to the social exclusion of large sections of our youth still exist in contemporary South Africa.

Data from a broad range of sources show that youth unemployment is both high and growing. Two-thirds of the SYR sample of 18 to 35 year-olds had never had a job and remained financially dependent upon others. The inability of large segments of South African youth to participate in labour markets is a key feature of their exclusion from, and an obstacle to, their integration into society. Large numbers of youth also remain trapped in poverty. Although a relative majority of young people perceived an improvement in their financial situation in the past ten years, others, in particular those who grew up under conditions of severe impoverishment and those belonging to historically disadvantaged groups, saw their financial positions as having deteriorated over time.

While young South Africans placed a high value on setting up their own homes and starting their own families, a majority of youth lacked the means to do so and remained financially and residentially dependent on their families of origin. Marriage rates among young people appear to be declining, particularly among young people from poor and historically disadvantaged groups. Over the years the numbers of disadvantaged female-headed households have grown, constituting a further source of impoverishment.

All of these trends pose serious threats to the integration of young people into society and to the very foundations of democracy. The consolidation of democracy in South Africa depends, in large part, on the socialisation of youth into good citizens and their integration into the society and polity. The engagement of youth and their integration into society also plays a major role in determining whether young people will develop trust in their fellow citizens and the institutions of their society and will contribute to the common good, or whether they will pursue narrow self-interests, or will become involved in crime, violence and substance abuse.

## Communities and civil society organisations

Participation in social networks, religious organisations, sectoral organisations, school governing bodies, community police forums and sports and other organisations. Stokvels and burial societies for example, economic strategies in response to the exclusion from banks and financial institutions, also play the role of social networks, as do funeral gatherings, as a means of engaging in philanthropic practices or simply for socialising. Communities are changing all the time. There are new real and imagined communities. What is the impact of these changes, networks and practices on society? We have suggested that crucial to social cohesion is the notion of solidarity. To what extent is it a reality and is it a phenomenon that is predominantly practiced between or within particular social institutions and networks? The following sections focus on participation in community life, raising the following questions:

How many people are active on school governing bodies, community police forums?

How many people/companies/organizations are active helpers/givers in their communities and what is the nature and value of such transactions?

How many people belong to trade unions, civics, single-issue campaigns and organisations, etc?

Number of citizen's arrests, public informants on crime?

Membership of stokvels, burial societies, etc?

Membership of religious organisations? Interfaith dialogue?

What is the impact of these factors in terms of social cohesion, social capital and social justice?

### **The Non-Profit Sector**

The Charities Aid Foundation (2000: 34) states that "...an overview of the non-profit sector in South Africa from 1994...is seriously hampered by the lack of historical and empirical data on the non-profit sector. In general, the sector is grossly understudied...The significant difficulties in providing an overview of the sector, including its income and funding sources...are founded in what could be labelled a self-perpetuating cycle of lack of recognition of the sector as a sector per se, of its profound diversity, of disagreements on what types of organisations should be included, of non-existent official statistics, and of very little other empirical research".

From 1990 to 1994, in the transition period towards democracy, non-profit organisations (NPOs) that had been previously involved in the liberation movement began to re-orientate for the demands of the new social, economic and political climate. There was an increase in new developmental NPOs, many of which started off working closely with the government, but soon took on an independent role (Charities Aid Foundation<sup>8</sup>, 2000). Welfare organisations continued providing services to the needy as they had before, but expanded their constituency to include black people. Prior to this period, the majority of NPOs had been unified by the liberation movement, but during this transition period the sector became largely disparate, with various visions of what democracy and development was about.

From 1996, GEAR defined the role of NPOs as central to poverty alleviation, expecting them to be social watchdogs for public good and to serve the interests of the disadvantaged by creating access to social and economic services that create jobs and alleviate poverty. Thus, the core roles of the NPO sector, as defined by the state, were social watch and service delivery. "The last few years have seen civil society organisations beginning to reconstitute themselves. Recent events, particularly around a lack of sufficient delivery to the poor, and other crises such as HIV/AIDS, have necessitated a stronger civil society that has found its feet and begun to use the progressive tools of democracy such as the Constitution, to its advantage" (Fleming et al, 2003: 27).

#### *International understanding of the sector*

Salamon and Anheier (1997, in CAF, 2000) attempted to define NPOs within broad cross-national parameters. They use the term non-profit organisations as synonymous with civil society organisations (CSOs). In their definition they included human rights organisations, residents' associations, day-care centres, unions, universities, sports clubs, interest organisations, advocacy groups, religious congregations, counselling and mediation agencies, arts and culture organisations, and savings clubs. In spite of the wide range of activities, these organisations are common in that they are all institutionally structured, separate from the state and government, non-profit, self-governing and include some level of voluntary contribution of time or money. The United Nations International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) is also broad in that it includes business associations, professional associations and unions (Major Activity Group) as well as philanthropic and voluntarism organisations in their definition of the sector.

#### *South African understanding of the sector*

In South Africa, the sector has many conflicting definitions. Some refer to the organisations as CSOs, others as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and yet others as NPOs. Greenstein, Kola and Lopes (2004) view civil society as all social interactions between the state and economy, comprising family structures, voluntary associations, social movements and forms of public communication. Civil society has been most often defined in terms of "what it is destined

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<sup>8</sup> Hereafter referred to as CAF.

to do (to fill in for the limitations of formal democracy), rather than by what it actually is or how it does it" (Heller and Ntlonkulu, 2001: 1). It has been noted that the term is far too open-ended and inclusive, and denies the class differences and competing interests between so-called members of civil society (Choudry, 2004) and that using it as a blanket term obscures the schisms within the group of movements and organisations (Kotze, 2003).

In 1993, Honey and Bonbright, for the Development Resources Centre (DRC), in their paper entitled 'The definition and typology of NGOs' defined non governmental organisations (NGOs) as "private, self-governing, voluntary, non-profit distributing organisations operating, not for commercial purposes but in the public interest, for the promotion of social welfare and development, religion, charity and education" (In Russell and Swilling, 2002: 7). In the mid-1990s, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) defined civil society as associations which are independent of the state, but that do not attempt to take it over.

The 1997 Non-profit Organisations Act from the Department of Welfare and Population defines a non-profit organisation as "a trust, company or other association of persons established for a public purpose and the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or office bearers except as reasonable compensation for services rendered". In 1998, when asked by the CPS to self-identify the type of institution they comprised (NGO, CBO, interest group, advocacy group, voluntary organisation, welfare organisation or other), 76% described themselves as NGOs, 40% described themselves as voluntary organisations; 16% as CBOs, 12% as other; 9% as welfare organisations; 4% as advocacy groups and 4% as interest groups<sup>9</sup>. The most overlap was with the term NGO, with a vast majority identifying as such, even if they chose other identities as well.

In 1999, the Cooperative for Research and Education, and Community Agency for Social Enquiry, in a report prepared for the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), defined civil society organisations as "those organisations and groups or formations of people operating in the space between family and state, which are independent, voluntary, and established to protect or enhance the interests and values of their members/funders".

In their 2000 report on working with the non-profit sector in South Africa, the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) states that the South African understanding of the non-profit sector is narrower than the international understanding in that it only includes organisations which provide professional developmental services to community groups or to a particular constituency through upliftment and empowerment; CSOs that bring together constituents at a grassroots level to take action on issues of common interest; and welfare organisations that provide relief and care for certain groups. In this case, the NPO sector would not include organisations such as unions, churches, political entities or sports clubs, that do not have developmental or welfare objectives. They chose to use an internationally comparative framework in their study that takes certain aspects of relevance to South Africa into account. Thus, their definition of the non-profit sector includes all the organisations defined by Salamon and Anheier as CSOs, but with a focus on those entities that have welfare and developmental objectives.

The Swilling and Russell report, based on John Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Study (2002)<sup>10</sup> used a broad structural approach and defined the sector as organisations that are:

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<sup>9</sup> These categories were not mutually exclusive.

<sup>10</sup> Although the report was published in 2002, the data was collected in 1998 and 1999, so the definitions used can be dated back to understandings of that time.

- Organised in that they are institutionalised, there is a persistence of goals and it excludes ad hoc/temporary groups;
- Private in that they are not governmental, although they can receive funds from government or carry out government contracts;
- Self-governing;
- Non-profit distributing in that any profits are ploughed back into the basic mission and not given to owners or directors.
- Voluntary in that they must engage volunteers in operational management, non-compulsory contributions and membership.

This definition does not take into account cooperatives, stokvels or burial societies as they consider them to be for profit; religious organisations as they are not self-governing, and political parties. Another characteristic of the organisations studied is that they all contribute social capital because they rely on trust built up over time, organisation, cooperation, reciprocity, intra- and inter-community networks, support, conflict resolution, access to welfare and information.

In 2001, the Cooperative on Research and Education (CORE) asked participants from NGOs and CBOs to identify characteristics that they associate with South African civil society. Included in the responses were: being non-profit, employing volunteers, having a delivery orientation, being independent from government and having their own constitution, rules and governance structures. Fleming et al (2003) surveyed 253 CSOs focusing on service delivery, grassroots organisations and community leaders, and found that their self-perceived roles were educating and informing citizens (95% of the respondents), offering services to communities (89%), contributing to the development of policy (74%) and acting as a watchdog over government (49%).

Greenstein, Kola and Lopes (2004: 2) decided to use the more restrictive definition of civil society in their report. They discuss the strengthening of “organisations playing a developmental role by seeking to improve the social, cultural, and economic well being of communities and sectors in society”. They do not include survival organisations such as stokvels and burial associations, or lobbying and advocacy activities.

Another issue to take into account when describing the non-profit sector is to note that there is a growing divide between “bigger, more professionalized NGOs, primarily involved in service delivery and increasingly referred to as ‘blue-chip’ NGOs, and the growing number of smaller, less formalised CBOs that tend to be more survivalist and oppositional in nature” (Kotze, 2003: 3). He notes that this divide is predicated on issues of representivity and unequal access to resources. CAF (2000) also noted that the definitions of NPOs and CBOs were problematic and that some researchers and practitioners used the term generically whilst others used old definitions that did not fit the realities of the situation. De Beer and Swanepoel (1998) define community-based organisations (CBOs) as those that tend to be clustered in rural areas, are often formed spontaneously to meet a community need, and include diverse organisations like burial societies, sports clubs, choirs, savings clubs, and women’s organisations.

Other problems with definition by typology of NPO are noted by CAF. In 2000, it was already becoming very difficult to distinguish between welfare organisations as opposed to developmental organisations as they tended to provide both types of services. In addition, membership-based NPOs are defined as those that provide services to or promote the interests of their members only, whilst non-membership-based NPOs work with certain segments of the public. The CPS study in 1998 found that about 57% of the surveyed NPOs were non-membership-based, while Greenstein et al found that there were 40% that were non-membership-based, also in 1998.

It is clear from the above definitions that there is much complexity in the literature regarding the definition of the sector. Terms like civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, non-profit organisations, community-based organisations, voluntary organisations, informal associations, welfare organisations, public benefit organisations are used interchangeably and are defined differently in each study. This makes all the data that has been previously collected on the sector impossible to compare. The sector needs to be clearly redefined before any further research is undertaken. This definition should be developed by representatives from all the different kinds of formal and informal organisations, associations and institutions, from government and from the international and local donor world.

The classification of sectors which work within the NPO realm provides further terrain for debate. The United Nations International Classification of Non-profit Organisations (ICNPO) defines the following sectors:

- Culture and recreation
- Education and research
- Health
- Social services
- Environment
- Development and housing
- Law, advocacy and politics
- Philanthropy and volunteerism
- Religion
- International activity
- Business and professional organisations and unions
- Other

Swilling and Russell adopt these classifications in their report in order to compare their findings internationally. Swilling and Russell found that 22% of organisations surveyed deal with social services, 20% with culture and recreation, 20% with development and housing, 7% with health, 6% with education and 3% deal with the environment. However, as Greenstein et al note, although the Swilling and Russell study is the most comprehensive study of NGOs and CBOs in South Africa, it is not particularly useful when investigating the nature and impact of the activities undertaken in the sector due to methodological issues.

The 2000 CAF report uses the classification system used in Camay and Gordon's 1997 report and added a few categories of their own to produce the following classification system:

1. Relief NPOs (humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters)
2. Welfare NPOs (provides basic services to communities or individuals in need)
3. Service NPOs (provides training and technical assistance to other NPOs)
4. Technical Innovation (Operation of own approaches to problems)
5. Traditional CBOs (eg burial societies, savings groups)
6. Cooperatives (joint investment in economic activity with profits going back into organisation)
7. Religious service NPOs (created by religious organisations to provide welfare services)
8. Economic interest associations (eg ratepayers associations, professional associations, trade unions)
9. Human Rights NPOs
10. Civic Education NPOs (public education with regard to civic rights and responsibilities)
11. Community Development NPOs
12. Advocacy NPOs (lobby on specific policy issues)

13. NPO Networks (information and education to other NPOs)
14. Educational NPOs
15. Religious organisations, including churches
16. Arts and cultural NPOs
17. Sports and recreation NPOs

Both the DRC and the CPS study attempted to assess what primary objectives NPOs in South Africa were involved with. CPS attempted to classify the non-profit sector into four main categories: Political and democracy-enhancing; economic and development; health, welfare and social justice; and education and training, whilst the DRC study did not have mutually exclusive categories. Therefore, due to the problems with classifications that have been discussed above and the flaws with the classification systems within the surveys themselves, these statistics are not valid and will not be presented in this report.

Again, classification of categories are disparate. Donors use their own terms for the categories they fund, and when analysing what categories South African donors are currently funding, another set of criteria are used. We recommend that a study be undertaken into categorisation of the NPO sector in order to formulate a South African NPO based classification system. As with the definitions of NPOs, this should be done cooperatively by all the different kinds of formal and informal organisations, the government and international and local donors, and should be compared with standard international categorisation.

In an excellent review of the under-researched properties of the non-profit sector, Social Surveys (2001) comments on the relatively small number of studies that use differing methodologies and sampling techniques and thereby inadequately capture data on the NPO sector and CBOs in particular. Clearly, the information and sampling methods that limit the inclusion of CBOs cannot be extrapolated to provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of the sector. The Swilling and Russell (2002) report is to date the most comprehensive study of the non-profit sector in South Africa, but is not without sampling, methodological and theoretical issues.

Although lists and databases<sup>11</sup> do exist to track the activities, budgets, and employees of the NPO sector, these information warehouses are often incomplete, not up to date and hold limited information (Social Surveys, 2001). Swilling and Russell (2002) note the inadequacies of many data sources, and the necessity of the use of triangulation in the sampling techniques and data verification for their survey. They make a strong recommendation borne out by the data gaps that Statistics South Africa, the Reserve Bank and the South Africa Revenue Service compile a centralised database on the NPO sector, collecting comparable data to that collected for the private sector and thus affording the NPO sector similar officially recognised status as a provider of services and contributor to the economy. Swilling and Russell (2002) note that Statistics South Africa in particular should be enabled to collect and analyse data relevant to the NPO sector “as part of its regular research activities” in order to “directly facilitate and enable the evaluation of the country’s developmental project” (Habib, 2002: ix, in Swilling and Russell, 2002). Databases and the collection of statistical information have proven to be effective and useful tools in the monitoring and evaluation of social development projects, and we echo the suggestion made by the Swilling and Russell report (2002) to apply this logic on a national scale.

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<sup>11</sup> Social Surveys acknowledges the following lists and databases: Development Resource Centre Database (1995); Programme for Development Research (PRODDER) Directory; Department of Welfare Database; the Section 21 Register and the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) records.

The dynamic and complex social interactions in South Africa are unique, which makes it difficult to extrapolate information from one community to another. In the Swilling and Russell report (2002), Bev Russell developed a sampling technique that tried to address the complexities by sampling communities and the NPOs and CBOs within these. This innovative approach should be applauded, but not accepted wholesale, as the methodology is based upon the assumption that there is a fit between NPO type and community type, and that particular communities produce particular types of NPOs. We question the assumption that NPOs necessarily fit with community types. NPOs with offices in Basic and Small clusters may service people in Poor High Density areas and be funded in part by people residing in Middle Class and Modern Development areas. In addition, the sampling and clustering methodology does not factor in the heterogeneity within communities and the possibility that social development work is not limited within geographical boundaries for. For example, in central Cape Town, a geographically demarcated suburb may broadly fit into the High Density category, yet may have a significant proportion of Middle Suburban homes. This sampling technique also limits the measurement and understanding of social cohesion between and within communities by focusing on the geographic location of an organisation as its primary associational network<sup>12</sup>.

Kraak (2001b) echoes these sentiments that research on the sector has not shared a common methodological approach and there is no comparative data against which new findings can be tested or validated.

The number of NPOs in South Africa is constantly changing, which makes counting them extremely difficult. The Charities Aid Foundation noted in 2000 that “there are significant uncertainties when it comes to assessing the number of NPOs in present-day South Africa. Established sources of information are of little help, since they tend only to cover certain categories of NPOs and/or still have to consolidate themselves” (p 43).

NPOs emerge in response to a need in society and/or a gap in service delivery. In 1996, Ann Kushlick and Ross Jennings, with the Development Resources Centre (DRC) and the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) UK, surveyed 108 NPOs in South Africa<sup>13</sup>. 45% of these organisations were established between 1900 and 1985; 27% had been founded between 1986 and 1990 mostly in opposition to the prevailing regime; and 27% were set up between 1991 and 1995 during transition to democracy. In 1998, Caroline Kihato and Thabo Rapoo, with the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), undertook a similar survey of 233 NPOs<sup>14</sup>. They found that 35 of the 233 organisations were established prior to 1948<sup>15</sup>, and some dated back to the late 1800s. The majority of these older organisations that are still in existence are those concerned with welfare objectives (CPS, 1998) and those that service mostly urban areas (Swilling and Russell, 2002).

It is widely assumed that there has been a decrease in the number of NPOs since 1994. Many NPOs closed down, others were in a state of “post-liberation depression” (CAF, 2000: 43) and many of those that remain are faced with financial, managerial and relational challenges. This is not to say that there is a crisis in the NPO sector; rather that this sector responds and adapts to the socio-economic and political environment. It seems that as new needs and new challenges arise, new NPOs keep emerging.

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<sup>12</sup> It must be noted that although Swilling and Russell (2002) do mention the contribution of NPOs to the formation and strengthening of social cohesion and social capital, this was not part of the research question and therefore it is understandable that this was not taken into account when formulating the sampling method.

<sup>13</sup> Hereafter referred to as DRC or the DRC survey.

<sup>14</sup> Hereafter referred to as the CPS or the CPS survey.

<sup>15</sup> For example, the South African Red Cross Society and the Salvation Army.

Younger NPOs are emerging in a climate of government bureaucratism that encourages formal registration. This process allows for a clearer vision of the size of the NPO sector. Swilling and Russell (2002) found that in 1998/1999 the NPO sector comprised of 98 920 organisations, including formal established and registered NPOs, as well as unregistered organisations. This is in keeping with David Cuthbert's rough estimation of about 100 000 NPOs, according to the international definition of a non-profit organisation (in the CAF report).

Type of NPO	Number
NPOs registered under the Fundraising Act of 1978	4 800
NPOs which should be but are not registered under the Fundraising Act of 1978	4 000
Religious institutions	29 000
Educational institutions	27 000
Community institutions (sport, services and cultural bodies)	11 500
Community-based organisations	30 000
<b>Total</b>	<b>106 300</b>

Table 1: Estimated numbers of different types of NPOs (Russell and Swilling, 2002: 44)

In this section of this paper, we wish to examine the non-profit sector in the narrower sense, by excluding religious, educational and community institutions. Therefore, Cuthbert's estimate of NPOs amounts to a rough total of 38 800. Cuthbert particularly noted that this estimate is very uncertain, particularly with regards to community-based organisations which are constantly changing. The Swilling and Russell (2002) report verifies that small and less formalised CBOs amount to 53% of the total number of NPOs in South Africa. It is not clear whether these CBOs are proliferating at an unprecedented rate in order to provide survivalist services and responses to the deepening socio-economic climate of poverty and HIV/Aids, or whether they have been counted and included for the first time (Kotze, 2003). As CBOs tend to avoid bureaucratism, this makes them useful conduits for the horizontal delivery of governmental and other services and policies. Yet because of the situation in most rural areas, community-based organisations suffer from a lack of technical and fiscal capacity and are often not self sustainable (de Beer and Swanepoel, 1998; Everatt and Zulu, 2001; Pieterse, 2001). For Steven Robbins (2003: 249) post-apartheid CBOs are involved in a project of redefining notions of community, citizenship and civic action, that is "both locally-embedded and globally connected". He notes that the South African Homeless People's Federation is a 100 000 member strong CBO, possibly an emerging social movement, that extends the definitive boundaries of social cohesion and trust and circumscribes academic notions of organisation and community. In statistical terms, the anecdotal evidence of a CBO with enormous support base calls into question certain findings on the state and scope of the NPO sector in 1998/1999 provided by Swilling and Russell in 2002.

Legally, NPOs in South Africa can be welfare organisations, voluntary organisations, trusts or Section 21 companies. The latter two are more formalised and need to be registered with the government. They are also more expensive which has led to only the higher-income institutions pursuing this process. Welfare organisations can be legally established under the National Welfare Act of 1978. The findings from the DRC, CPS and Swilling and Russell surveys are summarised in the table below:


Legal status	DRC study <sup>16</sup>	CPS study <sup>17</sup>	Swilling and Russell <sup>18</sup>
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<sup>16</sup> Percentage of 108 organisations studied.

<sup>17</sup> Percentage of 233 organisations.

<sup>18</sup> These figures are not weighted and are based only on the figures generated by the Swilling and Russell (2002) survey data.

### Number of registered NPOs in South Africa by province



Voluntary organisations	36	26.1 <sup>19</sup>	53.2
Section 21 companies	29	28.3	11.4
Trusts	18	21	3.8
Other	17	24.5	31.6

Table 2: NPOs in the DRC, CPS and Swilling and Russell study, according to legal status

The DRC and CPS studies indicated that there was an increase in registered Section 21 and trusts with the advent of newer NPOs, whereas the older NPOs tend to maintain their status as voluntary associations. Russell and Swilling (2002) reports that although there are an estimated 100 000 organisations in the sector, 53% are classified as informal community-based organisations that operate on community level and only about 11% of the organisations studied were formal Section 21 companies. Please note that the findings from the three surveys are incomparable because the sampling, methodological and classification systems which are different in each case. This, as noted earlier in the report, is one of the major problems with the research that has been conducted on the NPO sector thus far.

Sector	Informal/voluntary	Section 21	Trust/Foundation	Total
Culture and recreation	15 853	761	1 021	17 635
Education and research	4 028	474	0	4 502
Health	4 191	1 570	134	5 895
Social services	10 011	3 614	838	14 463
Environment	1 826	1 416	148	3 390
Development and housing	12 023	2 943	1 733	16 699
Advocacy and politics	3 465	246	47	3 758
Total	51 397	11 024	3 921	66 342

Table 3: Number of NPOs by sector and legal status

Inaccuracies in the data, due partly to the sampling technique, can be seen in these figures. For example, the figure of zero trusts/foundations involved in education and research is incorrect as a number of these types of organisations are actively involved in this sector in South Africa.

<sup>19</sup> CPS acknowledges that there was a bias to larger, more established organisations in their study so the percentage of voluntary associations is probably higher than reported in the survey.

Kraak (2001a and 2001b) reports that by the end of 2000, only 8000 NPOs had registered in terms of the Nonprofit Organisations Act that came into effect on 1 September 1998. During 1999/2000 the NPO Directorate within the Department of Social Development, which implemented the act, started a training and information campaign to boost registration. This seems to have had some effect as a search of the Department of Welfare's website in September 2004 found 26 777 registered organisations. A provincial breakdown is provided below. These statistics support the findings that newer NPOs tend to become formally registered entities, as mentioned earlier.

Figure 1: Number of registered NPOs in South Africa in 2004 by province

### Economic value of the NPO sector

NPOs contributed 1.2% of the GDP in 1998 with total operating expenditure of R9.3 billion, making the sector a significant driving force in the economy (Swilling and Russell, 2002). However, Statistics South Africa is not able to provide disaggregated gross domestic product and employment data from the non profit sector because the information is based on data from formal registered nonprofits only.

There seems to be a correlation between legal status and income for the NPO sector, with formal organisations receiving and generating substantially more fiscal power than voluntary associations (CPS report, 1998).

Income brackets of NPOs in 1998 according to legal status




Figure 2: Income brackets of NPOs in 1998 according to legal status

### Number of staff in nonprofit organisations

The number of staff employed by NPOs prior to 2002 was not known; however, Zane Dangor and the DRC estimated it to be more than 500 000 in 1997 (In CAF, 2000: 46). Swilling and Russell (2002) state that of the total managerial staff of NPOs in 1998/99, 59% were women and 73% were black, with 60% of full time employees being women, and 81% being black. Unlike many other sectors in South Africa, the NPO sector is line with Black Economic Empowerment and gender policies and directives from government. De Beer and Swanepoel (1998) note that

the predominance of women in rural areas has led to women assuming leadership roles in CBOs, providing them with useful social networks and contributing to social cohesion.


In terms of employment in 1998, the NPO sector engaged more workers than the mining sector – 645 316 full time workers – and exceeded the number of employees in most of the major economic sectors (Swilling and Russell, 2002).

In 1993 the DRC estimated an average staff size of 34 per NPO. In their 1998 study it was found that the average staff size was 15, but only 24% of NPO respondents had 10-19 staff members (medium-sized) and the majority tended to have either below 10 (small) or above 20 (large). DRC found that the majority of staff employed were professional and that as NPOs get larger, more professional staff get employed. About half of the NPOs surveyed indicated that they used consultants.

The CPS study used different size categories, but also found that the majority of NPOs were small with below 14 staff members or large with over 35 members. The CPS study also found that the majority of voluntary associations and community-based organisations had smaller numbers of staff with a significant number having over 35 staff members; and that about half of the welfare organisations surveyed had more than 35 members.

The DRC found the following trends in numbers of volunteers in NPOs. Although they found an average of 13-14 volunteers per organisation, they noted that this was misleading as some organisations had over 5000 volunteers. Swilling and Russell (2002) report that in 1999, volunteers alone in the NPO sector amounted to 1.5 million people, an equivalent of R5.1 billion in labour. In addition, volunteers were the main drivers of certain sectors, particularly advocacy and politics, and arts and recreation (see Figure 3 below<sup>20</sup>):

*Table 3: Percentage of NPOs according to numbers of volunteers*  
**Percentage of NPOs according to numbers of volunteers**




<sup>20</sup> This table has been adjusted from the numbers provided by Russell and Swilling (2002: 19).

DRC found that among NPOs with small boards (1-9 members), 59% of governing members were male, 41% were female. In larger boards (more than 10 members), 75% were male and 25% were female.

“Although not documented numerically, there is enough evidence to attest that from 1994 a significant number of skilled staff left the non-profit sector (mainly to take up positions in government), starting a process of high NPO staff turnovers. Many of the NPOs surveyed by CPS stated that this exodus of skilled staff, labelled a ‘brain drain’, has had a negative impact on their stability, growth and ability to perform their functions” (CAF, 2000: 55).

Figure 4: Numbers of NPO employees by selected sectors



### Membership and participation in NPOs

The HSRC (2002) measured participation in membership of political parties, trade unions, women’s organisations, youth organisations, civic organisations and anti-crime organisations from 1994 to 2001. Overall, it was found that there was a decrease in membership in civil society since the 1994 elections. Membership was highest in political parties, followed by youth and women organisations, and trade unions. In 2001 there was a large increase in the

percentage of membership: 75% in youth organisations, 67% in anti-crime organisations, 60% in women’s organisations and 50% in trade unions. While coloured respondents and those between the ages of 18 and 24 were the most active in youth organisations; they were least active in political parties, trade unions and anti-crime organisations. 35-49 year olds were most active in civil society organisations (wa Kivilu, 2002).

Participation in civil society is often limited to those with access – literate, healthy people who are also legal citizens of the country. Immigrants are therefore confronted with barriers to participation in civil society. However, Reitzes, Bam and Thulare’s (1996) work on immigrant participation in civil society<sup>21</sup> shows that “illegal and undocumented migrants and immigrants are deeply embedded in a web of associational organisations and process[es]” (p 31), including social services and economic contribution, and look forward to participating in an expanded definition of political space.

In an internal unpublished study of development offices and community outreach programmes at higher education institutions in South Africa, it was found that institutions used their institutional resources and available expertise to render technical assistance, training, research and consultation to communities. Community service is performed in the fields in which the universities have proven competencies. Whilst the universities assist communities, they gather data for their research at the same time. This practice is also a marketing tool – universities raise their profiles and images in the communities and, if a media interest is created, in South Africa as “a forward thinking or development oriented institution” (Inyathelo: The South African Advancement, 2003: 127). In addition, universities approach donors for funding for these projects and can access funds that are not only focused on education.

*Types of community outreach projects*

The table below shows the number and types of community projects that ten higher education institutions are involved in, as reported in the Inyathelo study. Again, a different classification system has been used.

Sector	Number of Projects
Business, trade and entrepreneurship	9
HIV/AIDS programmes	6
Schools and supplemental programmes (including teacher development)	16
Practical service provision	5
Social services, including counselling and legal aid	17
Health care, including dentistry and nursing	12
Community education and skills training	7
Sport, art and recreation	20
Agriculture and environmental development	27
Maths, science and technology	13
Rural development	4
African heritage	5

*Table 4: Number of higher education institutions community outreach projects per sector*

It is difficult to discern or measure the extent to which NPOs are cooperating amongst themselves. It seems that there is an increase in the number of formal and informal networks, although Dangor (1997) estimated there to be about 55 networking organisations, for example SANGOCO<sup>22</sup>. Fleming et al (2003) found that 65% of the organisations they studied said they interacted with other NGOs and CBOs on a weekly basis, 25% on a monthly basis and only 2% had no interaction with other organisations. Most NPOs, when they do network, are connected

<sup>21</sup> The study was conducted with immigrants in the Winterveld area 50km outside of Pretoria.

<sup>22</sup> South African National NGO Coalition.

by sector (Swilling and Russell, 2002), which contributes to the social cohesion within sectors, but limits the social networking between NPO sectors.

Because of the differences in values and goals between sectors, Greenstein, Kola and Lopes (2004) suggest a series of sector-specific forums organised by subject rather than departments. Provincial forums are also suggested, but the authors caution that these forums must be imbued with real power. "To strengthen the process, a series of specific research reports must be commissioned to gain further evidence of the circumstances and implications of partnerships, to highlight successful and unsuccessful cases, identify their unique features as well as the extent to which their example is applicable elsewhere" (Greenstein et al, 2004, p vi). Fleming et al (2003) suggest that alliances, partnerships and networks should be encouraged and strengthened.

The voluntary sector has a vital role to play in servicing and representing the poor and the marginalised, in affecting public policy and acting as a watchdog for democracy. Well-run, professional NPOs have tended to provide high quality and cost-effective social services to communities in a way that government has been unable to. However, there are many challenges in the sector, apart from the methodological issues surrounding research. Kraak (2001b) describes a few of the critical challenges:

- Paucity of sound research on the NPO sector and gaps in knowledge that have negative implications for the formulation of effective policy for the sector;
- Problems regarding long term sustainability of the sector, including reduced donor funding<sup>23</sup>;
- Difficult fiscal and legislative context in which the sector operates;
- Deteriorating relationship with government;
- Lack of effective national leadership and direction for the sector;
- Poor organisational leadership and capacity in many NPOs especially CBOs;
- Inability to attract skilled personnel on the open market by offering market-related wages;
- Lack of professionalism.

The size and scope of the NPO sector is extremely difficult to measure, due to the vast number of informal organisations that are not registered. Previous attempts to measure the sector are not comparable with each other due to the range of definitions and classification systems. Before any further studies are attempted, it is suggested that a standard is developed by NPOs, community organisations, donors and government, which is adopted by all of these bodies.

### **Philanthropy**

For the purposes of this section, we will review the giving environment in South Africa<sup>24</sup> by South African donors – individuals, corporates and trusts and foundations – to assess the level to which philanthropy is contributing to social cohesion in the country. Although international aid and foreign funding is vital in the country and makes up a large proportion of the funding received by the civil sector, we have concentrated on the local sector to assess where resources could be invested to grow local philanthropy. As Kraak (2001b: 137) discusses, NPOs tend to rely heavily on international funding, fostering a culture of entitlement, which is "an enduring, negative, and parochial aspect of internal NPO culture...given the historical experience of colonialism and apartheid".

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<sup>23</sup> For further information on this, please refer to the section on Philanthropy in this report.

<sup>24</sup> Exclusive of government funds.

Heller and Ntlokonkulu (2001: 62) note that NPOs and institutions that receive donor aid usually have a middle class character. "Donor funding is a social terrain. Indeed, it represents a distinct form of social capital...a set of social relations, governed by shared forms of cultural capital...and extensive interpersonal networks through which particular rankings, status and access to economic opportunity is reproduced. The donor community in South Africa is certainly a tight knit community, and the adage that what is important is not *what* you know but *whom* you know certainly rings true. Many donors like to dispel this view...but behind every contract...lies the non-contractual elements of the contract (or 'social ties'...)" They explain that donors face two key challenges: information about potential beneficiaries is very limited and measurement is a problem because the deliverables associated with the field are intangible. "Donors...rely on trust and familiarity, rather than hard market signals, to select and assess 'partners'. And trust is lubricated by social interactions, which are themselves deeply embedded, that is bounded by cultural parameters and socio-economic boundaries. The problem from the point of view of promoting democratic participation should be obvious – in this form, social capital is about exclusion" (Heller and Ntlokonkulu 2001: 62).

Social change philanthropy promotes a grantmaking philosophy that is based on the principles of economic, social and political justice. The Synergos Institute held a Global Senior Fellows Meeting in 2003 that focused on "Foundations and Social Justice: Visions, Strategies, Capacities". Represented at this seminar were varied viewpoints, cultures and philanthropic traditions from all over the world (including South Africa, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia) and various institutions participated, including community and corporate foundations, environmental trusts, philanthropic support organisations and national grantmakers. Generally, it was agreed that there were many injustices taking place in the countries represented, and serious inequities in the world system. It was agreed that philanthropy should play a part in redressing these conditions and that "supporting the development of organisations by the communities affected by social injustices is one of the most important things a foundation can do" (Emmett Carson, Executive Director of the Minneapolis Community Foundation).

There was discussion around various alternative means to addressing social justice concerns other than giving money, such as foundations taking on organisational, facilitation and relationship-building roles. From participants' examples, three interconnected roles that foundations could play in advancing social justice were identified: supporting institution-building and community organisations, engaging government, and building constituencies. In his discussion on foundation activity during the anti-apartheid struggle, David Bonbright of the Aga Khan Foundation noted that foundations can foster broad social movements within societies struggling for social justice and can provide important linkages to international movements and other societies, by acting as consciousness-raisers among change agents and providing safe spaces for dialogue.

Steven Burkeman (2001), through his investigation of why wealthy people give money, notes that the transfer of money can be a form of embedding power structures, but can also be a way to transfer power. He strongly suggests that when attempting to promote giving, one should be careful to promote the type of giving which aims to change the situations that made it necessary in the first place and which does not reinforce power imbalances in society.

The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation's Community Philanthropy Initiative is currently involved in a project to build philanthropy in South African communities through community foundations, which constitute a new type of organisation in South Africa. This organisation links community philanthropy with community development, by increasing current charitable giving practices and

connecting these resources to developmental needs at a local level. The community foundation acts as a conduit, collecting gifts from various sources and redistributing them in order to uplift and empower communities. The roles of a community foundation are to make grants, develop resources and build on existing practices of giving and volunteering in a particular community.

This initiative is based on the premise that when people work together for their mutual betterment, it builds a strong civil society. At a local level, this is practiced through community philanthropy – when individual citizens contribute time or money to promote the wellbeing of others and the betterment of their community. “These community philanthropy practices contribute to social cohesion within communities, illustrate how working together on a collective basis can accomplish more than acting alone, and can build trust between divided communities” (Mott Foundation booklet, 2004: 2).

There are currently a few community foundations already operating in South Africa<sup>25</sup>. The Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT) pioneered a matching funds project which builds philanthropy in the community by matching funds raised by the community themselves three-to-one. Communities use organisations like stokvels for raising these funds, illustrating how these organisations have shifted their traditional social purpose into community development and infrastructure ([www.donors.org.za/CGif\\_profiles.htm](http://www.donors.org.za/CGif_profiles.htm)).

Inyathelo: The South African Institute for Advancement has a database of donors that fund projects in South Africa. This is a database of approximately 1700 funders, of which 1 136 are South African. It is important to note that this database has been analysed for the purposes of this report, but it is a practical resource for grantseekers and was not set up for research purposes so there is no formal methodological and sampling framework.

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
<sup>25</sup> For example, the Greater Rustenburg Community Foundation, the Greater Tshwane Community Foundation, the Uthungulu Community Foundation, the Greater Durban Community Foundation for Social Investment and the Community Chest.

The table above shows the sectors that donors fund. Again, the classification system is different, making it difficult to compare to other statistics. It is important to note that the categories are not mutually exclusive.

Figure 5: Number of South African donors by sector in 2004

There is growing awareness among South African corporates and the NPO sector that corporate social investment (CSI) has great potential for public good. Social investment by the private

### Number of SA donors by sector



sector could possibly benefit all sectors of the country on a long-term basis if applied thoughtfully and with sustainable development in mind. The Second King Report on Corporate Governance (2002) argues strongly that companies adopt the triple bottom line – environmental, social and economic sustainability – as a method of doing business (Johannesburg Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Investment Index<sup>26</sup>, 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Hereafter referred to as the JSE SRI Index.

## Corporate Social Responsibility

The advent of the JSE SRI index in May 2004 is further evidence of the extended consciousness of, and appreciation for, CSI as a tool for sustainability and good business practice. The JSE SRI Index was created as “a means of helping to focus the debate on triple bottom line practices, in addition to recognising the tremendous efforts made by South African companies in this area” (Newton-King, 2004: 1). Vanessa Rockey (2003: xvii) notes that this index places CSI as “part of the broader transformative imperative<sup>27</sup>” and “on the boardroom agenda”. Of the 160 companies listed on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index, 74 participated in releasing information on their CSI activities, and 51 companies<sup>28</sup> (68.9%) met the criteria for listing on the JSE SRI, which includes active involvement in CSI on a sustained basis and over a period of time ([www.jse.co.za/sri/index.htm](http://www.jse.co.za/sri/index.htm)). It is interesting to note that less than a third (31.8%) of the companies listed on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index – which are the largest and most financially powerful South African companies – and meet the requirements for listing on the JSE SRI Index.

Triologue’s editions of *The CSI Handbook*, first published in 1998, are arguably the most informative and centralised annual publication on CSI in South Africa. If inclusion in this reference guide is taken as a barometer of corporate interest and commitment to CSI in South Africa, then clearly certain companies are investing a substantial amount of time, money and effort in this regard<sup>29</sup>. In each edition, Triologue conducts in-depth interviews with 100 top corporate grantmaker programmes and 100 NPOs, in order to benchmark the industry on an ongoing basis and to make comparisons on a year on year basis (2003). However, it is not clear whether the same companies and NPOs are sampled each year, which would track both upward and downward trends. While it is commendable that the CSI Handbook chooses to showcase success stories within the CSI donor world, it is perhaps not painting the bigger picture. Nevertheless, this outstanding publication remains the only reliable set of data to date on the CSI world in South Africa. We suggest that because this publication only measures the largest and most affluent companies in the country, further research is required to ascertain levels of giving across the range of corporates within the private sector. In addition, it is a commercial publication and all corporate that feature pay to do so. Therefore, it cannot be considered to be an objective research source. However, the companies that view it as worthwhile to be included in such a publication are also those who view CSI as important, whether for marketing or otherwise.

CSI was initially viewed as a marketing approach to leverage corporate reputation; but over time it has become an integral part of doing business. However, the pie chart below shows that almost two thirds of corporates do still use CSI as a brand reputation strategy (Triologue, 2003). Ikalafeng (2004: 5) notes that CSI funds in 2004 are allocated in most top companies marketing budgets: “more than R2 billion of the R12 billion plus annual marketing spend was earmarked for social investment”.

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<sup>27</sup> Along with Black Economic Empowerment, and we would argue gender equity.

<sup>28</sup> Please see Appendix x for an alphabetised list of these companies.

<sup>29</sup> The CSI handbooks showcase both NPO and CSI successes and have in depth and consistent contributions from top people in business, the NPO sector and government.

### Utilisation of CSI for company brand reputation




Figure 6: Utilisation of CSI for company brand reputation

Because corporate profile and image are important for marketing in the private sector, increasing emphasis is placed on the reputation of private sector donors by NPOs and other corporates. Ikalafeng (2004: 5) notes that in two unrelated surveys<sup>30</sup>, “seven<sup>31</sup> of the top 10 companies ranked by consumers as the most admired...are ranked among the top 10 most caring companies, or companies that have done the most to uplift the community. The table below provides perceptions of the top three corporate grantmakers by other corporates and NPOs, from 1999 to 2003 (Dialogue, 2003: 61).

<sup>30</sup> Markinor/Sunday Times Top Brands (2004) and Corporate Social and Market Research (2003).

<sup>31</sup> Coca-Cola, Eskom, Telkom, Absa, SABMiller, Pick 'n Pay, and Vodacom.

Criteria	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Good corporates grantmakers <i>By corporates</i>	1. Anglo American; De Beers 2. SAB 3. Nedcor	1. SAB 2. Anglo American 3. Eskom; Standard Bank; Transnet	1. Anglo American 2. Absa; SAB 3. Old Mutual	1. Absa; SAB 2. Anglo American 3. Old Mutual	1. SAB 2. Anglo American 3. Absa
Good corporates grantmakers <i>By NPOs</i>	1. Anglo American and de Beers 2. SAB 3. Nedcor	Not measured	1. Anglo American 2. Absa 3. Liberty Group	1. Anglo American 2. Absa; Nedcor 3. De Beers; Eskom	1. Anglo American 2. Nedcor 3. Absa
Highest profile corporate grantmakers <i>By corporates</i>	Not measured	1. SAB 2. Vodacom 3. Anglo American	1. SAB 2. Anglo American 3. Eskom	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Absa	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Absa
Highest profile corporate grantmakers <i>By NPOs</i>	Not measured	Not measured	1. Anglo American 2. Absa 3. SAB	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Absa	1. Anglo American 2. Nedcor 3. Old Mutual; SAB
Biggest CSI budgets <i>By corporates</i>	1. Anglo American and De Beers 2. SAB 3. Nedcor	Not measured	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Vodacom	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Absa	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Sasol; Eskom
Biggest CSI budgets <i>By NPOs</i>	1. Anglo American and De Beers 2. Nedcor 3. SAB	Not measured	1. Anglo American 2. Billiton 3. Vodacom	1. Anglo American 2. SAB 3. Absa	1. Anglo American 2. De Beers 3. BP; SAB; Vodacom

Table 4: Perception of the top 3 South African corporate grantmakers, by other corporates and NPOs

Almost half of all CSI money and resources spent in 2002 was urban-based, with unequal regional distribution of spending echoing the urban/rural divide (Dialogue, 2003: 106-107):

**CSI spending in rural, peri-urban and urban areas of South Africa in 2002**




Figure 7: CSI spending in rural, peri-urban and urban areas of South Africa in 2002

**CSI per capita spending in 2002 by province**




Figure 8: CSI per capita spending in 2002 by province

### Percentage of CSI budget spent in provinces in 2002





Figure 9: Percentage of CSI spent in provinces in 2002

Dialogue (2003) notes that the distribution of per capita spending on CSI roughly parallels the regional economic activity, with Gauteng and the Western Cape receiving the bulk of spending. However, the Northern Cape, which has lower economic activity than the Western Cape, receives almost as much per capita spending (R100) as Gauteng. Dialogue (2003) explains that this distribution is attributable to the corporate-community upliftment programmes run by the mining sector in that region. The more rural provinces receive less per capita spending, and less percentage of CSI spending, although they are poorer.

As noted earlier, the sectoral division of NPOs is a matter for debate. Dialogue (2003) classifies the work of NPOs according to corporate definitions – arts and culture; education; job creation; health; training; social development<sup>32</sup>; community and rural development; environment; sport; safety and security and housing.


<sup>32</sup> This sector includes the elderly; people with disabilities; the destitute; children; and animal care.

**Percentage of corporates supporting CSI by NPO sector in 2002**



*Figure 10: Percentage of corporates supporting CSI by NPO sector in 2002*

**Percentage of total CSI budget in 2002 across NPO sectors**



*Figure 11: Percentage of CSI budget in 2002 across NPO sectors*

The largest percentage of corporates support education and the largest proportion of CSI spending is given to education, with 95% of corporate grantmakers planning to increase or maintain this level of funding in the short term (Dialogue, 2003). Professor Kader Asmal noted that the private sector contributed R1 billion to education and training in 2002 alone (in Dialogue, 2003: xvi). This finding is in line with the general trends in funding as demonstrated in the Inyathelo database statistics above, although those statistics are not limited to corporates.




Figure 12: CSI education expenditure in 2002

CSI expenditure is concentrated in tertiary education, mostly in the form of bursaries. This makes good business sense as corporates need graduates for recruitment. Only 10% of CSI budget is allocated to the early childhood development (ECD) sector and 15% to primary education indicating a lack of emphasis on the sustainability of the education sector and the psycho-social and educational development of children. In an internal unpublished research report conducted in 2003, Inyathelo: The South African Institute for Advancement found that, out of a sample of 15 higher education institutions, only one had national corporates as their largest source of funding..

Job creation and training account for 12% and 9% of the total CSI budget of corporates surveyed for 2002 (Dialogue, 2003). CSI expenditure on job creation and small business development can be broken down as follows: 45% for entrepreneurial and skills training; 18% for outsourcing, procurement and sub-contracting; 16% for establishing SMMEs; 11% for access to finances and resources; and 10% towards infrastructure and facilities (Dialogue, 2003: 126).

62% of the corporates sampled funded health issues, including HIV/Aids, but this funding only accounted for 11% of CSI budget for 2002. While a substantial amount of R268 million is estimated for 2003, sizable chunks of this are contributed by certain individual companies. For example, Anglo American, who is already one of the largest CSI contributors, is responsible for

a community partnership project dealing with HIV/Aids services in public clinics worth R30 million (Ikalafeng, 2004).

CSI investment in sports is well diversified, with the bulk of spending (48%) going towards the sponsorship of development sports teams (Triologue, 2003: 144):

**CSI expenditure on sports development in 2002**




Figure 13: CSI

expenditure on sports development in 2002

Inyathelo: The South

African Institute for Advancement recognises

that CSI is a key source of philanthropy in South Africa. Out of the 1136 South African donors on the Inyathelo database of funders, 811 (71%) were corporates. Inyathelo views the establishment of a substantially endowed social development foundation as the true measure of corporate commitment to sustainable development as the foundation will continue to make a social contribution regardless of the financial performance of the company. In addition, they feel that the following six strategies are necessary for sustainability and that corporates should encourage them in the projects they fund:

1. NPOs need to establish their own endowment funds.
2. A degree of cost-recovery must be built into all projects.
3. Community-investment in projects should be encouraged by offering matching fund incentives.
4. Income-generation projects need to be undertaken where possible.
5. NPO leadership-succession should be given adequate attention.
6. Every organisation needs to establish internal organisational advancement and resource mobilisation apparatus.

### Individual giving


Everatt and Solanki (2004) have recently released results of a survey commissioned by the Centre for Civil Society (CCS), the National Development Agency (NDA) and the Southern African Grantmakers Association (SAGA) on social giving amongst South African individuals<sup>33</sup>.

It was found that, in the month prior to being interviewed, 54% of respondents had given money, 31% had given food or goods, and 17% had volunteered time to formalised organisations. In addition, 45% indicated that they had given goods or money less formally, for example people and children living on the street). By combining these different forms and methods of giving, it

<sup>33</sup> This report forms part of a larger study on giving that incorporates: state contributions and poverty budget; corporate giving; religious giving, private trusts and foundations; official development assistance and external private foundations; and giving in poor communities.

was found that 93% of respondents gave in some form. This is a fairly robust finding – even 92% of those who scored high ‘alienation’ scores<sup>34</sup> give, and 94% of those who scored low on this variable also give. In addition, both poor and non-poor respondents<sup>35</sup>, reported giving, and women and men gave almost equally (92% for men and 95% for women). A breakdown by race is provided below, with the only notable difference in giving being that Indian respondents give consistently more than other groups.

**Percentage of people who give by race in 2003**



*Figure 14: Percentage of individuals who give in 2003, by race*

Giving across the age groups is slightly lower for those in the younger categories (including students and scholars) at 91%, rising to 96% amongst those aged above 60 years old. There are no statistical differences across people with different education levels – 92% of those with no formal education were givers, as compared with 94% of those with tertiary level education.

89% of the total respondents reported belonging to a religion or a faith and 96% of that group reported giving, as compared to 80% of atheists. 89% of the religious group are required to make a regular payment to their religious organisation and 84% of them do so. 86% of the religious group felt that their faiths required them to assist the poor, whilst 73% felt that doing so would bring them closer to god.

The Everatt and Solanki study (2004) measured, per month, how much money was given to formal organisations and how much money was given directly to the poor.

	Money given to formal organisation	Money given directly to the poor	Total money given
Mean amount	R49	R14	R44
Sum amount	R80 781	R19 970	R100 571
African average	R30	R11	R44
Coloured average	R94	R15	R109
Indian average	R85	R29	R114
White average	R125	R123	R248
Men average	R53	R15	R68
Women average	R46	R14	R60

<sup>34</sup> To measure alienation, issues such as the following were measured: “no-one cares about me”; “people like me can influence developments in my community” to create a score.

<sup>35</sup> Based on an adaptation of Statistics SA Household Poverty Measure.

Table 5: Amount of money given by individuals to formal organisations and directly to the poor, by race and gender

Indian and white givers gave the most (in keeping with their economic status relative to the rest of the country), but Indians gave mainly to formal organisations, while whites gave equally to organisations and directly to the poor. When extrapolating the mean result to the entire population, we can estimate that South African citizens mobilise almost R930 million per month. This amounts to about 2.2% of the total monthly income for the working age population, as measured in Census 2001.

17% of those interviewed reported having volunteered an average of 11 hours, totalling 5807 hours for all respondents. Women volunteered slightly more than men and African people gave the most time (11 hours), followed by coloured people (10 hours), then Indians (9 hours) and lastly whites (5 hours). Youth and adults volunteered an average of 10-11 hours per month, and over 60 year olds averaged 12 hours. 23% of respondents volunteered, whilst only 17% of the non-poors were likely to.

Mean money and time spent per month across provinces




Figure 15: Mean money and time spent by individuals per month across provinces

It is worth noting that the Eastern Cape is the poorest province, yet still gives high levels of time and money. The Western Cape contributes by far the most money, but little time.

The table below breaks down what percentage of people gave what (money, goods or time) and to whom (excluding household members):

Province	% gave money to organisation	% gave money to poor	% gave goods to organisation	% gave goods to poor	% volunteered	% gave to non household family members
Eastern Cape	71	55	59	53	33	75

Free State	47	63	26	68	14	57
Gauteng	36	51	30	55	13	64
KwaZulu Natal	60	36	29	25	17	44
Mpumalanga	64	32	19	21	5	38
Northern Cape	56	34	27	27	17	52
Limpopo	49	48	35	49	26	73
North West	42	46	17	44	8	47
Western Cape	75	42	19	66	15	75

Table 6: Percentage of money and goods given by individuals to organisations and directly to the poor across provinces

It is worth noting that the Eastern Cape, again, although mainly poor and mainly rural, had the highest percentage of people giving goods to organisations, volunteering and giving to non-household family members; and had the second highest percentage of people giving money to the poor and money to organisations.

People perceived the most deserving causes to give to as:

1. Children and youth: 22%
2. HIV/AIDS: 21%
3. The poor: 20%

These were followed by the categories of disability (8%) and the elderly (5%), then by a religious body (3%), a political party (2%) and 1% of respondents thought no causes were deserving. 65% of South Africans thought that local causes were more deserving than international ones, whilst 20% thought they were equally important, and only 4% indicated that international causes deserved more attention.

#### *Why do people give?*

93% of respondents thought that helping the poor is part of building the new South Africa and only 2% disagreed with this. 61% disagreed that it is the government's sole responsibility to help the poor, whilst 24% felt that it was. It is interesting to note that Indian respondents, who had the highest levels of giving, were also the group with the highest percentage that felt that the government should be responsible for helping the poor. 68% of respondents gave to the poor because they were motivated by feelings of human solidarity and 10% of people felt that giving was a rational decision to try and tackle poverty. Almost 10% of respondents felt that there was a religious basis to their giving – being blessed or because God required it of them.

34% of respondents gave to people in immediate need and 21% attempted to give to address short-term and long-term need. Analysed across the socio-economic statuses, it was found that 33% of respondents in the low socio-economic status category gave to immediate needs, but 47% gave to longer-term change and 19% supported both; similarly 34% of those in the middle-income status category supported immediate charity needs, but 48% supported change in the future and 19% both; and in the high-income category 36% of respondents supported long-term change, 36% gave to immediate needs and 28% supported both. Thus, it is clear that those in lower income status categories are more likely to support causes that seek to change rather than to relieve. However, overall, people are more interested in supporting causes that seek longer-term solutions to problems, rather than ameliorating short-term charitable needs.

Inyathelo: The South African Institute for Advancement is planning a research project in 2005-6 identifying high net worth individuals and ascertaining their potential for establishing charitable

trusts and foundations. The majority of such trusts were established prior to the 1970s, although there are exceptions, for example The Shuttleworth Foundation. Inyathelo speculates that this is because, prior to 1994, wealthy individuals generally invested their spare funds abroad due to a lack of confidence in South Africa's future. Inyathelo has assessed that there is now a window of opportunity to encourage the establishment of such trust and foundations as there is much more confidence in the future of the country and therefore scope for private social investment in the country.

### **Income of NPOs**

Kraak (2001a) found that the only estimate of the total income generated by the NPO sector dated back to the early 1990s and amounted to R10 billion per annum. The sources of this funding differed markedly between foreign funding, corporate social investment (CSI) and individual giving.

CAF (2000) described some of the local trusts and foundations. They noted that it was almost impossible to find estimates of how much funding was generated by these organisations. The Swilling and Russell report (2002) attempted to study NPO income. Their estimate of R14 billion in 1998 is made up of funding from government sources (R5.8 billion – 42%)<sup>36</sup>, private sector funding (R3 billion)<sup>37</sup>, and self-generated income (34%). We were not able to get a sense of how much money was actually being generated and distributed within the country from this study.

In 2001, Kraak argued that the NPO sector is not in the funding crisis that it was widely assumed at the time. Some examples that he cites to illustrate the growth in local funding include the setting up of corporate social investment foundations by emerging black empowerment firms like African Harvest, the rise of community foundations (mentioned above) and individuals contributing to the COSATU job-creation fund which raised a total of R50 million (2001b). These examples, in conjunction with the findings from the SAGA, NDA and CCS individual giving study, show that the commonly held assumption that poverty stands in the way of creating a culture of local giving is not entirely true. Poor people give and they can generate resources for development. In addition, there is a growing interest in CSI with the corporate drive to achieve the triple bottom line and a rise in philanthropy that is focused on social change, social justice and sustainability.

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<sup>36</sup> This figure includes foreign government overseas development aid, so does not actually give a sense of how much money the South African government itself is allocating to the sector.

<sup>37</sup> This figure includes individual giving.


## CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS, COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Chetty et al (2000) surveyed townships and informal settlements in the Eastern and Western Cape, and found that while levels of participation in local civics were lower than during the anti-apartheid struggle, current involvement in civics still remains a popular option. In a study of the South African National Civic Movement (SANCO), Heller and Ntlonkulu (2001) also found that participation in civic organisations play an important role in community life in the informal settlements of Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape. They found that since 1998 the number of civics seem to be rallying, especially in the urban areas of Gauteng. In December 2000, the Pretoria area boasted 18 branches with 10 000 paid members. Similarly, membership of the Wattville branch of SANCO in the East Rand grew to 10 000 in just under a year (Heller and Ntlonkulu, 2001). While membership goes some way to explaining levels of participation and support, Chetty et al (2000) found that membership does not easily equate with community support. For example, 14% of Guguletu residents claimed memberships to their local civics, yet meeting attendance was at least double that figure, and approximately 58% of Guguletu residents had attended street committee meetings, although they were not formally affiliated to any civic organisation.

The HSRC ePOP survey found the following membership statistics:

*Figure 16: Active membership of civic organisations over 12 months by province*

### Active membership of civic organisations over 12 months by province



Heller and Ntlonkulu (2001) found that while SANCO plays a coordinating role, it conforms more to the definition of a social movement than an organised national body, as it is comprised of a large number of loosely connected community-based civics. Civic organisations provide space for residents to associate and deliberate on community issues and they provide resources and a framework for collective action like self-help activities, social protection, social development, and engaging the state.

As with all levels and sectors of civil society, the levels of participation in civic organisations at branch level fluctuates according to circumstance and governance (Heller and Ntlonkulu, 2001). Civic organisations sometimes cater to clients and to elites. For example, in Tladi-Moletsane in Soweto, the local civic catered solely for home owners, neglecting shack dwellers (CASE, 1997).

Beall (2000, in Heller and Ntlonkulu, 2001) found that democracy was strengthened through horizontal participation in an environmental movement in Meadowlands, Johannesburg. Heller and Ntlonkulu (2001) find that the assumption that civics are the preserve of the elderly is incorrect – more young than older people attended and participated in meetings and occupied official branch positions. They also found that socio-economic status seemed to play a minor role in participation. Gender remained a significant barrier; although more than 60% of the attendees were women, women are dramatically underrepresented in elected positions (Heller and Ntlonkulu, 2001).

Even in minority indigenous groups, there is social coordination happening. For example, Perrott (1998) describes the work of the Southern African San Institute that supports the San of Southern Africa to access their legal rights, assist with land claims, provide cultural support and a cultural village and training centre. The Institute also facilitates the establishment of a coordinating committee to lobby for the rights of indigenous people, and programmes that the San youth themselves will organise and participate in.

Pieterse (2001) identifies informal community organisations (such as religious structures, stokvels and cultural organisations) as “probably the most important source of social capital that enables many poor households to survive times of stress and crisis...However, very little substantive information is available about the precise role and nature of these organisations, or how they can be harnessed for developmental purposes...Community meetings tend to be ideal forums in which these organisations can relate to the broader socio-political processes that impinge on their members and their viability” (p 63). He notes that traditional leaders are also critical in shaping the identity of local organisations and developmental processes. They control access to resources and can mobilise quickly to become delivery CBOs if required by the government or they decide who gets labour jobs for public works programmes. These structures have power issues, particularly in terms of gender inequality, sexuality, disability etc.

There was a strong tradition of Xhosa youth associations or youth organisations, which has declined since the 1960s and 1970s and has been replaced by new activities which have changed the role that youth play in rural areas in South Africa. The traditional associations include the *umtshotsho* and the *intlombe* – the schools of the rural traditional Xhosa young men. From about the age of 12, young men would engage in weekly activities of dancing, sweet-hearting and stick-play, all of which were under-pinned by strict norms and values. From 1975 onwards membership to these groups became elective rather than obligatory due to the experience of labour migration. New practices, influenced by city experiences and the decreasing gap between rural and urban, include potsoyi (a shebeen party that was funded by the selling of beer) and stokvel and economic associations, as well as musical entertainment and, very importantly, soccer (McAllister and Deliwe, 1996).

#### *Membership of community organisations*

In 2000, the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) sampled 2500 youth between the ages of 16 and 35. Organisational membership of community associations is detailed in Table 7 below:

Organisation <sup>38</sup>	Africans	Whites	Urban	Non-urban	Total youth
Youth	6	6	7	5	6
Stokvel	7	1	5	6	5
Political	5	0	3	5	4

<sup>38</sup> Please note that the figures for church and sports have been removed from this table, and the results are included under those respective headings.

Student	2	2	2	1	2
Women	2	0	2	1	2
Cultural	1	3	1	1	1
None	54	47	56	53	54

Table 7: Organisational youth membership of community organisations in 2002

In all categories bar one (white youth), more than half of the respondents claimed no membership of any community association or organisation. This was true across all racial groups and areas, with whites showing greater tendency to belong to these organisations and lesser tendency to belong to stokvels or saving societies and to political organisations, as compared to Africans (CASE, 2000).

Piazzzi-Georgi (2000a) surveyed 1000 households in Soweto in mid-1999 to investigate human and social capital factors, in order to understand and assess the implications on income generation in households. Soweto was chosen as it is one of the most racially homogenous groups, although it differs in terms of income levels, social origins, ethnic groups and education, and it allows for an examination of traditional and modern forms of association and of social capital. Piazzzi-Georgi (2000a) argues that it was important to capture data in a homogenous racial group as apartheid policies had created significant economic, social and education differences among the racial groups, which would have obscured the human and social capital patterns being studied.

Social capital indicators were surveyed in five parts. In each of these parts, an effort was made to distinguish between low-rationalisation social capital<sup>39</sup> and high-rationalisation social capital<sup>40</sup>. Piazzzi-Georgi (2000a) found that 83% of adults belonged to at least one social group, 37% belonged to two groups, 4% belonged to three groups, and no-one mentioned belonging to more than three groups.

Group	Weighted % of membership	Mean annual contributions	Median annual contributions
Church or religious group	42	R283	R120
Political party	4	R226	R50
Burial society	25	R977	R600
Stokvel	8	R2220	R1200
Other economic group	1	R856	R516
Community/charity group	1	R380	R400
Cultural, sports group	2	R452	R240
No group	17		

Table 8: Percentage of memberships in groups and mean and median annual contributions

<sup>39</sup> Traditional, family-based, substantive forms.

<sup>40</sup> Modern, profession-oriented, value-oriented, process-based forms.

### Weighted percentages of membership of groups in Soweto in 1999




Figure 17: Weighted percentages of membership of groups in Soweto in 1999

Among those who only mentioned one group, church membership was very high at 67%, burial societies at 14% and stokvels at 12%. Church members were significantly less likely to belong to political parties, stokvels and other economic groups.

In the HSRC ePop survey, the following was found:

#### Active membership of Youth and Women's organisations over 12 months by race





Figure 18: Active membership of youth and women's organisations over 12 months by race

It is interesting to note that women's organisations enjoy a higher active membership than youth groups do, and that this is consistent across race groups. The active participation in women's organisations, when analysed by age group is illustrated below:

Figure 19: Active participation in women's organisations over 12 months by age group

**Active participation in women's organisations over 12 months by age group**



It is interesting to note here that the age group with the highest percentage of membership are in the over 50 year old category. The age group with the smallest percentage is the 18-24 year old group and the percentage of membership increases as women age.

*Neighbourhood groups*

40% of respondents stated that they often get together in neighbourhood groups to solve problems and activities such as security, childcare, and street clean-up.

Type of dwelling	Often	Sometimes	Never
Pre-1945 council housing	19	30	50
Post-1945 council housing	16	36	48
Forced removals housing	22	44	34
Private housing	12	48	39
Informal settlements	0	69	31
Workers' hostels	0	72	28

Table 9: Neighbourhood solidarity, by housing area

The HSRC ePop survey found the following:

### Rural and urban participation in neighbourhood associations or groups over 12 months




Figure 20: Rural and urban participation in neighbourhood associations or groups over 12 months

There is a consistently higher level of participation in neighbourhood groups in rural areas than urban areas.

Piazz-Georgi (2000) found that the average time spent on group activities per year was 90 hours, or 1.73 hours per week (including weekly religious service attendance). Following the distribution of membership, the most time spent was on church activities, followed by burial societies, then stokvels and political parties. The only significant difference across income levels, education, age and gender was found in the gender category, with women spending 143 hours per year as opposed to men who spend 121 hours per year. In terms of homogeneity, this seems to be less important than might be assumed. Social capital building time (eg with membership groups, other community work, extended family, socialising with work/study colleagues and other social activities) was distributed fairly evenly across men and women, and between different employment statuses. Relatively educated respondents spent more time on household activities, such as renovating, and with group activities and their extended family than less educated respondents did.

#### Trust in community organisations

Piazz-Georgi (2000a) found that members expressed overwhelming trust in their groups and the functioning of them, even more so than their families or any other parts of their social milieu. Respondents were asked to rate on a level of 1 to 5 what their trust in various groups and institutions were:

	Population mean
Members of groups	3.9
Extended family	3.7
Local school	3.5
Central/Provincial Government	3.3
Professional/working contacts	3.3
Local government	3.0
Police	2.9

Those who earn a living in the same way as you	2.9
Neighbours	2.7
People in same income category as you	2.6

Table 10: Levels of trust in different groups

Within groups, economic groups (eg cooperatives) scored the highest trust score, with community and civic organisations coming next, followed by church and burial societies, then political parties and stokvels, and lastly cultural and sports groups. The only significant difference across residential zone and household income analyses was that hostel dwellers were less trustful of their neighbours than other respondents.

When asked what type of organisation has helped improve the community the most, the youth surveyed responded in the following way:

Organisation <sup>41</sup>	Africans	Whites	Urban	Non-urban	Total youth
Political	18	0	14	16	15
Local government	12	4	9	12	10
National government	4	0	2	5	3
Youth	3	3	4	2	3
Stokvel	2	2	2	2	2
CBO/NGO	2	0	1	2	2
None	49	60	50	52	50

Table 11: Youth perceptions in 2000 of what type of organisations help the community the most

“The most striking finding of the table above...is the total absence of mention of political organisations and national government by white respondents. In contrast these are mentioned by 22% of Africans (18% and 4% respectively). If we add local government to the picture, just over a third of Africans (34%) compared to 4% of whites have a positive view of the contribution made by political structures. Church and religious organisations were mentioned by 6% overall, as having contributed the most to improving the community, but by 20% of whites as compared to 3% of Africans” (CASE, 2000: 94-95). The discussion by CASE neglects to point out that again, the majority of youth show a disinclination towards community organisations, political groups and community associations, by claiming that these organisations have not helped the community.

Higson-Smith (2002: 137) reinforces Piazzzi-Georgi’s (2000) statistical conceptualisation of social cohesion by explaining that “people’s social networks comprise members of their immediate and extended families as well as friends in the community and in the workplace. Although the number of people in the social network is at most a coarse appropriation of social capital, it does provide a starting point for analysis.” In addition, Higson-Smith notes that in order to understand social capital, the frequency of contact with social networks is important. Even if someone has an enormous social network, the social capital level might be very low if they are geographically or socially isolated from the members of that network.

Higson-Smith (2002) found that the number of immediate family members of respondents ranged from 0 to 28, with the most common responses being between 3 and 5. African people were found to be in contact with the least number of immediate family members.

<sup>41</sup> Please note that the figures for church and sports have been removed from this table, and the results are included in the section of this paper under those respective headings.

The table below breaks down the frequency of contact with immediate family members across the race groups:

Group	Number of face-to-face contacts per month			
	With favourite sibling	With child over age of 18	With mother	With father
White	5.8	17.5	7.4	6
Indian	14.5	29.8	8.8	7.2
Black	14.7	24.6	7.4	5.2
Coloured	17.9	29.9	11.2	9.9
Men	-	20.4	-	-
Women	-	26.1	-	-
18-24 year olds	25.7	-	-	-
25-34 year olds	16.6	27.6	-	-
35-49 year olds	9.7	27.6	-	-
Over 50 year olds	8.3	21.6	-	-
All	13.8	24	7.9	5.4

Table 12: Number of face-to-face contacts with immediate family members in 2002, by age and race and gender

The numbers of extended family members<sup>42</sup> ranged from 18 to 129. When analysing the percentage of respondents who viewed these members of their extended families as part of their social networks, a significant statistical difference was found between races, with Indian respondents consistently reporting the most contacts and white respondents having the least (Higson-Smith, 2002).

#### Friendships

18% of respondents felt that they had no close friends at all, while the majority reported having between one and ten close friends. People living in metropolitan areas reported having almost twice as many close friends as those in rural communities. Indian and white people have the most friends, almost twice as many as black people. Men reported significantly more close friendships than women (Higson-Smith, 2002).

To understand the social networks of working people, respondents were asked to approximate how many close friends they had at their workplace. It was found that whilst work was the most important determinant of income and economic advantage, it was not a source of social support for most people. More than half of working people did not have close friends at work. Men tended to have slightly more work friends than women; and adults aged 35 to 49 years had more close friends at work than any other age group. Indian and white people reported having twice as many work friends than African or coloured people (Higson-Smith, 2002).

People who lived in metropolitan or urban communities reported having more close friends in their neighbourhoods than those who lived in rural communities. Women seemed to have fewer friends in their neighbourhoods than men; black people reported fewer neighbourhood friends than other races; and adults in the age group 25-34 years indicated fewer neighbourhood friendships than groups older or younger than them (Higson-Smith, 2002).

An important part of social capital are relationships that are 'cross-cutting' or 'bridging' between communities rather than within them as "they are predictive of the flow of resources into and out of communities, as well as the extent to which communities are integrated into the broader society" (Higson-Smith, 2002: 141). It was found that people from better-resourced communities

<sup>42</sup> Extended family members included uncles and aunts, cousins, parents-in-law, brothers- and sisters-in-law, nieces and nephews.

were more likely to have friends in other communities, particularly those in metropolitan areas followed by those in urban areas. Rural communities scored the lowest in this regard. Indian and white respondents had three times the number of friends in other communities when compared to black respondents. Coloured people also had more outside friendships when compared to blacks, but less than other groups; and men had significantly more friends in other communities than women (Higson-Smith, 2002)

More than 40% of adult South Africans see their closest friends on a daily basis, and a further 43% have contact with their friends at least once a week. Respondents aged 18-24 years old have more frequent contact than do older respondents. People in rural communities have the most frequent contact with their friends and those in metropolitan areas have the least. Black and coloured people have substantially more contact with friends than do white and Indian respondents.

Higson-Smith (2002: 146) reports that “although the level of community development enhances social capital in some respects, it detracts from it in others”. Those living in metropolitan areas have the most contact with family members (mainly from living together), but the least contact with their friends. Those living in rural communities often don’t see family members for long periods of time (often because they are looking for work in cities), but they see their close friends in the area on a more regular basis. People in metropolitan areas need to make plans and travel to see their friends, whilst those in rural communities meet their friends within their communities and neighbourhoods. This also means that metropolitan dwellers have more friends in other communities as opposed to the situation in isolated rural communities. This impacts on the social capital available to them as rural dwellers only have access to those with similarly limited resources to themselves.

Higson-Smith’s (2002) findings have gender and race implications too. He reports that mothers tend to have more frequent contact with their adult children than fathers, but women generally have fewer friends within and outside their communities than men. This is also true for the workplace and implies that women are important in the social networks of other women who face similar challenges and thus have limited social capital themselves.

Although it is widely assumed within South African society that black South Africans have the strongest social networks in the country, the study found that they actually have weaker social networks, especially in comparison to coloured and Indian people. When critically reviewing the methodology to assess this surprising result, Higson-Smith (2002: 148) notes that the questions asked did have some Eurocentric bias and that there was more of an emphasis on blood relatives than on members of the extended family. Furthermore, terms such as “close friends” could have very different meanings in different cultures. However, he argues that these issues do not explain the findings that black South Africans have far fewer contacts with immediate and extended families than coloured and Indian people do. He argues that these findings imply that social scientists need to be careful about assuming that black social networks are well established in the country and “that the values of communalism are equally reflected in the realities of black people’s lives”.

In terms of age breakdowns, the elderly, for the most part, have less developed social networks than the youth. As people age, they tend to have less frequent contact with their siblings, parents and children. This finding is not surprising because people tend to start their own families and move out of the community as they get older. In addition, older people are more likely to have lost one or both of their parents. Other important factors are the level of education of different generations and the fact that as South Africa is changing so rapidly, younger people

may be more mobile and may be constructing different social networks to the ones surveyed in the study. Younger adults only scored lower than their older counterparts when it came to the number of friends within their community. This is also not surprising as young adulthood is a time when many people are looking for employment, which might push them to move between communities more often; therefore they are less able to maintain the same network of friends as those who are more settled are able to.

In terms of community involvement, CASE (2000) found that 86% of respondents used personal contacts (friends and neighbours) and 1% joined civil society development projects in order to find employment. Social safety-nets are critical components of a cohesive society. As such, Piazzzi-Georgi (2000a) investigated the effects of social capital on job-finding:

	How did you get your present job?		How do you think you might get your next job?	
	<i>Sub-matric</i>	<i>Matric or more</i>	<i>Sub-matric</i>	<i>Matric or more</i>
Mass media	16	26	36	50
School or employment centre	2	12	4	12
Family/Friends	52	40	45	27
Schoolmates/Colleagues	1	3	1	1
Groups to which you belong	2	2	2	2
Yourself (set up business)	9	7	5	4
Going door-to-door	16	6	6	3
Other	2	3	1	1

Table 13: Job-finding sources and perceptions of source for finding next job

Piazzzi-Georgi (2000) also explored where people would turn in times of financial trouble. Extended family was the first option for 52% of respondents, followed by informal employment (41%). 22% of respondents mentioned the community (including groups they belonged to) and 22% mentioned friends, 19% thought about loans and the same percentage would turn to existing savings.

Although it is limited to higher-income populations, there has been an increase in online communities. People go online to play games and to chat-rooms (eg [www.mirc.co.za](http://www.mirc.co.za) and [www.lan.co.za](http://www.lan.co.za)). “Cyberspace is a huge electronically mediated network of interaction between human beings through computers. Online or as virtual reality, cyberspace is not ‘unreal’: it is an environment of its own, connected, in many ways, to the offline reality” (Pejout, 2003). This type of networking has recently moved away from just the cyber-realm, and members subscribe to groups which hold face-to-face social meetings where online groups meet for coffee at set times and travel to set places for regular face-to-face competitions<sup>43</sup>. Pejout (2003) analysed three South African chat rooms – SATeens, SAHeart2Heart and SALiving – by questioning chatters, and observing and participating in recorded chat sessions. There were three main empirical conclusions:

1. There is an online social order that is created through technical and social rules/norms.
2. People play around with their online/offline identities through identity-switching scenarios.
3. Online racism is fully expressed, in opposition the government’s optimistic vision that the internet will enhance communication and is a tool to create an “e-community”.

Bakilana and Esau (2003) used alternative methods of data collection to explore issues of reproductive health and the social networks and confidants of young people in the Cape Metropole. The majority of participants (who were mainly living with their parents and siblings)

<sup>43</sup> Interview with active members of online groups.

identified their parents as closest to them. Mothers were noted first, followed by sisters and aunts by participants of all ages and genders.

Friends were identified as those who were closest after parents. Friends are those who can keep your secrets, who are there in times of need, who can cheer you up, who is reliable and trustworthy and loyal and who encourages you to do good. Young men were more likely to have larger groups of friends (for example, sports groups, church youth groups) than one-to-one pairs and were guarded about keeping their groups of boy friends together without interference from girls or girlfriends.

Grandparents ranked next in terms of those close to participants, particularly grandmothers. Teachers were considered to be distant.

Girls predominantly said that they would talk to those closest to them if they had a problem, but indicated that they wouldn't discuss boyfriend problems with their mothers, but might with their sisters. Alcohol use and smoking were other issues that were not discussed with parents. It was noted that girls had more parental control than boys, largely because of safety reasons, but that on the whole the participants did not feel that parents were not there to listen and guide them without judgement and that they had had very different experiences to what the young people were going through themselves. Friends (usually those of the same gender) were confidants on all these 'taboo' issues and this was a value and a benefit that they did not get from their family members. Teachers were not identified as those who youth could turn to, and social workers were not perceived to be trustworthy enough to keep their secrets.

The data from Higson-Smith's (2002: 149). study was used to produce a general social capital score, which argues "supports the fundamental principle that social capital can also be transformed into other kinds of capital" When comparing the social capital score with living standards measures it was clear that Indian and coloured people had significantly higher social capital scores than white or black people, even though whites score highest on the standard of living measure. People older than 50 had significantly lower social capital and men had significantly higher social capital. This kind of conglomerated score does not present a holistic picture as having a strong group of friends outside your own community can provide a higher level of social capital than those with extensive social networks within their communities, especially if the community does not have good resources to offer. Overall, poor people, women and rural dwellers – those who are already prioritised for developmental assistance – have the lowest social capital. Higson-Smith (2002: 150) argues that if "social capital is fundamental to sustainable developmental work, then it is essential that social activists put some energy into building this important resource. Furthermore, social activists who assume that the African value of communalism is in itself a strong enough foundation for building a person's social capital are at serious risk of underestimating the tremendous damage that generations of colonial and apartheid rule have done to many people's (particularly black South Africans) social networks".

John Abbott (2000: 5) expresses his view that crime can draw people in informal settlements closer together. "You cannot put a dollar figure on these social networks, but this social capital is extremely valuable. Survival is based on interdependence. You don't have the resources in an informal settlement to operate as an individual. If you want to go out and sell food informally at the market, who is going to look after your children? If you don't get paid on a regular basis, how are you going to live from month to month? If you get sick, who is going to help you?" He warns against the destruction of informal settlements as these linkages are lost when people are moved around into new housing in random fashion.

Civic association, community organisations and social networks provide opportunities for social cohesion, while at the same time highlighting intra-cultural activities that do not contribute to inclusivity. Other less formal but valuable areas of interaction, for example book clubs, rotary clubs and choral groups exist, but very little reliable information is available. As with many other areas of community life, further investigation is required in order to assess the impact that these associations have on the social cohesion of South Africa.

## RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS

For the purposes of this research, religious organisations are defined as faith-based organised bodies that fall outside of the classic NPO structures and that are established by religious institutions for the purposes of social services delivery, the promotion of values, recreation, and culture (Swilling and Russell, 2002).

Robert Putnam claims that in the United States of America “faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital” (2000: 66). He notes that although religiosity is not a conclusive causal factor in the development and sustainability of social cohesion, it does indicate high levels of civic participation, public engagement, social networking, volunteering and philanthropy. Thus, religious adherence and attendance at religious events is equated with social cohesion. Because of the moral and value-laden ethos of religions, the social cohesion that is generated by these organisations is considered useful and productive to the social cohesion of broader societies. A more nuanced view takes into account the possibility that although religious organisations do generate a remarkable degree of social capital and cohesion, this is not always distributed in egalitarian ways between and across religions, cultures, and communities. For example, conservative Christian churches may give enormous amounts of time and money to social causes like HIV/Aids, yet simultaneously marginalise gay communities, for example Rhema Network on DSTV Channel.

Census 2001 quantified the number and distribution of religious affiliation in South Africa. Almost 80% of South Africans, about 35.8 million people, claimed some form of Christianity as their primary faith. Christianity is comprised of many denominations, including mainline reformed churches, Anglican, Dutch Reform, Pentecostal/Charismatic, Baptist, Apostolic, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and the United Congregational Church; as well as Zionist, Ibandla lamaNazaretha, Ethiopian-type churches; and other churches. By far the most popular form of Christianity claimed and practiced in South Africa is that of the African Independent Churches, with the Zion Christian Church the largest of this group with membership of 11.1% of the population. David Cuthbert, in an interview with the Charities Aid Foundation in 2000, states that African Independent Churches (AIC) number about 4000, with a total population of almost 10 million people.

Islam, African Traditional beliefs, Hinduism, Judaism and other religions were represented by 1.5%, 0.3%, 1.2%, 0.2%, and 0.6% of the population respectively. The SASAS data from 2003 shows that although not directly measured by most surveys or Census 1996 or 2001, Buddhists account for 0.2% of the South African population, as substantial a faith community in terms of numbers as the Hindu community. While the overwhelming majority of respondents declared their religious identities in Census 2001, 15.1% noted that they do not subscribe to any religion. Interestingly, this group of people numbers almost five times the combined count of Muslims, Hindus, Jews and African Traditionalists.

In 2002, the Stephen Rule and the HSRC undertook a survey to ascertain levels of participation in religious organisations and public opinion. The data collected on religious groupings is similar to the earlier Census 2001 data and the two sets are presented below for comparison:

Religious group	Census 2001	HSRC Study 2002
Zionist Christian Church	11.1	10.2
Methodist Church	7.4	8.5
Other Zionist Christian Churches	4.2	8.5

NGK	6.7	8.3
Roman Catholic Church	7.1	7.6
Apostolic Faith Mission	0.5	7.6
Anglican Church	3.8	6
Lutheran Evangelical Church	2.5	3.4
Pentacostal / Charismatic Church	7.6	2.4
Other Churches	31.7	19.1
Baptist Church	1.5	2
Hinduism	1.2	1.5
Islam	1.5	1.6
Judaism	0.2	0.2
Other religion	0.6	5.4
No religion	15.1	7.1

Table 14: Percentage of South African population across religious groups in 2000 and 2001

While Christianity is the dominant religion in South Africa, the constitution provides for freedom of religion. Census 2001 shows that the majority of people across all races affirm Christianity as their core faith:

#### Christianity by race, South Africa, 2001




Figure 21: Christianity by race in South Africa in 2001

The data further shows that approximately 80% of black South Africans are Christian, with 17.5% claiming no religion. White South Africans are also overwhelmingly Christian (86.9%) 1.4% are Jewish, and 8.8% claim no religious affiliation. Nearly half of all Indians or Asians in South Africa in 2001 were Hindu, with the remaining half either Muslim (24.6%), Christian (24.4.%) or other (0.4%). As with all other race groups bar Indians/Asians, coloured South Africans were majority Christian (87%) with 7.4% of this group claiming Islam, and 3.8% stating that they did not subscribe to a particular religion.


Religion	Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
Christianity	79.7	86.8	24.4	86.9	79.8
African Traditional Belief	0.4	0	0	0	0.3

Judaism	0	0	0.1	1.4	0.2
Hinduism	0	0.1	47.3	0.1	1.2
Islam	0.2	7.4	24.6	0.2	1.5
Other faith	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.6
No religion	17.5	3.8	2.2	8.8	15.1

Table 15: Religion by race in South Africa 2001

Attendance at religious services and membership of sites of worship and sacred sites is difficult to quantify. In addition, figures from faith-based institutions do not always correlate with Census data. For example, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, the central and representative institution of the Jewish community, estimates the Jewish community to equal approximately 100 000 people (www.jewish.org.za), whereas Statistics South Africa provides a more conservative estimate of 68 058. Rule (2002) tried to ascertain the frequency of religious attendance and participation at religious services.

### Frequency of religious participation



Rule (2002: 87) points out that “religious denomination claimed attendance at services or meetings”. In a similar study, (Vermeulen, Gerhard, Porteous, Teichert, Siaki, Jackson and De Oliveira, 2000), it was found that only about 20 of the population attends churches regularly. However, Everatt and Solanki (2004) found that 50 of their respondents that stated they belonged to a religion or faith visited their place of worship at least once a week and 9 even daily: that these findings are contestable and does not necessarily correlate...with participation at

Frequency	Percentage of respondents
Daily	9
Weekly	50
Monthly	26
Seldom/Never	13

Table 15: Frequency of participation at religious services in 2004

The HSRC ePop study investigated the frequency and type of religious participation over 12 months, and the data revealed that 37.4 of respondents participated more than twice a year, 20.6 participated once or twice a year, and 13.3 belonged to religious organisations or churches but never participated.

### Participation in a religious organisation over 12 months




Figure 23: Participation in a religious organisation over 12 months

Religious membership also correlates with non-membership of other types of community organisations. In the Piazzzi-Georgi (2000) study of social capital in Soweto, it was found that 42 of people surveyed belong to a church or religious group and that members of this group were significantly less likely to belong to political parties, stokvels and other community economic groups.

The Census 2001 data is disaggregated by race and gender, but does not conclusively show whether religion across categories is gaining or receding in popularity. What is clear, however, is the massive support that religion garners across race groups. The conflation of race and religion in post-apartheid South Africa still holds sway in contemporary Muslim communities, with most South African Muslims having been classified as either Coloured, or Indian/Asian (Jeppie, 2001). An analysis of the disaggregated data provided by Statistics South Africa (2003) shows an increase in the number of African and white South African citizens claiming Islam from 1996 to 2001. In percentage terms, this shift is tiny, but in real terms the African and white Muslim populations of South Africa almost doubled each in a relatively short period of four years<sup>44</sup>. This could indicate a growing tendency to resist previously assumed boundaries of religion, race and culture; showing the fluidity of these terms and the changing and challenging nature of communities and identities.

Wa Kivilu (2002) undertook a study into civil society participation and found a number of interesting results relating to religious membership and affiliation. White respondents had the highest percentage (56) of membership to religious organisations and Indians had the lowest (19). Active participation, when measured by the HSRC epop survey differed across race groups<sup>45</sup>, with white respondents again showing the greatest amount of participation (58.6), and Indians the least (29.9); and between urban (47.6) and rural (40.6) regions. Far more women (50.1) than men (37.6) were active members of religious organisations, yet were significantly under represented as office bearers when compared with men – only 2.8 of women compared with 4 of men.

<sup>44</sup> 43 253 in 1996 to 74 701 in 2001 for African Muslims; 3 741 in 1996 to 8 410 in 2001 for white Muslims.

<sup>45</sup> See Table 16 below.

Type of participation	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Male	Female
Sympathiser	23.7	14.5	20.6	12	24.9	18.5
Active member	43.3	39	29.9	58.6	37.6	50.1
Office bearer	3.8	2	0	2.4	4	2.8
None	29.3	44.5	49.5	26.9	33.5	28.6

Table 17: Participation in religious organisations, by race and gender

The Youth 2000 study (CASE, 2000) reported that church and religious organisations, as well as sports clubs, were the most common forms of associations to which respondents belonged. 16 of all youth claimed church membership; marginally more white youth than black youth (21 as opposed to 16), and slightly more non-urban than urban youth (18 and 16 respectively). However, when asked which organisation contributed most to the community there was a definite schism between black and white youth, with only 3 of African youth mentioning the church, as opposed to one fifth (20) of white youth surveyed.

While established religions and faith based communities contribute significantly to both bridging and bonding capital, it would be remiss to assume that those without religion do not also contribute to social cohesion outside the structures and confines of religion. This is partly supported by findings from Everatt and Solanki (2004). They asked participants whether they belonged to a religion and assessed how this affected their philanthropic giving. 89 of respondents reported belonging to a religion or a faith and, of those, 96 of them reported giving, as compared to 80 of atheists. 80 is still a very high figure and illustrates that those without religion still have an important role to play in building social cohesion.

Swilling and Russell (2002) found that of the total 16 105 organisations surveyed in the study, 8 738 were religious organisations which are not formalised NPOs (Section 21 companies). When investigating which sectors they operate in, it was found that they are most heavily involved in the delivery of social services and religion propagation. Swilling and Russell (2002) noted that 2532 informal or voluntary organisations and 435 Section 21 companies stated that they ran religious projects or programmes. An analysis of the data<sup>46</sup> provided by these authors reveals that religious organisations comprise 17.6 of the non-profit sector in South Africa, and that religious activities account for 14.7 of the combined activities for informal/voluntary organisations, Section 21 companies and religious organisations. While it is clear that religious organisations contribute significantly to the South African non-profit sector, 54.2 of all work done by these organisations is direct religious work, meaning that less than 46 of all other work conducted by religious organisations is split between eight other sectors, the bulk of which is in social services. This differs from informal and voluntary organisations and Section 21 companies, where religious work amounts to 4.7 and 3.8 of total work, respectively.

Detailed information by faith on the number of religious organisations and the work that these organisations do is not available for most faiths. The Jewish community in South Africa has a listing of these types of organisations and the fields in which they operate, and it would be useful to establish a similar breakdown for other faiths. South African Jews are a minority (0.2 of the population) with a reported total of 306 religious and community organisations that are involved in developmental work, ranging from propagation of the faith to fundraising, sports and youth movements. These are disaggregated below:

<sup>46</sup> Please see the discussion earlier on the methodological issues in the Swilling report.

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Number</b>
National Bodies	12
Sports	4
Welfare and community organisations, servicing the elderly, disabled, sick, and unemployed.	59
Students, young adults, and youth movements	23
Women's organisations	17
Culture, including museums, arts, genealogy, libraries	17
Fundraising	18
Education including early childhood development, pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary education, informal education.	62
Funeral services, bereavement and counselling	4
Shuls, including independent, progressive and orthodox	90
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>

*Table 18: The number of Jewish organisations in South Africa in 2004 by sector*

Numerous faith-based initiatives that contribute to social cohesion occur across and between religious institutions and religious organisations. In order to establish the extent of this type of social cohesion, certain key facts must be gathered and questions answered. The Census 2001 data provides a relatively accurate reflection of the distribution of individual faith communities in South Africa, but no comprehensive account of the number of religious institutions, religious bodies and inter-faith initiatives exists. While a large body of literature exists on the divisive nature of religion, very little information in terms of numbers exist. In addition, the quantification of less formalised religious institutions and practices<sup>47</sup>, might prove challenging, but is important as these organisations and associations contribute to social cohesion and community development.

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<sup>47</sup> For example, madressahs which are schools for the religious education of Muslim children and youth, generally take place after school hours, are organized by communities and are often home-based.

## SCHOOLS

Almost half of South Africa's population are under 18 years old, and almost 12 million children – accounting for 28 of the population - are enrolled in schools (Statistics South Africa, 2003). The South African Schools Act of 1996 makes the attendance of all children between the ages of 7 to 15 years old mandatory (Department of Education, 2003); therefore schools are important and influential sites of socialisation, service delivery and social cohesion. However, the statistical evidence on the situation of schools for South African learners show that these sites of learning are also sites of danger. The recent socio-economic report by the South African Human Rights Commission (2003) shows that many of South Africa's schools have shortfalls in infrastructure from too few classrooms to lack of access to library facilities:

Lack or shortage	Number of schools
Shortage of classrooms	10 723
Shortage of textbooks	13 204
No electricity	10 859
Inadequate toilet facilities	2 498
Lack of access to library facilities	22 773

Table 19: Lack or shortages at South African schools

In 2001, 11 738 126 learners were enrolled in primary and secondary schools in the nine provinces of South Africa, with the vast majority (97.9) attending public schools (Department of Education, 2003). The location of schools seems to echo the population distribution for children, with the most densely populated provinces of KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape enjoying 43.1 of the nation's schools. Only 2.3 of children benefit from early childhood development skills at pre-primary schools, although almost two thirds of all school-going children in the country are enrolled in primary schools. Once learners reach secondary school, the enrolment rate drops to one third (34.3).




Figure 24: Percentage distribution of learners by school phases in 2001

The gender parity index (GPI) is considered one of the key indicators of development set down in the Millennium Development Goals, as it notes the levels of equality in school registration and

attendance between boy and girl learners. The GPI<sup>48</sup> score for South Africa across all provinces in 2001 for primary schools was 0.95 and for secondary schools 1.10 (Department of Education, 2003). In effect, this means that there is an equal distribution of girl and boy learners at schools in South Africa on the whole, but that there marginally fewer girls in primary school than boys and vice versa in secondary schools.




Figure 25: in schools in governing bodies (SGBs) statutory requirement legislated by the Schools Act of 1996 for all public and private schools in South Africa, and are responsible for the management of the school (Department of Education, 2002). These managing and governing bodies comprise members of the school community (the principal, teachers/educators, staff members, parents of learners, and learners above Grade 8), as well as co-opted members of the broader community who rescind the right to vote in matters concerning the school (Department of Education, 2002). The Department of Education (2003) writes that in 2001 there were 27 458 ordinary schools<sup>49</sup> in South Africa. Because all schools are required by the Schools Act to establish a School Governing Body to oversee management of the school, the number of SGBs and the number of schools in the country should be equal<sup>50</sup>. However, no official statistics have been located in this regard, either at a local or national level<sup>51</sup>.

SGBs play an important role in the recruitment and pay of teachers. The Department of Education (2003) notes that in public provincial schools, the percentage of SGB paid teachers differs from province to province and within schools, as presented in the table below:

Province	Percentage of SGB paid teachers
Eastern Cape	3.2
Free State	3.4
Gauteng	10.5
Kwa-Zulu Natal	5.8
Limpopo	1.3
Mpumalanga	4.6
North West	2.5

<sup>48</sup> Please note that these figures are adjusted for age appropriate school enrolment.

<sup>49</sup> This figure excludes stand-alone ELSEN and pre-primary or ECD centres.

<sup>50</sup> It is critical to note that certain schools are not on the radar of surveyors or Census. Wilson (2002) points out that because of tricky legislation, certain farm schools are not legally defined as schools and would therefore not appear in a count of schools.

<sup>51</sup> For the most part, the Department of Education regularly makes disaggregated statistics and other information readily available.

Northern Cape	4.1
Western Cape	10.4

Table 20: Percentage of school governing board paid teachers by province

It is interesting to note that the wealthiest provinces – Gauteng and the Western Cape – also boast the highest percentage of SGB paid teachers (10.4 each).

Although SGB appointed and paid educators are in the minority in the school environment, the appointment of these teachers and the composition of the SGB is a useful barometer of the culture of the school community and the power invested in the SGB. The South African Human Rights Commission (1999) explains that in some schools, even with a majority of black learners, SGB members are overwhelmingly white.

#### Profile of school governing body members by race




Figure 26: Profile of school governing bodies by race

The Department of Education (2002) acknowledges that one of the challenges for SGBs is to reflect the demography of the country and so redress imbalances in governance structures.

The level of participation in SGBs is difficult to quantify. An analysis of the right to participation within the school setting and questions of governance is an important step in the progressive realisation of children's rights in South Africa. While education is one of the basic rights of all citizens of this country, a number of studies show that children's right to education is barred by other socio-economic factors. Poverty and the costs of education conspire to prohibit children's access to education, and although unlawful, children still experience exclusion from school if they do not pay their school fees (Guthrie and Berry, 2003). Wilson (2004) and the National Association of School Governing Bodies (2004) explain that school governing bodies are often remiss in their application of the School Act for the setting of school fees and awarding fee exemptions<sup>52</sup>. In poverty-stricken rural areas, the misapplication of the laws around awarding fee exemptions is more common than in more affluent areas. This is partly because the SGBs need the money to meet their responsibilities of governance and management (Wilson, 2004).

<sup>52</sup> The exemption is calculated on a sliding scale where parents of learners who earn less than ten times the annual school-fees are completely exempt from paying school fees.

Attendance rates at schools are not precise so enrolment is not an indicator of attendance. Wilson (2002) makes the point that children enrolled at farm schools are sometimes forced to engage in child labour which takes them away from lessons and/or detrimentally affects their schooling; but these children are not removed from schools.

#### *Schools, SGBs and social capital*

While school governing bodies can act as agents of social cohesion and deliverers of social services, and can provide opportunities for community participation in school processes, these bodies can also misapply laws to the detriment of learners and the school community they serve. Wilson (2002) explains that on farm schools there is a high incidence of indigence, and that the injunction on parents to provide time and resources through the school governing body is an unrealistic expectation which places a greater financial and emotional strain on already overburdened families and communities. Pampallis (2002) notes that the Schools Act does not take into account the fact that many parents lack the skills and confidence to actively and meaningfully engage in SGBs, which are often dominated by principals who do not take accountability to parent bodies or communities seriously.

Pampallis (2002) writes that often teachers and principals do not live in the communities in which they teach and do not identify with that community. Another challenge is that parents tend to focus on the individual benefits of education for their children and not the community benefit of schools and schooling (Pampallis, 2002).

A ministerial committee appointed by Education Minister Kader Asmal earlier this year is investigating problems of and challenges to school governance. The report is due to be presented to the Minister in October.

Schools cannot be theorised as nodes of community safety. There is growing concern about violence in schools that takes the form of teacher-on-student violence, student-on-student violence and violence perpetrated against learners by members outside of the school community. The Constitutional Court's ruling prohibiting corporal punishment in schools (Guthrie and Berry, 2003) goes some way to alleviating violence as a method of control and to publicising the damaging effects of violence on society and children in particular. Sexual violence and abuse seem to be endemic to the school environment for girls. In November 2003, several NPOs<sup>53</sup> released the Dossier of Shame, a document detailing the schools in KwaZulu Natal that allegedly covered up reports of child rape and sexual assault on school premises by learners and by teachers (Mail and Guardian, Jan 30 – Feb 5 2004). ChildLine KwaZulu Natal claimed that only two of the 58 cases of sexual abuse at schools by teachers against learners, which had been reported to the organisation in that province, had been investigated (Mail and Guardian, Jan 30 – Feb 5 2004). The South African Human Rights Commission found that in Gauteng "teachers and principals were reported not to want to get involved with sexual abuse cases and ignore incidents reported to them or simply refer the abused child to the police station without reporting the matter themselves" (2002: 98).

The South African Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (2003) conducted in 2002 surveyed learners in the national public education system in Grades 8, 9, 10 and 11 in all nine provinces. 10 699 learners were interviewed and the results show that learners experience very high levels of

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<sup>53</sup> The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children; Women against Child Abuse; Kwa-Zulu Natal ChildLine; United Sanctuary Against Abuse and Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN).

violence, sexual assault and depression<sup>54</sup> (Medical Research Council, 2003). Many of the respondents noted that violence-related behaviour occurred on school property, with 13.2 of male learners and 6.3 of female learners admitting to carrying a weapon to school (Medical Research Council, 2003). Table 20 below shows that significantly more boys than girls were involved in violence at schools, but that there was no gender disparity for learners feeling unsafe travelling to school and feeling unsafe at school (Medical Research Council, 2003). Incidents of violence and violence-related behaviour at schools are excellent indicators of the levels of violence at public education stations for learners. The impact of these violence levels on the school community is tangible, with almost a third of all learners reporting that they felt unsafe while at school (Medical Research Council, 2003). Interestingly, violence perpetrated on school property was consistent with patterns of violent behaviour outside of school with respect to gender, age and grade (Medical Research Council, 2003). This implies that schools are not viewed as spaces of safety, or spaces imbued with particular state and governance issues that prohibit the use of violence. The implications of this for the establishment and nurturing of good social cohesion (as opposed to gang membership etc) are far reaching.

Gender/ Race	Carried any weapon at school	Was threatened/injured by someone with a weapon at school	Threatened/injured someone else with a weapon at school	Engaged in a physical fight at school	Felt unsafe on way to and from school	Felt unsafe at school
Male	13	19.1	11.9	24	24	31.7
Female	6.3	11.6	7.1	15.5	21	31.7
Black	9.4	15.8	9.5	19.9	24.5	33.6
Coloured	10.4	13.3	10.3	19.4	16.8	29.2
White	5.6	6.6	3.9	13.7	5.7	9.2
Indian	12.8	13.1	18.6	25.2	24.9	25.3
Other	8.6	19.5	8.9	13.3	22.2	44.7
Total	9.2	14.9	9.2	19.3	22.3	31.7

*Table 20: Violent and threatening behaviour at school and perceptions of safety at and on the way to school, by gender and race*

Substance abuse on school property is another indicator of how learners perceive schools. The Department of Education prohibits the use, possession and distribution of illegal substances and alcohol on school property; nevertheless, 17.2 of learners have been offered, sold or given an illegal drug on school property; 6.1 had used dagga; and 9.1 had imbibed alcohol on school property (Medical Research Council, 2003).

<sup>54</sup> The depression data is not related specifically to behaviour at school. Almost 25% of the learners surveyed complied with the DSMIV definition for depression. This illness has a significant and long-term effect on learning and self-esteem, as well as friendship and kinship networks.

Gender/ Race / Age	Used alcohol on school property	Used dagga on school property	Was offered, sold or given illegal drugs on school property
Male	12.5	9.1	20.2
Female	6.4	3.8	14.8
Black	9.5	6.4	16.9
Coloured	8.6	5.8	22.8
White	5.2	2.8	13.6
Indian	8.7	10.1	16.7
Other	11.9	6.5	18.1
13 or under	8.1	2.5	15.9
14 years old	6	4	16.5
15 years old	6.7	3.5	15.9
16 years old	7.6	5.9	15.7
17 years old	9.9	6.9	18.3
18 years old	13.4	15.2	19.5
19 or over	12.4	7.4	19.9
Total	9.1	6.1	17.2

*Table 22: Use of alcohol and dagga and offers of drugs on school property by gender, race and age*

## **Conclusion**

All children between the ages of 7 and 15 are required by law to attend school, and the majority of the country's children have access to educational facilities. However, the situation for many children in South Africa is that schools are sites of danger as well as under resourced spaces. Most children spend between two and eight hours at school, making these institutions hugely significant in children's lives. A major window exists for children and the school community to foster and implement strategies for social cohesion. For example, the South African Human Rights Commission's (1999) report into racism at schools suggests that the development of policy that encourages anti-racist sentiment and behaviour at schools as a critical component of the development project for the entire country. The report acknowledges that schools are central nodes in communities and can be mobilised for the proliferation of social cohesion and nation-building.

## **SPORT**

The White Paper on Sport and Recreation in South Africa: Getting the nation to play (1998); noted that these activities contribute to the well being, welfare and cohesion of South Africans. One of the primary objectives set forth in the White Paper was to increase the participation of South Africans in sport and recreation in order to increase national health and scholastic performance, and decrease work absenteeism and delinquency. In addition, the Minister claimed that an increase in sport and recreational participation could contribute to nation-building and international relations, because “many role models in sport are among the top opinion makers in many countries”; successes in sport lead to decreases in racial prejudice; international recognition comes with sporting success; and that increasingly foreign policy is driven through sport and recreation (1998: 3).

As Dr Willie Basson, recently appointed as head of a newly formed government-approved national multi-sports body, explains “real sport...happens at the bottom of the triangle where kids play cricket under the streetlights of the townships” (Sunday Argus, September 12 2004:19). He also notes that sport and recreation are critical tools to hasten sociological change in South Africa.

Sedentary behaviour among South African teens increases the risk of isolation and low socialisation, ill health and low self esteem. The South African Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (2003) found that 37.5 of teens performed too little physical activity to promote health benefits, and 25.2 watched television for more than three hours per day. Sedentary lifestyle is an individual choice, as well as reflective of an environment that promotes inactivity, and can be closely linked to low levels of social cohesion. If a third of all South African youth are not participating in sports, work activity, exercise and/or recreation, the opportunities for social networking and the collection of social capital are diminished.

At the same time, the South African Human Rights Commission (1999) notes that school sports are seen by learners in high schools in South Africa to be both a unifying and divisive factor. Black learners at previously white schools feel marginalised by what are perceived as white sports – cricket, rugby and swimming – which for the most part do not form part of their day to day activities. Conflict is extended to audience participation, cheering and singing at sporting events. “Black learners often are perceived as over-exuberant, noisy and rude, while white learners are viewed as suspicious and too earnest” (South African Human Rights Commission, 1999: 52).

It is enormously difficult to quantify the number of people involved in non-professional sport and recreation in South Africa at any given time because of the diversity of recreational activities and differing levels of participation and organisation in sport. In addition, sporting activities tend to be extremely informal, ranging from the soccer game by neighbourhood friends after school on an open field to regular Thursday night squash games in a booked squash court. It is estimated that 10 of South Africans participate in competitive (professional and semi-professional) sport, which compares unfavourably with the international rates of 50 (Department of Sport and Recreation, 1998).

The spectatorship of sport is another factor that contributes to social cohesion as many people form social networks with regular face-to-face meetings in order to watch sport together. However, this is another variable that is almost impossible to quantify. The only data available is from the United School Sports Association of South Africa (USSASA) website which estimates that the spectator participant ratio at school sports events is 4:1


([www.ussasa.co.za/docs/USSASA20Policy.pdf](http://www.ussasa.co.za/docs/USSASA20Policy.pdf)), without giving any data on the actual numbers of participants and events.

The Department of Sports and Recreation has links on its website to provincial sports and recreation departments, international sporting bodies, sports partners, and 50 federations representing sports ranging from chess to aerobics and fitness to rugby ([www.srsa.gov.za](http://www.srsa.gov.za)); and notes that the local sports club is most often the basic unit of sport and the provision of recreation. The department notes that there are serious and pervasive inequities within this sector, including the lack of facilities especially in rural and impoverished areas, and the need for special emphasis on the following interest groups – women and girls; senior citizens; people with disabilities; and worker sports. The South African Human Rights Commission's (2003) count states that there are 17 762 schools that lack access to recreational and sporting facilities. USSASA, a national multi-code schools sports body, estimates that 300 000 teachers are involved in sports at schools via employment contracts, and that about 12 million learners are involved in USSASA programmes ([www.ussasa.co.za/docs/USSASA20Policy.pdf](http://www.ussasa.co.za/docs/USSASA20Policy.pdf)). As noted earlier, Census 2001 claims that 12 million children are enrolled in schools throughout the country, making USSASA's estimate of the number of learners involved in their programmes questionable.


CASE's (2000) study of youth in South Africa found that double the amount of white youth (30) compared with black youth (15) belonged to sports organisations and/or associations in 2000; with no difference in regional membership - both urban and non-urban youth reported a membership rate of 16. Small and consistent percentages of youth responded that sports organisations have assisted in improving the communities in which they reside, with a response of between 3 and 4 across all categories.

HSRC's ePop survey echoes CASE's findings in that significantly more white people (21.9) belong to and actively participate in sports groups, hobby or leisure clubs more than twice in a year, than black (9), coloured (9.8) or Indian (10) people. The findings confirm the Department of Sport and Recreation's (1998) concerns around women's and girls' participation in sports and calls into question the assumption that lack of facilities necessarily translates into lower participation as the regional differences between urban and rural areas is negligible.

**Participation in a sport, hobby or leisure club over 12 months by gender**



*Figure 27: Participation in a sport, hobby or leisure club over 12 months by gender*  
**Rural participation in a sports, hobby or leisure club over 12 months**



**Urban participation in a sports, hobby or leisure club over 12 months**




Figure 28: Rural and urban participation in a sports, hobby or leisure club over 12 months

Physical activity for children not only contributes to the physical and psycho-social development of the child, but sport and recreation are also forms of play that occupy differing and fluctuating levels of organisation. There is a dearth of comprehensive reports on sport and recreation for children, with “the South African Youth Risk Behaviour Survey [being] the first nationally representative study about the prevalence of physical activity among high school learners in South Africa” (Medical Research Council, 2003: 63).

The First South African Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (2003) did not measure participation in sports directly, but has published some very useful information with regards to secondary school learners and physical activity. Less than half (44.6) of all learners surveyed had participated in sufficient vigorous physical activity<sup>55</sup> and only one third (33.5) of all learners surveyed had participated in sufficient moderate physical activity (Medical Research Council, 2003). Over half (54.3) of all learners had physical education classes schedules on their school timetables, and 52.8 of those learners were actively engaged in vigorous physical activity on school premises during school hours; while 29 of learners had absolutely no physical education classes scheduled. Of the learners who did not participate in sport, work, exercise or recreation at school, 25.9 chose not to; 19.1 were ill; and 32.3 weren’t sure why. The remaining learners were prohibited from participating in physical activity either because they were afraid or felt unsafe to go to the school grounds or gym (7), or could not enjoy the benefits of recreation because of a lack of facilities and equipment at the school (15.7). Schools are noteworthy catchment areas for children and youth and potentially provide a great deal of social cohesion. Listed below are tables detailing the information presented above:

Gender/ Race	Participated in sufficient vigorous activity	Participated in sufficient moderate physical activity	Participated in insufficient or no physical activity	Physical education classes on timetable	No physical education classes on timetable
Male	57.1	32.6	34.4	57.9	26.5
Female	34.7	34.2	43	51.4	30.9

<sup>55</sup> Physical activity is defined as “all movements in everyday life, including work, recreation, exercise and sporting activities” (Medical Research Council, 2003: 62).

Black	44.3	33.5	37.5	56.7	26
Coloured	38.8	43.1	45.6	51.7	32.6
White	56.7	27.7	29.4	37.6	55.5
Indian	51.9	33	33	38.1	44
Other	30.4	31.4	54.8	55.7	22.6
Total	44.6	33.5	37.5	54.3	29

*Table 23: Participation in physical activity and education classes, by gender and race*

Gender/ Race / Age	Did not want to take part in physical activity	Was ill	Felt unsafe	No access to equipment
Male	23.9	21.2	8.8	15.4
Female	27.1	17.8	6	15.8
Black	25.1	18.9	7.4	17
Coloured	35.5	18.5	7.3	7.5
White	26.8	23.4	1.6	5.6
Indian	39.2	11.7	7.7	6.1
Other	13.9	38.3	6.8	4.4
13 or under	27.2	20.3	6.1	8.8
14 years old	27.7	17.7	5.9	9.7
15 years old	23.3	19.3	6.8	17.9
16 years old	25.4	19.2	7	16.2
17 years old	28.4	18.3	7.7	15.9
18 years old	25.3	17.9	6.5	21.4
19 or over	22.8	23.4	10.7	20.6
Total	25.9	19.1	7	15.7

*Table 24: Reasons for not participating in physical activity at school, by gender, race and age*

As noted, it is very difficult to measure informal sports groups and spectatorships, but these do contribute significantly to social cohesion. Information on sports clubs is scattered, and an audit of sports clubs nationally could be useful in assessing the extant of participation in these clubs; the numbers of these sports organisations; and the extent to which sport and recreation contribute to or detract from social cohesion.

## COMMUNITY POLICING

Policing before the transition in South Africa was rules-based and “became associated with abuses of human rights” (Mistry, 1997: 40). On 14 September 1991 the National Peace Accord was signed, which included provisions for policing that was non-partisan and non-discriminatory and “preserves the fundamental and constitutional rights of each individual” (Cawthra, 1993: 184). The principles of transparency, accountability, integrity, impartiality and effective service that were outlined in the accord informed all future models of community policing. This new style of policing envisaged greater consultation with and participation by communities for a more transparent and accountable police force, with an aim prevent crime more effectively. The necessary liaison with communities was to occur through community police forums (CPFs).

Community policing was formally referred to in the Interim Constitution (Act no 200 of 1993) and Section 221(1) called for the establishment of community police forums. In April 1997 the Department of Safety and Security published its formal policy on community policing: The Community Policing Framework and Guidelines.

The South African Police Service (SAPS) Manual on Community Policing (Policy, Framework and Guidelines) outlines the five core elements of community policing as:

1. Service orientation and responsive professional policing service;
2. Partnership in cooperative problem-solving;
3. Innovative problem-solving based on identifying and treating causes of crime and conflict;
4. Empowerment through the creation of joint responsibility and capacity for addressing crime;
5. Creating a culture of accountability for addressing needs and concerns of communities.

Community policing involves unique strategies that are tailor-made for each community in consultation with them, through the CPFs. The functions of the CPFs were to promote local accountability of the police service to communities and cooperation of communities with the service; to monitor effectiveness and efficiency of the service; to advise service regarding local policing priorities; and to evaluate the provision of visible police services.

“The logic of community policing assumes the availability of inherent community resources – social capital – that may be tapped and enhanced to produce social order...The key issue is that of reciprocity, the ability of people sharing a residential area to engage with, receive and contribute to the generation of social capital...the key assumption here is that the reciprocal relationships that build the social capital to be contributed by a ‘community’ are generically crime preventive” (Pelser, 1999: 4).

Community policing is based on the engagement of the community so that they share responsibility for dealing with crime, and safety and security. The SAPS manual acknowledges that participation in CPFs and boards is a voluntary community service, but is compulsory for SAPS staff and that police officials are responsible for motivating and encouraging community involvement. It is suggested that police lobby communities of interest in the station area by targeting specific members of the community who have a stake in crime prevention – for example, those who have been victims of crime or community leaders – and an open invitation is also extended to all people living in the area to become involved. Mistry (1996) found that apathy from the community to get involved was a very real problem in stations in Gauteng.

In order for CPFs to be effective, they should be broadly representative of all groups in the community. Important issues regarding representation to note are that CPFs are not political platforms, and criminals should not be included, but police reservists can be included.

In Mistry's examination of the state of CPFs in Gauteng in 1996 and the problems they experienced, she found that representation of all groups on CPFs was a particular issue. In some cases, subforums had been established to ensure participation from all groups<sup>56</sup>, so that all members of the community had a space where they could express their priorities and concerns and become active participants.

Research by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE, 1998, in Pelser, 1999: 4) showed participation in crime-prevention by township communities, and research conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (Segal, Pelo and Rampa, 1999, in Pelser, 1999: 5) shows that crime is a form of initiation into manhood for youth. "These research findings problematise the assumption that the social capital generated through reciprocal intra-community relationships will necessarily be positive and crime preventive" (Pelser, 1999: 5).

In the first CPF established in Mannenberg, Cape Town, there were many power struggles between the community and the police in terms of who chaired CPF meetings, who set the agenda, who took the minutes, where the meeting was held, how police staff were appointed, who could be represented in the forum, what community representivity meant, what the community level of participation in police management meetings should constitute, and what the roles and duties of community visitors at stations should be (Scharf, 2000: 8). Between 1995 and 1997, problems that undermined the success of community policing were reported through the Western Cape Community Policing Project. For example, "police abuse of power...change of station commissioner...perception by the police that the CPF was being dominated by a political party not favoured by the police...where the chairperson of the CPF became the conduit and active pursuer of complaints against the police...[when] the brother of a powerful gang boss became the chairperson of the CPF" (Scharf, 2000: 13).

In Gauteng, CPF members had various common concerns and issues regarding power balances. Firstly, there was a big difference between black and white CPFs. Because of the police activities of the apartheid era, there was a tense relationship between black people and the police. CPFs had provided real empowerment in these communities and they undertook a strong monitoring and guidance role. Because many white people already trusted the police, they were not holding police accountable for their actions and were not insisting on transparency. Secondly, debates and developments that were taking place in local government were having an effect on the functioning of the CPFs at a local level. Thirdly, CPF members (particularly in predominantly black communities), felt that they were at risk from certain members in the community because they were seen as *impimpis*<sup>57</sup>.

Altbeker and Rauch (1998) found that "black communities [were] typically more concerned with ameliorating socio-economic causes of crime and white communities [were] more concerned with keeping crime and criminals out of their areas...[with] the consequence that the development of community-centred crime prevention programmes involving the police are much

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<sup>56</sup> Some examples of groups where these subforums have been necessary include women's groups, those who belong to a different political party to the majority of the community, youth groups, domestic workers in still predominantly white areas, charge office police personnel.

<sup>57</sup> A term that was used to refer to informers to the security police during apartheid and the liberation struggle in South Africa. The community members referred to in this instance felt that a solution to the risk was to be remunerated for their service on the CPF, even though it is clearly defined as a voluntary activity.

more developed in rich areas than in poor, black areas” (in Pelser, 1999: 9). This finding supports earlier research findings in CASE’s Evaluation of the Gauteng Community Policing Project in 1995 (in Pelser, 1999, p 9) and in Shaw and Louw’s research in 1997 (in Pelser, 1999: 9).

An audit of CPFs in Gauteng carried out by the Office of the MEC for Safety and Security in 1996 found 134 functional forums and 11 functional subforums. In a telephone interview with Superintendent Thabeni of the national SAPS office (14 September, 2004), we found that there is no centralised statistical monitoring of the numbers of community members who attend CPF meetings. On a provincial level, records are not uniformly kept either. If there are any records, they only measure the number of formal executive members and do not track the differing number of community members at meetings or events. Any such numbers were not readily available and no information on CPFs was reported in the SAPS 2002/2003 annual report.

A study conducted by Mbithi wa Kivulu (2002) found that anti-crime organisations had a lower membership level than other community organisation, and had decreased by 38 from 1998 to 2001. The 18-24 year old group was the least active in these organisations, and people over the age of 35 were the most active. Although these statistics do not directly link to community policing, it does indicate the levels of community participation in the reduction of crime. The graph below shows sympathisers and active members of anti-crime organisations by province (HSRC ePop Survey, unpublished):




Figure 29: Sympathisers and active members of anti-crime organisations by province

Findings from analysing CPF meetings, agendas and minutes in the CASE Evaluation of the Western Cape community policing pilot project (1998) support the fact that very few CPFs are

actively involved in crime prevention, but have rather become “Community Safety Forums”. 60 of these forums were not engaged in identifying, prioritising or solving problem. Growing pressure on the police to “get tough on crime from 1997 onwards” (Scharf, 2000: 13), combined with the implementation problems of community policing, reverted the community’s role to being eyes and ears for the police and not to being equal partners.

Pelser (1999) examined a pilot feasibility study, by the National Secretariate for Safety and Security, which comprehensively reviewed the development of community policing in South Africa. Findings indicated that although CPFs and community policing experiences differed considerably across the country, there was a specific set of challenges, including lack of basic resources, problems developing trust<sup>58</sup>, lack of formal training for police staff in community policing, unequal distribution in resources (wealthy areas tended to provide more financial support, whilst poorer ones provided more time). Successful community policing depended on how these challenges were addressed. It was found that only 6 of localities studied, all privileged, had achieved full partnership status – that is active involvement and cooperative synergy by all or most relevant local roleplayers to prevent crime.

In 1997, a slightly new approach was undertaken, called partnership policing. This concept is based on the idea of “independent agents working together in partnership with formal structures. This form of policing conforms to the ideal of a ‘multi-agency’ approach whereby the police, the public, elected officials, government and other agencies work in partnership to address crime and community safety” (Oppler, 1997: 1). Yet again, police are relieved of sole responsibility to prevent crime, punish offenders and protect property and life, and states that these are direct responsibilities of ordinary citizens. However, the police are responsible for bringing together disparate groups to focus on these issues.

Oppler (1997) cites examples of successful partnerships in South Africa as illustrated in interviews that were held with police officials. A youth subforum was established in Orlando, Soweto to address the high youth crime rates and a domestic worker subforum was established in Gallo Manor, Johannesburg, to counter the problems of burglaries with the police. A business watch was set up in the middle of Johannesburg to encourage the reporting of and action against crime in the central business district. McKinsey, a consulting firm, worked with the most needy stations to develop strategic plans to overcome the specific problems experienced at the stations through an initiative called ‘Project Lifeline’.

The ‘Adopt-a-station’ project was based on local businesses adopting local stations and assisting with providing business expertise, resources etc. The project had not been implemented at the time of the paper and no further literature was found on the project. Lastly, many CPFs had started setting up Section 21 companies to facilitate donations. However, Pelsler (1999: 7) argues that, despite these programmes and others, “community policing is seen as synonymous with the functions of the CPFs...[which indicates] that there has been little, if any, understanding of the policy as an operational methodology impacting on all functions of the organisation”.

Another partnership programme – Partners in Policing: Crime Reduction Programme (PiP2) – was implemented in the Eastern Cape from June 2000 to December 2001 to enhance CPFs. An

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<sup>58</sup> Over 50% of communities had problems when it came to trusting the police. This was due to the historical relationship between the community and the police, the prevailing perceptions about the integrity of the police, public understanding of the role of the police in the broader justice system and the police’s attitude to change. Development of trust was a challenge across rural and urban areas, and in both predominantly black and predominantly white areas.

evaluation of the programme by the Institute of Security Studies found that the programme was limited because of design, management and implementation flaws, which led to misplaced assumptions on the purposes of the programme and a lack of impact (Pelser and Masuku, 2002: 136).

The first concept document on sector policing was developed in 1998 and The Final Draft of the South African Police Service (SAPS) National Instruction on Sector Policing was released in 2003 (Dixon and Ruch, 2004). The 2003 South African Police Service (SAPS) annual report describes sector policing as “an approach to policing whereby the service area of a police station is divided into smaller, manageable areas, known as sectors. Cooperation between sector commanders and their communities through consultation and joint projects will lead to healthy police-community relations, greater police visibility and enhanced crime prevention.” The process was continuing during 2003, supported by the increase of personnel 31 March 2006, and is described as a “practical manifestation” of community policing (Dixon and Rauch, 2004: 4). Sector policing relies more heavily on Police Reservists – community members who voluntarily assist the police – and calls for the implementation of ‘Sector Crime Forums’ (SCFs) which can link to the CPFs.

Province	Total no of stations	People per police officer	Total no of stations that have started implementing	Total no of sectors	Total no of sectors where sector policing is fully implemented	of stations where sector policing has been implemented
Eastern Cape	201	539:1	109	892	71	0.08
Free State	107	360:1	105	1048	234	22.33
Gauteng	123	352:1	114	680	138	20.29
Kwa-Zulu Natal	182	538:1	122	793	58	0.07
Limpopo	90	746:1	70	420	85	20.24
Mpumalanga	91	613:1	76	653	86	13.17
Northern Cape	83	326:1	75	495	72	14.55
North West	92	486:1	89	331	165	49.85
Western Cape	141	413:1	67	444	34	0.08
Total	1110		828	5756	943	16.40

Table 25: Total number of sectors at all stations per province in relation to the total number of sectors where sector policing has been fully implemented (2002-3)<sup>59</sup>

A successful example of a community policing programme that is structured on the sector and partnership policing models<sup>60</sup> was demonstrated in Pietermaritzburg, where crime rates decreased by 16 due to the proactive Safer Streets project (Impumelelo Innovations and Winners, 2002). ‘Priority crimes’ (eg murder, armed robbery, rape etc) dropped by 40 and ‘more preventable crimes’ (eg vagrancy, petty theft, prostitution, drunkenness) dropped by 40. The success of this project has been attributed to the innovative approach of dividing the district into areas that are overseen by sector managers and the formation of citizen watch groups in each domain. Other successful measures have included TV cameras in the CBD (sponsored by Business Against Crime) and car-guards, as well as a bicycle squad that is concerned with protecting the elderly, women and children and special task teams that are focused on curbing

<sup>59</sup> This data was collated from the SAPS 2002/3 annual report.

<sup>60</sup> The project is a partnership between the Central Policing District of Pietermaritzburg, the Central Community Policing Forum, the department of welfare, local municipalities, NGOs dealing with social issues and the local Chamber of Commerce.

specific criminal activities. The main success of the Safer Streets Project has been the team approach and active involvement of the community.

The Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nkunkula, acknowledged in an interview on the Tim Modise Show on Cape Talk Radio (21 September 2004, 9h20) that within civil society, communities are working more closely with the police and have contributed to the recent and long-term drop in crime rate. It is generally accepted that the murder rate is a good indicator of serious crime trends on the whole as almost all murders are reported to the police. Between the years 1994/1995 to 2003/2004, the total murder rate across all nine provinces of South Africa decreased by more than a quarter – 25.9 (South African Police Services, 2004, [www.saps.gov.za](http://www.saps.gov.za)). The Minister added that further reasons for the drop in crime rate over seven crime categories included the fact that police are better trained and more enthusiastic; and that within sector policing, the Metro Police are closer to the people as the first port of call for crime reporting.

There is, however, debate that crime statistics are not a valid way to measure the success or failure of community policing. It was found in 1997 that there had been an increase in particular communities in reported cases of certain crimes, like child abuse, sexual abuse and domestic violence. However, rather than assuming failure of community policing, it is likely that this is indicative of a success in community policing as communities had greater trust in the police to investigate and solve these crimes and were thus reporting them (Oppler, 1997).

Scharf (2000) poses the following research questions that should be investigated if any form of community policing is to be successfully re-implemented:

- How can poor communities be active and sustained partners if participation is voluntary and if training and support is minimal and funds have to be raised by the communities themselves.
- How can communities tackle crimes within the community where the perpetrators have the power in the community (eg domestic violence or sexual assault crimes, often perpetrated by those known to the victim, are often treated as 'not real crimes' by the patriarchal police officers)?
- How can vigilantism be more beneficial and productive?

Apart from CPFs, communities are involved in crime prevention through vigilantism, even though this is a criminal activity in itself. As Scharf (2000) notes, vigilantism can be channelled through legal structures to work for positive social cohesion through community participation.

To accurately measure the level of community participation in crime prevention, a focused attempt should be made to log numbers of executives and board members on each CPF and SCF, as well as the numbers of community members that arrive at each meeting. In addition, crime statistics should be kept for each sector so that these can be measured against the level of participation to try and assess the impact. This data will allow for a later evaluation of sector policing.

## CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to present relevant findings on the number, membership of and level of participation in organisations and associations that constitute community life in South Africa. A consistent theme that has emerged from all sections – the non-profit sector; philanthropy; civic associations, community organisations and social networks religion; sports; schools; and community policing – is the need for further research.

A definition is required in the NPO sector in terms of identity and classification of categories in which organisations work, which is satisfactory for NPOs, donors and government and which is used in future studies so that data can be compared. A broader study into corporate social investment, that samples more than the top 100 companies and includes small and medium businesses, also requires research and would possibly provide a more accurate reflection of the situation in South Africa. More work on civic associations, community organisations and social networks is needed to fully comprehend the role that these types of associations play in promoting democracy and nation building.

A survey of all formal and informal religious organisations in South Africa could contribute to understanding the effects of faith on social conscience and to what extent it builds or diminishes social cohesion. Similarly, the impact of schools on communities has not been adequately explored, mostly because of a narrow definition of schools in the literature, which counts teachers and learners, but does not take into account parental involvement in school activities and on governing boards, community support for schools and vice versa. Professional sport receives a substantial amount of publicity in South Africa, yet while government acknowledges the importance of non-professional and informal sport and recreation to the social cohesion of the nation, very little reliable data on this subject is available. No national audit of non-professional and informal sports and recreational associations and organisations exist. In order to measure community participation in crime prevention, numbers must be kept of CPF and SCF board members and community members that attend meetings, as well as crime statistics for each sector.

From the above findings it is clear that communities *are* mobilising themselves, and that organisation and associational membership and participation fluctuates according to the socio-economic and political environment. However, it is very difficult to measure this and no longitudinal studies exist to assess the changes that have occurred and why.

The state and governance

Constitution, Policies, Legislation,

The following are taken as the institutions, legislation and policy that are relevant to this study.

### 2.1 Constitution

### 2.2 Policies/strategies

### 2.3 Legislation

### 2.4 Institutions

### 2.5 Departments

### 2.6 Local government

The fourth area, governance, is one in which the participation of people in various aspects of the polity needs to be assessed. The constitution sets out clearly fundamental rights, co-operative governance and a series of instruments to promote social and political justice. Given this, it is instructive to consider who has access to these rights and who votes? Who doesn't and why? Who participates in social dialogue, in lobbying, campaigning and in networking with those in positions of power in the state? What do citizenship, sovereignty and national identity contribute to social cohesion? The issue of satisfaction with government, trends in voting etc. assists to some get a sense of broader issues of inclusion, trust and whether people feel that social justice is at least a possibility. Equally important is the need to get a clear picture of the policies and programmes of government that seek to promote social cohesion and to assess their efficacy.

The state and governance

5.4.1 Voting-who votes and who doesn't and why?

5.4.2 Participation e.g. ward committees, social dialogue institutions, civil society in political processes, political action; lobbying, demonstrating-who does, who doesn't, and why?

5.4.3 Membership of political organizations and membership of a trade union

5.4.4 Number of strike days? Over what-pay, discrimination, political issues?

5.4.5 How many agreements have been reached in social dialogue forums and processes (Nedlac, Presidents Working Groups, Milenium Labour Council, Provincial Development Forums, Local Economic Development Forums) and what is the nature of these?

What is the impact of these factors in terms of social cohesion, social capital and social justice?

This report reviews selected issues of governance in South Africa during the period 1994- 2004. In particular it highlights trends and issues regarding social cohesion and democracy particularly in the spheres of voting participation and political action with reference to variables such as race, gender, age, class and urban/rural areas. The report reviews the data from surveys, and reports from a number of constitutional institutions and academic, private sector and non-government-organizations. Its tentative findings are that governance in South Africa has undergone a paradigm shift since 1994. These changes are particularly pronounced in the political arena. The country is governed by a constitution and has hosted several successful multiparty democratic elections. Constitutional institutions charged with the task of protecting our democracy have been established and the level of institutional transparency has increased. However, despite the Government's efforts, the impact of its policies in the socio economic arena to reduce poverty remains limited. As the government itself recognizes, there is clearly a need to accelerate implementation and service delivery in ways that impact significantly on poverty reduction or run the risk of undermining political legitimacy.

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As a contribution to a larger project –civil societies review of ten years of democracy in South Africa– coordinated by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) this report reviews selected issues of governance in South Africa during the period 1994- 2004. It highlights trends and issues regarding social cohesion<sup>61</sup> and democracy in the spheres of voting participation and political action with reference to variables such as race, gender, age, class and urban/rural areas.

The report reviews data from a number of surveys and reports from various constitutional institutions, academic, private sector and non-government-organizations. The information is organized into four sections. The **first section** deals with governance, representative democracy and political legitimacy. The focus is on the constitution and voting participation in democratic elections. The **second section** discusses governance, state efficacy and participatory democracy. The focus is on the transformation of the public service and its capacity to provide quality service consistent with the '*Batho Pele*' principles. The **third section** discusses local government and community participation. The **fourth section** provides a short analysis of NEDLAC and social dialogue.

Caution is required when interpreting data because of the different methodologies employed in surveys and across data sets. The surveys drawn on this report were conducted by different organizations, for example academic institutions such as the HSRC (2002), non-government not for profit institutions such as IDASA (Afrobarometer)<sup>62</sup> and the Institute for Reconciliation and Social Justice (South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey), private sector marketing organization such as Markinor; and government institutions such as the Public Service Commission (Citizen Satisfaction Survey 2003). The different methodologies used obviously impacts on the extent to which the data is comparable and generalizations can be made.<sup>63</sup>

Even within the same organization surveys are conducted at different times by different people employing different methodologies. These methodologies are also in the process of being developed in order to improve the quality of the data.<sup>64</sup> In addition they also focus and measure different things. For example the SARBS (2004) focuses mainly (although not exclusively) on reconciliation, and the Citizen Satisfaction Survey focuses on only four government departments.

In some instances organizations supplement survey data with other sources of information. For example, IDASA uses expert discussion groups and the PSC uses Peoples Forums. In addition organizations also used desktop and literature research to corroborate information and strengthen analysis. While many of the organizations try to ensure representative population samples, difficulties persist. For example, IDASA (30 March 2004: 27) notes that the final

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<sup>61</sup> The HSRC defines 'Social cohesion' -as the extent to which a society is coherent, united and functional providing an environment within which its citizens can flourish.'

<sup>62</sup> The survey focused on the opinions of the South African Citizens about the overall direction of their new democracy. Surveys were conducted in 600 randomly selected sites across the country to interview a random stratified nationally representative sample of 2400 South Africans between 13 September and 13 October 2002.

<sup>63</sup> See (IDASA 30 March 2004: 15) for further discussion on some of the differences in methodological approaches between questions asked in IDASA and Markinor surveys.

<sup>64</sup> See PSC Citizen Satisfaction Survey (2003) because of small sample size adopted limit scale of 1-10 and reflect extremes and not variations of happiness or unhappiness. However the next round of methodologies employed would concentrate on including the variation rating.

sample still reflected a strong urban, male and civil society sector bias and the PSC acknowledges that its sample size was very small and restrictive.

Finally it should be noted that, while these survey polls capture the subjective opinions of the public, people's perceptions and opinions influence behavior and form part of the multi-faceted political landscape of South Africa's polity.

The discussion about governance in democratic South Africa since 1994 takes place against the background of a debate on the role of the State in which the current trend advocates bringing the State back in.<sup>65</sup> Governance refers to the state's technical or material capacity and capability<sup>66</sup> to provide services and regulate society as well as the manner in which those elected to govern balance the needs and interest of all sectors of society when they formulate policies, allocate resources and implement decisions.

The South African government's view is that the State is both an actor and leader. In '*Towards a ten year review*' government described its position as: follows:

*"...[t]he dual role of the State as an actor in providing services and helping to create an appropriate environment for development and as a leader in forging common cause among the variety of social actors."*

An interventionist and strong developmental role is envisaged for the South African government in order to shape society in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Act 108 of 1996. This entails strengthening the capacity of government departments to speed-up the implementation of their constitutional obligations of transforming society based on the principles of equity, non-racialism and non-sexism (see Box 1).

*Box 1: The South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey*

The South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey (2004: 8-9) argued that past injustices continue to skew advantages in present day and that a developmental paradigm of reconciliation requires that the South African government implement structural and systematic adjustments to address the legacy of apartheid. The SARBS (2004: 49) also noted that the extension of democratic franchise is not sufficient to counter the widespread exclusion, discrimination or unmediated conflict that retards reconciliation. Political reconciliation demands a more socio-economically just and equitable society, respect for law and trust in political institutions.

<sup>65</sup> Peter Evens, Dietrich Rueshemeyer and Theda Skocpol (1989) argue for a strong developmental state in "*Bringing the State back in.*" As a response to academics associated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Banks call for the withdrawal of the state in the 1970s, a minimalist state in the 1980s and an effective state in the 1990s. Today the dominant views is that the state is as an important actor influence by society but also shaping social political processes.

<sup>66</sup> The theme of states capacity and capability is extensively discussed in documents by the World Bank. See for example the World Development Report 1997 "*The State in a Changing World.*" An 'effective state' according to the WDR (1997: 1) is one which harnesses the energy of private business and individuals and acts as their partner as catalyst to development. In addition to ensuring the rule of law and the protection of private property, States need to ensure the provision of public goods which the private sector cannot deliver. In this way states would prevent their workload from exceeding their capability while at the same time building the capacity to implement plans to achieve their objectives. An important aspect of improving this capability is to reinvigorate public institutions and improve civil servants performance.

**Source:** The South African reconciliation Barometer Survey (2004, 8, 9 and 49)

Using Dommen's (1997: 490-491) terminology the model of governance South Africa follows is described as '*conciliarity governance*'.<sup>67</sup> This style of democratic governance strives to be inclusive by inviting wide participation both in the making of decisions and in the distribution of benefits. Conciliarity expresses solidarity with at least some of those who are at present excluded from the system. Indeed the cabinet describes its vision for South Africa and its style of governance as working toward the "*Shosholozza scenario*" which assumes an accommodating world and an inclusive South African society where people are united and prosperous.<sup>68</sup>

The report by civil society organizations on governance in South Africa (1994-2004) must take into account that the South African government has already undertaken a similar exercise as part of its "*Towards ten years of freedom –Review.*" This review is a self-initiated evaluation that identifies the strengths and weaknesses of government's performance and highlights plans to address these weaknesses. Civil society nevertheless needs to conduct its own independent evaluation of governance in South Africa and identify for itself what the strengths and weaknesses are. In this way the points of similarities and differences with government's own assessment becomes more meaningful and can be the basis for constructive social engagement and dialogue.

#### REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

According to the HSRC (2002: 7) the election results are proof that citizens are largely satisfied with the performance of the ruling party. Indeed the political participation and results of the April 2004 national elections is viewed as a huge vote of confidence by the electorate and the poor in particular in the Government and an endorsement of a 'social contract' between the electorate and ANC.<sup>69</sup> However the HSRC (2002: 7) observed that the results of various surveys conducted during the period (1995-2002) suggests otherwise.<sup>70</sup> Only 37 of the respondents were satisfied with the way the country is being run while 42.5 were unhappy with the state of governance at the national level. 40 of the respondents registered dissatisfaction with provincial government and the highest levels of unhappiness (50) were reserved for local government.

More recently though Surveys conducted by Markinor (2004) and IDASA (2004) suggests that people were becoming more optimistic about their future under the rule of the ANC government. The Markinor survey (2004) indicates that 42 of its respondents perceptions have change for the better and 16 feel we are worse off. In particular coloured people were more optimistic and expect a better life in 2005. 66 of the respondents felt that the economy was well managed, 57 perceived government as encouraging investors and 70 of the respondents indicated that government failed to create jobs.

<sup>67</sup> According to Dommen (1997: 485) governance takes on a variety of forms, each one has different strengths and weaknesses. A further issue is that of managing 'the tensions between social differentiation and common belonging.' Exclusion whittles away at cohesion by placing some members of society beyond its bounds.

<sup>68</sup> See communiqué issued by Government Communication and Information Service on behalf of the Presidency (20 December 2003).

<sup>69</sup> The government '*Towards ten year review*' document measured political participation by the proportion of eligible people voting in the two most recent local government elections. The use of the local government elections gets us away from the use of the founding elections of 1994 which had an abnormally high turnout. Political approval was measured by an approval rating of the political institutions derived from Afrobarometer.

<sup>70</sup> Although this refers to the HSRC survey it also applies to the results of surveys conducted by IDASA over a similar period.

The seemingly contradictory result of the elections and survey can be understood in two ways. One is the racial thesis, which argues that, despite its relatively poor performance in job creation and poverty reduction, the ANC is seen as an African party and the majority of the people vote according to their racial identity. This view is rejected by the HSRC (2002: 7). Their explanation is that people make a distinction between satisfaction and trust meaning that despite their dissatisfaction people still maintains a sense of faith in the institutions that represent them. The HRSC (2002: 4 and 10)<sup>71</sup> argues that citizens' political and electoral behaviour and decisions are much less determined by racial identities than analysts have led us to believe. They conclude that there is evidence that citizens are way ahead of political elites from both the ruling and opposition parties, who are far more occupied with and influenced by a racial mindset.

Nation wide election total 2004				
	National assembly		Provincial Legislators	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Registered electors	20,674,926		20,674,926	
of registered electors voting		76.73		75.05
Invalid (spoilt) votes		1.58		1.37
Valid Votes		98.42		98.63

Table 1: Results of nation-wide election 2004 (<http://electionresources.org/za/2004>)

Table 1 indicates that more than 75 of the citizens that registered voted – this indicates that participation is high. Less than 2 of the votes were declared spoilt and more than 98 were valid in both the national and provincial legislators. Usually the spoilt vote is seen as a disgruntled vote. However, at less than 2 this argument cannot be sustained. There are currently over 20 million registered voters and the turnout of registered voters in the 2004 elections was 77 compared with 88 in the 1999 election. At the same time there was a significant increase in the number of registered voters, from 18.2 million in 1999 to 20.7 million in 2004.<sup>72</sup>

### Eligible Voters

The IEC does not have official figure for eligible voters. However, Table 2 provides an estimate based on Stat SA 2001 census data for people aged 18 years and above. The 2001 census data does not indicate whether these were only South African citizens or whether they include foreign citizens. However, it might be safe to assume that the true figures are somewhat lower than those presented in Table 2. Based on these estimates, the proportion of the eligible electorate who voted would be in the region of 60.

<b>National</b>	<b>27 436 819</b>
Eastern Cape	3 559 309
Free State	1 692 978
Gauteng	6 325 393

<sup>71</sup> There is a debate about whether political and electoral behaviour is determined by racial identities which is the main thesis among old mainstream political science circles. Another view is that there is evidence that demonstrates a relationship between living standard measures and identity and that most citizens had a national as opposed to a racial identity.

<sup>72</sup> Four million people voted for the first time in 2004. Young people (aged between 18 and 35) constituted 44.4% of the registered voters. Voter turn out can be viewed in two ways one is as a proportion of the total population or the alternative as a proportion of registered voters. It is not possible to know with any degree of certainty how many people identified themselves as being of voting age in the Census are in fact South African citizens who are eligible to vote.

Kwazulu-Natal	5 467 448
Limpopo	2 756 231
Mpumalanga	1 805 135
Northern Cape	519481
North West	2 286 637
Western Cape	3 024 207

Table 2: Estimate of Eligible Electorate by Province, 2004 (Census, 2001)

### Distribution across national and provincial legislatures

Party	National Assembly			Provincial Legislators		
	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats
ACDP	250.272	1.60	6	242.924	1.59	8
ANC	10. 878.251	69.68	279	10.591.064	69.21	304
DA	1.931.201	12.37	50	1.846.540	12.07	51
ID	269.765	1.73	7	245.277	1.60	6
IFP	1.088.664	6.97	28	1.119.530	7.32	32
NNP	257.824	1.65	7	275.185	1.80	7
UDM	355.717	2.28	9	349.504	2.28	10

Table 3: Comparing votes for National Assembly and Provincial Legislators April 2004 (<http://electionresources.org/za/2004>)

	Total Registered Voters	Number of Votes	Poll
National	20 674 926	15 863 558	76.73
Eastern Cape	2 849 486	2 259 903	79.31
Free State	1 321 195	1 027 401	77.76
Gauteng	4 650 594	3 452 225	74.23
Kwazulu-Natal	3 819 864	2 782 565	72.84
Mpumalanga	1 442 472	1 129 484	78.30
Northern Cape	433 591	323 894	74.70
Limpopo	2 187 912	1 636 461	74.80
North West	1 749 529	1 321 787	75.55
Western Cape	2 220 283	1 582 503	71.27

Table 4: Outcome of the 2004 elections (Independent Electoral Commission, 2004)

Table 3 indicates that the ANC received 69.68 in the National Assembly and 69.21 in the Provincial legislatures giving the ruling party more than a 2/3<sup>rd</sup> majority. This was an improvement from 62.65 in 1994 and 66.35 in 1999 in the National Parliament and from 62.29 in 1994 and 65.85 in 1999 in the Provincial Legislatures. This is interpreted as an overwhelming vote of confidence in the party. The largest increase in the absolute number of votes cast for the ANC was in the Eastern Cape, followed by KwaZulu Natal, where ANC votes grew by 11.5. The number of ANC voters also increased in the Western Cape and Northern Cape.

Table 3 also indicates the distribution of votes per party across the national and provincial assembly in the 2004 national elections. The party with the second largest amount of votes was the DA with 12.37. The number of votes cast for opposition parties declined from 1994 and 1999. The Gap between the ANC majority and the party with the second largest number of votes (the DA) is large and increasing, indicating that there is no viable parliamentary opposition in

South Africa. The ANC is extending its political legitimacy, indicating a trend at the national level towards greater political integration.

The ANC is the largest party among Coloured and Indian South Africans, indicating that the ANC is living up to its claim of embracing non-racial inclusivity. There was a large swing towards the ANC in a number of Indian areas. For the ANC vote in Lenasia increased from 40 in 1999 to 55 in 2004. Similar trends were reported in Laudium, Phoenix and Chatsworth. In addition the fourteen by-elections held on 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004 confirm the consolidation of the ANC as the largest party among the rural and urban coloured people in the Northern Cape.

Table 5 indicates that in general females as compared to males make up a larger portion of the voters roll. The age groups of 26-35 years, 20-25 years and 40-49 years contribute the largest number of votes. Whilst this tells us something about the size of voting constituency that has to be mobilized, the data would need to be disaggregated in much greater detail to provide greater insights into voting patterns.

Age	1999 Elections			2004 Elections		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
16-17	8606	8820	17426	0	0	0
18-19	351063	348977	700040	314006	283184	597190
20-25	1553742	1462159	3015901	1535762	1385453	292215
26-35	2653638	2298253	4951891	2997762	2677671	5675440
36-39	906075	780858	168933	1034707	868834	1903541
40-49	1756741	1548616	3305357	2197401	1860107	4057508
50-59	1139756	940739	2080495	1433349	1192775	2626124
60-69	869839	526269	1396108	963037	649584	1612621
70-79	468825	274968	743793	606042	312150	918192
80 & over	187084	87723	274807	251955	111140	363095
Grand Total	9895369	8277382	18172751	11334028	9340898	20674926

Table 5: Comparison of Certified Voters Rolls for in the 1999 & 2004 Elections (Independent Electoral Commission)

Table 6 indicates the difference between the number of people that registered and those that voted during the 2000 municipal elections. The IEC (2000:62) further noted that the 2000 municipal elections in terms of voter turnout were on par with the 1995 municipal elections accounting for 48. This is much lower than the turnout for national elections. Although somewhat disappointing, the lower turn out in the municipal elections is consistent with international trends.

Provinces	Registered Voters	Ward	PR	Total voter turnout (%)
Eastern Cape	2 552 287	1 354 360	1 427 678	55.96
Free State	1 227 578	601 295	602 526	49.09
Gauteng	4 375 578	1 888 734	1 891 213	43.23
Kwazulu-Natal	3 508 154	1 623 504	1 635 207	46.67
Mpumalanga	1 419 315	625 486	635 371	44.77
Northern Cape	452 218	252 411	255 060	57.61
Northern Province	1 758 593	730 405	745 441	42.46
North West	1 263 004	559 560	565 760	44.79
Western Cape	1 955 454	1 116 512	1 124 478	57.87
Total	18 511 975	8 752 223	8 882 734	48.06

Table 6: Registered and actual voter turnout across provinces and wards, 2000 Municipal elections (Independent Electoral Commission, December 2000)

### Distribution across parties

According to the South Africa Local Government Research Centre (SALGRC), the opinion poll conducted by IDASA in late October 1999, predicted that the ANC would achieve 54 of the votes, while the DA could win between 16 and 17. The Markinor poll predicted that the ANC would achieve 59 support, the DA 17 and the IFP 6. The rest of the votes would be split between the smaller parties.

Table 7 provides details of the actual results of the 2000 municipal elections. This shows that the ANC, DA and IFP did better than predicted. Whilst the ANC won 60.69 of the votes, it secured overall control of 76 of the municipalities.

National Summary			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Support
DA	18	349	20.43
ANC	170	4200	60.69
UDM	1	33	3.60
IFP	36	684	9.78
Other			6.51
Total			100

Table 7: Leading Party Support in the 2000 Local Government Election (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

### Distribution across provinces

Tables 8-16 indicate the leading party with the most votes, municipalities and seats won compared to others in different provinces during the 2000 local elections. The ANC received the majority votes in municipalities in 6 of the 9 provinces, the exceptions being Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and the Western Cape.

Eastern Cape			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Support
DA	1	12	10.49
ANC	36	874	74.50
UDM	1	33	10.94
Other			4.07
Total			100

Table 8: Leading Party report per municipality/Eastern Cape (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

Free State			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support
ANC	20	417	72.11
Other			27.89
Total			100

Table 9: Leading Party report per municipality/Free State (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

Gauteng			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats Won	Percentage Support
DA	1	9	31.24
ANC	11	534	59.88
Other			8.87
Total			100

Table 10: Leading Party report per municipality/Gauteng (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

Kwazulu-Natal			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support
ANC	13	272	33.79
IFP	36	684	48.83
Other			3.63
Total			100

Table 11: Leading Party report per municipality/Kwazulu-Natal (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

Mpumalanga			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support
ANC	20	641	80.04
Other			19.96
Total			100

Table 12: Leading Party report per municipality/Mpumalanga (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

North West			
Party Name	No. of municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support
ANC	20	465	71.35
Other			28.65
Total			100

Table 13: Leading Party report per municipality/North West (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

Northern Cape			
Party Name	No. Of municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support
DA	3	16	29.32
ANC	23	203	64.59
Other			6.09
Total			100

Table 14: Leading Party report per municipality/Northern Cape (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

Northern Province			
Party Name	No. of municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support

ANC	23	701	80.45
Other			19.55
Total			100

Table 15: Leading Party report per municipality/Northern Province/Limpopo Table 16: Leading Party report per municipality/Northern Province/Limpopo

Western Cape			
Party Name	No. of Municipalities won	Total No. of Seats won	Percentage Support
DA	13	308	50.69
ANC	4	93	40.27
Other			9.05
Total			100

Table 17: Leading Party report per municipality/Western Cape (Independent Electoral Commission: 1 March 2001)

### Distribution across racial groups

Given that the ballot is secret, there are no official figures on voting patterns according to race or gender. However, estimates of the predicted voting patterns by race were made by SALGRC following its 2000 opinion poll, and also by IDASA in its 1999 November survey. The results are shown in Table 17.

The SALGRC estimates suggested that the DA would largely gain support from the Indian community, and that Africans in particular would vote for the ANC as the party of choice. Reynolds (1999: 37) argues that the ANC has projected itself as the sole legitimate representative of the largest African ethnic or racial group, and could count on almost automatic support from voters in that block as expression of communal solidarity. This implies that race would continue to be a major force in terms of party loyalty.

Party	African	White	Coloured	Indian	TOTAL
ANC	69 (72)	5 (2)	44 (35)	35 (27)	58 (58)
DA	2 (2)	58 (58)	29 (43)	19 (42)	12 (15)
IFP	9 (6)	0 (0)	0 (1)	2 (1)	7 (5)
Other	6 (7)	5 (22)	2 (4)	11 (13)	5 (8)
Unknown	14 (13)	32 (18)	25 (17)	33 (17)	18 (14)

Table 18: Projected () votes in the 2000 Municipal Elections, by race

**Source:** South African Local Government Research Centre (2000: 14)  
IDASA November 1999 survey data in brackets

The HSRC (2002: 8-9) makes a distinction between representative democracy and substantive democracy. The latter is dependent on the performance of government institutions as well as the efficient functioning of constitutional and societal institutions. Furthermore the HSRC argues that constitutional institutions charged with the responsibility to defend the interest of citizens - such as the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) - took long to be established and to function optimally. The HSRC

concludes that the vast majority of South African citizens are either unaware of or do not know how to utilize these institutions.<sup>73</sup>

In this section we address the question of whether the institutions of government are efficient, capable of implementing state plans and delivering on their constitutional obligations. Such institutions have an important role to play, *inter alia*, in ensuring citizen participation in South Africa's multiparty liberal democratic system, protection against discrimination and the violation of human rights, judicial fairness and safety, as well as the delivery of basic services and public social security provision.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996 is the basis of the liberal democratic political system in South Africa. It is generally seen by government, citizens and international observers as one of the more important achievement of the decade (SARBS 2004: 49).<sup>74</sup> The Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: iv) survey however indicates that only 60 feel that the constitution reflects the values and aspirations of all South Africans.<sup>75</sup>

The Constitution lays the basis for good governance and rule of law, outlines the basic obligations (including the Bill of Rights) of government to its citizens, and provides institutional guidance on how this is to be achieved. In particular, it outlines the three spheres of national, provincial and local government where each sphere is "distinctive," "interdependent" and "inter-related." This constitutional form places great emphasis on the concept of cooperative government that is distinctively South African. Co-operative government requires a paradigm shift in the values of governance, as well as the development of intergovernmental structures to enable municipalities and provinces to simultaneously relate to each other and to the national government in ways that promote the achievement of the key national goals of socio-economic development, poverty reduction and nation building.

The Constitution gives local government specific developmental objectives such as the primary responsibility for the delivery of basic service (eg water, electricity, sanitation, sewerage, and municipal infrastructure) in conjunction with the other spheres. The provinces are responsible for supporting and overseeing the effective delivery of services by municipalities at the local level. According to Powell (2001: 254) the system of intergovernmental relations in South Africa is highly integrated and is peculiar to countries with multi-sphere systems of governments. In practice the development of instruments for smooth interaction between these spheres has been less effective at the provincial and local levels than at national level (Powell 2001: 259).<sup>76</sup>

*Box 2: Governance and Administrative Cluster*

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<sup>73</sup> This is potentially an area for further research

<sup>74</sup> During the hearings for the constitution 596 organizations were consulted, 1.7 million submissions were received and just over 11,000 were substantive. Seven hundred and seventeen organizations and 20 549 people attended participatory public meetings.

<sup>75</sup> Suggesting that approximately a third are not happy with the constitution. These may well include right-wing supporters of the former apartheid regime, citizens who call for the death penalty, and those that reject the concept of South Africa as a secular State.

<sup>76</sup> Powell is an IGR practitioner and Chief Director for Intergovernmental relations in the national Department of Provincial and Local Government. He has advised on policy, integrated rural development and local government transformation as well as provided strategic and technical support to intergovernmental structures such as the President's Co-ordinating Council, the forum of South African Directors'- General and the Cabinet cluster on governance and administration.

The view from government is that policy and implementation are more integrated thanks to the governments cluster approach, whereby government departments together collaboratively in related clusters. One of these is the Governance and Administration Cluster which, amongst others, includes the Department of Public Service and Administration, the Department of provincial and Local Government, and the Presidency. This cluster focuses mainly although not exclusively on supporting the efficient and effective functioning of government and is primarily concerned with matters internal to government operations. These include strengthening integrated governance, improving the capacity of government, the transformation of local government, integrated service delivery, including promoting good governance and the implementation of the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy.

**Source:** <http://www.info.gov.za/issues/poa/govadmin.htm>

The cluster approach (see Box 2), the Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD), the Presidential Coordinating Council (PCC) and the restructured Cabinet Committees combined with the more recent Integrated Development Plans (IDP) programme is designed to improve better coordination of policy-making, programme implementation and coordination. The PCC brings together the President, the Minister for Provincial and Local Government and the nine provincial Premiers to discuss high-level cross-cutting policy matters. This is positive and necessary to drive a corporate (co-operative and collaborative) approach to achieve more coherent public policy and more effective service delivery in compliance with the constitution, as well as to ensure an environment enabling local economic development to take place. This approach is crucial for transforming South Africa's system of government from the inherited fragmented and divided system to a unified democratic system of government.

These institutions have coincided with the introduction of new legislation at the average rate of 90 Acts per annum in the first nine years. Since 1994 over 789 laws or Amendments Acts aimed at reconfiguring South African society were adopted. For government the emphasis has now shifted strongly from policy formulation towards a much greater focus on implementation. The SAHDR (2003: xviii and 56) also noted that the establishment of impressive political and institutional structures to respond to the above challenges implies recognition on the part of government of the significant problems of integration and coordination but until now government policies have not succeeded in significantly transforming the objective conditions of the poor.

A major task of the Government since 1994 has been the transformation of the Public Service from a fragmented to an integrated efficient service. The purpose is to replace the apartheid administration with a service orientated-public service representative of the South African population and capable of delivering quality services to all sections of the country's population. According to the Government this process is almost complete and the implementation of a competency framework and performance management system for the senior management service (SMS) is in the process of being implemented.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) and South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) are two of many constitutional structures that examine the public sector, give citizens a voice, and promote compliance with the "*Batho Pele*" principles laid down in the 1997 White paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery (see Box on page). According to the PSC Report (2004: 4) the public service has shrunk by around 15 since 1994.<sup>77</sup> Although the number of

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<sup>77</sup> The PSC is one of the institutions created by our Constitution it started work on 1999. The PSC produces an Annual State of the Public Sector Report that provides a comprehensive overview of public service performance. The PSC

public servants has steadily decreased from 1.2 million in 1994 to just over 1 million in 2001, there is evidence that the number of employees have again increased slightly in recent years. The South Africa Year Book (2003/04: 356) observed that during the period December 2001 to December 2002 there was an increase of 8 912 people raising the total number of employees to 1 040 506. Despite the decrease in the total number of employees during the period 1994-2002 in real terms total expenditure on wages and salaries has increased.<sup>78</sup>

With respect to representativeness, the public service has come close to meeting the targets set out by the Government in its 1995 White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, particularly with respect to race.<sup>79</sup> The South Africa Year Book (2003/04: 365) notes that as of 31 March 2003 Africans now make up 72.5, whites 14.7 coloured 8.9 and Asians 3.6 of the Public Service at all levels. With regard to gender 52.5 were female and 47.5 male. At the senior management level 56 were African, 25.6 were White, 10.1 were Coloured and 8.2 were Asian. The gender breakdown for senior management was 22.1 female and 77.9 male. In state-owned enterprises, the composition of the boards with regard to race was as follows: 63 African, 25 Asian, 9.9 Coloured and 24.7 White. In terms of gender 76.5 were male and 23.5 female. The breakdown at the senior management levels was as follows: 56.5 were White and 43.5 Black with a gender breakdown of 75 male and 25 female.

Notwithstanding the continuing skewed gender representation, Gouws (2004) and others have observed a significant increase in the representation and influence of women in all spheres of government. Women constitute 32.8 percent of the National Assembly. Of the ministers and deputy ministers appointed after the April national elections 41 percent are women, as are three of the nine premiers (up from just one before the election). South Africa has moved up from 141<sup>st</sup> position in the period before 1994 to 7<sup>th</sup> in the world with regard to the number of women in parliament. Nevertheless data from the South African Year Book (2003/04) and the SAHRC Reports (2002: 35) indicates that the number of women in senior positions in the public and private sectors needs to increase. So too does the number of people with disabilities in all forms of employment.<sup>80</sup>

With regard to the share of personnel in the Public Service, 62 work within the social services sector or cluster (health, social development and education), followed by 17.3 in the criminal and justice cluster, 13.6 in the governance and administration cluster and 7.1 in the defense and intelligence cluster. During the rationalization and restructuring of the Public Service some employees were redeployed to other departments, others were retrained through re-skilling programme and others were retrenched. The capacity of the public sector was enhanced by a

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also produces Citizen Satisfaction Surveys to promote and reflect on the views and perceptions of citizens in the process of service delivery (South African Year Book 2003/04: 364). The public service comprises those entities governed by the Public Service Act namely national and provincial departments. Local authorities, parastatals and public entities are governed by other legislation.

<sup>78</sup> While there is agreement about the increase the amounts quoted by different organizations vary for example the SAHDR (2003:16) note that in real terms, total expenditure on wages and salaries of government employees increased by an average of 0.8% per annum between 1995 and 2002. The PSC Report (2004) notes that given the decline of 4.5% in the number of general government employees during this period from 1.5 million to 1.4 million the average real wage bill per government employee increased by 2%.

<sup>79</sup> The White Paper proposed that within four years all departmental establishments must be at least 50 percent black at the middle and senior management levels. During the same period at least 30 per cent of new recruits to the middle and senior management echelons should be women. Within ten years, people with disabilities should comprise 2 per cent of public service personnel.

<sup>80</sup> There is little data on the employment of people with disabilities in the public as well as private sector, and therefore it is difficult to assess and monitor progress.

decision taken in August 2003 to employ Community Development Workers (CDW).<sup>81</sup> The Integrated Provincial Support Programme (IPSP) continues to support five provincial administrations in enhancing the performance of selected institutions.

According to the PSC (27 May 2004) capacity constraints in the public service have meant that almost 25 of government's procurement budget annually is spent on consultants, primarily providing information technology, and policy advice and project management services. According to the SAHDR (2003: 57), the vast majority of capacity –building and human resource planning activities have been directed at the two upper spheres: namely the national and provincial governments. While there remains a general lack of technically skilled personnel at all levels, this has particularly been the case at the local government level, a factor that undoubtedly helps to explain the inability of local government to deliver basic services to the poor.

The PSC Report (2004: 6) emphasizes that one of the most important challenges facing the Government in its efforts to improve socio-economic development and address poverty is that of performance improvement. Government is not yet as effective as it needed to be and is not achieving the results it could. Generating timely and credible information about performance, identifying improvement measure and implementing these successfully is a major human resource challenge that seriously needs to be addressed.

#### PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND SERVICE DELIVERY

According to HSRC (2002: 8) most South Africans have a substantive conception of democracy, one that includes economic justice as an important component of the definition. In this regard the HSRC observes that while the elections indicate a high degree of satisfaction most of the unhappiness with the governing party is centered on the economy and the delivery of basic services at the level of local government.

The PSC's Citizen Satisfaction Survey of 2003 on Public Service and Administration, which was conducted in the Departments of Education, Health, Housing and Social Development across the nine provinces, indicates that generally citizens felt that their expectations were being met (South Africa Year Book 2003/04: 358). The Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: iv) also indicates that in general all South Africans are becoming more positive about the overall democratic regime and more optimistic about where it will be in ten years time. Fifty four percent now give an overall positive mark to "our current system of government" up 18 points since 1995 when only 36 did so. Forty six percent of whites offered a positive assessment compared to only 12 in 1995. Furthermore 74 of all respondents (including 44 of whites) offer an optimistic evaluation of how they believe the political system will be in 10 years time. These results were also confirmed in the IDASA Report (March 2004: 2-3) and the Markinor Survey (2004).

The Citizen Satisfaction Survey (2003) measures actual service delivery against expectations in order to identify gaps and to determine the citizen's perception of the quality of services being offered. According to the Citizen Satisfaction Index (CSI) the results are mixed with some feeling that their expectations were met and others that they were not. According to the Afrobarometer (Jan 2003) 57 feel that government can solve "all" (17) or most (40) of the country's major problems. Eleven percent felt that government could solve very few of such problems, and 2 felt that none of the problems could be solved. While people are confident that government can

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<sup>81</sup> They are an additional type of public servant (different to the mainline public servant or local government official); skilled facilitators who will bridge the gap between governments services and the people.

solve the major problems facing the country, not everyone is convinced that it has the capacity to enforce its rules.

People's experiences in obtaining services from government also indicate important problems with state capacity. Their experiences and the interaction they have with one-government department clearly influence their perception and expectations of overall government performance. In general citizens were unaware of complaints processes and procedures and, of those who were aware, a small proportion have actually lodged complaints. Many of those who have complained remain dissatisfied with the way their complaints were dealt with. According to the SAHRC (2003c: 64) one measure of judging a government's programme is the extent to which its content is known appropriately by the public. Many of the policies and documents relevant to those directly affected by malnutrition and hunger for example are not understood by the large number of people that are potentially affected by the problem. There are also strong regional disparities in government capacity to implement its policies. Whereas in the Northern Cape and Western Cape provinces 12 and 22 respectively reported difficulties obtaining household services, in the Northwest the figure was 42, in Kwa-Zulu –Natal 44, and in Limpopo 55.

In Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: iv) there is a great deal of negative assessment about how the country is actually governed. In addition, IDASA (March 2004: 3) describes citizens' view of the overall democratic system as fragile. In particular the overall assessments of the provincial government and local government are very negative. Only 36 of the respondents in the 2002 Afrobarometer survey indicated that they approve or strongly approve of the job performance of the Premiers. The respective ratings for the provincial governments and local governments were 32 and 26 respectively.

According to the SAHDR (2003: xvi) the Human Development Index (HDI) for South Africa moved from 0.72 in 1990 to 0.73 in 1995 and declined to 0.67 in 2003. Major differences continue to exist, however, in the HDIs for different provinces and population groups. For example the HDI in the Western Cape is 0.77 compared to HDI's of about 0.61 for the North West and Limpopo Provinces. With regard to race even though the HDI for the African population has increased slightly since 1990, it has remained significantly lower than the HDI for the white population group.

The SAHDR (2003: xvi and 48-49) has also developed a Service Deprivation Index (SDI)<sup>82</sup> the SDI shows that the number of households that are considered deprived of access to good quality basic services increased from 5.68 million to 7.24 million between the 1996 and 2001 censuses. In aggregate terms, the percentage of population that is considered deprived of access to 'good' basic service has increased by 2 from 63 to 65 between 1996 and 2001. There are also major differences among nine provinces.

Income distribution remains highly unequal and has deteriorated in recent years. This is reflected in the Gini-coefficient that rose from 0.596 in 1995 to 0.635 in 2001. Spatially income inequality has deteriorated among urban households, while it has improved among non-urban households. Racially there is rising polarization of income within all racial groups. However the deterioration of income equality is more severe among African, Coloured and Indian households than among White households.

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<sup>82</sup> This index has been especially developed for the case of South Africa in order to provide a more encompassing measure of the distribution of progress and to measure the backlog of deprivation that still exists in several dimensions of basic services.

The SAHDR (2003: xvi) also indicate that 48.5 of the South African population currently falls below the national poverty line. The income and Expenditure Survey for 2000 shows that the share of African households in the bottom income quintile increased from 29 per cent to 33 percent between 1995 and 2000, while the share of total households in the top income quintile declined from 8 in 1995 to 5 in 2000. On the other hand, the average income and expenditure of white households improved during this period. Their share of the bottom quintile declined from 2 to 1 percent and their share of households in the top quintile increased from 60 per cent in 1995 to 66 percent in 2000.

Government has queried the statistics and data used in the SAHDR (2003) and popular notions of jobless growth.<sup>83</sup> Nevertheless government does acknowledge that serious problems exist that if not addressed can turn a positive outlook into a negative one.<sup>84</sup> Government has recently put in place a number of policies and programme such as the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) to address unemployment and poverty. The impact of these policies in addressing unemployment and poverty turning still needs to be seen, however.

According to the SARBS (2003: 12) class<sup>85</sup> and racial divides were the biggest divisions that need to be addressed but the evidence under the period of review yielded no significant change in the divisions identified by the public. This conclusion is corroborated by the statistics highlighted above by the SAHDR (2003). SARBS (2004: 41) noted that despite studies by Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000), and Seekings and Natrass (2003), indicating that increasing differentiation is occurring among the African population as a consequences of black empowerment, the racial composition of the country's poor has remained largely black and the overwhelming majority of the country's black citizens have remained poor. The SARBS (2004: 49) is of the view that income inequalities are the result of systemic problems rooted in apartheid.

The results from the surveys are mixed and contradictory. According to the HSRC (2002: 4) a majority (42.1) of the respondents surveyed are of the opinion that race relations in South Africa have improved since 1994, but also indicate that this view is most prevalent among the Indian (58.9) and black (42.9) respondents. The SARBS (2004: 3) survey on the other hand suggests the opposite. Fifty five percent of South Africans never socialize with people of another race. During 2003 there was a significant increase in the percentage of people who report never having cross-racial involuntary or voluntary social contact. Furthermore about 40 of South Africans surveyed find members of other races inherently untrustworthy.

According to the Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: iv) popular trust in political institutions remain at relative low levels. Just over one third trust the President (37) and just under a third trust Parliament (31). About a quarter trust their Provincial Government (28), Premier (28) or local government (24). Trust in other institutions associated with the State has also declined sharply

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<sup>83</sup> The figures around employment and job creation are the source of an intense debate See [Employment 11: The myth of jobless growth ANC Today Vol. 4 No 9 5<sup>th</sup> March 2004] paper for a more detailed elucidation of governments arguments. Government claims that between 1995 and 2002 1.6 million new jobs were created but the number of unemployed grew by 2.4 million. The net effect is that unemployment increased. See also paper titled "*Governments response to the SAHDR 2003*"

<sup>84</sup> These include high levels of unemployment with continuing job losses in the formal sector, rising joblessness especially among the youth, low economic growth, low savings and low levels of investment, continued mass poverty and deep inequalities based on class, race, gender and region.

<sup>85</sup> The wealth gap is identified as the most prominent rift and most frequently identified amongst coloured South Africans than any other group and rose significantly over the course of last year.

since 2000, from 62 to 47 in the case of the SABC, 49 to 31 in the case of the IEC, and 41 to 32 in the case of the SANDF. The IDASA Report (March 2004: 8) confirms these trends and notes that levels of trust are also very low with only 23 saying they trust provincial government “a lot” or a very great deal. The respective figures for provincial premiers and local councils were 23 and 17 respectively.

According to the SARBS (2004: 24-25) peoples’ attitude to parliament has not changed significantly. More than half agree that parliament as a law making institution is fair and can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country. In this group African and Coloured people are the majority followed by Indians and Whites. However, more than 40 of all South Africans are uncertain or disagree that Parliament treats all citizens equally. There are also differences across race groups as twice as many Blacks than Whites and Indians believe Parliament treats all South African’s the same.

According to Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: iv) two thirds feel that instruments of State authority such as the Courts (68), Police (67) and the Revenue Service (60) have the right to make people abide by their decisions and rules. Furthermore the SARBS (2004: 27 and 49) note that about a third of all South Africans admitted to choosing an extra-legal route to solving problems rather than waiting for a legal outcome, whilst about a quarter think they do not have to obey laws that were not made by the political party they support. A third of the people surveyed have disregarded for the law based on the grounds that it is ineffective.

This indicates that the rule of law is not unequivocally respected, but may be disregarded if deemed unsuitable or not advantageous. In sum the Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: iv) concludes that the democratic system enjoys an important, but insufficiently wide base of popular legitimacy. As a form of political authority the reach of the democratic political system is quite limited. The Afrobarometer conclusion is reinforced by SARBS (2004) that also concludes that the new democratic political system has not as yet been fully and unconditionally legitimated by the entire population.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) in conjunction with the Department of Public Service and Administration recently conducted an audit of anti-corruption capabilities in national and provincial departments (PSC 2004). Corrupt employees are blacklisted from employment in Public Service, and government uncovers 80 of the cases reported in the media first. According to Afrobarometer (Jan 2003: v) public assessments of the extent of official corruption have improved significantly over the past two years. While a large majority still thinks that corruption exists in government, most seem to agree that the Government is taking action and that the level of corruption is declining. The proportion of respondents saying all or most government officials are involved in corruption fell from 50 in 2000 to 27 in 2002. For MPs the decline was from 45 to 22 and for the President’s office from 25 to 13. Five percent of respondents claimed that they had been victimized in the past year by corrupt officials while trying to obtain government services. Only 1 reported encounters with corrupt officials in the Free State and Northern Cape, compared to 6 percent in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, and 13 in Limpopo.

With respect to the Government’s record in delivering on the socio-economic rights, the survey results are mixed. The SAHRC (2003a: xii-xv) reports apparent success in increasing access to water including the provision of free basic water on the one hand, and an increase in infant mortality (from 45 in 1998 to 59 in 2002) on the other. This means that more children under the age of one died in 2002 as compared to 1998. The under five-mortality rate has risen from 61 in 1998 to 100 in 2002. Similarly the maternal mortality ratio shows a steady increase since 1998

and is currently estimated to be 150 per 100 000 live deaths. Whilst the increase in the number of HIV/Aids and TB infections has increased the number of people using public health care facilities, there are insufficient medical and support staff to deal with the workload (SAHDR 2003: 32).

In general the SAHRC Report (2004c: 55) notes that very few departments reported in any detail on their monitoring and evaluation systems.<sup>86</sup> Some of the problems and constraints identified include a non-alignment of national and provincial areas, ineffective coordination mechanisms within and across levels of government and inadequate human resource capacity (see Box 3). The SAHRC (2003a: 3) noted that the delivery of social services has not been efficient in some parts of the country as a result of maladministration. Complaints of violations of human rights have been steadily increased (SAHRC 2002/3: 6 and 22). The bulk of complaints received continue to be in the area of equality.

According to the South African Year Book (2003/04: 653-4) household access to water increased from 80 in 1996 to 85 in 2001. By June 2003, 78 of the country's municipalities were implementing the Government's water policy, providing more than 27 million people with free basic water. However, according to the 2001 Census, about five million people still need access to the basic supply of water.

*Box 3: Realizing and protecting citizens socio-economic rights*

In its overall assessment the SAHRC (2003b: 4) states

*“Notwithstanding positive developments during the reporting period marginalized and vulnerable groups continue to face a vicious combination of inferior access to water, discrimination, higher prices, greater chances of using contaminated water and inadequate sanitation. This is because the laws and policies in the country fail to respect and promote the right to clean water as a human right ...Laws and policies thus continue to provide scant protection for vulnerable people in South Africa.”*

According to the SAHRC (2003b: 5) the occurrences of recurring problems associated with the provision of water and sanitation is attributed to the fact that national and local government faces difficulties or challenges with regard to: monitoring executed measures; the provision of free basic water; service sustainability; provision of water to farm dwellers and residents near farmers; and the provision of sanitation services. SALGA argued that the development of indigence policies for poor households remains a challenge to DWAF. According to the SAHRC (2003b: 55) the DWAF, its regional offices the DPLG, local government and bulk water providers have not fully met their constitutional obligations. SAHRC (2003b: 57) concludes that

*“DWAF and DPLG have realized the right of access to water partially not fully. ...While much has been done to realize the right to water it is not enough.”*

**Source:** South African Human Rights Commission Report 2003

<sup>86</sup> Notable exceptions include the KwaZulu Natal Department of Health, the Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, the Western Cape Department of Agriculture and the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs.

According to IDASA (March 2004: 4) 84 of the respondents surveyed identified unemployment as the most important problem facing the country. Only 9 felt that government is handling the issue fairly or very well. People were also unhappy about government's efforts in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor. Only 19 said fairly well or very well. Since 1993 unemployment has increased from 15 to 30 and there has been a rapid fall in income from work (SAHRC 2003a: 3).<sup>87</sup> The SAHDR (2003: 20) observed that between 30 to 42 percent of the labour force is caught in a vicious cycle of unemployment. The official unemployment rate among Africans is 2.6 times higher than the combined rate of other population groups in 2002 (36.8 compared to 14.1). Data pertaining to the number of people (or households) in low income and expenditure categories suggests that even among those that work there are many working poor people (SAHRC 2003a: 31). This is also corroborated by the SAHDR (2003: 21). Africans especially blacks are most affected by poverty in South Africa.

According to the SAHRC (2003a: xv), most provincial departments of social development indicated that the allocated budget was not enough and that the number of grant beneficiaries was constantly increasing, thereby resulting in overspending for social security. The delivery of social services has therefore not been efficient in some parts of the country, largely as a result of administrative problems (such as the lack of documentation as barriers to accessing grants, and poor conditions at pay points), as well as corruption and maladministration.

According to the SAHRC (2002: 35) citizens with disabilities are daily confronted by barriers that prevent them from fully participating in society. People with disabilities continue to be systematically denied equitable access to their rights. The SAHRC Report 2002 "towards a barrier – free society" highlighted the fragmented nature of existing legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

The new local government dispensation introduced new instruments of governance, including mechanism for participatory democracy such as the integrated development planning programmes. Steps to improve service delivery in line with the *Batho Pele* principles (see Box 4) have had uneven success. In the Government's view, most of the institutions are operating effectively although the process of stabilizing the intergovernmental system is still not complete. Community monitoring and evaluation of government's performance has also been strengthened by the publication of the Government's programme of action on the governments website, as well as the public reporting of progress through media briefings and regular postings of progress updates on the site (Governance: Batho Pele programme given teeth ANC Today Vol 4, No. 34 27 August 2004). Government, however, has identified two areas of weaknesses. These include poor senior management involvement in the monitoring of the implementation of the principles driving *Batho Pele* and a lack of public involvement in the enforcement of these principles.<sup>88</sup>

### Box 4: Batho Pele Principles

#### **Batho Pele: "People First" Principles<sup>89</sup>**

<sup>87</sup> Using the narrow definition of unemployment preferred by government, the unemployment level is 28%. Using the expanded definition of unemployment preferred by COSATU, the figure is closer to 40%.

<sup>88</sup> See 'Towards a ten year review' (page 13) Indicate governments awareness and sensitivity to problems?

<sup>89</sup> The Batho Pele principles for service delivery were set out in the Government's 1997 White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery. Although designed for the public service, these principles also apply to local government.

- 1. Consultation:** Citizens should be consulted about the level and quality of the public services they receive and wherever possible, should be given the choice about the service that are offered.
- 2. Service standards:** Citizens should be told what level and quality of public service they receive so that they are aware of what to expect.
- 3. Access:** All citizens should have equal access to the services
- 4. Courtesy:** Citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration
- 5. Information:** citizens should be given full, accurate information about the public services they are entitled to receive
- 6. Openness and transparency:** Citizens should be told how national and provincial departments run, how much they cost, and who is in charge
- 7. Redress:** If the promised standard of service is not delivered, citizens should be offered an apology, a full explanation and a speedy and effective remedy, and when complaints are made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, positive response.
- 8. Value for Money:** Public services should be provided economically and efficiently in order to give citizens the best possible value for money.
- 9. Encouraging Innovation and Rewarding excellence:** New ways of providing better service, cost cutting and improving conditions and rewarding the staff, who “go the extra mile”
- 10. Customer Impact:** looking at the benefits to the customer

**Source:** <http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/bathopele.htm>

In terms of local government performance, the SALGRC (2000) poll found that 73 of respondents were unhappy about aspects of local government service delivery. Eighty percent of these were Black. Less than half respondents (33) knew who their local councilors were and only 16 had personally met their councilors (SALGRC 2003: 13). The poll found that there was a general lack of communication by municipal councils with communities. People are not interacting and participating optimally because wards systems not being fully functional, there is also a lack of understanding among communities about how they can best participate. A consequence is that delivery of services is slow and not directly responding to the needs of communities. Many municipalities have not as yet passed by-laws facilitating community participation in the IDP and other processes.

### **Integrated Development Planning (IDP)**

Poor participation of communities in the IDP processes and local government decision-making more generally has served to undermine the kind of participatory democracy envisaged for local

governance.<sup>90</sup> Many IDPs have been produced by outside consultants with little community consultation or participation. This situation needs to be seriously addressed, if communities are to be more than mere rubber stamps for law making and governance at the local level.

## **NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR COUNCIL (NEDLAC) AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE**

The establishment of the National Economic and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in 1995 was aimed at promoting consensus between government, business, labour and other stakeholders on social and economic policy, through a process of social dialogue. NEDLAC is comprised of four chambers - Development, Labour Market, Trade and Industry and Public Finance Chambers.

NEDLAC plays a critical function in making socio-economic issues and debates a more inclusive matter. A number of agreements have been reached through negotiations between the social partners. They include proposals on paths of economic development for South Africa such as the Growth and Development Summit Agreement; labour market issues that include an agreement on UIF, Basic Conditions of Employment, insolvency, skills development and many more; trade issues such as an agreement on developing the Proudly South African Campaign; IDC Policy; and public finance issues, such as the Financial Sector Charter and other agreements (Nedlac 2004).

Although the institutionalization of social dialogue is relatively new, it seems clear that NEDLAC will continue to play an important role in South African society, in bringing together divergent social groupings in the country on issues of national and international importance.

*Table 18: NEDLAC Agreements and Reports*

	Number of Agreements or Reports concluded	Work in Progress	Total
Development Chamber	19	2	<b>21</b>
Labour Market Chamber	35	3	<b>38</b>
Trade and Industry Chamber	19	1	<b>20</b>
Public Finance Chamber	10		<b>10</b>
Miscellaneous	5		<b>5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>92</b>

**Source:** NEDLAC, 2004

<sup>90</sup> See 'Towards a ten year review' (page 14) suggests that this poor participation and decision making is because the poor lack formal organized power at local level outside of the formal political processes. Where civil society organizations participate the prioritization of service delivery is better identified and more appropriate.

## CONCLUSION

Surveys are able to capture and convey valuable information pertaining to people's perceptions of governance and service delivery. However, the data needs to be interpreted with caution because the survey results represent the interpersonal subjective responses of individuals and are difficult to validate. There is methodological variation in the different surveys used and biases in terms of sample size, gender, and urban areas persist.

Participation in elections at the national level is higher and less ambiguous than that of the local level. It is problematic and simplistic to interpret the huge support given to the ANC in racial identity terms because recent studies indicate a strong national identity. People make a distinction between their political support for the ruling party and the level of satisfaction with service delivery and the realization of their socio-economic rights. In other words they make a distinction between representative and substantive democracy.

The report suggests that people's participation in the constitutional institutions designed to protect their socio-economic and human rights remains quite weak. Similarly, the attempt to ensure that local government engages citizens as social partners in service delivery and local economic development has been far from successful. Greater efforts to ensure community involvement and participation in policy formulation and implementation are clearly crucial. Encouraging the development and participation of civil society organization in constructive social dialogue with the objective of reducing poverty and ensuring a better life for all remains an urgent task as South African enters its second decade of democracy.

## Abbreviations and acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
CSI	Citizen Satisfaction Index
DA	Democratic Alliance
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
FF	Freedom Front
FOSAD	Forum of South African Directors General
GCR	Gender Commission Report
HDI	Human Development Index
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDASA	Institute for Democratic Alternative for South Africa
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MTEF	Medium Term Economic Framework
MTSF	Medium Term Strategy Framework
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NNP	New National Party
PAC	Pan -African Party
PCC	Presidential Coordinating Council
PSC	Public Service Commission
SAHDR	South African Human Development Report
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SALGA	South African Local Government Association

SALGRC  
SARBS  
UDM  
WDR

South African Local Government Research Center  
South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey  
United Democratic Movement  
World Development Report

In terms of social cohesion, the above aspects of society present a mixed picture. Certain of our institutions, such as the family and the state, arguably are strong in terms of social cohesion, though there is a need to do more work on the family to get a detailed understanding of trends in this regard. Others, such as community organisations, show results. On the whole it is clear that, despite the worst efforts of previous policies, society has remained fairly cohesive. The challenges it faces, in terms of the restructuring of the economy, preventable diseases such as HIV and AIDS, may well have significant impact on this cohesion and point to the need for a discussion of integrated strategies to combat these.

Social capital.

Ours is a society rich in social capital. The myriad forms of organisation, networks and relationships that have allowed people to survive the worst excesses of apartheid and to remain resilient in the face of new challenges point to this. Yet this is horizontal or bonding social capital. In terms of vertical or bridging social capital the picture is very different. There is high and increasing social capital in terms of the state and institutions at a national level and citizens, in many instances. This is evident in the satisfaction of people with government delivery, in terms of grants, housing, land and most basic services. (see 10 year review)

In terms of bridging social capital between communities, the racial, class and geographical cleavages point towards low social capital. The levels of corporate social investment, for example are very low. Philanthropy, a measure of the extent of solidarity is reasonable high, but the issue as to what the impact this is overall and whether it is not a strategy of avoidance of confronting social difference needs to be interrogated.

Social justice

The extent to which these institutions, other than government and trade unions, play any definable role in terms of social justice is a more difficult one. There are no studies or data that the research has identified in terms of the impact of community organisations, churches, etc on social justice. Social movements are a highly contested issue and while work is being carried out in this area, with few exceptions such as the TAC, the results are not clear of the strategies employed by these organisations.

Further research required

Further research questions

*The data and analysis presented above suggest the following further research questions:*

- *Why do people watch the most popular television programmes?*
- *Why do people listen to the most popular radio stations?*
- *Why do people read the most popular magazines?*
- *Why do people read the most popular newspapers?*
- *What is reflected in the content of these about what it means to be South African?*

*The question of language identity bears further investigation:*

- *To what extent are English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans acquiring additional South African languages?*
- *To what extent is there an expectation that English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans should acquire additional South African languages?*

*Also for further research: **Social movements***

A number of what have become known as social movements have been formed in South Africa in the post-1994 period. These organisations, either single issue campaigns, such as the Treatment Action Campaign, or organisations with a self-proclaimed radical agenda, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, are mostly either in opposition to or highly critical of the current government. There are a number of issues regarding the phenomenon of social movements that need consideration with regard to social cohesion and social justice. Among these are;

How many of these are there?

What issues do they take up?

How many members do they have?

How many supporters do they have?

Who do they claim to represent?

What action have they taken or been engaged in?

Look at BIG, TAC LPF, APF, FSCC, SANGOCO

Political campaigns and activities

There have been a number of post-1994 political campaigns and actions. These manifestations tell us something about social cohesion and social justice. Among these are the following;

Government led campaigns such as Lestema

SACP led campaigns such as the Red October campaigns against the financial sector

COSATU led campaigns such as the Anti-Privatisation campaign, anti-Job Losses campaign

Other civil society led campaigns such as; Anti-crime campaigns led by PAGAD, ACF

### Chapter Three: Values, Attitudes, Identity and Culture

There are many possible indicators of people's values and attitudes. In the Ten Year Review, the indicators established show high satisfaction for the progress made by government in terms of social delivery.

#### Approval of social delivery

Housing	62%
Welfare grants	78%
Land	63%
Rate of service delivery	75%
HIV/AIDS	61%

The Ten Year Review also indicates a decline in concern over education, health and crime as issues of priority.

The election results, covered in the chapter dealing with the state and government, are also another indicator of peoples' satisfaction with progress in this regard.

There are various aspects of society that involve trust. These range from institutions and their relationships with citizens, to citizens relationships with each other. In research carried out by the HSRC, 54,9% of South Africans surveyed trust the government. There appear to be some variations in terms of gender, more men trust the government, age, where the older people get the more trust increases, urban bias where those in formal urban areas trust it less and variations in terms of income that show no clear pattern. (Ref) More Africans trust the government than other racial groups. Yet if one counterposes this against voter participation in elections, one is forced to ask the question, what is meant by trust and what do respondents mean when answering the question? 47% of those surveyed felt that they had no say over what government does.

The survey also indicates that people trust few of their fellow citizens. 85,4% surveyed felt that they only trusted a few people. They also seem wary of each other. 82% of those surveyed were concerned of others taking advantage of them. 57,6% felt that others wanted the best for them. In these instances there seem to be few variations in terms of race, gender or age. There appear to regional variations of those surveyed that need explaining.

#### National identity

Because South Africa's conflict was primarily along racial lines, a new national identity had to be one that transcended identity by race. "Identity formation and conception in South Africa is far more complex than is normally assumed, and...identity and broader political behaviour is as much influenced by class as it is by racial variables" (Habib, 2002: 4-5). This is important for the consolidation of democracy in the country. Habib (2002: 1) warns that "democracy cannot be taken for granted" and that there have been various examples where democracies are reverted to authoritarianism. "The fundamental goal of a democratic system is citizen satisfaction. A central element of the system is the empowerment of ordinary citizens so that they can replace their leaders in the event of dissatisfaction with leaders' performance<sup>1</sup>" (Habib: 2002: 7).

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<sup>1</sup> Democracy is threatened when citizens who are unhappy merely withdraw from participating in the political system rather than using their choice to replace the leaders (Habib: 2002).

### Happiness, satisfaction, optimism, and trust in the government

“People who trust government are more optimistic about an improvement of their situation in the future” (HSRC, 1999: 2). If government succeeds in reducing inequality, then dissatisfaction will decrease, because a reduced sense of deprivation, and trust in the government will therefore increase. This will, in turn, lead to South Africans feeling more optimistic about the future (HSRC, 1999:2). Dickow and Moller (2001: 46) hypothesise that national pride is positively correlated with subjective well-being and particularly the affective dimension of happiness. This is based on a study of 14 countries undertaken by Cantril in the 1960s, which found that people in societies which had recently undergone political upheavals had higher positive correlations between national factors and happiness. This suggested that national issues became personal ones in conditions of major change.

This section investigates the period of 1994-2004, looking at the following main topics:

1. Perceptions of democracy in the country
2. National identity and self-identity
3. National pride
4. Levels of optimism for the future
5. Satisfaction of citizens with the governance of the country
6. Trust of citizens in the government and other institutions
7. National priorities, as identified by citizens
8. Government performance
9. The brain drain

### Perceptions of democracy

Liebenberg (2000) found that an average of 72% of South Africans agreed that ‘democracy is always preferable to any other system of government’ and a low 7% felt that “in some cases an authoritarian government or a dictatorship is preferable to democracy”, while 14% of people were “uncertain/did not know”.





Figure 1: Preferences for democracy in 1999

72% of black people, 75% of coloured people and 74% of white people in 1999 preferred democracy, while a lower 64% of Indians did. Whites had the lowest preference for an authoritarian system (3%), followed by coloured people at 5%, then blacks at 7%. 10% of Indian people would prefer an authoritarian system (Liebenberg, 2000).

Brodie, Altman and Sinclair (1999), in a study for the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation and Independent Newspapers, conducted a survey measuring people’s attitudes to democracy. It was found that the majority of South Africans believed in democracy, believing strongly in the right to private voting, the right to vote for the party of their choice and the freedom of the press. However, disturbingly, 30% felt that if a particular community supports one group, an opposition party should not be allowed to campaign there. Brodie et al found that the majority of people in 1999 were optimistic that South Africa would remain a democracy (only 8% said they didn’t think democracy would be maintained). White people were most likely to be pessimistic, but still only 12% of them felt that SA would not maintain its democratic status.

IDASA’s Afrobarometer measure (2000: 1) found 60% of South Africans stating that democracy is always preferable to any other form of government. This number seems to have increased by 2004. The Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University (2004) found that 71% of respondents felt this way. Attitudes towards democracy are presented below:



**Figure 2: Attitude towards democracy in 2004**

There was a substantial rise in confidence that South Africa would remain a democratic country – from 54% in 1998 to 81% in 2004. People were equally split when it came to deciding whether a strong economy was better than democracy (33%), democracy was better than a strong economy (33%) or both were equally important (32%). 81% of people felt that crime was a threat to democracy; 76% felt that the HIV/AIDS epidemic was a threat and 57% felt that there was a gap between rich and poor (Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University, 2004).

When asked whether they would return to apartheid, with all things considered, 87% of South Africans said no and only 12% said yes. 10% of black people and 13% of coloured people said yes. Figures were higher for whites, with 19% of them wanting to go back. The most shocking figure is that 37% of Indians (double the percentage of whites) would prefer to return to apartheid.

#### Unification of the country

Brodie et al (1999) found that 63% of people believe that the country will become unified and 14% believed that it was already becoming united. About 22% felt that it would always be divided. In 2004, Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University found that the percentage of those who felt South Africa was already unified had increased to 22% and there was a slight decrease (22% to 21%) in those who felt that the country would never be united.

In 1999, the HSRC found that 84% of a sample of people expressed that “being a South African is an important part of how I see myself”, which is consistent with findings from a similar survey in 1997 (85%). “Other research suggests that this was not true before 1994. Exclusive subgroup identities with an absent overarching shared national identity was characteristic of how South Africans defined themselves under apartheid rule. This has now changed. While a range of subgroup identities is very much in place, these identities are shared with a strong overarching national identity. In present day South Africa subgroup identities have become important elements in support of the national identity. Furthermore, these inter-linked identities are important for building societal cohesion” (HSRC, 1999: 1).

#### Race, language and gender


The HSRC found that in 1997 only 30% of blacks agreed strongly with a strong national identity and this increased to 40% in 1999, the highest figure among the race groups. Within the white community, the sense of being a South African is stronger among Afrikaans-speakers than English-speakers. Indian and white females consistently show a stronger national identity than their male counterparts, although this gender disparity was not found amongst black and coloured respondents.

In the HSRC 1999 national survey, respondents were asked how they identify themselves. 61% overall expressed that they identified as South Africans, 10% as Africans, 11% by their racial group<sup>2</sup>, 15% by their language group, 3% by their religious affiliation and 1% in other ways. The graph below shows the breakdown by racial group:

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<sup>2</sup> When using racial group, the four categories as defined in apartheid were used, ie African, Coloured, Indian, White.

**Self-identification in 1999, by race**



**Figure 3: Self-identification in 1999, by race**

It is very interesting to note that Indian people have the highest percentage of identification as South Africans, closely followed by white people, with black people having the least percentage that identify as South African, but the highest percentage of those who identify by language or as African. Also interesting is that coloured people identify the most by their racial group.

**Age groups**

The finding that the majority of South Africans identified as South Africans in 1999 is also consistent across age groups:

Percentage who identify as South African, across age groups




Figure 4: Self-identity as South Africans in 1999, across age groups

#### Socio-economic group

In 1997 a strong national identity was positively correlated with a high socio-economic bracket. However, in 1999, 24% of the lowest and highest identified strongly as South African, while 40% of those in the middle income brackets felt that being South African was an important part of who they were. This indicates a positive shift amongst the middle class.

#### Identification with subgroups

There was an increase in identification with subgroups between 1997 and 1999, especially amongst coloured and black respondents. The number of people who had a strong identity with a subgroup shared this with a strong national identity and the number of these increased in the period. It is argued by cultural identity academics that such combinations of subgroup and national identity are “healthy combinations that provide the cement of society. On the one hand, identification with subgroups such as class, gender, ethnic community, generation, and the like, helps people to form meaningful bonds. On the other hand, the more such subgroup identities are embedded in an overarching national identity, the more cohesive society becomes, according to Professor Klandermans” (HSRC, 1999:2).

#### Identity and politics

In the first democratic elections in 1994, there was a clear link between the voters’ choice and their race or ethnicity. This is not a healthy trend for democracy, because, as Mattes (1995:3) argues ‘comparative research shows us that establishing stable, comparative multi-party democracy in societies which are deeply divided by race, language, religion or tribe is a very difficult undertaking’ (in Ramutsindela, 2002: 54). “The logic here is that if South Africans are still locked into different racial/ethnic compartments, attempts to establish a non-racial order are most likely to fail” (Ramutsindela, 2002: 54).

The 1994 election was interpreted in terms of the pre-eminence of race and ethnicity as a determinant of voting behaviour (Eldridge & Seeking, 1996, in Ramutsindela, 2002). However, one needs to consider the identity of the voters, both in terms of the labels that are given to them and their identity of themselves, particularly if we assume that these group-related factors like race or ethnicity influence voting decisions.

To look at the relationships between people's self-identity and their association with political parties, respondents in the HSRC 1999 survey were asked to indicate how close or distant they felt towards the political parties active at the time. "The largest proportions of respondents who indicated that they felt 'very close' to any of the political parties said that they identify with the label 'South African'. This finding corroborates with another survey question, which asked why respondents who had voted had opted for particular parties (Rule, 2000)" (Ramutsindela, 2002: 56). The survey found that many people chose according to an improved lifestyle (32%) or a specific policy of the party (35%). Only 22% identified with a party for non-material reasons like trust or belief in the party or the importance of a good opposition). It is important to note that only 4% gave reasons that suggested overt racial identity as their voting motivation.

Identification with a party versus self-identification:

Political party	Identity label					
	South African	African	Racial group	Language group	Religious group	Other
ACDP	74%	6%	16%	4%	0%	0%
ANC	58%	13%	10%	17%	2%	0%
AEB	80%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%
AZAPO	51%	39%	3%	7%	0%	0%
CP	30%	10%	0%	46%	0%	14%
DP	76%	4%	4%	11%	4%	1%
FA	80%	0%	6%	14%	0%	0%
FF	58%	0%	8%	30%	0%	6%
IFP	44%	14%	16%	26%	0%	0%
MF	44%	0%	6%	27%	23%	0%
NNP	69%	5%	9%	11%	5%	1%
PAC	43%	34%	5%	18%	0%	0%
SACP	70%	17%	6%	5%	2%	0%
UCDP	70%	0%	4%	23%	3%	0%
UDM	59%	10%	15%	8%	8%	0%

Table 1: Preferred labels of people feeling 'very close' to each political party

"The majority of people see themselves as 'South African', despite people's different racial groups. Of added significance is the dominance of a South African identity among people who voted for all of the major political parties. However, identity constructs that have been established and nurtured over the years are still present. The future of South Africa will likely hinge on how effectively a common 'South Africanism' is built and sustained in the presence of other identity formations" (Ramutsindela, 2002: 60).

Habib (2002) notes that a strong political opposition is important in a democracy, but political analysts agree that there is no viable parliamentary opposition in South Africa. Opposition parties in South Africa concentrate a lot of their campaigns on racial divides; however the

citizenry does not identify this way. The main reason that people would vote for another party is if they felt that the current ruling party was not governing well.

#### Proud to be South African

Research Surveys<sup>3</sup> (2004) conducted a telephone survey among a sample of 500 South African adults living in metropolitan areas. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement: "You are proud to be a South African". It was found that 96% of the respondents agreed. Figures were highest among the 18-24 year old age category, and dropped to 93% among older people and to 91% amongst white respondents. The figures were consistent across gender groups and fairly consistent among racial groups and income groups, except that metropolitan whites felt slightly less proud (the figure was still high at 91%) and those in the highest income brackets felt the least proud. Figures were also consistent across marital status and area.

#### The Proudly South African campaign

The concept of being Proudly South African has been built upon by the "Brand South Africa" project through the Proudly South African campaign. Lascaris (2003:4) notes that "an integrated brand-building campaign should be measurable. A key benchmark has to be the development of home-grown South African patriotism". The campaign also has a job creation aspect and this 75% of consumers felt that this was a motivating factor for them to buy Proudly South African products (Proudly South African, 2000: 4). The branding of the country, a world-first, has been developed to sell South Africa to foreign markets, and a recent estimate valued the brand at R380bn, equal to top companies like Coca-Cola, Microsoft and IBM (Loxton, 2004: 1).

#### South Africa's "rainbow people", national pride and optimism

Dickow and Moller (2001: 46) report on trends between 1994 and 1999 on the acceptance of the rainbow symbol as "shorthand for a nation seeking reconciliation and unity after decades of racial and political tensions". Dickow, in his doctoral thesis in 1996, argues that "successive South African governments have adopted a civil religion to legitimate their claim to serve the well-being of the people" (Dickow and Moller, 2001: 49). This civil religion is the rainbow nation, one that is inclusive of all races, as opposed to the Afrikaner civil religion of the past. It is theorised that people who support the civil religion of the rainbow nation are more likely to be proud of their nation than those who don't. This is supported by earlier research on perceptions of South Africa as a rainbow nation, conducted by Moller, Dickow and Harris in 1999, which found that supporters of the political symbolism of the rainbow were happier and more often proud to be South Africans than those who were non-supporters. Rainbow supporters were also more likely to be optimistic. These findings were consistent in the 1999 survey with 60% of those who supported the notion of the rainbow nation stating they were happy, 53% of supporters stating they were satisfied with life and optimistic about the future. Those who viewed the rainbow symbol as a political tool for nation building were among the happiest, most satisfied and most optimistic about the future.

Nationwide surveys were conducted in 1994 (one month after the elections), in 1996 and in 1999 to investigate acceptance of the rainbow nation as a source of national pride. In 1996, 65% of South Africans stated that they were often or very often proud to be South African. In

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<sup>3</sup> Research Surveys was contacted to ask for further data. They would be willing to divulge other information about these variables, but would need to be given advance notice. It is suggested that this data is retrieved for any future studies.

1997, 85% stated they were very proud to be South African and a further 14% were quite proud (Moller, Dickow and Harris, 1999). A comparison of the three major sources of national pride across the race groups in 1996 and 1999 as ranked by respondents are presented in the table below:

1996	Rank 1	%	Rank 2	%	Rank 3	%
<b>Black</b>	Rainbow nation	19%	TRC	16%	Sport/RDP	15%
<b>Coloured</b>	Sport	26%	Rainbow nation	25%	World acceptance	19%
<b>Indian</b>	World acceptance	31%	Rainbow nation	26%	Sport	20%
<b>White</b>	Sport	60%	World acceptance	20%	Rainbow nation	6%
<b>1999</b>						
<b>Black</b>	RDP	36%	Sport/TRC	12%	Rainbow nation	11%
<b>Coloured</b>	Sport	21%	RDP	19%	Rainbow nation	14%
<b>Indian</b>	Sport	25%	Rainbow nation	23%	World acceptance	14%
<b>White</b>	Sport	51%	World acceptance	19%	RDP/rainbow nation/constitution	4%

Table 2: The three major sources of national pride in 1996 and 1999, by race

In 1996, only 41% of those who viewed sports as the country's main achievement were happy, compared with 93% of those who took pride in the rainbow nation. Those who did not identify with any national achievement, mainly white people, were the most unhappy. Optimism among whites had declined significantly between 1983 and 1996. Dickow and Moller hypothesised that if they believed in the rainbow nation, they were less likely to feel excluded in the new South Africa and would therefore be more happy and optimistic. This theory was tested in the 1999 survey, and it was found that those who supported the rainbow nation were significantly happier, more satisfied and more optimistic.

#### Positive about South Africa and its future

Dickow and Moller (2001): When analysing trends in subjective satisfaction, happiness, and expectations for the future between 1983 and 1999, it was found that:

- Happiness remained stable until 1988 and rose dramatically after 1994, but then dropped to well below the pre-1994 level in 1995, rising again between 1995 and 1999. Levels were still lower in 1999 than they were pre-1994.
- Satisfaction followed a similar path to happiness, except that it remained stable between 1995 and 1997 and rose again in 1998. Levels were still also lower than pre-1994.
- Optimism for the future steadily declined until 1995, when it started increasing and has been increasing steadily since, reaching a peak in 1999. Optimism is rising faster than current satisfaction.

#### Responses across race and income bracket

	All	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Rich	Poor (gross monthly income below R580)

<b>Satisfied with life</b>	53%	47%	58%	65%	81%	60%	46%
<b>Happy</b>	60%	57%	66%	70%	75%	67%	53%
<b>Optimistic about the future</b>	53%	56%	51%	50%	37%	56%	52%
<b>Pessimistic about the future</b>	28%	27%	26%	31%	88%	26%	28%

Table 3: Subjective well-being: percentages across race groups and income bracket

The above table indicates that white people were by far the most satisfied with their current situation and happiness in 1999, but the least optimistic about the future. African people were the least satisfied, but the most optimistic (Dickow and Moller, 2001). These findings are consistent with the HSRC's findings in 1999 which note that black people's dissatisfaction had decreased between 1997 and 1999, although dissatisfaction levels had risen in other groups between 1994 and 1999. When asked by Dickow and Moller (2001) what positive changes had occurred in their lives since 1994, more African or coloured people indicated a change in their material lives, while more Indian and white people indicated a non-material change in the way they felt about themselves and about interacting with other people (21% and 15% in Indians and whites, as opposed to 8% and 4% in Coloured and African people).

#### Socio-economic category

While the average living standard of white and Indian people – 92% and 81% respectively who fell in the highest income brackets – had remained stable, those of the coloured and particularly black people had significantly increased between 1998 and 1999. Therefore, a new social class that cut across all race groups was emerging. It was concluded from the HSRC survey in 1999 that satisfaction with one's situation is more likely amongst those with a high standard of living rather than membership to a race group. Thus satisfaction is more dependent on distribution of wealth and trust in the government.

In 2002, IDASA (2002: 1) noted that “all South Africans are becoming more positive about the overall democratic regime, and more optimistic about where it will be in ten years time”.


In 2003, Markinor (2004) found that the percentage of people who were optimistic about the year ahead had increased significantly, from 24% in 2002 to 38% in 2003. In addition, 38% of people had felt that 2003 would be worse than 2002, but only 24% felt that 2004 would be worse than 2003. 32% felt 2004 would be the same. Coloured people were most likely to feel optimistic, as well as those within higher income brackets. People aged between 16 and 24 years old were the ones who were more positive. The majority of this group is employed, with a matric or a tertiary education. This is mirrored by a general view in the press, where numerous articles have been written about it. For example, Hunter-Gault (2004:1) notes that “the country may not yet be the Rainbow Nation that...Nelson Mandela dreamed of, but it is breeding a new generation that could make it happen”. Those who felt South Africa would be worse than in 2003 were those who were mostly older, unemployed and with little or no education. Indian people were the most pessimistic.

When asked whether they felt positive about South Africa and its future, 85% of those surveyed in 2004 by Research Surveys agreed. 93% of younger people agreed, with 83% of all other age groups agreeing. This trend is consistent with other data gathered by Research Surveys earlier

in 2004 and with findings from previous years (see above). It seems that younger people are generally happier and more optimistic than other age groups, partly due to their higher levels of health. Respondents who earned below R2000 per month and those who earned above R6000 a month were the most optimistic. Those who fell in an income bracket between R2000 and R6000 were less so. A noticeable regional difference was found, with 95% of those in Durban expressing positive feelings, whilst only 82% of those in Gauteng felt positive. White respondents were the least optimistic (75% of them agreeing that they were optimistic about South Africa and its future). Comparisons with studies undertaken earlier in 2004 shows a steady rise in optimism in South Africa throughout the whole year, but particularly since end of March/early April 2004, although the gap between younger and older people has widened throughout the year. The press release (2004, [www.bizcommunity.com](http://www.bizcommunity.com)) suggests that “this is, no doubt, influenced by the falling inflation rates, reductions in the interest rate, the successful elections, winning the 2010 Soccer World Cup bid, the success of our athletes in Athens and our Tri-Nations win...Perhaps there is a new vitality about South Africa at the moment”.

The Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University poll in 2004 found that 59% of people felt the country was going in the right direction and 39% felt it was going in the wrong direction. 65% of black people were positive, compared to 44% of coloured, 36% of white people and 30% of Indian people. Their levels of optimism are presented below:

**Optimism for the future in 2004 across race**



**Figure 5: Optimism for the future in 2004, across race**

#### Satisfaction with governance

The majority of South Africans previously lived with a government who was the enemy. Measuring the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of South Africans with the post-apartheid governance, and their trust in the new government and new democratic institutions are valid measures to assess whether they have accepted the new government and developed trust and pride in the new democratic institutions which they fought for. These questions are integral to the issue of democratic consolidation. “Though hard won, democracy cannot and should not be taken for granted in South Africa today” (Daniel and de Vos, 2002: 13).

Using studies from Daniel and de Vos (2002) and Houston (2000), it can be seen that the majority of respondents felt dissatisfied at all levels, which indicates that expectations were not being met.

<b>Governance</b>	<b>Satisfaction</b>	<b>Percentage in 1998</b>	<b>Percentage in 1999</b>	<b>Percentage in 2000</b>
<i>General political situation</i>	Dissatisfied	55	36	-
	Satisfied	31	46	-
<i>Local governance</i>	Dissatisfied	55	42	46
	Satisfied	31	43	35
<i>Provincial governance</i>	Dissatisfied	53	38	41
	Satisfied	32	44	36
<i>National governance</i>	Dissatisfied	50	32	43
	Satisfied	37	53	38

Table 4: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA in 2001

It is encouraging to note that levels of dissatisfaction have decreased over time. Gregory Houston (2000) found that dissatisfaction with national governance dropped from 55% in 1998 to 32% in 2000, while satisfaction rose from 37% to 53% in the same period of time. However, the HSRC's findings in 2001 show a steep decline in satisfaction, from 53% to 37% and an increase from 32% to 42,6% in dissatisfaction.

In 2004, the majority of respondents felt that the government was doing a good or fair job (Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University):

	<b>Excellent/good job</b>	<b>Fair job</b>	<b>Poor job</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
National government	41%	40%	17%	1%
Provincial government	36%	39%	23%	2%
Local government	30%	33%	35%	2%

Table 5: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA in 2004

It seems that the general trends identified between 1998 and 2000 still remain, with local government perceived as the level at which the most dissatisfaction occurs and where the majority of people are dissatisfied with their service. However, it is encouraging to note that levels of dissatisfaction are dropping fairly steadily.

#### Satisfaction by race

The racial dimension to satisfaction with governance has been fairly consistent – with white and Indian people expressing the most dissatisfaction, coloured people less so and black people the least. On a local level of governance, about a third of respondents were satisfied, consistently across groups. On a provincial level, race differences start becoming apparent, with 37% of Africans responding positively compared to 27% of whites. On a national level, however, 43% of Africans were satisfied, and only 13% of whites. This illustrates that while Africans may be

discontented with how their local area is being governed, they demonstrate a much greater sense of confidence in the government's performance countrywide than most whites, who do not hold the national government's performance in high esteem. Significantly, no majority of citizens in any single category was satisfied (Daniel and de Vos, 2002).

#### Satisfaction by income bracket

Satisfaction with governance was generally found to be highest among lower-income groups and declined steadily as income increased. It is interesting to note that the richest people have the least faith in the government and are the most dissatisfied, while those with the fewest means seem to have the most faith in the government's ability to provide for them. In 1999, 39% of those in the highest Living Standards Measure (LSM) groups, indicated distrust in the national government, while only 22% in the lowest groups expressed distrust. (Daniel and de Vos, 2002).

Significantly, respondents who had a higher living standard in 2000 also felt that South Africa was not more peaceful or safer post-1994. From these trends, one can see a paradoxical relationship between race and class emerging. "Although Africans of lower socio-economic status are more apt to suffer from violence and the failures of government policy in areas like service delivery, they are still more politically satisfied than well-off whites who have greater socio-economic security and are presumably less dependent on public services" (Daniel and de Vos, 2002: 20).

#### Trust in institutions

The HSRC (1999) found that Indians, whites and coloureds had high levels of trust in the government before the 1994 elections, while blacks did not trust the government then. Since 1995 this pattern has been reversed and blacks now have the highest levels of trust. A general decline in trust was noted in all groups between 1994 and 1998, but this increased in 1999, shortly before the 1999 election.

Daniel and de Vos (2002) found that, on average, 51,5% of South Africans trusted in the national government, compared to 28% who distrusted them. Only 37,5% expressed trust in local governance, while 34,1% did not trust local governance. IDASA (2002) found that this level had again dropped in 2002, with 31% of all groups trusting the government, and only 32% of blacks.

<b>Institution</b>	<b>% who trust in 1998 (Brodie et al, for the Kaiser Foundation)</b>	<b>% who trust in 1999 (Daniel and de Vos)</b>	<b>% who trust in 2000 (Daniel and de Vos)</b>	<b>% who trust in 2004 (Kaiser Foundation)</b>
National government	56%	60%	52%	45%
Courts	43%	44%	45%	46%
Labour unions	42%	38%	31%	43%
Media	54%	66%	53%	65%
Police	33%	47%	40%	38%
Defence force	34%	57%	49%	55%
Political parties		39%	27%	
Local government	44%	48%	36%	32%
Business		55%	43%	
Churches	64%	80%	81%	71%
Independent Electoral		54%	63%	

Commission				
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Table 6: Trust in institutions between 1998 and 2004

In the above table it is clear that trust in national and local government is decreasing.

Houston and Rule (1999) also found that black people expressed the highest levels of trust in most institutions, except police and churches where coloured people had higher levels. Black people had the least trust of police, political parties, courts and labour unions. On the whole white and Indian people had the lowest levels of trust in institutions and Indians had slightly higher levels than whites in most instances. In 2000, white South Africans showed a much greater degree of trust in business than black South Africans did, while Africans had greater trust in the government and civil institutions than whites did. In 1999, Brodie et al also found that churches had the highest level of trust, followed by parliament, then the media. However, their findings found slightly lower levels of trust in the police and the defence force than above. IDASA (2002) notes a decline in the level of trust in institutions from 2000 to 2002 – for example, trust in the media dropped from 62% to 47%, trust in the IEC dropped from 49% to 31% and trust in the defence force dropped from 41% to 32%.

Daniel and de Vos (2002: 27) feel that “the democratisation process remains fragile, with high levels of dissatisfaction over issues like crime and violence...and too little faith in the judicial process and rule of law. The alarm bells may not be ringing, but the warning signs are certainly flashing”.

#### Support for the President

In 2004, SABC and Markinor found 71% of registered voters felt Mbeki is doing his job well or very well and 26% felt he was not performing well. Younger voters and black voters felt more positive and white voters felt the least positive. Another poll in 2004, by the Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Foundation/Harvard University found very similar results: 72% of respondents had a favourable opinion of Thabo Mbeki, 24% had an unfavourable opinion and 2% didn't know. A substantial 62% approved of the way he was handling his job as President.

#### National priorities

Government's main priorities after the democratic elections of 1994 were to eliminate racial imbalances created by apartheid, attack poverty and deprivation, and restore peace and a sense of community security (Mbithi wa Kivilu, 2002). It has been found that South Africans mirror these priorities to an extent, with unemployment and crime being identified as the main problems. This finding is consistent over time.

In 1999, Dickow and Moller found that the main disappointments with the new South Africa were predominantly crime, corruption and nepotism on the one hand and unemployment on the other.

	All	African	Coloured	Indian	White
<b>Crime</b>	39%	<b>33%</b>	47%	55%	<b>61%</b>
<b>Unemployment</b>	37%	<b>43%</b>	30%	26%	<b>11%</b>
<b>Corruption/nepotism</b>	11%	9%	9%	11%	<b>20%</b>
<b>Service delivery</b>	5%	5%	4%		3%
<b>New rich</b>	4%	5%	3%	2%	2%
<b>Race relations issues</b>	2%	2%	1%	2%	1%

<b>No disappointments</b>	2%	2%	3%	2%	
<b>Other/don't know</b>	1%	1%	5%	4%	2%

Table 8: greatest disappointments with the new South Africa, across race, in 1999

Unemployment is the biggest issue for Africans, followed by crime, while Indian, Coloured and white people feel that crime is a bigger issue than unemployment. Only 11% of white people felt unemployment was a problem for them.

IDASA's findings in 2002 were along the same lines, with jobs and crime remaining the most urgent issues (84% and 35%). Relevant shifts in priorities were a decline in the emphasis on crime and housing, and an increase in problems of poverty and HIV/AIDS (IDASA: 2002a).

Markinor and the SABC tested the perceptions of 3500 respondents older than 18 years old regarding their expectations and perceptions of government performance between October and November 2003. The findings were consistent with the HSRC 1999 survey – with unemployment being the first priority and crime reduction the second:


	<b>% All mentions</b>	<b>% Most important issue</b>
Unemployment/job creation/too few jobs	90%	54%
Crime/criminal activity	64%	18%
Poverty	48%	6%
HIV/Aids	48%	11%
Health other than HIV	22%	3%
Corruption/dishonest government officials	21%	3%
Education/educational standards/equality in education	16%	1%
Development/infrastructure (industrial, water, electricity, roads)	15%	2%
Land/landlessness/land claims	9%	1%
Brain drain/losing trained or skilled people	4%	
Build houses	2%	
Other issues	6%	1%

Table 9: Perceptions of national priorities, by all mentions and by most important issue in 2003

When analysing these priorities according to supporters of the four major political parties at the time (ANC, IFP, DA and NNP), it was found that supporters of the DA and the NNP felt that crime was the highest priority and supporters of the IFP and ANC were most concerned with unemployment.

Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University (2004) report the following as the most important problems that people identified for the government to address:

**Priorities for government to address in 2004**



**Figure 9: Priorities for government to address in 2004**

The top five problems according to each race group are reported in the table below:

Rank	Black	Coloured	Indian	White
1	Unemployment (72%)	Crime and security (53%)	Crime and security (78%)	Crime and security (72%)
2	Crime and security (36%)	Unemployment (36%)	Transportation (39%)	Government corruption (26%)
3	HIV/AIDS (25%)	Transportation (28%)	HIV/AIDS (18%)	Unemployment (24%)
4	Housing (22%)	Housing (24%)	Education (17%)	HIV/AIDS (23%)
5	Water supply (20%)	HIV/AIDS (15%)	Poverty (17%)	Transportation (14%)

**Table 10: Top five problems in the country, according to race**

It is interesting to note that Indian people had a higher percentage of those who felt crime was an issue, as compared to whites who had been the majority in the past across all surveys. In addition, Indian people did not feature unemployment (the country's overall major concern) in their list of main priorities. In addition, Indian people were the only group that identified education as a priority and white people were the only group that identified government corruption as a priority.

#### Job creation and unemployment

In 2001, the surveyed respondents in the HSRC study (Wa Kivulu, 2002) were asked to choose specific suggestions as to how the government could best address job creation. The majority of South Africans felt that the best solution was for government to develop job-creation policy; surprisingly white people, who had the lowest rate of unemployment, favoured this option the most. All race groups felt strongly that the second best solution was for the school system to be more career-orientated. These findings were consistent across metropolitan, urban and rural


areas and across those with different levels of educational qualification. The findings were also similar when comparing them across employment status, with the one notable exception being that those who were employed in the informal sector favoured a career-orientated school system as the first option.

58% of people surveyed in Markinor (2004)'s poll expected the unemployment rate to increase (compared to 64% in 2002) and 61% of those currently employed felt that it would take a long time to find a new job if they lost their jobs. The Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University (2004) found that only 15% of people approved of the way the government was handling job creation and unemployment.

### Crime

Brodie et al (1999) found that 85% of respondents had said that crime had gotten worse between 1994 and 1999. Crime was the only area which the majority of people felt would not get better in the future. Daniel and de Vos (2002) found that regarding government performance, crime was again the issue which caused the most dissatisfaction, with 75,3% of respondents responding that they felt 'violent crime' had increased since 1994. This feeling was strongest in Gauteng (83,9%), the Free State (87,7%) and the Western Cape (89,3%) where crime statistics are higher (including farm killings in the Free State). In 2004, only 26% of respondents in the Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University survey approved of the way the government was handling crime and 74% still felt that it was a major priority that needed attention.

**Perceptions of government's handling of crime and safety in 1999**



**Figure 10: Perceptions of government's handling of crime and safety in 1999**

Interestingly, when looking at the issues of political violence and whether people had felt South Africa was more peaceful than before the 1994 election, 57 % of those in the 2002 survey (Daniel and de Vos, 2002) indicated that they thought the former had decreased since 1994, but 69,8% of respondents answered that South Africa was 'not safer than it was before 1994' and 75.4% felt violent crime had increased since 1994. KwaZulu-Natal, the province which was

hardest hit by political violence in the period 1984–95, had the highest percentage (62,2%) of respondents who thought South Africa was now more peaceful. These statistics show an overwhelming sense of public insecurity. When weighted for race, whites not surprisingly expressed a higher degree of insecurity, and a greater sense that violent crime had increased since 1994. While 52.5% of Africans indicated that they thought South Africa had become more peaceful since 1994, only 18,2% of whites had the same impression. Even fewer (9,4%) whites thought the country was safer now than before 1994.

#### Factors contributing to crime and the reduction of crime

In 1999, most responses answering what the major contributing factor to crime was pointed to poverty. Although whites felt more strongly than other racial groups that disregard for the law and corruption are important factors, they too cited poverty as the main factor. In 2001, surveyed respondents (Wa Kivilu, 2002) were asked to choose specific suggestions as to how the government could best address these priorities. Significant differences were found across provinces in regard to crime. First option for the Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Cape and Western Cape was the improvement of the criminal justice system by government; allocation of more resources was favoured by Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. The North West province alone felt that the best solution was better training for police. In metropolitan areas, respondents felt that allocating more resources and improving the criminal justice system were equally important (39%) and 22% felt that police should be better trained. In urban and rural areas, better police training was seen as the most important. African people favoured better training for police, coloured and white people thought improving the justice system was the most important and Indian people felt more resources should be allocated. Upper-income groups significantly favoured allocating more resources.

#### Economic issues

Brodie et al (1999) found that 64% of respondents surveyed felt that the economy had gotten worse between 1994 and 1999, but 49% felt that this would improve. In July 2001, an HSRC survey tested perceptions of citizens about economic circumstances in South Africa, in terms of whether they thought it had improved or deteriorated during the 12 months prior to the interview, and what they thought of the economic policies' effect on the country and on their buying capacity. It was found that 58,1% of respondents felt the general economic situation in South Africa had worsened, while 16,1% felt it had stayed the same over this period. Only 16,5% thought the economic situation had improved and 9,4% were uncertain. This is consistent with findings from previous HSRC surveys, as detailed below:

Perception of general economic situation between 1999 and 2001




Figure 11: Perception of general economic situation in South Africa during the last 12 months


Indians and whites were generally more dissatisfied with the economic conditions in South Africa than coloureds and Africans were.

Perceptions of the economic situation by province and by LSM (Struwig, 2002):

Province	Economic situation has worsened
Gauteng	64%
KwaZulu Natal	61%
Western Cape	58%
Eastern Cape	57%
Free State	56%
Mpumalanga	56%
North West	55%
Northern Cape	48%
Limpopo	47%

Table 11: Percentages of people in 2001 who felt that the economic situation had worsened in the 12 months prior to interview, across provinces

**Perceptions of economic situation in 2001 during the 12 months prior to interview, by LSM**




**Figure 12: Perceptions of the general economic situation in 2001, during the 12 months prior to the interview, by LSM**

As the above figure shows, the wealthiest and the poorest people were those most dissatisfied by the performance of the economy, although an overwhelming majority of the country felt that it had deteriorated.

In May and June 2004, Markinor and the SABC surveyed 3500 respondents over the age of 18 and found that people were far more positive about the country's economic situation than the findings from between 1999 and 2001. Only 16% felt that they were economically worse off than in 2003 and only 9% thought they would be worse off in 2005, with 54% expecting to be better off in 2005.

The figure below shows the results when respondents were asked how they felt they would be a year after the interview (ie in 2005):

**Economic prospects for next year (2005), by race**




**Figure 13: Perceptions of economic prospects for the following year in 2004, by race**

Only white people did not feel more optimistic about their economic prospects in the next year, although more of them (25%) felt positive than negative (24%). Coloured people had the highest levels of optimism and black people had the lowest levels of pessimism.

66% of adult South Africans felt that the government was managing the economy well and encouraging international investment well, particularly those in the younger age categories. There were mixed feelings about their performance regarding controlling inflation and the cost of living, but 65% of those with a tertiary education thought they were controlling inflation well. However, 70% of people felt that the government was not succeeding at reducing unemployment by creating jobs. This rises to 80% amongst those with no formal education.

Findings from various HSRC surveys are consistent with the Markinor (2004) survey. The graph below illustrates the drop in confidence between 1999 and 2001, but the findings indicate a slow but steady increase since then:

**Positive economic prospects, trends between 1998 and 2004**



**Figure 14: Positive economic prospects between 1998 and 2004**

Regardless of the rand’s recovery and the cut in interest rates, 22% of people surveyed in Markinor (2004)’s poll were most concerned about the economy; however, 34% felt it would improve in 2004 and 33% felt it would remain the same. People were most concerned about economic difficulty in KwaZulu Natal and the Northern Cape.


In 2004, Washington Post/Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University found that 58% of people approved of the way the government was handling the economy and 39% disapproved. These findings are consistent with the Markinor (2004) and HSRC studies.

**Government’s economic policies**

46,6% of South Africans thought that the government’s economic policies had had a bad effect on the country and 56.8% felt it was detrimental to their ability to purchase goods. The rest of respondents had no view on the matter or felt that the policies were having a good effect. (56,8%). Similar results were found in the HSRC 1999 and 2000 surveys.

In line with their perceptions of the general economic situation, whites and Indians were more pessimistic about government policies than Africans and coloureds, which was also found in previous surveys:

**Government's economic policies have bad effect, by race in 1999, 2000 and 2001**



**Figure 15: perception that government's policies have a bad effect in 1999, 2000 and 2001**

Findings indicate that respondents have consistently felt a negative effect of government's economic policies in their personal capacity rather than generally on the country. Black and coloured people expressed higher levels of dissatisfaction in 2000.

An inverse relationship was found between income and perceptions about the economy. Those with a lower income tended to perceive the economic situation more positively than those with higher incomes.

What is particularly surprising about these findings is the fact that those with higher incomes are consistently negative about the national economy and the government's economic policies, despite the neo-liberal market model favoured by the ANC government – a policy which has ensured that wealthy citizens can continue to live affluently.

**Government performance**

When evaluating government's performance on key issues, the following percentages of respondents in the SABC/Markinor (2004) study felt that government was doing a good job:

<b>Below 50% of respondents</b>	<b>50%-66%</b>	<b>Over 67%</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transparency and accountability</li> <li>• Right appointments</li> <li>• Fighting corruption</li> <li>• Controlling inflation</li> <li>• Creating jobs/reducing unemployment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unity</li> <li>• Basic health services</li> <li>• Educational needs</li> <li>• Access to land</li> <li>• Building houses</li> <li>• Affirmative action</li> <li>• International investment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Welfare payments</li> <li>• Gender equality<sup>4</sup></li> <li>• Basic services delivery</li> </ul>

<sup>4</sup> It is particularly interesting to note that such a high percentage of people perceive that gender equality is being promoted, when the realities are so different. Refer to the section on sexism in this report.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preventing crime</li> <li>• Controlling the cost of living</li> <li>• Stopping the 'brain drain'</li> <li>• Handling HIV/Aids</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Closing the income gap</li> <li>• Managing the economy</li> <li>• Controlling political violence</li> <li>• Bringing the police force closer to the community</li> </ul>	
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Table 12: Levels of positive perceptions regarding government's performance in 2004

In 2002, 22% of respondents indicated that they felt that government was performing well in creating jobs and 36% thought the government was effectively reducing crime. In the 2004 survey, both these levels were down (to 18% and 31% respectively). It is clear that government is still not delivering on issues that are viewed as priorities by the people.

SABC/ Markinor (2004) Respondents were asked to state what they thought the most negative things and the most positive things government had done or failed/accomplished to do:

Most negative <sup>5</sup>	AGE GROUP					Most positive <sup>6</sup>	AGE GROUP				
	Total	18-24	25-34	35-49	50+		Total	18-24	25-34	35-49	50+
Lack of jobs	59	59	62	62	53	Created jobs	4	5	5	4	2
Crime	27	22	29	29	28	Crime reduced	2	2	2	2	2
Lack of housing/ other issues with housing	11	9	12	13	9	Improved housing	36	37	41	39	28
AIDS	10	12	11	10	9	AIDS	3	4	3	3	2
Not a "better life for all"	10	10	10	9	11	Alleviated poverty	2	3	3	1	1
Poor service	9	10	7	7	12	Community development	2	2	2	2	1
Corruption	8	7	7	9	7	Democracy and human rights	7	6	7	8	8
Education	7	9	7	7	6	Education	14	19	15	12	10
Infrastructure	6	7	6	5	8	Infrastructure and services	32	31	31	32	33
Poor healthcare	6	5	6	5	8	Health services	7	8	10	6	6
Empty promises	5	5	5	5	5	Land distribution	2	3	2	3	2
Economy	3	3	4	3	2	Economic development	3	1	3	3	3
Affirmative action	3	2	3	2	4	Unity and tolerance	2	2	2	3	2
Certain	3	2	3	3	3	Freedom	2	1	2	2	2

<sup>5</sup> The categories presented in this table are summarised.

<sup>6</sup> The categories presented in this table are summarised.

contentious laws (eg abortion, gambling)						(speech, movement, religion)					
Services too expensive	2	1	2	1	2						
Reverse racism	2	2	2	2	2	Ended apartheid	4	3	4	5	5
Social issues, eg child abuse	2	1	2	2	2	Grants/pensions	29	29	29	32	34
Others	12	-	-	-	-	Others	8	-	-	-	-
Nothing	5	6	5	5	6	Nothing	13	13	13	12	16
Don't know	2	-	-	-	-	Don't know	2	-	-	-	-

Table 13: Perceptions in 2004 of the most positive and most negative things the government has done, across age groups

#### The brain drain and returning citizens

There has been recent alarm about a new “black brain drain” as black professionals and managers leave the country to gain experience internationally. Ericsson (2003) notes that between 1994-2002 the recorded number of skilled immigrants into South Africa were lower than those of skilled emigrants leaving. Statistics South Africa announced new figures showing that fewer South Africans are actually leaving the country on a permanent basis, mainly due to South Africa’s stable economy and the dangerous situation overseas where there are fears of terrorist attacks. (Basson, 2003). Kemp (2003) reports that Elliot International’s figures showed a decline of 40% when it came to families moving out of South Africa. In 2001 there was a drop of 16% and a 25% decline in 2002. In the 1980s and 1990s Elliot was moving one person into South Africa for every ten that left. They are now moving one person in for every one person out.

Bernes-Lasserre (2004) reports that a number of South Africans who emigrated over the last ten years are coming back. He ascribes some of this success to the “Homecoming” website – a non-governmental organisation run by two young executive women – which encourages people not to wait till things get better, but to come back and make them better. Bernes-Lasserre (2004) does note that while the numbers are not quantifiable, they are still not as high as the numbers of skilled people leaving the country. Amelia Jones, founder of the site, notes that “the obstacles preventing people from returning – crime and concerns about job losses – are often the same that still drive them away: some 9000 South Africans left during the first nine months of 2003” (Bernes-Lasserre, 2004: 2).

Crush (p 1) reports that although men and women generally have very similar attitudes and specific concerns about life in South Africa, “women have significantly lower emigration potential than men”. While 73% of men had given thought to emigrating, only 61% of women had. Men were more likely to want to leave permanently as opposed to women who expressed more interest in temporary absence. Women make more return visits to South Africa than men, are less likely to dispose of assets in South Africa and were less likely to want to retire or be buried in a foreign country. It was found that gender was a more significant factor in leaving South Africa than race, with black men having the highest emigration potential, followed by white men, then black women and lastly white women. In addition, “patriotism” was a factor that would encourage men to stay more than any other, while women wanted to remain close to their family. This indicates that social networks are a stronger influence than a sense of national identity.



## Media

### Introduction

This section of the report considers:

- What do people read, listen to on the radio, and watch on TV?
- What is the impact of this in terms of social cohesion, social capital and social justice?

It looks at the broader question of how South Africans group themselves in terms of media consumption and what the implications are of what people read, listen to on the radio and watch on TV for social cohesion, social capital and social justice.

The data referred to here is from the All Media Products Survey (AMPS) 2003b. It does not include the Child AMPS and Teenage AMPS figures. There is a great deal of data available, both in terms of demographics and mass media products themselves. In terms of demographics, this report focuses on race, gender, household income group, age and home language. It should be noted that disability was not available as a category. In addition, Deafsign was not indicated as one of the home languages. This report focuses on television, radio, monthly magazines, daily newspapers and the internet. Television, radio and daily newspapers represent a very large audience. Although monthly magazines do not have a very large audience, they represent special interests very directly. Internet users are also not a large group, but its demographics are revealing. In addition, this new and extremely global media form can be expected to grow substantially. It also provides access to information for people with visual disabilities in ways that other media cannot, and so should be considered.

What is not dealt with here in any detail, for reasons of time and space constraints, is the content of the most popular mass media products. It should be noted that an analysis of media consumption must draw on qualitative and quantitative analysis of selected content in order to take the question of how South Africans are grouping themselves further, to answer the bigger question: How do we imagine ourselves as South Africans?

Inherent to the questions posed above is the assumption that what takes place in the media matters. What is not spelled out is how or why it matters, and although time and space

constraints prohibit going into this in too much detail, it is important to touch on a few key issues. The relationship between media and society is a complex and nuanced one. Media theorists do not agree on the degree to which media content impacts on social practice. There is a certain reciprocity between audiences and media producers that complicates matters – do sensationalist newspaper stories create the market for sensationalism or are they simply a response to a demand? In addition, mass media production is characterized by involvement by a great deal of people in producing a single text such as a television programme, a newspaper or magazine article or a radio segment. Another problem with the idea of a direct link between media and audience, is that where researchers have shown a direct relationship between what happens in the media and what happens in 'real life' it is not clear how the process works. Why are some people more influenced than others by what they see on TV? Why are we drawn to some programmes and not to others? Cohen (2001) suggests that what really affects behaviour is the degree to which we identify with a character, and the nature of that identification. It is not so simple as identifying with characters because they are of the same gender or age or race as you are. The most profound identification is often on the basis of a sense that an observer and the character share a history – have experiences and feelings in common. Where such identification takes place the borders between the observer and the character become permeable: the observer becomes that character. It is this that makes understanding the relationship between media and society so difficult: like earlier forms of cultural expression it is as much about imagination and fantasy as it is about medium, and these are not easily pinned down.

What makes the mass media so powerful and so different from, e.g, the theatre, is partly the sheer volume possible – millions of people can watch one programme at the same time. Secondly, the possibilities for speaking back are limited – unlike in a theatre where the actors can be addressed directly if one wished. However, audiences do exercise choice. We choose what we will consume and when we will consume – we turn down the sound when the ads come on. What programmes, stations, magazines, newspapers are popular tells something about the ways in which we are imagining ourselves. However, what also makes the media so powerful – like with any form of cultural expression – is the possibility to use it to articulate different aspects of yourself without a sense of conflict (so, for instance, watching cooking and news programmes). Community can be realized and experienced through the mass media. What is important to remember is that, as with other kinds of communities, belonging in one community does not preclude belonging in another.

What is also important to bear in mind is that the media is extremely influential. Although it is difficult to say to what extent exactly, or exactly how, the media is important in how we conceive of our identity, in generating and in subverting stereotypes. For instance, media representations of race and of femininity have marked effects on girls' self-perception (e.g. Milkie, 1999). The frequent representation of black people committing crime has also been shown to influence the ways in which people mis-identify criminals (e.g. Oliver & Ponash, 2002). Racial stereotypes are also common in the ways in which African conflict is portrayed (see e.g. Fair and Astroff's (1991) discussion of South African conflict was represented in the US media). Media stereotype is interesting to social study both in how it produces and how it reflects social norms or social stereotype. For instance, the representation of social risk as it is related to HIV is important in establishing and maintaining stereotype, and researchers often study media representations in order to track how specific stereotypes function (see e.g. Ruiz, 2002; Pigg, 2002; Vitellone, 2002; Worth, 2002; Bardhan, 2001). As powerful as the media is in generating stereotype, it may also be powerful in subverting stereotype, in giving people a chance to speak back to stereotype and so can be a powerful space for exploratory and empowering narratives. This is the case where representations of disabled people are concerned. While mistaken beliefs about people with disabilities are played out in many mass media representations (both fictional and non-fictional) (see e.g. De Negrine, 1992; Poore, 2000; Valentine, 2001; Auslander & Gold, 1999; Thomas & Smith, 2003), the mass media also provide a space for disabled people to describe their own experiences, to mock contemporary taboos about the body and so to claim a voice (Rapp & Ginsburg; 2001; Snyder, 2000).

The first section regarding what South Africans listen to, watch and read is with reference to the All Media Products Survey (2003b). The discussion of reading material is limited to daily newspapers and monthly magazines, but there is also data available on bi-monthly, weekly etc. The data regarding media consumption habits is discussed in relation to race, gender, home language, age and household income group.

This data is representative only to the extent that it reflects what South Africans who consume the media group do. The AMPS data that referred to is valid for the adult South African population of approximately 30 000 000. However, as will be clear in the following discussion, in some categories of media activity there is little consumption in the lowest household income

groups. So, for instance, for magazines the range of interests catered for reflects the interests of higher income groups and has more impact in this social sector. Historically, regional media interests (such as SABC regional radio stations) were quite closely allied to ethnic and/or racial divisions, as defined under apartheid policy. These divisions were reflected regionally due to the policy of separate development, and the restrictions on movement and residency. However, by looking at the information in terms of social grouping, there is the risk of equating the impact of all the media. In order to avoid this media consumption habits have been sketched according to media type below. Finally, it should be noted that disability has not been considered as a demographic category. This is an oversight, not only because an estimated 10 of South Africans are disabled (and more are affected by disability), but because this is an important special interest group. In addition, Deafsign has not been included as one of the home languages, and therefore the data does not reflect this special interest group either (and therefore the extent to which Deaf people are excluded from information broadcast on television).

It should be noted that


- people commonly consume many different forms of media. One person may in one day listen to more than one radio station, watch more than one television channel, read newspapers and magazines and surf the web;
- radio audiences and magazine audiences are considerably smaller than TV and daily newspaper audiences, and internet users form a very small group;

It should also be noted that the **television** data only indicates channels watched, and not programmes watched. Unlike magazines or even to some extent radio stations, television channels cater to a very wide range of audiences that are determined more by the timeslot of programming than the channel. The amount of people watching DSTV/ pay MNET channels and taped or rented material is very small, and viewers are spread out more or less evenly across the other channels. Television audiences are relatively large with SABC 1 garnering the largest audience ( $\pm 15\,500\,000$ ) and eTV the next largest ( $\pm 14\,500\,000$ ). **Radio** audiences are quite small in relation to the total sample. The radio stations with the largest audiences are Ukhosi ( $\pm 5\,000\,000$ ), Metro ( $\pm 3\,000\,000$ ) and Umhloba Wenene ( $\pm 2\,500\,000$ ). **Magazine** audiences are quite small in comparison with other media. The important aspect of magazines is that they indicate far more than the other media data how people are clustered around specific interests. This is because an entire publication is usually targeted at a more specific interest group than is the case with television, newspapers, radio or the internet. In comparison with magazine and

radio audiences, **newspaper** readerships are far larger with the *Sowetan* having the largest readership ( $\pm 4\,300\,000$ ) and the *Sun* the next largest ( $\pm 2\,600\,000$ ). Only approximately 1 300 000 people regularly access the **internet**.

Although race is clearly a factor in what media people choose to consume, it is not the only explanation for the distribution of media consumers. Differences in household income group and, to a lesser extent, home language appear to be as important additional ways of understanding the distribution of media consumers. Eighty percent of SABC 1's viewers are black, and black people form majorities of all other channels except for MNet Open time and DSTV channels. However, only a very small percentage of the overall sample watch these channels. Coloured people form significant percentages (of between 10 and 20) of all the major channels' viewers. Similarly, Indian viewers are spread across the major channels, although forming overall quite small percentages of total audiences.


### TV watched - Race




Racial distribution for newspapers is similar in that, with the notable exception of the *Beeld*, most newspapers have a majority of black readers. This includes the *Business Day*, *Citizen*, and *Daily News*. Somewhat surprisingly, the *Volksblad* has a 34 black readership. Coloured and Indian people form a very small percentage of most newspapers' readers, with the exception of some of the regional newspapers. For instance, Indians form 33 of the *Daily News*' readership, and significant percentages of the *Natal Mercury* and *Witness*. Similarly, Coloured readers form almost half of the readerships of both the *Cape Argus* and *Times*. That Coloured readers also

form a significant proportion of the *Burger's* readers is most probably a function of language rather than race. Similarly, the overwhelmingly white readership of the *Beeld* may be related to its being distributed only in the Free State, and so these figures may be a better indicator of language division than of racial division.


**Daily Newspapers - Race**



**Daily newspapers - Race (excluding Sun & Sowetan)**




In radio, white and black listeners are spread out quite evenly across the major channels. However, the most popular radio stations – the African languages services and Metro Fm - have predominantly black listeners, as can be seen from the graph below.



Coloured and Indian listeners tend to be clustered around fewer stations. White people, like black people, form significant portions of a number of radio station audiences.


### Radio Stations - Race (excl African Languages Services)




Language appears to be a significant indicator as race. For instance, some radio stations have exclusively black audiences: e.g. Lesedi, Wenene Umhloba, and Ukhosi. Similarly, significant numbers of Coloured people listen to Afrikaans radio stations, but share these listenerships with Afrikaans-speaking white people. The only exceptions, where race would appear to be the primary indicator, is Lotus (with an almost exclusively Indian audience (94) and Metro (with a 91 black audience). Region is clearly also a factor, with, for instance, Coloured listeners forming large segments of Radio Good Hope (88) and Kfm listeners (56).

Monthly magazine readerships have quite distinctly racially divided audiences. For instance, *Bona* and *True Love*'s readers tend overwhelmingly to be black. For most other magazines, white readers form the majority. However, these majorities are in most cases not overwhelming, and black people form significant percentages of a large range of magazines. Coloured readers tend slightly more towards Afrikaans magazines, and Indian readers form very small percentages of a very wide range of magazines' audiences. In the graph below, of magazines with mostly female readers, it is clear that white and black readers form by far the majority. The same is true of magazines with mostly male and with male and female readerships.

Monthly magazines - Race (male readership>60%)




However, as with radio listenership, despite the occurrence of racial division in consumption, race is not the only indicator of audience. In the case of magazine readership household income group and gender appear to be more significant indicators. Similarly, despite the fact that 65 of internet users are white and only 22 are black, as can be seen in the graph below.



However, as with magazines and radio, household income is a better indicator.


## Gender

Gender does not appear to be a major factor in audience distribution, except in the case of monthly magazines. However, it should be noted that, in general, slightly more men than women listen to the radio, use the internet (see below) and read newspapers.



Similarly, male readerships of newspapers are consistently higher.


Daily Newspapers - Gender




Within these media women and men are spread more or less equally across radio stations, major TV channels and newspapers. The major exceptions are the *Business Day* (where the readership is 65 male), SAFm (where 66 of listeners are men), and 5Fm (where 62 of listeners are men)<sup>7</sup>. Monthly magazine audiences are sharply divided along gender lines, as can be seen in the two graphs below. The first graph shows magazines with male readerships of over 60 and the second female readerships of over 60.

<sup>7</sup> I have disregarded radio stations that have 1% or less of the total radio audience.

Monthly magazines - Gender (Male readers > 60%)




Monthly magazines - Gender (female readership > 60%)



What is clear above is that the distinctions between male and female audiences in magazines are very sharp. There are few magazines that appeal to both male and female audiences.

Monthly magazines - Gender (cross-gendered audiences)




However, even heterosexual pornographic magazines, do not have an exclusively male or female readership. Special interest magazines, such as sporting magazines, computer magazines and even travel magazines (such as *Getaway*) have predominantly male readers. Fashion, interior decorating and parenting magazines have predominantly female readers.

### Language


Examining language distribution allows for a more nuanced representation of how South Africans group themselves in media consumption than examining racial distribution does. Distribution by home language comes closer to indicating cultural difference than racial distribution does. Language seems in many cases to be a non-negotiable divisor where race, gender and age distributions make for less sharp divisions. So, for instance, 86 of Umhloba Wenene’s listeners speak Xhosa at home, 84 of Ukhosi Fm’s listeners speak Zulu at home, and 88 of Radio Sonder Grense’s listeners speak Afrikaans at home (see graph below).

Radio Stations - Home Language (stations not broadcasting in English)




Similarly, 93 of *Isolezwe's* readers speak Zulu at home, and 84 of the *Burger's* readers have Afrikaans as their home language. Language and region are related to each other as distribution factors. For instance, 82 of the *Daily Dispatch's* readers speak Xhosa at home. Region may explain why 21 of the *Volksblad's* readers are speak South Sotho as a home language.

Daily Newspapers - Home Language (non-English newspapers)




However, it is not only English-speakers who read English-speaking newspapers – note in the graph below how all English newspapers draw a mixed-language audience (especially the *Sowetan*, *Daily Sun*, *Star* and *Citizen* draw an extremely mixed language audience).

Daily Newspapers - Home Language (English newspapers)



The same is true of magazine audiences in that Afrikaans magazines have high percentages of Afrikaans readers. Looking at the graph below, it is more difficult to tell how language impacts in choice of television channels.


TV watched - Home Language



Both SABC 1 and 2 broadcast programming in more languages than just English, and this may account for the relatively high numbers of black people choosing these channels. Slightly more Afrikaans-speaking viewers (35) watch SABC 2, which broadcasts Afrikaans programmes, than watch SABC 1,3 and ETv. In some cases language is clearly related to household income group, as in the case of internet use where most people who accessed the internet over the last week have either English or Afrikaans as a home language.

In the case of internet use, home language clearly intersects with household income group, as can be seen below.


Internet Accessed - Home Language



### Household Income


Household income group is a very revealing way of understanding the differences in audience distribution. It should be noted, though, that the highest income group (R12 000 +) collects together a very wide range of incomes (although a small percentage of the total sample). Monthly magazine readership falls predominantly in two highest income groups. This is not surprising considering the relatively high price of magazines. That magazine consumers are drawn from the highest income groups can also be assumed to reflect the importance placed on expensive leisure activities in the magazines available (e.g. golf, computers).

Monthly Magazines - Household Income Group (male readership > 60%)




Household income group is the most important factor in whether people have access to the internet.

Internet accessed - Household income group



It is not however a significant factor in which television channel is chosen, except in the case of DSTV and MNet Open time.


Television - Household income group



There are no dramatic differences in how many people from different income groups watch TV or do not watch TV. People from higher income groups are less likely not to watch TV though – it seems the more money you make the more likely it is that you will be watching TV tonight. Income group is not a significant factor in determining newspaper readership. It should be noted though that the highest income group predominates in *Business Day* readership, and that very few people from the lowest two income groups read newspapers. However, people from the second, third and fourth income groups (ranging from R500 to R2500) form the bulk of the readership of *Isolezwe*, *Sowetan* and the *Daily Sun*. lowest income group form around 20 of the readerships of *Isolezwe*, the *D F Advertiser*, *Sowetan*, *DailyDispatch*, *Daily Sun* and 10 of the *Volksblad*'s readership.

Age does not appear to be prominent in how media audiences are organized. It is a factor in some magazine audiences (notably FHM), and in some radio stations, which cater specifically for a younger market.

Radio Stations - Age (< 250 000 listeners)



However, the trend is more that media consumers tended somewhat to be between the ages of 24 and 50, with no marked relation to media products. If there were more information about television and radio programming there might be more differentiation regarding age, but newspapers and magazines tend to be targeted but not exclusively geared towards middle age groups.


### Popularity

The most popular television programmes in South Africa for the week 8 August are the soapsies. Generations is the most popular, and Sewende Laan, Isidingo and Egoli also among the most popular programmes. International smackdown (on ETv) is the second most popular programme.

The most popular daily newspaper is the *Sowetan*, followed by the *Sun*. These newspapers are by far more popular than the others.

The most popular radio stations are the African languages services (which claim a listenership of over 50 of all radio listeners). The top ten radio stations Ukhozi, Metro, Lesedi, Motsweding, Thobela, Jakaranda, East Coast Radio, YFM, Radio Sonder Grense and 5Fm.

Most popular radio stations



The most popular monthly magazine is *Bona*, followed by *True Love*. As with newspapers, there is a vast difference between the audiences of the two most popular and the rest of the monthly magazines.

Media consumption is a lens into how South Africans are grouping themselves and how they are imagining identity. There is a necessary tension between expressing unity and diversity, and social justice is best served through maintaining and encouraging the expression of diversity through the mass media. This diversity should be reflected in the people making the media texts, the people appearing in the media texts and in the formal aspects of the media texts themselves.

The data analysed above reflects the divided nature of South African society, but is inconclusive without more information about and analysis of the content of what people are watching, reading and listening to.

South African invest in language identity as language is a very important factor in popularity, and this indicates that language or cultural identity is very important to a number of South Africans. The audiences for radio stations and publications in languages other than English are made up predominantly of home-language speakers in those other languages.

Although audiences are still in some cases polarised along racial lines, Race on its own does not explain audience patterns. It is likely that these polarisations are reinforced by language differences or household income group differences. The *Volksblad* is the most interesting case where looking at race alone is insufficient to understanding the paper's curiously broad-based appeal. Although its readership is largely Afrikaans-speaking, it also has a small but substantial readership among people who speak South Sotho as a home language, and 10 of its readers earn less than R500 per month.

Gender identity is not completely polarised but continues to be organised around stereotypical ideas of masculinity and femininity. The magazine data suggests that South African men and women in higher and middle household income groups still invest in quite stereotypical ways of understanding gender. The data suggests that South African men and women are both willing to buy and read the monthly magazines available on animals, religion, and travel, but not on parenting, décor, fashion or sport. Investigating the gendered nature of audiences for specific radio and television programmes would be more reliable.

Audiences are not generally organised according to age. What about the fact that the AMPS surveys dealing with teenagers and children were not considered? YFM, Metro, 5FM etc must have high teenage listenership. So to teen magazines, TV programmes. This section needs to be reworked.

There are two implications of this finding. The first is that age is not an important part of identity for South Africans as media consumers. This is unlikely to be true, and the second implication is more likely to be true: that age-specific interests are not catered for in any depth by the South African mass media (notwithstanding a lack of information on what television programmes are watched).

Apart from these general findings, there are two aspects of the data that warrant further discussion:

- (i) the overwhelming popularity of a very few stations, newspapers, magazines and channels; and
- (ii) the extent to which less popular stations, newspapers, magazines and channels have quite mixed but uniform audiences.

## Media, Social Cohesion and Social Capital

This discussion is also a discussion of the value of unity and diversity, and of the relationship between social cohesion, social capital and social justice in regard to the South African mass media.

What is immediately apparent from the graphs included above is that in some mediums there are two distinct perspectives from which to look at the data. The problems of scale in presenting, for instance, the radio data is in itself revealing. The audience figures for, for instance, Metro, Ukhosi, Wenene Umhloba, are completely out of proportion with the rest of the radio stations. The interesting demographic detail of the other radio stations is lost in the sheer scale of the difference in audience numbers. The same is true for the magazine results. The interesting detail at the very bottom of the graph is lost in looking at the bigger picture. In some mediums there are two completely different scales of consumership. The fact that this is not the case for the major television stations, and less remarkable for the newspaper readerships, is interesting (and worth investigating) but not necessarily important. That such a marked distinction is possible indicates that there are social schisms or cleavages. It is not clear, nor is it likely, that the difference in consumer patterns is the result of only one social factor. While, as is to be expected, race is clearly an extremely important in how South Africans consume mass media products, a closer look at the data shows that income is also extremely important as language group. That language and income are important social distinctions in South Africa is not surprising, and that they continue to be to some extent coterminous with race is old news. What is perhaps more interesting is that there are indications of a burgeoning group of consumers who share interests across income group and language – the readers of the second most popular newspaper, *Sowetan*, and those listening to Metro Fm (the second most popular radio station). The demographics of this group is similar in composition to that of the most popular TV station – SABC 1. This group may reflect urban interests (and certainly the most popular stations, newspapers and channels are geared towards urban concerns) What is disturbing is that while these hypothetical consumer groups cut across race to some extent, white people (and to some extent Indian people) barely form part of them at all. The cases of the *Sowetan* and Metro Fm are interesting because they are accessible to people who speak only English – although not popular with people who speak only English. This is unlike with the cases where it might be hypothesised that white people or Indian people are absent from certain

consumer groups because of language barriers (such as the readership of *Isolezwe* newspaper or listeners of Wenene Umhloba Fm).

These huge popularity spikes might indicate, on the one hand, that some media texts are getting it completely right. More negatively, it might also suggest that there are too few mass media publications that cater for popular interests. It is difficult to tell without further research into why people choose certain stations, newspapers, channels or magazines over others. However, looking at these huge popularity spikes along with the other overwhelming feature of the data analysed here – namely the great degree of cohesion across the majority of publications – it appears that there is too little diversity catered for in the South African mass media.

The content of the most popular programming is interesting. Soap operas are the most popular programmes and *Generations*, the most popular programme of all, is broadcast on SABC 1 (the most popular TV station). Almost all the most popular programmes are South African productions. This is encouraging as it implies that the generation of a uniquely South African sense of identity. However, *Generations* is not the most South African of the South African soap operas, as it modelled more closely on US soap operas than, for instance, *Isidingo* or *Egoli*. It would be interesting to look more closely at its content: for instance, although the Heritage Day episode mentions the public holiday, it does so only in that it is a public holiday. The question of how to define or celebrate heritage is not raised. Is this slight distancing from overt nation-building a trend in the programme? To what extent does this enable a more nuanced representation of South African identity, or is it a way of making the fantasy of a kind of American South African identity possible?

Although this report has focused on discussing difference within the South African community, the discussion of national cohesion should also include how South Africans are defining themselves in more global terms. A recent report on the representation of immigrants in the printed press shows that xenophobia is alive and well in the South African printed press (Danso & McDonald, 2000). Excluding people is, of course, an excellent way of building social cohesion, and publicly denigrating foreigners is a disturbing but effective way of building social cohesion. This suggests that some care should be taken in how social cohesion is fostered.

Along with the huge popularity spikes discussed earlier, the data also reflects a great degree of cohesion across race, language and gender groups. Looking at lower sections of the graphs, the

detail mentioned earlier, what is immediately apparent is that there is no domination of one group over another. While more men than women are mass media consumers, the difference is in most cases slight, and there are no instances in which either men or women are completely absent from a particular audience. Similarly, most media audiences include people from most of the language groups, and from all the apartheid racial categories. This is encouraging in that it suggests that there are shared interests. However, taken along with other aspects of the data, it might also suggest a disturbing lack of real diversity in media publications.

Apart from the popularity spikes discussed above, the demographics for all the stations, magazines, newspapers and channels are surprisingly similar. This is less the case for television stations than it is for the other forms of media. It suggests that there is not much difference between most of the different forms of media publications. The fact that so many people choose so few publications (in the case of the most popular publications) and that the rest of the publications attract quite homogenous audiences may be reflections of the same phenomenon: a tremendous and disheartening sameness in media publications. That there are very few publications that appeal to the majority of consumers is certainly (as discussed earlier) an indication that some interests are more popular among *producers* (if not consumers). The paucity of publications catering for popular concerns also means that there are very few avenues for expressing certain interests. It also means that there is then a kind of overcrowded enforced sameness about those interests, as they are currently being expressed in the mass media. However, the converse – that there is plenty of room for diversity within certain broader interest groups in the rest of the media publications – does not necessarily hold true. On the contrary, the similarity in the (albeit mixed) audience demographics of the less popular stations, newspapers and magazines suggests that there is not much to choose between these different media publications. There is other data to suggest that there is the possibility that the South African mass media is overwhelmingly homogenous. The data regarding how immigrants are portrayed in the printed press finds that immigrants are portrayed in a very similar negative light across a wide range of publications (including those with the highest and lower audience numbers) (Danso & McDonald, 2000). My own survey of how schools are represented also found remarkable similarity across a range of publications (McDougall, 2004). The magazine data – which offers the most indication of specialised audience interest<sup>8</sup> - suggests that few mainstream interests are catered for over and over again. Of the approximately 60 locally published monthly magazines, those geared specifically at women deal only with fashion, décor

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<sup>8</sup> The data for television and radio do not indicate which programmes people watch.

or children. Magazines geared at men deal with cars, pornography or sport. Again, more information is needed about why people choose the media publications they do, and about what the content is of these media publications. A cursory glance at what is on offer on across a medium suggests that competition takes the form of simply offering variations on a theme – different styles of economic reports rather than something other than economic reports, different sports matches rather than something other than sport, different takes on fashion rather than something other than fashion.

The popularity spikes for some publications and the cohesion across others are related to a general paucity in difference, and this has a negative impact both on fostering social justice and on the accumulation of social capital.

Where the mass media is concerned, too much social cohesion can be a bad thing. A homogenous media producing homogenous programmes and publications is an impoverished media and also ultimately makes for poor social justice. The principle of press freedom is rooted in the understanding that differences of opinion are not only inevitable but also productive. The expression of difference is essential to the project of democracy in South Africa. By difference I do not mean the stagnant categories imposed in apartheid legislation. The expression of differences that cut across the well worn paths of racial difference would be reassuring of the development of a social system that is not polarised racially – as we might well expect it to be, dread that it might be. There is more to this than just the expression of a range of political opinions, or that programming caters to all ages and to both men and women. A healthy media should reflect a continuum of both of opinion and of modes of expression, allowing for stories that are on the edge of what is considered acceptable – pushing out the boundaries of how it is possible to be South African, releasing the strictures on thought and imagination.

Apartheid attempted to limit the South African imagination. For instance, the state reinvented and legislated how to be African, how to be Zulu, how to be Afrikaans. The mass media, like the education system, was part of that exercise in social engineering, and separate channels was part of separate development. Racially specific programming and advertising made some stations whites-only and some blacks-only – and to watch the ‘wrong’ ones was transgressive, subversive even, a small invisible act of defiance. Part of the state control of public imagination was the tight control not only on how race was expressed but on expression in general. The result was the bland local stuff that was the norm. Although an unintended result was the edgy,

powerful and politically subversive material of, for example, Pieter Dirk-Uys and the *Vrye Weekblad*, normal SABC fare was not only political propaganda but dull. Given the paucity of imagination that apartheid sought to institute, it would be tragic indeed if post-apartheid expression were limited only to the inoffensive and to overt nation building. The new programming associated with state social services is, on the contrary, innovative and appealing – *Yizo Yizo* is a particularly good example. This show depicting contemporary township school life is to be commended not only on its excellent editing and camera techniques but on how it provokes public debate about issues like rape.

Ironically, the sense of the sameness of a nation – nation building – relies on a sense of difference. A sense of community is – counter-intuitively – produced in debate and disagreement within that community. In both feminist and disability activism, for instance, a sense of community arises as much out of shared disagreement as it does out of shared experience. The space in which to articulate the experience of being a woman (of being different to a man) is made bigger by the articulation of many different women's different experiences. Disability studies, to move to another example, are generated out of discussion not so much of sameness but of difference within the disabled community. The understanding that while disabled people share certain experiences there are many different ways of experiencing being disabled undermines stereotype. Without that sense of difference within sameness, there is no sameness and the disabled community in all its richness is really absent: like an empty disabled parking space. Equally paradoxically, it is in the expression of difference that there is the possibility for inter-community sameness. When so many different ways of expressing what it means to be disabled are possible, it also becomes clear that nobody is just disabled. I might be disabled and also a mother, also a student. I might be also a filmmaker, also a Joburger, also of Zulu heritage. I might be also a South African.

The interests of social justice are therefore served not only in the most obvious way of promoting messages of social justice in the media, but in opening a space for a range of expression and of experience that is beyond the established range. Too much sameness threatens the social fabric, as it allows for domination of the weaker by the stronger. The historical tendency in the South African mass media is towards the expression of dominant interests, and this is a serious threat to social cohesion, the more so given how polarised South African society is.

Diversity is not expressed in having weird mirror-world stations, channels or programmes – like the apartheid ads where the Omo housewife is black or white on different channels, oblivious of her Zulu, Afrikaans, English counterpart. It is expressed in catering for interests drawn from a larger, more exciting palette than ‘black, white, coloured, indian’ or ‘men, women’ or ‘higher income, lower income’. There should also be room for diverse forms of media texts – for experimental and well as established forms and producers – and for experiment within established forms. It is extremely important that diverse South Africans are given the opportunity, skills, resources and institutional sanction to produce media texts. One way of achieving this is to make support available for community media initiatives (see Hadland & Thorne, 2004), and to encourage employment equity (especially as regards people with disabilities).

The mass media can be instrumental in increasing social capital. The most obvious example of this is simply the possibility in the mass media to inform, to educate and to raise awareness. The mass media can also provide a space for articulating community and for imagining identity. This last is more complex than simply reflecting a ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way of being South African – of reflecting a moral code for important social issues such as HIV/AIDS, racism or the abuse of women.

All the ways in which we understand our identity, our communities, form part of social capital. The media can promote social justice by extending the range of what is popularly understood as the South African experience, and by offering increased more diverse opportunities to narrate the South African experience. This implies an increase in social capital. The wider the parameters of how it is possible to be South African, the easier it is to be South African, and the easier it is to find common ground.

Xenophobia:

### Prevalence of Xenophobia

A study by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation identifies three main areas where xenophobia is demonstrated. The first, the media, both disseminates information about foreigners as well as offers a public platform for comment on foreigners, through letters, talk-shows and television debates.

Lack of research into the ways that the media produce and reproduces public understandings of foreigners; most available research focuses on print media (problematic given the high levels of functional illiteracy and extensive popularity and preference for broadcast media).

Findings suggest that the media perpetuates negative stereotypes about migrants and regularly connects them with crime, poverty and unemployment.

Bias in media reporting favours quoting of officials of the Department of Home Affairs, the SAPS and SANDF and gives little opportunity to migrants or specialist researchers and interest groups to offer counter views. The trend is that while immigrants are much spoken about, they do little talking themselves.

The second is in terms of political statements. Frequently public figures and senior politicians make discriminatory and inflammatory statements about migrants and foreigners.

Some political parties have capitalised on xenophobia (thereby contributing to it) by campaigning for the need to protect South Africans against the threat posed by foreigners to South African's social and economic security.

Senior political figures have demonstrated their xenophobic prejudices through inflammatory statements about foreigners. The previous Minister of Home Affairs stated in Parliament: "if we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme" (quoted in Harris, 2001).

Senior police officers have also lent legitimacy to xenophobic perceptions by linking foreigners with crime. For example, the commander of the Brixton murder and robbery unit has claimed that "at least 60% of bank robberies and serious house robberies [are] perpetrated by Zimbabweans" within the Johannesburg region".<sup>9</sup> However, arrest figures do not substantiate this claim.

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<sup>9</sup> Bronwyn Harris, "A Foreign Experience: Violence, Crime and Xenophobia during South Africa's Transition," *Violence and Transition*, 5 (August 2001).

	No. of Arrests	% RSA	% Zimb	% Mozam	% Unknown	% Other
Murder	11 884	97.9	0.1	0.3	1.3	0.4
Attempted murder	8 795	98.9	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3
Robbery (aggravating circumstances)	15 259	97.4	0.4	0.4	1.4	0.4
Rape	20 480	98.8	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.3
Assault GBH	73 617	98.9	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.4
Common assault	34 719	98.9	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.4
Burglary - R	37 949	98.6	0.1	0.4	0.6	0.3
Burglary - B	19 800	98.3	0.1	0.4	0.7	0.5
Other robbery	12 988	98.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6
Illegal possession of firearms	9 162	97.3	0.2	0.2	1.2	1.1
Drug-related crime	37 104	96.2	0.1	0.2	1.5	2.0
Car-jacking	1 663	97.6	0.2	0.7	1.0	0.5
Robbery-cash in transit	31	81.0	0	0	19.0	0.0
Bank robbery	132	87.1	3.8	0	9.1	0

Bronwyn Harris, "A Foreign Experience: Violence, Crime and Xenophobia during South Africa's Transition," *Violence and Transition*, 5 (August 2001).

When considering these statistics, it is important to remember that foreigners are more likely to be arrested than locals and that arrest does not indicate guilt.

The third area is in terms of public violence and vigilantism. Many South Africans have no contact with foreigners; most South Africans have very little knowledge of the rights accorded to refugees and migrants in SA; most South Africans demonstrate a marked lack of concern about the plight of refugees and migrants in SA. Yet, the South African public holds largely negative attitudes and perceptions of foreigners.

Public action against foreigners is usually linked with perceptions that foreigners are a threat to social and economic security; they commit crime and take jobs. Public action against foreigners is common in the informal sector. For example, the African Chamber of Hawkers and Independent Businessmen has been active in agitating against foreigners. The Unemployed Masses of South Africa (UMSA) is another body that has been linked to public acts of violence against foreigners.

Incidents of violence and vigilantism often follow public gatherings and marches. For example, the widely reported train murder of two Senegalese and one Mozambican in 1998 followed a UMSA march against unemployment.

More spontaneous and localised attacks and displays of hostility are frequently reported on trans and taxis.

### Resistance to Xenophobia

There has been some resistance to xenophobia, often linked with compassion for migrant's plight and advocacy for refugee's rights.

Public outrage at images of police dogs being set on undocumented migrants helped to initiate a public debate on the issue, though the prominence of this debate has declined without any apparent decline in the incidences of violence against foreigners or adjustment in the xenophobic attitudes of the public at large.

Organisations and bodies prominent in the struggle against xenophobia include the SAHRC, the UNHCR, and the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA).

Xenophobia in South Africa is insidious in the way that it builds high levels of bonding social capital between South Africans to the detriment of non-South Africans. It could be argued that the strength of this kind of horizontal social capital is a powerful impediment to efforts to build vertical bridging social capital orientated toward promoting social justice, for South Africans as well as foreigners in South Africa.

To shift this trend toward a social justice that is not exclusive requires transforming this inverse relationship between horizontal and vertical dimensions of xenophobia. To do this effectively require substantially more research to critically examine the intersections between vertical and horizontal dimensions of xenophobia in South Africa.

## Intellectual and cultural life

### Introduction

All societies and social groups have social capital in some form. There is a critical difference between the social capital available within closely bonded local groups, and the social capital available across lines of difference in a nation. The key measure of social capital is the experience of identity. Local social capitals value identity within the bonds of sameness and stress the lines of difference between groups. Effective national social capital secures and values both local and national identity-building bonds across lines of difference. Social cohesion and social justice are the potential products of rich national social capital and provide the basis for full social development.

South Africa has large stocks of local social capital circulating within localised groups but has only a limited stock of national social capital circulating through the society as a whole. The imbalance is the product of a history of division.

The section of the report disaggregates the dataset which gives the above figures in two statistical tables; namely by language usually spoken at home and by highest educational qualification, revealing the chasm between people with matric and a home language of English or Afrikaans, and those who are without matric and speak African vernaculars.

On the basis of this evidence of division the report argues that social cohesion and social justice can best be developed through major investment in national public culture aimed at the construction of inclusive national identity.

Tables given in the paper explore the relative strengths of African culture, 'the Western World' and the 'Rainbow Nation' for the construction of present identities among both the marginalised and the mainstream.

The inference drawn from a comparison of the tables is that new South African public culture has made considerable ground in stabilising a national identity across the divisions. It made its beginning in the TRC process and its first major achievement was the signing into law of the new constitution.

Through a case study of the music industry, the report demonstrates that even within the terms of the consumer market there is evidence that younger audiences are crossing the divisions of taste which split the music audience of former times.

..'what is especially interesting is the strong overlap in the 16-24 year old group between the 'core genres' of House, Rap, Hip-Hop and Reggae. The report suggests that 'together these constitute a contemporary urban sound' and represent a growing audience'<sup>10</sup>.

The formation of a vibrant public culture cannot be left solely to the market because the market will tend to follow the mainstream and further exclude the marginalised groups.

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<sup>10</sup> The South African Music Industry: Trends Analysis and Questions Commissioned paper for HSRC

## Social capital

Social capital cannot be found in a treasury or a bank. Its currency is culture. Culture stores the life practices and assumptions of a people. Culture circulates between individuals, families, groups, institutions and throughout the society as a whole. Culture forms and regulates the ways people live together. Its most powerful form of regulation is informal, silent and taken for granted. Social capital is first minted in the family, where adult parents, generally without realising it, transmit their own history and the culture of their life world to their children. The child inherits a framework for making sense of life, building an identity and realising the boundaries of difference.

South Africa has vast stocks of local social capital but it is largely the social capital of difference; capital whose value is exclusive to a group, such as a vernacular language. These local cultures fall within the lines of division that come from our history. They provide localised forms of identity but at the cost of narrow boundaries which emphasise difference – white from black, men from women, Xhosa from Zulu, Christian from Muslim, while the eleven official languages provide powerful identity boundaries. The society as a whole has only very limited stocks of national social capital. The circulation of local culture currencies is intense and powerful; there is only a weak national intellectual and cultural currency. This is the fundamental problem of South African social capital, and thus social development in the country.

The critical statistic reflecting the position is taken from an analysis of the HRSC EPOP Survey of 2001<sup>i</sup>. The factor analysis examined the data in terms of social cleavages distinguishing overall between a population considered to have access to the mainstream of social life and a population considered to be excluded from the mainstream. The figures drawn across ten variables give the following result

55.2% of the total population are excluded from the mainstream  
44.8% of the total population have access to the mainstream.

The lines of division are a great deal more stark when the data is disaggregated in terms of home language.

### What language do you speak mostly at home? \* FACTOR Crosstabulation

% within What language do you speak mostly at home?

		FACTOR		Total
		1.00	2.00	
What language do you speak mostly at home?	Sesotho	71.5%	28.5%	100.0%
	Setswana	63.2%	36.8%	100.0%
	Sepedi	77.0%	23.0%	100.0%
	Siswati	91.2%	8.8%	100.0%
	IsiNdebele	81.5%	18.5%	100.0%
	IsiXhosa	70.2%	29.8%	100.0%
	IsiZulu	65.7%	34.3%	100.0%
	Xitsonga	80.2%	19.8%	100.0%
	Tshivenda/Le mba	79.4%	20.6%	100.0%
	Afrikaans	8.9%	91.1%	100.0%
	English	.1%	99.9%	100.0%
	Other African language	100.0%		100.0%
	European language		100.0%	100.0%
	Indian language		100.0%	100.0%
Other (specify)	27.2%	72.8%	100.0%	
Total	55.2%	44.8%	100.0%	

The figures under Factor 1 reflect the extent to which a particular language community experience the conditions of marginalisation from the mainstream of the society - i.e.: 70.2% of home language Xhosa speakers are at the margin.

The figures under Factor 2 reflect the extent to which the various language communities experience the conditions of the mainstream. In the case of Xhosa speakers the percentage is 29.8%.

The most dramatic evidence from the disaggregated table is the huge gap between the African vernacular languages and Afrikaans and English.

Care however needs to be taken not to over-read the figures. Each percentage figure is drawn from the specific language population and in the case of, say, Siswati the population is small. No allowance is made for the size or the race of the language groups. The English speaking community will certainly include many people who are neither white nor of English South African descent.

Perhaps the key inferences to be drawn from the language data for the purposes of considering social cohesion and social capital are that the most viable form of national linguistic capital is found in the imported languages, but that the marginalised vernacular

language populations still constitute the majority of the total population (55.2% as against 44.8%)

A roughly similar pattern emerges from the data disaggregated and factorised for educational qualification

**What is your highest educational qualification? \* FACTOR Crosstabulation**

% within What is your highest educational qualification?

		FACTOR		Total
		1.00	2.00	
What is your highest educational qualification?	None	84.5%	15.5%	100.0%
	Primary	74.6%	25.4%	100.0%
	Grade 8 to grade 11 (std 6 to std 9)	50.8%	49.2%	100.0%
	Grade 12 (std 10)	30.8%	69.2%	100.0%
	Post-matric certificate or diploma	13.9%	86.1%	100.0%
	Degree	5.6%	94.4%	100.0%
	Other (specify)	8.7%	91.3%	100.0%
Total		55.2%	44.8%	100.0%

In this set the critical point is reached at the Grade 12 level. Levels lower than Grade 12 all show a majority percentages on the marginal side, with the figure increasing as the qualification level falls. However after grade 12 the majority percentages shift rapidly upwards through the qualification structures on the mainstream side of the cleavage. However it must always be borne in mind that the majority of the whole population remain on the marginalised side – the 55.2% figure is a constant

Social cohesion

The figures set out above clearly demonstrate the problem of social cohesion. A society in which the majority of the population experience their existence as marginal to mainstream energies and resources cannot sustain itself over the longer term.

The direction for social capital growth and development is clear enough. What is required is a national intellectual and cultural currency which will be able to acknowledge differences between the local cultures at the same time that it secures an identity form for individuals within the larger boundary which defines South Africans. The question is how is this to be achieved?

The answer will take many forms, as the Social Cohesion project as a whole demonstrates, but it is vital first to grasp the fact that the period between 1990 and 1994 opened an entirely new narrative of South African life. Formal citizenship for all, guaranteed by a new constitution, gave closure to the 300 year history of domination and exclusion and opened the first chapter of the new national narrative. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission saw the creation of a public space in which for the first time the violent differences of the past could be brought together within the framework of a new order. The formulation and acceptance of the Constitution was the first great act of the new national public culture.<sup>ii</sup> It is the task of public intellectual culture to

carry the new national narrative further into the lived experience of South Africans. Its goal is to provide a new national cultural currency of social capital.

In this task the role of intellectual and cultural activity is to use the resources of formal, organised, culture to interact with the informal cultures of the localised and divided groups of the population. Local informal cultures are deeply embedded in their contexts and fiercely guarded. It will be neither a simple nor speedy process to draw them into a vibrant and responsive national culture in which everyone participates.

### Social justice

There are strong links between the concepts of social capital, social cohesion and social justice. A society well endowed with social capital in the form of a rich intellectual and cultural life is able to project to its citizens a compelling vision of its national purpose and identity. The projection of such a social imaginary makes it possible for citizens to balance their experience of their immediate local linguistic, ethnic and historical cultures against their experience as South African citizens. The national social imaginary gives the intellectual means through which the intentions of the constitution can be realised in the ordinary lives of the people. The imaginary offers a national identity in which the local cultures can find a home. Social capital in this form is the foundation of social cohesion. People recognise themselves as South Africans sharing a common destiny at the same time that they recognise their different pasts.

Social Justice is a normative concept which employs available social capital to balance the claims of one local culture against another, or the claims of a local culture against the norms of the national culture. Inevitably, as the foundation of South African national public culture, it is the constitution which will provide the framework for evaluating the different claims but it is the available social capital which will test the implementation of any normative judgements in the real conditions of daily life.

### Identity Construction in South Africa

HSRC MAPP has interrogated datasets on the significance of factors in current identity construction. The crosstabulations given below follow the same factorisation as the tables given earlier which divided the population samples along the marginal/mainstream cleavage. Factor 1 remains the marginal group and Factor 2 the mainstream. The identity questions are posed in the form of affiliations to Africa, the western world and the 'rainbow nation' as social imaginaries. 'Africa' and 'the western world' clearly present different distant social imaginaries; the 'Rainbow Nation' poses a closer potential imaginary.

### Importance of African culture for sense of identity \* FACTOR Crosstabulation

% within Importance of African culture for sense of identity

		FACTOR		Total
		1.00	2.00	
Importance of African culture for sense of identity	Very important	61.3%	38.7%	100.0%
	Reasonably important	52.5%	47.5%	100.0%
	Uncertain/ Don't know	45.9%	54.1%	100.0%
	Reasonably unimportant	31.5%	68.5%	100.0%
	Totally unimportant	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%
Total		55.2%	44.8%	100.0%

There are several surprising and interesting features to the table given above. Among them are the following

- the almost exact balance within the marginal factor (1) of those who think African culture is 'very important' and those who think it is 'totally unimportant' (61% for both scores)
- the similar balance of scores for importance/unimportance among the mainstream factor
- the near correlation in the percentage figures in the 'middle' ('reasonably important', 'uncertain/don't know' and 'reasonably unimportant') categories for both sides of the cleavage line.

An inference which can be drawn from these unexpected balances is that African culture is not in and of itself a critical issue of cleavage in the population. It is not an affiliation which threatens social cohesion and it represents a form of social capital available for negotiation between the margins and the mainstream.

### Importance of The western world for sense of identity \* FACTOR Crosstabulation

% within Importance of The western world for sense of identity

		FACTOR		Total
		1.00	2.00	
Importance of The western world for sense of identity	Very important	37.3%	62.7%	100.0%
	Reasonably important	48.2%	51.8%	100.0%
	Uncertain/ Don't know	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%
	Reasonably unimportant	61.7%	38.3%	100.0%
	Totally unimportant	68.0%	32.0%	100.0%
Total		55.2%	44.8%	100.0%

Affiliations to 'the western world' are more polarised at the extreme positions than in the case of African culture. A rough ratio of 2 to 1 characterises both the 'very important' and the 'totally unimportant' samples with the mainstream positive and the marginal negative.

An inference might be that 'the western world' is further away and less reachable as an imaginary for a large percentage of the marginal factor. This would be confirmed by the high percentages in the 'middle categories' on the marginal side – the percentage among the 'Uncertain/don't know' group is nearly as high as those who think it 'totally unimportant'.

In terms of social cohesion the figures describing the degree of affiliation to 'the western world' imaginary indicate a sharp cleavage in the society. 'The western world' is plainly an important source of cultural capital for the mainstream factor, and equally plainly it is rejected as 'totally unimportant' by a substantial percentage of the marginal factor. There must be some doubt about the potentials for building social capital through a negotiation of the divide on 'the western world'.

**Importance of The South African 'rainbow' nation for sense of identity \* FACTOR Crosstabulation**

% within Importance of The South African 'rainbow' nation for sense of identity

		FACTOR		Total
		1.00	2.00	
Importance of The South African 'rainbow' nation for sense of identity	Very important	56.1%	43.9%	100.0%
	Reasonably important	55.2%	44.8%	100.0%
	Uncertain/ Don't know	52.7%	47.3%	100.0%
	Reasonably unimportant	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
	Totally unimportant	37.9%	62.1%	100.0%
Total		55.3%	44.7%	100.0%

Possibly the most interesting of all the tables, especially when read with the previous two, is the extent of the affiliation felt with the 'new' South African imaginary as figured in the idea of a 'rainbow nation'.

Only one category registers a sharp cleavage – those that think the 'rainbow nation' is 'totally unimportant'. 62.1% of the mainstream factor share that view while only 37.9% of the marginalised regard it as totally unimportant to them.

The remainder of the categories show a fairly steady 50% - 40% symmetry which configures closely to the total percentages for marginal and mainstream factors. This seem to suggest that the 'rainbow nation' has made considerable ground in stabilising a national identity. This must surely be good news in terms of social cohesion and social capital, especially when read against all of the previous tables including the language and education cleavages. The marginalised value the identity resources more than the mainstream but there are healthy percentages in the mainstream who are ready to participate in the new identity.


## The Music Industry

The HSRC Social Cohesion project commissioned studies in five fields of intellectual and cultural activity - the Film and Television Industry, the Music Industry, the Book Industry, the Craft Sector, the Heritage Sector and the public Media. The principal methodology employed in the studies was value-chain analysis with the goal of empirically demonstrating the economic contribution of each industry to the national economy. In addition, the project identified the key problems experienced in each field through an extended process of consultation with principal role players. The key problem statements were as follows:-


Heritage	The lack of public ownership of the sector
Book Industry	The lack of distribution and consumption of books among the majority of the population.
Film and TV	The lack of supply of a distributable product
Craft	The lack of supply of a quality product
Music	The lack of cultural entrepreneurship and professionalism.

The data generated by the studies profiled the culture industries within the dominant economic discourse. However as the debates over the processes of social development and cohesion have intensified it has become clear that a broader discourse of social capital and social justice should accompany the economic account.

This report on the Music Industry gives important insight into the broader perspective. Data for the study was gathered from the bi-annual All Media and Products Survey (AMPS 2003) of the South African Advertising Research Foundation and analysed in terms of the patterns of consumption of music of different genres. Further analysis disaggregated the data sets by race and age. The relevant results are given graphically on the following pages.



**Figure 1: Top 10 genres that 16+ adults are interested in, in South Africa**



**Figure 2: Top 5 genres by percentage of 16+ adult population disaggregated by race and by expression of interest (Source: AMPS 2003A, own analysis)**




Figure 3: Top 5 genres by percentage of 16-24 year-old youth disaggregated by expressed interest and by race. (Source: AMPS 2003a).<sup>iii</sup>

The results are in one way startling, and in another unsurprising. The massive dominance of Gospel music, for all groups, is startling in itself, but much more interesting is the position of Kwaito, which, as the paper says 'is a relatively recent genre', and becomes the second overall genre choice – next after gospel. In the 16-24 age group Kwaito scores equally with Gospel.

What is not surprising is the selection which different race and age groups make among the different genres. The choices plainly reflect the divisions between 'local cultures' as they have been described above. However what is especially interesting is the strong overlap in the 16-24 year old group between the 'core genres' of House, Rap, Hip-Hop and Reggae. The paper suggests that 'together these constitute a contemporary urban sound' and represent a growing audience.

The study draws the following inferences from the data.

“First, people’s social and cultural experiences shape the genres that are likely to interest them. Young people are much more inclined to like kwaito and hip-hop than older generations;

Second, the social separation that apartheid enforced meant that musical trends very rarely ‘crossed over’ and it is only amongst younger South Africans that we are seeing a more common musical taste emerging. However even within this movement, language and therefore the ‘accessibility’ of the music continues to limit the popularity of genres across racial lines;

Third that the economic inequalities that resulted from apartheid have served to distort the influence of South African music within the overall music industry as genres in which the domestic industry is stronger (kwaito and gospel) have tended to be the music of

choice for black consumers who continue to have lower levels of disposable income than white consumers.

The changing income distribution within South Africa holds considerable promise for the industry as black South African's ability to purchase music increases; and

Changing patterns of social interaction which both allow for increasingly common experiences that are in turn reflected in music.”<sup>iv</sup>

The Music study is important in the general Arts and Culture context for the account given above which shows significant trends in consumption, but it is also important for another different reason. The author focuses on the consumer as the critical link between the economic activity of the industry and social culture.

Culture is important to understanding the music industry because culture is important to the consumer. Culture understood as the composite of language, personal identity, history, memory, space and time are all critical determinants in the purchase of music. People purchase music for a multitude of reasons but at its simplest level music is purchased because it ties into some sense of a consumer's personal identity that is in turn derived from the language that they speak, their experiences, the experiences of their friends and family, the music What they've been exposed to and a multitude of other variables. A focus on culture, therefore, is important because it is in fact a focus on patterns of consumption that serve to shape and drive the music industry.<sup>v</sup>

This passage sets out the vital connections between the market, the industry, the economy and culture. The critical point of connection is personal identity, which is where culture manifests itself. The analysis of the trends shows clearly that music (and hence culture) has the capacity to develop new forms of identity across the divisions of the past. The 'core genres' of rap, hip-hop and reggae are, in other words, building what has been termed national social capital.

The market is an enormous resource for building social capital but it has serious limits. Its first interest is in accumulating private financial capital. The representations of modern lifestyles which it employs to generate revenue and profit (as in 'the urban sound' referred to in the Music study) are most often directed toward private patterns of consumption and competitive behaviour. Markets create and affirm identity by exploiting difference. National social capital, by contrast, requires a *public* culture, which will reach beyond the market; a culture which creates and affirms identity at the same time that it celebrates difference. The creation of such a public culture is the role of formal arts and culture in the national life bearing in mind that the AMPS 2002 survey revealed that 5.4% of the adult population attended a live music concert in that year.<sup>vi</sup>

The Conditions for Public Culture.

A public culture needs three sets of conditions to flourish and build social capital.

- public spaces
- stable partnerships in cultural production and consumption

- creative artists

## Public Spaces

Among the many horrors of the apartheid era was the determined prohibition of public spaces in the environment where people could participate freely in following their interests and sharing their pleasures; where people could encounter social difference and find it stimulating. The policy has obviously changed for the better but the legacy had been built into the environment and will take many generations to replace. It is not possible to quickly overcome the social disaster of residential segregation, but there is much that can be done in the creation of new public spaces. The process is already well underway with the deracialisation of public institutions and precincts and the construction of major new public projects (Constitution Hill and Freedom Park are examples) but there is a long way to go. Public spaces in the built environment must remain a policy priority for the government as a whole.

Public space is however not simply a matter of the built environment. Possibly even more important from a cultural perspective, are spaces of representation. Here the key institutional environment is the halls, theatres, cinemas, churches, museums, galleries, schools and universities as well as the public media of radio, television, books, magazines and newspapers. Representational space can be anywhere where the conditions and potentials of life can be depicted. In the present representational arena the market is clearly dominant. Advertising generates the most powerful forms of description and has a massive impact on the cultural life patterns of the population; it dominates the public media through its creative products and its massive revenues, and it offers compelling images of personal identity. Its failure, from a social capital perspective, is that the drive for profit turns it away from anything that is not linked to a saleable commodity. It ignores the marginal and the poor and it cannot afford to stimulate thought and enrich feeling without a connection to the consumption of goods.

Competition for the available public spaces of representation is intense. It is the space in which the society communicates with itself and there are many voices wanting to make themselves heard - to sell, to persuade, to celebrate, to warn, to cajole, even to forbid. Political life holds a commanding position in the contest to be heard – and the ruling party commands political life. Any ruling party naturally seeks to present itself as the embodiment of the past, present and future of the national narrative and to dominate, even monopolise, the public dialogue. But public space must be kept open if the interactions between local and national cultures are to be encouraged. A national narrative can never be identical with the narrative of a single party. The interests of long term governance of the society lie in building social cohesion and national social capital through a polycentric dialogue rather than monological representation.

Stable partnerships in cultural production and consumption.

Cultural producers are to be distinguished here from creative artists. What is in view is the extensive field of institutions, agencies, associations, entrepreneurs and individuals who trade in cultural products. They operate in a market but it is not the mass commodity market. Their goods run from things like plays, musical events, books, paintings, and films, to craft objects and media programmes. They are critical to the culture industry but their primary interest is not in the accumulation of financial capital. It would be more accurate to describe their engagement with the public as trading in intellectual capital. The cumulative effects of their activity is the accumulation of social capital. The HSRC study of the Craft Sector identifies these cultural producers as 'the middle-men' between the suppliers and the consumers and places great emphasis on their importance for the creation and distribution of craft objects.

The 'middleman' or intermediary is actually a critical cog in many industries. Without the much-maligned 'middleman' rural craft simply doesn't stand a chance of making it into wider or urban markets. The intermediary role is key, and it's costly... this role has high costs and if we expect it to be done out of solidarity alone we will never grow the potential of this sector.<sup>vii</sup>

The importance of the 'middlemen' can hardly be overestimated in any of the sectors analysed in the studies. Among the critical 'middle' group are museum and gallery curators, print and electronic media editors, journalists, event planners and managers, designers, publishers – anyone in fact who is in a position to survey, interpret, select, compose and present cultural work. And the same applies to the spaces and places where the presentations can be made – galleries, museums, city streets, community centres, public buildings, newspapers and magazines, radio and TV, cultural festivals and celebrations. It is in the 'middle' – between producer and consumer - where the creative interpretation of public purpose can take place and where it can be linked to representations of sociality. These are institutions and operations of the highest value in the creation of a national culture which interacts with the local informal cultures of the country. Generally speaking they operate off low budgets and produce high quality services.

Two key points need to be registered in this context. The first is that effective support decisions require detailed professional understanding of each field. Funding by formula, is no substitute for a thorough grasp of the inner dynamics and processes of building an inclusive national culture. The second is that however appropriate a decision might be and however well-intentioned the planned support, the cultural production will come to nothing if the systems for delivering support are not accountable, simple, speedy and stable over time.

The Grahamstown National Arts Festival offers an instructive case history. We will not rehearse here the full scope of the Festival organisation, nor the widely expressed critiques of the Festival, but focus instead on what the influential cultural journalist Robert Greig considered necessary to carry through the improvements needed to fulfil the Festival's potentials.<sup>viii</sup>

Greig identified 10 forms of change needed and the conditions required to put them in place.

1. Security of tenure – money that will guarantee a five year planned programme
2. Formal status such as SAA or the HSRC. A form of parastatal under professional direction.
3. A strengthened administration – with a sound succession plan for Black direction and management.
4. A more flexible pricing structure to attract new younger audiences – a special subsidy to achieve the result.
5. Flexible pricing should also reduce the ticket cost of expensive shows to poorer people.
6. Modernised booking and payment procedures.
7. Less focus on Anglocentric shows and more on work from Africa and Latin America.

8. Wider commissioning of artists and performers – only possible with a five-year budget plan.
9. Funding for artists of proven record – at present funding favours novices.
10. A need to experiment and innovate in the programme – only possible with a five year budget plan.

In essence what Greig is calling for is a stable partnership between the Festival organisation and the state bodies responsible for cultural and intellectual life. The state provides the security of tenure for the Festival as conceived and operated by its professional staff under its Board. The goal would be to draw local South African cultures into contact with national and international presentations. Contact of this sort already takes place at the Festival but it requires intense planning over a long period and a secure financial base to work from. The Festival provides a good example of the important 'middle' role which the DAC is responsible for supporting. The present arrangement in which the NAC gives a grant of R1 Million annually to the Festival is an important start but with an annual budget in excess of R13 Million much must be done to secure the tenure of the Festival. Only successful and sustained support will help to build long term social capital.

#### Creative Artists.

Greig identifies support for 'artists of proven record' as an important component for promoting cultural innovation. It is through the hands of creative artists that the culture renews itself. They are the source from which the vision of the future flows. They are concerned with making new forms of representation through which we can understand who we are, where we have come from and the direction in which we are moving. They provide the psychic and material base on which the formal culture of the country constructs itself. They are the tap root which penetrates deep into the subsoils of local cultures which they recontextualise and reinterpret in the forms of contemporary global experience. The painter Zwelethu Mthethwa put the point this way

In South Africa, culture – although it has played a major role in liberation – is no longer at the forefront anymore. There are a number of reasons why. The first is that as a country, we always looked outside of ourselves. We've always used overseas references when it comes to music fashion, movies, even when it comes to language. In architecture it is the same. We neglected who we are.

We tried to fit in, to be like Europeans, to be like Americans. But we never can be. And its unfortunate because that is what the previous government enforced. And now we are sitting with the problem of changing.

...the (few) artists who are making it internationally have managed to look deep down inside themselves and they are very loyal to their identities and the country they come from. This makes them very different to their international counterpart artists. The South Africans have something to offer.<sup>ix</sup>

Art and culture played a very important role in shaping and directing the narrative of the struggle against apartheid but the conceptual and psychic challenges which the society now confronts are very different. There are worrying signs that the present public culture is having difficulty in

going beyond the culture of the struggle and that it is being trapped into reproducing worn out forms and narratives. Only creative artists, both novices and established individuals, have the capacity to break the representational frames of the past and take the new national narrative forward.

#### Indicators for the Measurement of Intellectual and Cultural Life

The culture industries play an important role in the economic life of the country and that role will increase as 'the information economy' continues to grow. This paper has argued that there is a different, perhaps even more important role for arts and culture in the development of the country. The role has been defined in terms of building social capital and the paper has focused some of the terms and conditions which will assist the DAC in building the confidence of government as a whole in placing long term investment into arts and culture.

The measurement of the effectiveness of state investment in intellectual and cultural life is obviously critical to developing sound policies and practices and any such measurement requires the specification of indicators to determine the dynamics and trends within the field over time.

There is a vast amount of published research on indicators of cultural life. The UNESCO World Culture Report presents 30 tables of indicators and measurements covering cultural activities and trends, cultural practices and heritage, cultural trade and communication trends, state ratifications of cultural rights declarations, translations and cultural contexts. The surveys are international and give comparative figures across the full range of indicators. The problem however with the international comparative figures is that they do not make it possible to follow the internal trends and capacities of any national or local culture.

#### Indicators for South African Intellectual and Cultural Life

This proposal issues from the argument developed in this paper that the trends of the South African cultural and intellectual can most readily be seen and measured through the shifts in personal and group identity.

This is not in any way surprising. The simultaneous impact of global capitalism and local political transformation has thoroughly disembedded the frozen identities of the apartheid period. The process is visible from the apex of the society in government and the private sector, to its lower reaches in the massive new urban environments. The essence of the proposal made here is that some simple indicators of the directions of change in intellectual and cultural life can be defined in terms of new identity construction.

The research background to the proposal is taken from the work of sociologist Basil Bernstein<sup>x</sup>. Bernstein posits two basic forms of new identity construction – retrospective and prospective. The first seeks to anchor the new identity in a narrative drawn from the past. The second looks to establish a new identity by projecting a narrative into the future. The first is more concerned with establishing security of identity – the second more concerned with transforming identity into the future.

Pursuing his categories further Bernstein identifies two dominant narrative forms of the past for retrospective identity formation. One is the narrative of fundamentalism whether religious or populist; the other is the narrative of elite formal culture. Each constructs a version of the past in which the individual self can construct a secure form of identity.

Prospective identity projects a narrative of some future self in solidarity with others of the same taste and persuasion. Strong influences in the formation of projective narratives are gender and race solidarities as well as strongly defined popular culture movements (eg: rap, hip-hop, reggae).

Our submission is that Bernstein's identity formation grid offers the means of defining simple indicators. These are the suggestions:-

1. Measurement of arts festivals – annual measure of the number of festivals, the total attendance at each, disaggregated for race and age, and the total income and expenditure of the festival
2. Measurement of charismatic/fundamentalist religious institutions – annual measure of number of institutions, total congregations of each disaggregated for race and age, and total income and expenditure.
3. Measurement of trends in consumption of music – the present form of the study to be repeated annually.

The rationale behind the selection is simple enough. The first will answer the question whether there is a pattern of growth or decline in the extent and influence of national formal culture. The second will indicate whether there is growth or decline in the most powerful form of local culture. The third will indicate growth or decline in broader more national forms of popular culture.

Gathered over a period of three years, the assumption is that the data would enable us to see the degree of progress that the country is making in the building of national social capital because we would be able to assess the shifts in the forms of identity construction. The festivals would be taken as proxies for national intellectual and cultural life; fundamentalist institutions would be taken as proxies for intense local bonding and the music industry would be taken as proxy for a market-based movement.

## Findings

This area of focus presents a mixed set of findings. This is largely because of the paucity of data and the poor quality of available data. Far more research needs to be undertaken into the identity, values, attitudes, perceptions, hopes, prejudices and fears of people. This can only be done through surveys. Generally surveys undertaken are quite problematic, either because of the sample of people surveyed or because of the interviewing process. The resources needed to conduct such an exercise are significant and a decision would have to be taken on whether to spend these.

## Social cohesion

In this respect the findings are mixed. At one level people identify strongly with one another as South Africans. At another level, perceptions in terms of race, point to deep cleavages. That there is little racial violence is an indicator of the fact that these cleavages are superficial, that is, do not impact on the daily lives of people. This could be a reflection of geography, social distance and other factors. Sporadic racial incidents, whether at schools or in residential areas, point to an underlying tension in society that needs further investigation. There is still little social

interaction between people of different races and as few white South Africans speak African languages not interactions take place in a particular power relationship that militates against free expression of views by the majority. Violence against women and children points to the effect of cleavage when social distance is not present. This is clearly an area of concern that needs ongoing attention.

#### Social capital

It is harder to assess what social capital exists, if any, in terms of these issues. There is clearly high group social capital, whether one defines groups as along linguistic, ethnic, geographical or any other line. Between such groups it is harder to say.

#### Social justice

If the measure of social justice here is the extent to which people are free of the vagaries of others, then there is clearly a long way to go in this regard. The constitution does give legal protection, within clear boundaries, to all in terms of values, attitudes, etc. But actioning these in society is another matter. There are anomalies, such as on issues of abortion and the death penalty, where indications are that the majority do not accept the current legal position on these as correct. But since there is little opposition to the status quo, it is tempting to conclude that more is made of such issues by lobbyists than the actual importance of these in peoples' daily lives.

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<sup>i</sup> Data Mining to Determine What Holds Us Together Unpublished Paper SAMM HSRC

<sup>ii</sup> *Inside and Outside: On the Nature of the public and Public Art in Contemporary South Africa (2002)* C. Jane Taylor. Faculty of Arts University of the Witwatersrand. Mimeo.

<sup>iii</sup> All graphics and headings from *The South African Music Industry* HSRC

<sup>iv</sup> *The South African Music Industry: Trend, Analysis and Questions* Karl Gostner HSRC Report

<sup>v</sup> *ibid*

<sup>vi</sup> *The Kwaito Nation* Karl Gostner 2002 Cultural Observatory HSRC

<sup>vii</sup> The South African Craft Sector HSRC Commissioned Paper 2004

<sup>viii</sup> *Arts Festival in Desperate need of Innovation* Robert Greig: The Sunday Independent 18/07/04

<sup>ix</sup> Interview reported in the Sunday Independent 15/08/04

<sup>x</sup> *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity* Basil Bernstein Taylor and Francis London 1996

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## **OCCUPATIONAL JUSTICE: AN INDICATOR OF SOCIAL COHESION**

### **INTRODUCTION**

One of the challenges in examining social capital and social cohesion is that the terms are difficult to define and to measure operationally. There is the danger that circular definitions may apply, or that there may be bias in assessing social cohesion or social capital. A promising perspective which may be helpful in addressing these concerns comes from occupational therapy and occupational science (Zemke and Clarke 1996). 'Occupation' as used in this context is much broader than the conventional understanding of occupation as formal work. To be occupied is to use and seize control of time, space and place in pursuit of a recognisable life endeavour. Understanding more about what occupies people as interdependent, active agents in culturally defined occupations will shed light on the 'what holds us together'; an operational definition of social cohesion (Chidester and Dexter 2003).

### **DEFINING OCCUPATION**

Occupation refers to the ordinary things that people do everyday and the way they expend their time, energy, interests and skills in meeting their needs (Townsend & Wilcock 2004: 244). It is a means for individual and group participation in life for example, in the occupational science framework, eating a meal, cleaning a yard, reading a book, and children's engagement in play activities or community members gathering to plant a communal garden or build houses are all examples of occupations. Watson (2004) defines occupation in the following way:

"Occupation, or the ordinary and extraordinary things that people do every day, is central to the way we all live our lives – what we are, who we become, and how we achieve our dreams and aspirations" (Watson, 2004: 3)

This definition signals that occupation is more than 'doing'; it is also about 'being', 'becoming' and 'belonging' and about the meaning and purpose that generates the life force to act. As such it emphasises the importance of 'spirituality' in the pursuit of personal and societal transformation. But 'spirituality' is used in its broadest (least doctrinaire) sense, to imply "the discovery of meaning in our day to day lives". Meaning, in its existential sense, involves actively realizing the link between our personal health, our collective well being, and our small but vital place in the universe

(Werner 2004, in Kronenberg et al, 2004). Uncovering the meaning and purpose of occupations draws attention to people's values, hopes, fears and expectations. Focussing on the questions of what , why, where and with who people 'do' every day therefore potentially gives us a window into many aspects of social and personal life in South Africa. Instead of examining quite abstract concepts like 'social networks', using an occupational perspective, we can ask a series of simple empirical questions such as:

- A. What does person X do all day? (A useful way of answering this question is to look at activities over a specific period of time – two weeks, say – and to plot these).
- B. To what extent do these activities match what the person would like to be doing?
- C. What are the barriers which lead to the gap (if there is one) between B (what the person wishes to do) and A (what the person does do?)

These barriers may be located at a number of intersecting levels, including the personal, the social, and the environmental. Understanding these barriers has important implications for describing progress in social cohesion. Not everyone does all that they hope in life and many never get the chance to develop the abilities that they possess. This may be because of personal choice, but is often due to lack of opportunity.

## **BARRIERS TO OCCUPATION**

The World Health Organization's International Classification of Functioning (ICF) approach to daily activities provides a helpful framework for understanding opportunity, social, and environmental barriers to optimal functioning and participation. For example, the ICF allows us to consider the case of a person who in terms purely of physical capacities *cannot* do something but actually *does* do it through the provision of an enabling environment. An example of this would be a person with a mobility impairment who cannot get around unaided but in fact does get around very well because of the use of a wheelchair in a wheelchair-friendly environment. Of more interest to this discussion, perhaps, would be the case of the person who *can* do something but *does not* it – for example, a person able to work in a particular industry but not working in that industry because there are no jobs, or

because there are attitudinal barriers to the person entering the industry – for example, a belief that a woman would not succeed in the construction industry as this is a 'male' field.

From an occupational perspective, those of us who are interested in social justice should have an understanding of :

- **Occupational deprivation:** prolonged preclusion from engagement in occupations of necessity and/ or meaning due to factors outside the control of the individual such as environmental barriers. For example, people who are incarcerated commonly experience occupational deprivation. It is also experienced in situations of poverty for example, lack of playgrounds and play things for children in informal settlements.
- **Occupational alienation:** separation and estrangement from the mainstream of society and networks of community due to hegemony and other sociopolitical forces eg. refugees, 'live-in' domestic workers and migrant workers living in hostels who are separated from established social networks and therefore shared communal, culturally valued occupations
- **Occupational dysfunction or disruption:** this is usually associated with illness or injury and may well be a temporary situation if adequate remedial resources (such as curative health care, rehabilitation etc.) are available.
- **Occupational imbalance:** restricted engagement in occupations that meet unique physical, social, mental or rest needs. For example, work overload resulting in burnout and stress related disorders.

(adapted from Watson, 2004a: 56; Whiteford, 2000; Wilcock 1998)

People who are poorer and live on the margins of society are more at risk for occupational deprivation, disruption and dysfunction than are other members of society. Social conditions such as high levels of crime also contribute, potentially, to greater occupational deprivation and disruption. Even factors in the natural environment such as heavy rains or droughts have differential effects on occupational functioning according to how people are placed socially. Taking these concepts into account, we can develop a notion of *occupational justice* as an ideal of a society striving for social cohesion.

## OCCUPATIONAL JUSTICE

Occupational justice is focussed on rights, responsibilities and liberties of enablement related to individual and collective occupational needs, strengths and potentials (adapted from Whiteford and Townsend 2004). An occupationally just world is envisioned as one that is governed in such a way as to enable individuals to flourish by doing what they decide is most meaningful and useful to themselves, their families, communities and nations. Whilst social justice addresses the social relations and social conditions of life, occupational justice addresses what people *do* in their relationships and conditions for living (Wilcock & Townsend, 2002)

OCCUPATIONAL JUSTICE	SOCIAL JUSTICE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•humans are occupational beings</li> <li>•interest in health and quality of life</li> <li>•different opportunities and resources</li> <li>•enablement</li> <li>•individual differences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ humans are social beings</li> <li>•interests in social relations</li> <li>•same opportunities and resources</li> <li>•possession</li> <li>•group differences</li> </ul>

An important advantage of an occupational justice perspective is that it provides materiality to relatively abstract concepts like ‘social justice’. A cohesive and enabling society increases opportunity for occupational diversity, and distributes these opportunities equitably. Humans participate in occupations as autonomous agents. Their occupational participation is however interdependent and contextual and is, as such, a determinant of health and quality of life. Appreciating diversity, inclusion and shared advantage in occupational participation, based on an inclusive classification of occupations, will shed useful information on ‘ what holds us together ’ as a nation.

Methodologically, detailed accounts of occupational deprivation and restriction are easy to provide (see, for example, Fourie, Galvaan & Beeton, 2004, in Watson & Swartz on occupational restriction in the context of poverty). These accounts, when aggregated, could provide composite indices of the extent to which occupational justice has been achieved in particular and more general contexts. Intuitively, one would assume that occupational deprivation would be associated with social exclusion and instability;

collecting empirical data on occupation should assist us in demonstrating the importance of occupational opportunity and diversity to the social fabric of South Africans. Research questions emanating from an occupational justice perspective will address the rights, responsibilities and freedoms that govern the enablement of occupational potential and participation in South African society. For example:

- Are physically inaccessible buildings a matter of occupational injustice or social injustice?
- Does occupational injustice or social injustice occur when employers cannot or will not offer reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities or equal opportunities for foreigners, women etc
- What if social inclusion undermines the occupational potential of some people for instance should children with a disability be included or segregated in schools if the aim is enablement of their occupational potential?
- How should the enablement of community and family occupations be balanced with enablement of economic occupations?
- How and why do occupations determine a community's potential to flounder or flourish?

## **RESEARCHING OCCUPATIONAL JUSTICE**

Many economists have done inventories of what people do, and how they spend their time, even related to the difference that possessions make (what A. Sen calls capabilities). There has also been a lot written about environmental influences and social capital. None of these studies however deal with the full context of occupation. The ICF for example, focuses on what people can or cannot do, an important aspect of occupational behaviour but it does not identify the meaning and purpose behind human activities.

To explore occupational justice is to try and understand what the consequences for the development of human potential are, in the absence of opportunity and freedom of choice. An improvement in environmental context, e.g. employment options, will not automatically lead to a change in the occupational behaviour and justice for previously disadvantaged people nor will it lead to greater social cohesion. The impoverished circumstances that so many South African people grow up in, plus changes in previously held cultural certainties and psychosocial conditions, threaten occupational development. The range, complexity,

diversity and scope of occupations are so limited, that there are for example, few role models from whom children can learn. The following section summarises the recommendations from one study currently underway:

**POVERTY AND DISABILITY VIEWED FROM AN OCCUPATIONAL PERSPECTIVE**  
(Watson 2004)

This study has chiefly concerned the exploration of human capital in one specific aspect ie. occupation in the lives of thirty persons living with either a physical or psychiatric disability in very poor households in the Cape metropole. In line with the critical theory approach, data was collected in an attempt to detect the gaps between occupational justice and the realities, beliefs and practices that limit the occupational freedom and democracy that would enable people and communities to realise changed and fulfilled lives. Occupational behaviour is profoundly influenced by poverty and by the disadvantages associated with disability at all ages and stages of life.

The chronically poor people interviewed for this study were occupationally deprived, as well as being socially, politically and economically disadvantaged and restricted. They had neither the means nor the opportunities to overcome the fundamental barriers that stood in the way of their occupational success. What they did possess were individual abilities and the potential to develop these. The statement from the United Nations Summit on Social Development (1995) itemises and emphasises the limitations imposed by poverty. It is not only what people lack, but also how to value and make the most of what is inherently available to them that should receive attention. The power and potential that ordinary chronically poor people possess, which enables them to cope in the face of severe and ongoing adversity, needs to be recognised and directed into meaningful and materially productive channels. At present chronically poor people's human resources are circumstantially underdeveloped, which denies them the right to attain the fullness of their identity through the challenges and experiences of occupational engagement. Examples have been given in different parts of this report about the *doing* aspect of occupation. Occupation enables growth towards what each person wants to or can *become*, which is strongly influenced by, and influences each person's *being* (Fourie, 2000). Occupation therefore has a transformational power to effect multiple transitions when choices and processes are personally meaningful. The capacity to do much more and to achieve an expression of selfhood is being denied people who have strength and potential. A lack of

opportunity and choice confine chronically poor people to a narrow round of daily tasks and activities that barely fulfil their basic needs.

Without a fair distribution of resources, exclusion, discrimination and lack or loss of opportunities will prevent the empowerment that ensues from occupational engagement, put the present generation at risk and threaten the next one (Watson and Fourie, 2004). People living in chronic poverty are at risk of inter-generationally transmitted (IGT) poverty, which, according to Hulme, Moore and Shepherd (2001), is likely to be relatively intractable, and therefore to escape current poverty reduction efforts. These authors go on to attest that IGT poverty is both a *characteristic* and a *cause* of chronic poverty, occurring through the transfer of different forms of capital: human, social-cultural, social-political, financial/material and environmental/natural.

The South African political vision and commitment to improve human, material and physical capabilities and infrastructure is applauded. The enhancement of human knowledge and skills to acquire and maintain the employment so badly needed requires a long-term investment. The process leading towards this aim should start in peoples' homes. A range and diversity of tasks and activities needs to be experienced by all members of the household, children learning from adult role-models, and adults offering the fruits of their broader exposure and experience to each other. Long-term improvement would then concern the interplay between home circumstances and the wider environment, ultimately attacking all forms of poverty.

The need to upgrade and improve the quality of peoples' lives has been recognised by numerous entrepreneurial ventures (small, medium and micro), most of which are instigated by NGOs and subsidised by the State. Employment or access to a reasonable source of livelihood is obviously essential for sustainability. But, the elements of individual empowerment and enablement are the indispensable developmental components that make someone employable, and which would put workers beyond the basic income subsistence level where most people are stuck at present. Information on how occupational justice and enablement may be achieved can be found in Duncan and Watson (2004). A strong public lobby is needed to promote and advocate for recognition of the right to occupational justice. This appeal should come from the heart of the household, where the occupations so essential to

the skills of daily survival and livelihood are instigated, fostered and brought to maturity. The combined thrust of improved circumstances because of a regular income and the ongoing development of all members of the household would collectively lead to an overall enhancement in quality of life and social cohesion not only in the home but also beyond.

### **OCCUPATIONAL JUSTICE: THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN POTENTIAL**

Chilean development economist Manfred Max-Neef set out to develop a theory of human development that more adequately accounted for the realities of poverty, illness and despair in the continent of Latin America than that proposed by Maslow. Working with an interdisciplinary team in the Centre for Development Alternatives in Santiago Chile, the assessment of Quality of life was untangled from purely economic measures like GDP. He makes a simple but profound distinction between *satisfiers* on the one hand, and *human needs* on the other. Generally we tend to talk of needs purely in terms of their material manifestations. Water, housing, jobs, electricity,... until we have a shopping list that stretches endlessly. We then classify the 'needs' largely in terms of demands for goods and services in the market, and spend the rest of our lives worrying where to get the money to pay for them. While not disputing the value of the marketplace in efficiently distributing goods and services to satisfying needs, Max-Neef explains that the free market system is not the only domain where human needs are satisfied. Most needs can be very adequately satisfied without large expenditures of money and occupation holds one of the keys.

Max-Neef differs fundamentally from Maslow, in terms of the *motivational structure* that in a sense 'organises' the needs. There is no universal hierarchy. Each person, family, community and organisation has its own unique pattern of satisfying its needs. The word 'culture' takes on a new meaning indicating the way a group seeks to satisfy its combined human needs. This makes for a fascinating diversity of cultures as there are an infinite number of possible combinations and styles of (for example) satisfying the need for identity or affection or participation etc.

While 'satisfiers' are infinite Max-Neef proposes that needs are finite and number but a few universal human needs. Ever since *Homo Habilis* appeared on the earth the needs for subsistence, protection, affection, participation, understanding, creation and leisure

(he prefers the word idleness) have motivated human development. These needs are profoundly satisfied through what people do, where they do it and with whom they do it. At a later stage the need for *identity* emerged and still later the need for *freedom*. At the current state of human evolution, these nine needs are proposed as *fundamental* to our self-understanding as human beings. They constitute the benchmarks for determining quality of life, and thus health through occupation. They are the 'lenses' through which development is amplified to maintain a 'human scale'.

With this framework, one can begin to understand and diagnose the underlying causes of poor family health as well as strategise towards greater social cohesion. Is the family poor in respect of affection, understanding, leisure, protection, identity, participation. What does one do to bring healing and well-being to a society sickened by prolonged 'poverties' with respect to the needs for protection, affection, understanding, identity, freedom, participation, creation and idleness, as well as subsistence? How do we break the vicious cycle? How, in our fragmented and ailing society, do we set in motion virtuous cycles that counteract the vicious cycles of fear, despair, disease and suffering? An occupational justice perspective objectifies these benchmarks.

## **CONCLUSION**

It has been argued that occupational justice must be tackled at a household level through the empowerment and enablement of individuals. For most, the question is about living with dignity and trust. At a very practical level, occupational scientists and occupational therapists are in agreement with social developers and economists that new satisfiers be conceptualised with the simple recognition of the huge effects and benefits that flow when *synergies* are created. When a flock of geese flies in formation they are able to fly some 50% further and 70% faster than a goose flying alone. This is what is meant by that oft used but seldom understood word, *synergy*. South African families, communities and organisations can become healthy organisms, radiating a quality of life that advances social cohesion if greater attention were paid to their innate need for meaningful and purposeful occupational engagement.

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